Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Regulations 2025

The Regulations use and refine a small set of concepts that determine who must disclose what, and in which circumstances a person is treated as not having a disqualifying interest.

Pecuniary interest and required information (r 4(1) and table)

• The Regulations list six categories of pecuniary interest that senior officials must disclose for s 17 of the Act. For each category, the Regulations specify what information must accompany the disclosure. The categories and required information are granular: for example, employment contracts require a description of the contract or vocation and the amount and source of remuneration (item 1); offices in companies require the company name and address and the amount of remuneration (item 2); and investments require the name and address or description of the entity (item 3).
• The final category is open‑ended: “any other pecuniary interest of the person of a kind determined by the Minister,” with information required as the Minister specifies (item 6). That creates a residual ministerial power to add categories and to require bespoke information (r 4(1)(6)).

Interpretive clarifications (r 4(2))

• Beneficial interest in land includes a right to reacquire land (r 4(2)(a)). This broadens what counts as a land interest beyond present legal title.
• A person who is an object of a discretionary trust is treated as a beneficiary (r 4(2)(b)). This treats contingent or discretionary entitlements as qualifying for disclosure.
• The “investor” definition is an objective, monetary test: a person is an investor if they have deposited or lent money that is unrepaid in an amount equal to or exceeding $10,000, or if they hold shares, debentures or a life insurance policy issued by the body (r 4(2)(c)(i)-(ii)). This fixes a concrete financial threshold for investor status.

Exemptions and the ministerial notice mechanism (r 5, r 6)

• Members of corporate agencies and advisory bodies who were appointed wholly or partly because of their engagement with a particular industry, activity or sector are not to be taken as having a direct or indirect interest in a matter merely because they share common interests with others in that sector (r 5(1)). This addresses membership‑by‑virtue‑of‑sector expertise.
• Members of non‑statutory advisory bodies can be exempt from s 12 of the Act (the disqualification rule) if they both notify the relevant Minister in writing of any conflicting direct or indirect personal or pecuniary interest and comply with any directions the Minister gives to resolve that conflict (r 5(2)(a)-(b)). “Relevant Minister” is defined depending on whether the advisory body advises a Minister directly or another public sector agency (r 5(3)).
• A very similar provision applies specifically to members of the Minister’s Advisory Committee under the Return to Work Act 2014, with identical notice-and-directions requirements to trigger the exemption from s 12, but excluding participation on selection committees under s 118 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (r 6(1)-(3)).

Relationship to the Act and to other statutes

• The Regulations operate as subordinate rules to the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995; the disclosure and exemption provisions are expressly linked to sections 17, 12 and 32 of the Act (r 4, r 5, r 6).
• The Return to Work Act 2014 is specifically engaged by the Regulations: the Minister’s Advisory Committee under that Act is afforded a dedicated exemption procedure, subject to an exclusion for selection committees under s 118 (r 6(1)-(3)).

Temporal effect and repeal

• The Regulations commence on the day they are made (r 2), and they expressly repeal the prior 2010 Regulations (Schedule 1).

Together these concepts set the regulatory architecture: a prescriptive disclosure list with specific informational content, objective definitions (including a $10,000 investor threshold), and a ministerial notice-and-directions mechanism that produces an exemption from s 12 in narrow circumstances. The Regulations also reserve to the Minister a power to identify additional pecuniary interests and to require specified disclosures for them (r 4(1)(6)), creating a rule‑making/collection function within the statutory framework.

The Regulations affect three groups directly, and a fourth group indirectly.

1. Senior officials required to make disclosures for section 17 of the Act

• The disclosure table in regulation 4 is explicitly “for the purposes of section 17 of the Act” (r 4(1)). The Regulations therefore apply to the class of persons who meet the Act’s definition of “senior official” and who are subject to the s 17 disclosure obligation. The Regulations themselves do not define “senior official”; they operate to specify the content of disclosures that those persons must make under s 17. The practical effect is to impose an information‑gathering requirement on senior officials, detailing particular categories and the precise information to be included.

2. Members of corporate agencies and advisory bodies

• Regulation 5 affects members of corporate agencies and advisory bodies who were appointed wholly or partly on the basis of their engagement in or association with a particular industry, activity or sector. For such persons, reg 5(1) prevents them from being taken as having a direct or indirect interest in a matter merely because they share interests common to that industry or a substantial section of it. That modifies how conflicts of interest will be treated for members with sector expertise.

3. Members of non‑statutory advisory bodies and the Minister’s Advisory Committee under the Return to Work Act 2014

• Regulation 5(2) directly affects members of non‑statutory advisory bodies by providing an exemption from s 12 where they notify the relevant Minister in writing of a conflict or potential conflict and comply with ministerial directions. Regulation 6 provides the same mechanism for members of the specific Return to Work Advisory Committee, subject to the selection committee exclusion in r 6(2).

4. The Minister (and relevant Ministers)

• The Regulations assign actionable roles to Ministers. The Minister can determine “any other pecuniary interest” and prescribe information for disclosure (r 4(1)(6)). The exemption mechanisms require that the member notify and then comply with directions given “by the Minister” or the “relevant Minister” (r 5(2)(a)-(b); r 6(1)(a)-(b)). The definition of “relevant Minister” in r 5(3) ties the decision‑making to the Minister either directly advised or responsible for the relevant agency. Thus, Ministers receive notices, give directions, and have the power to expand disclosure categories; they are central to implementing the exemptions and to refining the disclosure regime.

Indirect effects

• Agencies that host advisory bodies or corporate agencies will need to operationalise the disclosure formats specified in r 4, manage notices to Ministers, and implement any ministerial directions. Members who accept appointments on advisory bodies will need to be prepared to disclose under r 4 and, where relying on an exemption, to put the required notices in writing and follow directions. The Regulations also alter the legal framing of participation for sector representatives on bodies, potentially affecting appointment practices and the management of perceived conflicts.

Who does not get new obligations under these Regulations

• The Regulations do not create standalone offences or penalties; they supply content to the Act’s existing provisions. They also do not alter the Act’s definitions or thresholds except where they clarify terms (for example, the investor threshold and treatment of discretionary trust objects) for the purposes of s 17 disclosures.

In sum, the Regulations place concrete information obligations on senior officials under s 17, create a ministerially mediated exemption pathway for certain advisory body members, and vest active administrative functions in Ministers and agencies that receive advice or host advisory bodies.

The Regulations articulate duties of disclosure and procedural duties to notify and to comply with ministerial directions. They also create a narrow right to be treated as exempt from the Act’s disqualification provision (s 12) when specified conditions are satisfied.

Duties to disclose (r 4)

• Senior officials required to comply with section 17 of the Act must disclose pecuniary interests of the kinds listed in regulation 4(1). The Regulations do not recreate section 17 but specify its content: for each type of pecuniary interest, the Regulations list the precise data to be provided. Examples of mandatory information are:

  • For a contract of service, office, trade, vocation, business or profession remunerated outside the Act, a description of the contract or activity and the amount and source of remuneration (r 4(1), item 1).
  • For an office held in a company or body that pays a fee or remuneration, the name and address of the company and the amount of the remuneration (r 4(1), item 2).
  • For investments, the name and address (or description) of the company, partnership or body (r 4(1), item 3).
  • For beneficial interests in land, the address or description of the land (r 4(1), item 4).
  • For trusts (non-testamentary) where the person is a beneficiary or trustee, a description of the trust and the trustee names and addresses (r 4(1), item 5).
  • For other Minister‑determined pecuniary interests, the information required by the Minister in respect of that interest (r 4(1), item 6).

• The Regulations also impose interpretive duties, in the sense that those making disclosures must apply the clarifications in r 4(2), including treating objects of discretionary trusts as beneficiaries and recognising right to reacquire land as a beneficial interest (r 4(2)(a)-(b)). The investor test in r 4(2)(c) imposes a duty to quantify deposits/loans against the $10,000 threshold or to identify holdings of shares, debentures or life policies.

Notice-and-direction duties for exemptions (r 5(2), r 6(1))

• Members of non-statutory advisory bodies and members of the Return to Work Minister’s Advisory Committee have a conditional duty to advise the relevant Minister, in writing, of any direct or indirect personal or pecuniary interest that conflicts or may conflict with their functions, if they are to obtain the exemption from section 12 (r 5(2)(a); r 6(1)(a)).
• They also have a duty to comply with any directions given by the Minister regarding resolution of the conflict or potential conflict (r 5(2)(b); r 6(1)(b)). Compliance with directions is a precondition for the exemption.

Rights created or clarified

• Exemption right: Where the procedural requirements are met (written notice plus compliance with directions), the member is exempt from the application of section 12 of the Act in relation to that interest (r 5(2); r 6(1)). That is a narrow statutory right to participate despite a conflict, conditioned on ministerial oversight.
• Sector‑appointment protection: A person appointed to a corporate agency or advisory body because of industry engagement is protected against being taken to have a disqualifying interest solely because they share interests common to that industry (r 5(1)). That operates as a substantive limit on how s 12 is to be applied to such members.

Ministerial discretions and administrative rights

• The Minister may determine additional pecuniary interests that must be disclosed and may require specified information for those interests (r 4(1)(6)). This is an administrative power to enlarge the disclosure schema.
• The “relevant Minister” receives written notices and gives directions under r 5 and r 6. Those directions become the operational mechanism by which the exemption right is activated or refused, and members must comply with them in order to obtain the exemption.

What the Regulations do not do

• They do not themselves create new sanctions or specify penalties; enforcement and sanctions remain matters for the Act (the Regulations reference s 17 and s 12 but do not add enforcement text). They do not set timeframes or filing processes for disclosures (for example, no prescribed time within which disclosure must be made in these Regulations). They also do not supply definitions for “senior official” or the detailed content of section 12 or 17 of the Act , those remain in the primary statute.

Operational duties for agencies

• Agencies will need to receive, record and act on the disclosures set out in r 4, process written notices under r 5 and r 6, and assist Ministers in giving directions where conflicts are identified. Agencies must also recognise the limited exception in r 5(1) for members appointed for sectoral expertise.

In short, the Regulations impose specified information duties on senior officials and conditionally confer an exemption from disqualification where members notify and comply with ministerial directions. They allocate active administrative roles to Ministers and agencies and leave enforcement and timing to the Act.

The Regulations themselves do not create penalties or an enforcement regime. They operate as prescriptive content for the Act and rely on the Act’s enforcement mechanisms where applicable. That division of labour matters for compliance and risk.

No penalties in the Regulations

• The text of the Regulations contains no offence provisions, monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, or tribunal/judicial enforcement procedures. The Regulations limit themselves to specifying disclosure categories and information (r 4), setting out exemptions tied to ministerial notice and compliance (r 5, r 6), and repealing the prior 2010 Regulations (Schedule 1).

Delegation to the Act for enforcement

• Because the Regulations are tied to section 17 and section 12 (and section 32) of the Act, any failure to comply with a disclosure duty or any consequence for a breach of the Act will be determined under the Act’s provisions. The Regulations supply content that would inform whether an interest was disclosed or whether an exemption applied, but they do not themselves prescribe the legal consequences of non‑disclosure or of acting when disqualified. The precise penalties, investigative powers, and remedial routes therefore remain those in the Act.

Ministerial directions and compliance as a condition of exemption

• The exemption in r 5(2) and r 6(1) is conditional on the member advising the relevant Minister in writing and complying with any directions given by the Minister. Compliance with those directions is therefore material to whether the exemption applies. A failure to follow directions would mean the exemption is not available; the practical effect might be that section 12 would operate to disqualify the member, but the Regulations do not themselves set out the procedural steps for adjudicating non‑compliance or the consequences beyond the loss of the exemption.

Administrative enforcement and recordkeeping

• Although the Regulations do not specify administrative enforcement mechanisms, they create functions that imply administrative oversight: Ministers receive written notices and issue directions, and agencies must record disclosures of the kinds listed in r 4. The absence of prescribed filing forms, time limits, or recordkeeping requirements in the Regulations means that the practical enforcement environment will depend on agency processes and the Act’s general obligations or on ministerial directions that may set procedural detail.

Risk allocation

• Because the Regulations allow the Minister to determine additional pecuniary interests and to require specified information (r 4(1)(6)), there is an enforcement pathway that can be given operational weight by ministerial direction. Ministers and agencies can create compliance expectations through directions and agency protocols, but any sanctioning power remains with the Act.

In summary, these Regulations create disclosure content and conditional exemptions but leave penalties and formal enforcement to the primary legislation and to administrative practice. Entities and individuals must therefore assess compliance risk by reference to the Act and agency procedures, not by looking to the Regulations for standalone sanctioning provisions.

The Regulations are explicitly subordinate to and operate in support of the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 (the Act). They also reference the Return to Work Act 2014 and in practice will sit alongside other South Australian administrative and public sector law. The text itself contains a limited set of cross‑references; how those operate is a matter of statutory interaction.

Direct textual links

• The Regulations are made under the Act and explicitly state that certain provisions implement obligations in the Act: r 4 operates “for the purposes of section 17 of the Act,” while r 5 and r 6 link to section 32 of the Act and section 12 (the disqualification provision) by specifying exemptions from s 12 where the procedural conditions are met (r 5(2); r 6(1)). The Regulations therefore cannot be read in isolation: their legal effect depends on the substantive duties, definitions and sanctioning framework in the Act.

Return to Work Act 2014 interface

• Regulation 6 creates a specific exemption regime for the Minister’s Advisory Committee under the Return to Work Act 2014 and defines “relevant Minister” as the Minister responsible for administration of the Return to Work Act 2014 (r 6(3)). It also excludes participation in selection committees under section 118 of that Act (r 6(2)). The effect is that for members of that particular advisory committee, the Regulations provide a pathway to remain eligible to act despite potential conflicts, except in the selection committee context prescribed by s 118 of the Return to Work Act 2014. The Return to Work Act 2014 therefore provides a contextual constraint (selection committees) that the Regulations respect.

Ministerial authority and potential overlay of agency rules

• The Minister’s power to determine “any other pecuniary interest” that must be disclosed and to specify the required information (r 4(1)(6)) introduces a mechanism by which the scope of disclosure under the Act can be administratively expanded without legislative amendment. In practice this means Ministers may, via determinations or directions, create an overlay of additional disclosure obligations that sit alongside the Regulations’ table. Those ministerial determinations will need to be exercised so as not to conflict with the Act’s substantive constraints.

Interaction with existing advisory body and agency governance

• The sectoral protection in r 5(1) interacts with appointment practices for corporate agencies and advisory bodies. It narrows how s 12 of the Act applies where appointment was made wholly or partly for industry expertise. That will affect internal governance rules for agencies and how conflicts are assessed when members have shared sectoral interests. Agencies must interpret r 5(1) together with any statutory duties in the Act and any agency codes of conduct.

No conflict‑resolution detail provided

• The Regulations specify that members who notify the Minister and comply with directions are exempt from s 12, but they do not set out procedures for appeals, independent review of ministerial directions, or how agency decisions interact with other statutory obligations (for example, employment law obligations or other public sector standards). Those interactions will thus be governed by the Act, the Return to Work Act where relevant, agency instruments and general administrative law.

Repeal and transitional interaction with the 2010 Regulations

• Schedule 1 repeals the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Regulations 2010. The Regulations take effect immediately on making (r 2). The source does not include transitional provisions; therefore, the repeal might create immediate change to agencies and persons previously operating under the 2010 Regulations. Agencies must reconcile any existing procedures enacted under the 2010 Regulations with the new content and any ministerial directions that follow.

In effect, the Regulations operate as a content supply to the Act, with targeted linkage to the Return to Work Act 2014 for a specific committee. Their practical operation will depend on ministerial decisions, agency procedures, and the primary statute’s definitions, enforcement tools and obligations.

The Regulations as provided in the source have a concise legislative history recorded in the text.

Principal regulations and commencement

• The Regulations are the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Regulations 2025 (r 1). The legislative history block records the principal regulations as Year 2025, No 87, Gazette 14.8.2025 p3220, with the commencement noted as 14.8.2025 under r 2. Regulation 2 states expressly that the Regulations come into operation on the day on which they are made (r 2).

Repeal of earlier regulations

• Schedule 1 repeals the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Regulations 2010. The effect is that the 2010 Regulations are no longer in force from the commencement date of these 2025 Regulations. The source does not supply transitional provisions or savings clauses; it simply records the repeal (Schedule 1).

No other amendments recorded

• The source provides no further amendment history, amendment notes, or prior versions. There are no listed amendments to these Regulations themselves (they are the principal instrument for 2025), and no historical versions of the 2025 Regulations are included.

Absence of explanatory or consequential amendment information

• The source includes no explanatory memorandum, no statement of policy intent, and no schedule of consequential amendments to other Acts. It does not list any transitional arrangements to address existing registers, disclosures made under the 2010 Regulations, or how ongoing processes should migrate.

Practical consequences of the recorded history

• The immediate repeal of the 2010 Regulations (Schedule 1) and the immediate commencement (r 2) mean that the new disclosure definitions and exemption mechanisms take effect at once. Agencies and persons who relied on or operated under the 2010 Regulations must therefore apply the 2025 Regulations from their commencement date.

If further changes or ministerial determinations are made under r 4(1)(6) (Minister‑determined pecuniary interests) those will appear as administrative instruments rather than formal amendments to the 2025 Regulations, unless a formal amending regulation is made. The Regulations themselves provide a mechanism for administrative expansion of disclosure obligations via Ministerial determination; that mechanism is part of the 2025 instrument, not an amendment.

The legislative source supplied contains no litigation history. It does not list any court decisions, tribunal determinations or other adjudicative outcomes arising from the Regulations. There are no cases named in the text, and no references to past judicial interpretation of either the 2010 Regulations or these 2025 Regulations.

What the absence in the source implies

• Because the source provides no litigation history, readers should not infer judicial treatment of the specific provisions. Any legal questions about the interpretation or application of the Regulations , for example, disputes over what the Minister may properly determine under r 4(1)(6), the scope of r 5(1)’s sectoral protection, or whether a given notice and direction operation under r 5 or r 6 satisfies procedural fairness , would need to be litigated or otherwise adjudicated before courts or tribunals. The Regulations themselves do not prescribe adjudicative processes.

How litigation might arise (text‑based risk points)

• The Regulations leave room for interpretive disputes that could generate litigation, including:
  • The scope of the Minister’s power to “determine” other pecuniary interests and to require information (r 4(1)(6)), particularly where it intersects with privacy, administrative law or proportionality considerations.
  • The application of the investor threshold ($10,000) in r 4(2)(c)(i) to borderline loans or deposits, and whether particular arrangements constitute “deposited money” or a loan.
  • Whether an individual was “appointed wholly or partly on the basis” of sector engagement for the purposes of the sector protection in r 5(1).
  • The adequacy of written notice and the content required for notification under r 5(2)(a) and r 6(1)(a), and whether compliance with ministerial directions for resolution of conflicts can be legally enforced or is subject to review.

Because none of these matters are resolved in the Regulations themselves, agencies and advisees should expect that legal clarity on more contentious interpretive points would come from future administrative rulings or litigation rather than from the Regulations’ text.

The Regulations contain several detail‑level features that produce practical pitfalls. These are operationally important because the Regulations are specific about data to be disclosed, about the definition of investor, about exceptions that rely on ministerial directions, and because certain exclusions are explicit.

1. The Minister’s residual power to add interests and require unspecified information (r 4(1)(6))

• Risk: The final category in the disclosure table allows the Minister to determine “any other pecuniary interest” and to require information “as determined by the Minister.” This is a flexible, open‑ended power that could be used to require disclosure of interests not listed elsewhere. It places a compliance obligation on senior officials to respond to ministerial direction or determination. Agencies and officials should not assume the table is exhaustive.

2. The investor test is monetary and specific (r 4(2)(c))

• Gotcha: A person is an investor if they have deposited or lent money to a body that remains unrepaid in an amount equal to or exceeding $10,000, or if they hold shares, debentures, or a life insurance policy issued by the body. The monetary threshold is objective; amounts just below $10,000 will change disclosure obligations. Advisers and officials must run precise accounting checks on deposits/loans and holdings to determine investor status.

3. Beneficial interest includes right to reacquire land (r 4(2)(a))

• Gotcha: A right to reacquire land is counted as a beneficial interest. That means options, buy‑back rights or similar reacquisition arrangements may trigger land disclosure even if the person does not currently hold legal title.

4. Objects of discretionary trusts are treated as beneficiaries (r 4(2)(b))

• Gotcha: Contingent or discretionary rights under a trust are not ignored. Even if entitlement is not presently vested, the person may be treated as a beneficiary for disclosure purposes. This can capture interests that might otherwise be seen as non‑quantified or contingent.

5. Exemptions require written notice and compliance with ministerial directions (r 5(2); r 6(1))

• Gotcha: The exemption from section 12 is not automatic. To rely on it, a member of a non‑statutory advisory body or the Return to Work Advisory Committee must both notify the relevant Minister in writing and comply with directions given. There is no implied informal exemption; the procedural step of written notice is mandatory.

6. The “appointed because of industry engagement” protection is narrowly framed (r 5(1))

• Gotcha: The protection from being “taken to have” an interest applies only where appointment was made “wholly or partly on the basis” of being engaged in or associated with a particular industry, activity or sector. That phrase invites factual inquiry into appointment records and the reasons for appointment; a member who cannot show that one of the bases for appointment was sector expertise may not qualify.

7. Specific exclusion for Return to Work selection committees (r 6(2))

• Gotcha: Even where the Return to Work Advisory Committee exemption applies, it does not cover a member acting as a member of a selection committee under section 118 of the Return to Work Act 2014. That is an express carve‑out; members must not assume the exemption covers appointments to selection committees.

8. No timing rules, no prescribed forms, no penalties in the Regulations

• Gotcha: The Regulations provide no timelines for when disclosures or notices must be filed, nor do they prescribe forms or recordkeeping standards. Agencies may have systems set up under the repealed 2010 Regulations that need updating. Absent such procedural detail in the Regulations, agencies must rely on the Act or on ministerial or agency directions to specify logistical requirements.

9. Immediate repeal of the 2010 Regulations and immediate commencement (Schedule 1; r 2)

• Gotcha: The 2010 Regulations are repealed and the 2025 Regulations commence on the day they are made. That can create immediate compliance gaps if agencies relied on the 2010 Regulations for forms or guidance. There is no transitional wording in the source; agencies and members must act promptly to align to the new requirements.

10. Interaction with the Act is necessary but not spelled out in these Regulations

• Gotcha: Because the Regulations do not restate section 17’s audience or section 12’s consequences, advisers must read the Regulations in conjunction with the Act to understand who is a “senior official” and what the legal consequences of failing to disclose are. Misreading the Regulations in isolation could lead to under‑ or over‑reporting.

These are not abstract risks: they affect what must be recorded in a disclosure instrument, whether a person can rely on an exemption to participate in decision‑making, and whether agencies must reconfigure administrative processes. The Regulations’ specificity on some points and silence on others create a set of practical traps that must be managed through agency policy, ministerial directions and careful recordkeeping.

The Regulations set discrete compliance steps. Compliance requires agencies and affected persons to translate the table and the notice-and-direction procedures into administrative practice, and to coordinate with the Act’s substantive requirements which the Regulations do not restate.

1. Prepare or update a disclosure template aligned to r 4(1) table

• Create a disclosure form or register that captures the required information for each item in the table:
  • For item 1: a field for “Description of contract/office/trade/vocation/business/profession” and fields for “Amount of remuneration” and “Source of remuneration” (r 4(1), item 1).
  • For item 2: fields for “Name and address of company/body” and “Amount of remuneration” (r 4(1), item 2).
  • For item 3: fields for “Name and address or description of company/partnership/association/body” (r 4(1), item 3).
  • For item 4: field for “Address or description of land” (r 4(1), item 4).
  • For item 5: fields for “Description of trust” and “Name and address of each trustee” (r 4(1), item 5).
  • For item 6: a process field noting that the Minister may determine other pecuniary interests and the required information, and a checkbox/attachment area for any ministerial determination (r 4(1)(6)).

2. Operationalise the interpretive clarifications

• Add guidance notes in the template instructing disclosers to:
  • Treat a right to reacquire land as a beneficial interest (r 4(2)(a)).
  • Treat being an object of a discretionary trust as being a beneficiary (r 4(2)(b)).
  • Apply the investor definition: list any deposits or loans unrepaid equal to or exceeding $10,000; list holdings of shares, debentures or life insurance policies issued by bodies in which they are invested (r 4(2)(c)(i)-(ii)).

3. Implement written notice process and recordkeeping for exemptions

• For members of non‑statutory advisory bodies and the Return to Work Advisory Committee:
  • Provide a standard written notice form for declaring “any direct or indirect personal or pecuniary interest that conflicts, or may conflict, with the member's functions” (r 5(2)(a); r 6(1)(a)).
  • Keep a register of written notices received and of directions issued by the relevant Minister, with dates and any actions taken to comply, because compliance with directions is a condition of the exemption (r 5(2)(b); r 6(1)(b)).
  • Ensure that notices are routed to the correct “relevant Minister” as defined in r 5(3) and r 6(3).

4. Seek written ministerial directions and confirmations where relying on exemptions

• Because the exemption depends on both written notification and compliance with ministerial directions, members and agencies should:
  • Request directions in writing if a conflict is identified, and where possible obtain confirmation that compliance with specified steps will render the member exempt from s 12 with respect to the interest.
  • Where the Minister issues directions orally, seek written confirmation to create an audit trail for the exemption.

5. For members appointed because of sector expertise, document appointment rationale

• To rely on r 5(1) protection, a factual record that the member was appointed “wholly or partly” on the basis of engagement in or association with a particular industry or sector will help show that the protection applies. Retain appointment papers, selection criteria and evidence of the sectoral basis of appointment.

6. Check selection committee involvement for Return to Work Advisory Committee members

• Members of the Return to Work Advisory Committee must not assume that the exemption covers participation in selection committees under section 118 of the Return to Work Act 2014; r 6(2) expressly excludes that role. If a member will sit on a selection committee under s 118, do not rely on the r 6(1) exemption.

7. Coordinate with the Act for timing and enforcement requirements

• The Regulations do not specify timing for disclosures or notices. Agencies and officials should:
  • Review the Act’s requirements (for example section 17) to determine when a disclosure must be made and the Act’s recordkeeping and penalty framework.
  • If the Act is silent on timing, adopt prudent internal deadlines (e.g. immediate disclosure upon appointment or upon becoming aware of a new interest) and document those deadlines in agency protocols.

8. Train personnel and update agency governance documents

• Provide training to senior officials and to members of advisory bodies on:
  • The types of interests that must be disclosed and the required information per r 4(1).
  • The investor threshold and the treatment of trusts and land interests per r 4(2).
  • The procedural steps required for obtaining an exemption (written notice and compliance with directions).
• Update codes of conduct, conflict of interest policies, registers and public disclosure pages to reflect the new categories and information requirements.

9. Prepare for ministerial determinations under r 4(1)(6)

• Agencies should establish a process to:
  • Monitor any ministerial determinations expanding the list of pecuniary interests or specifying additional information.
  • Notify affected officers promptly and ensure the disclosure template and internal protocols are updated to incorporate any new requirements.

10. Maintain audit trails and evidence of compliance

• Because the Regulations create conditions for exemptions and specify required disclosure fields without prescribing enforcement mechanisms, maintain clear audit trails:
  • Copies of completed disclosure forms with dates.
  • Copies of written notices to Ministers and responses/directions from Ministers.
  • Records of actions taken in compliance with ministerial directions.

By translating each regulatory requirement into a concrete administrative step, agencies and individuals can operationalise compliance. The absence of prescribed forms or timelines in the Regulations means that agencies must fill those gaps by reference to the Act and their own procedures, documenting actions to ensure that disclosures and exemption notices satisfy r 4, r 5 and r 6.