Public Interest Disclosure Standards Determination 2025

The Determination organises obligations around a small set of recurring administrative concepts. Each concept is defined by the instrument’s operational instructions and references to the Act.

Authorised officers and principal officers. The instrument repeatedly places obligations on the principal officer of an agency to ensure procedures exist and are followed (see s 7, ss 8-11, s 13, s 14, s 22). Authorised officers are the individuals who receive and allocate disclosures under the Act. The Determination requires principal officers to make it easy for potential disclosers to find authorised officers (s 7), and requires recordkeeping of decisions that authorised officers make or actions affecting allocation (ss 8-10).

Allocation, non‑allocation and reallocation. The Determination details what must be recorded when a disclosure is allocated to one or more agencies, when a disclosure is not allocated to any agency, and when allocation is prevented by a stop action direction under the National Anti‑Corruption Commission Act (NACC Act) (s 8 table and s 9(1)(c)). Where a disclosure will be investigated under another law or power, the record must note which law or power and the steps taken to refer the conduct (s 8 item 2(c)). Reallocation under s 45 of the Act is explicitly treated the same as initial allocation for recordkeeping (s 8 Note 1).

Notices and communication. The Determination requires written records about whether allocation‑related notices were given to disclosers, and if so when and how (s 9(2)). It requires records of the timing and means of giving investigation‑related notices and reports to disclosers (s 10 item 1). Where notices are not given, the reasons must be recorded (s 10 items 1(c) and 2(d)). The instrument imposes an operational obligation on principal officers to give disclosers "initial information" about certain discretions (not to investigate, to investigate under another law, or to investigate under a separate investigative power) within 14 days if reasonably practicable (s 14(1)-(2).

Records and investigation reports. The Determination prescribes the contents of investigation reports prepared under s 51 of the Act (s 19). These reports must identify instances of disclosable conduct, the statutory or regulatory context, evidence gathering steps, a summary of evidence and findings, and an explanation linking findings and recommendations to the evidence (s 19(a)-(e)). The instrument also prescribes detailed recordkeeping about allocation and investigation decisions (ss 8, 10).

Interview conduct and evidence standards. The Determination prescribes interview conduct: interviewees must be told identities and functions of interviewers, the investigative process, the authority for the investigation, and the statutory protections (s 15(1)(a)-(d)). Audio or visual recordings must not be made without the interviewee’s knowledge, and interviewees must be given an opportunity to give a final statement which must be included in the record (s 15(2)(a)-(c)). The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities (s 16). Findings must be based on logically probative evidence and relevant evidence (s 17).

Support measures. The Determination requires that agency procedures outline support available to disclosers, persons who assist with a disclosure, and persons who are the subject of a disclosure (s 11). The instrument does not specify particular forms of support; it requires agencies to document the support they will offer.

Reporting to the Ombudsman. The Determination obliges principal officers to supply a set of metrics and narrative information to the Ombudsman for annual and six‑monthly reports (ss 21-22). These include numbers of disclosures received, kinds of conduct alleged, numbers allocated, numbers and timeframes of investigations, actions taken in response to recommendations, and any other information reasonably requested by the Ombudsman (s 22(1)(a)-(g)).

Scope and limits. The instrument applies to agencies and principal officers dealing with disclosures under Division 2 of Part 3 of the Act (s 13(1)). It does not apply to investigative agencies acting under separate investigative powers (s 13 Note 1). It also gives priority to rules relating to fraud made under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 where those rules are not inconsistent with the Act (s 13(2) and Note 3).

Transitional and repeal mechanics. The Determination repeals the 2013 Standard in full (Schedule 1). Sections 8-10 apply to allocation decisions and stop action directions made on or after commencement (s 24(1)). Parts 3 and 4 of the old Standard continue to apply to investigations that commenced before the commencement date and are not finished by that date (s 24(2)).

These core concepts structure the Determination: it is primarily a document prescribing how agencies must handle, record and report public interest disclosures and how investigations under the Act must be conducted.

Primary actors. The Determination expressly places obligations on the principal officer of each Commonwealth agency. The phrase "principal officer" recurs across the instrument as the actor required to ensure procedures are established, records kept, and information provided to the Ombudsman (see ss 7-11, 13-17, 19, 21-22). Therefore the agency leadership is the primary decision maker responsible for compliance.

Authorised officers. The instrument repeatedly references authorised officers, who under the Act receive and allocate disclosures. The Determination requires principal officers to ensure contact details make it effective for potential disclosers to find authorised officers (s 7) and requires that the procedures established under subsection 59(3) of the Act govern recordkeeping of allocation decisions made by authorised officers (ss 8-10). Authorised officers will therefore incur practical administrative burdens: documenting reasons for allocation decisions, consultation or consent required by the Act (s 8 item 1(c)-(d)) and documenting the giving, or non‑giving, of notices to disclosers (s 9).

Disclosers and witnesses. The Determination directly addresses disclosers in several places. It requires principal officers to ensure that disclosers are given initial information about the principal officer’s discretions (s 14) and to ensure the manner and timing of notices and copies of reports are recorded and, where given, provided to the discloser in prescribed ways (ss 10 and 9). Interview rules under s 15 impose protective procedural steps relevant to interviewees, who might be disclosers, witnesses, or subjects. Support obligations under s 11 have to be outlined for disclosers and persons who assist in the disclosure process.

Persons who are the subject of disclosures. The Determination requires that procedures outline support that will be made available to persons who are the subject of a public interest disclosure (s 11(c)). The instrument does not prescribe particular protections or entitlements for subjects beyond that requirement to outline support and to comply with evidence and procedural requirements in ss 15-17.

Investigative agencies and agencies with separate investigative powers. The Determination explicitly does not apply to disclosure investigations by investigative agencies under separate investigative powers, as reflected in the definition of "disclosure investigation" in the Act that the instrument references (s 13 Note 1). That limits the Determination’s direct operational impact on bodies that investigate under other legislation rather than under Division 2 of Part 3 of the Act.

The Ombudsman and IGIS. The Ombudsman is the maker of the Determination and the recipient of required information. Part 5 (ss 21-22) obliges principal officers to supply specified data and assistance to the Ombudsman for annual and six‑monthly reports under ss 76 and 76A of the Act. Where the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is responsible for an agency, any request from the Ombudsman will be made through the IGIS (s 22 Note). This operational link makes agencies subject to the Ombudsman’s data‑gathering direction under the Act as implemented by the Determination.

Who bears the cost. The Determination’s requirements fall on agencies (via principal officers) to implement procedures, maintain record systems, provide support and conduct investigations in line with the specified standards. Those costs manifest as administrative time, recordkeeping systems, training for authorised officers and investigators, and resources to provide discloser support and to prepare information for the Ombudsman.

Who does not fall under it. The instrument does not change the law for private parties or for investigations by agencies under separate investigative powers. It does not create new offences or impose obligations on non‑Commonwealth actors. Its obligations are internal to Commonwealth agencies and to the Ombudsman in respect of reporting.

In short, the Determination primarily affects principal officers and authorised officers in Commonwealth agencies, disclosers, witnesses and subjects in disclosure processes, and the Ombudsman as beneficiary of the reporting regime. Investigative agencies acting under separate powers are largely outside its direct ambit.

Principal duties imposed on principal officers. The Determination creates an array of affirmative duties for principal officers to ensure their agencies adopt procedures and practices aligned with the instrument. The principal officer must ensure effective public access to authorised officer contact details (s 7). Under the procedures required by subsection 59(3) of the Act, principal officers must require written records for allocation and non‑allocation decisions (s 8 table), notices of allocation (s 9(2)), and decisions to investigate or not investigate a disclosure (s 10 table). They must also ensure the procedures outline support available to disclosers, assistants and subjects (s 11). For investigations conducted under Division 2 of Part 3 of the Act, principal officers must ensure disclosers receive initial information about certain discretions (s 14), that interviews comply with the instrument’s safeguards (s 15), that the standard of proof is balance of probabilities (s 16), and that findings are based on logically probative and relevant evidence (s 17). Finally, principal officers must provide specific information to the Ombudsman for reporting purposes (s 22(1)).

Duties on authorised officers and investigators via procedures. Although the instrument directly addresses principal officers, it requires principal officers to put in place procedures that apply to authorised officers and investigators. These procedures must require that authorised officers keep specified records when allocating disclosures, consult or obtain consent when allocation involves investigative agencies or other agencies (s 8 item 1(c)-(d)), and give or record notices appropriately (s 9). Investigators must follow interview protocols, evidentiary standards and the balance of probabilities standard (ss 15-17), shaped by the procedures principal officers are required to adopt.

Communication and timing duties. The Determination sets a timing duty for initial information: principal officers must ensure that, where reasonably practicable, disclosers are given initial information within 14 days after allocation of the disclosure (s 14(2)). The procedures must also require records of when and how notices and investigation reports were given to disclosers, and where they were not given, the reasons (s 10 item 1 and item 2(d)). The Determination further requires that agencies provide information to the Ombudsman within a time requested or otherwise agreed (s 22(2)).

Rights and procedural protections for interviewees and disclosers. The Determination imposes procedural protections that function as rights in practice. Interviewees must be informed of the identity and function of each person conducting the interview, the process, the investigator’s authority under the Act, and the protections provided by Part 2 of the Act (s 15(1)(a)-(d)). Interviewees must be given an opportunity to make a final statement and that statement must be included in the record (s 15(2)(b)-(c)). Audio or visual recordings cannot be made without the interviewee’s knowledge (s 15(2)(a)). Disclosers are to be given initial information about non‑investigation discretions and alternative investigative routes (s 14). Where investigations are undertaken, disclosers must be given copies of reports and notices as required under the Act, and the agency must record when and how those were provided (s 10 item 1).

Investigator obligations on evidence and standard of proof. The Determination requires principal officers to ensure that investigations apply the balance of probabilities standard to determine whether evidence proves a fact (s 16). It further requires findings of fact be based on logically probative evidence and that the evidence relied on be relevant (s 17). Report writers must set out a summary of evidence and explicitly explain how findings and recommendations are supported by the evidence (s 19(d)-(e)).

Reporting and cooperation duties to the Ombudsman. Principal officers must provide specified metrics and narrative information to the Ombudsman for the Ombudsman’s annual and six‑monthly reports (ss 21-22). The agency must provide the information within the time requested or as otherwise agreed (s 22(2)). For agencies in the IGIS portfolio, the Ombudsman’s request will be made through the IGIS (s 22 Note).

Limits and caveats on duties. The Determination contains scope limits. Part 3 does not apply to the extent inconsistent with fraud rules made for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (s 13(2) and Note 3). The instrument also excludes investigative agencies acting under separate powers from its application to disclosure investigations (s 13 Note 1). Subsection 14(3) provides that the initial information obligation does not apply where the authorised officer has already given the initial information to the discloser under s 44 of the Act.

Enforceability. The Determination is made under s 74(1) of the Act (s 3), which places it within the administrative framework of the Act. The instrument itself prescribes procedural duties but does not create specific penalties. The primary accountability mechanism provided in the Determination is reporting to the Ombudsman (Part 5), which allows the Ombudsman to include information in statutory reports. The instrument also anchors principal officer obligations to the Act, for example by noting that a principal officer must comply with this instrument and any standards in force under s 74 of the Act (s 13 Note 2, referencing subsection 53(3) of the Act). The Determination therefore creates duties whose compliance is monitored through internal agency processes and Ombudsman oversight.

The Determination does not itself create criminal or civil offences or specify pecuniary penalties. It is an instrument made under subsection 74(1) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (s 3) that prescribes standards and procedures for agency handling of public interest disclosures. The instrument instead embeds enforcement and accountability through procedural obligations, recordkeeping and reporting to the Ombudsman.

Ombudsman oversight and reporting. The principal enforcement mechanism provided by the Determination is the requirement that principal officers provide specific information and assistance to the Ombudsman for the Ombudsman’s annual and six‑monthly reports (ss 21-22). Those reports are statutory outputs under ss 76 and 76A of the Act, and the Determination sets out the data and narrative items the Ombudsman may request. The informational flow gives the Ombudsman oversight capacity to identify systemic or agency‑specific compliance issues and to report publicly on the operation of the Act. The Determination also requires agencies to maintain records of allocation and investigation decisions (ss 8-10), which the Ombudsman can review or require in the course of inquiries.

Internal administrative accountability. The Determination repeatedly makes the principal officer responsible for ensuring procedures and records are in place and followed (for example, ss 7, 8, 10, 11, 14 and 22). That places responsibility within agency leadership for implementing and enforcing the standards internally, and for providing requested data. Enforcement in practice therefore relies on agencies’ internal governance, human resources, and compliance functions to discipline or remediate failures to meet the standards.

Relationship to the Act and other laws. The Determination is made under the Act and must be read alongside it. The instrument notes that a principal officer must comply with this Determination and with any standards in force under s 74 of the Act (s 13 Note 2, referring to subsection 53(3) of the Act). The Determination also acknowledges that it does not apply to the extent inconsistent with fraud rules made for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (s 13(2)). Where those fraud rules apply, they will control on matters of consistency. The Determination therefore functions within a broader legal framework that can affect enforcement in particular circumstances.

No express sanction mechanism in the Determination. The text imposes procedural obligations but does not say what happens if an agency fails to comply with a recordkeeping requirement, fails to give the initial information within 14 days, or otherwise breaches a provision of the Determination. This means that any consequences for non‑compliance will arise through the Act’s general compliance architecture, Ombudsman reporting, public accountability, or other legal avenues under the Act or other statutes rather than from a penalty clause in the Determination itself.

Potential for administrative or reputational consequences. Given the Determination’s emphasis on records and reporting to the Ombudsman, the most immediate enforcement levers are administrative and reputational. Agencies that do not comply with the Determination risk findings in Ombudsman reports and consequent reputational effects. Where non‑compliance engages other statutory obligations or reveals unlawful conduct, other legal mechanisms may be brought to bear, though those are not created by this Determination.

In short, the Determination enforces compliance through internal agency obligations, recordkeeping and reporting obligations to the Ombudsman, rather than by imposing specific statutory penalties within the Determination itself. The instrument situates accountability in the Ombudsman’s reporting and in principal officers’ internal governance responsibilities.

The Determination is an instrument made under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013; its authority and limits are defined by that Act. Section 3 records that it is made under subsection 74(1) of the Act. The instrument expressly ties several of its Parts to the paragraphs of subsection 74(1) that authorise the Ombudsman to make standards (s 6, s 12, s 18, s 20 identify purposes tied to paragraph 74(1)(a)-(d) of the Act). Consequently it is best read as the exercise of delegated standard‑making power under the Act rather than as freestanding law.

Interaction with the Act’s allocation and notice provisions. The Determination repeatedly references allocation and notice rules in the Act. For example, the recordkeeping requirements for allocation decisions note requirements under paragraph 43(9)(a) and paragraph 43(9)(b) of the Act (s 8 item 1(c)-(d)); notices given under sections 44, 44A and 44B of the Act are identified in s 9(1); and the stop action direction under the NACC Act is addressed in ss 8 and 9 (s 8 item 3 and s 9(1)(c), s 9(3)). The Determination therefore operationalises several procedural duties that originate in the Act and in the NACC Act’s stop action mechanism.

Priority and inconsistency rules. The Determination recognises interactions with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). It states that the Part 3 investigation procedures do not apply to the extent inconsistent with any fraud rules made for the purposes of the PGPA Act (s 13(2)). Note 3 to s 13 elaborates that principal officers must act in accordance with fraud rules under the PGPA Act where an investigation relates to fraud, and where those rules are not inconsistent with the PID Act, except for subsections 53(1) and (2) of the PID Act. This introduces a legal hierarchy on a specific subject matter: where fraud rules apply and are consistent with the PID Act, those rules govern.

Status of investigative agencies and separate investigative powers. The Determination excludes disclosure investigations by investigative agencies under separate investigative powers from Part 3 (s 13 and Note 1). The instrument quotes the Act’s definition of "disclosure investigation" as encompassing only certain types of investigations, meaning that agencies that investigate under other statutes or separate powers are not constrained by this Determination’s Part 3 procedures. This creates a bifurcation: the Determination governs principal officer investigations under the Act, but not investigations by investigative agencies under other statutory powers.

Reporting relations with IGIS and intelligence agencies. The Determination notes that where the IGIS is responsible for an agency, any request by the Ombudsman for information will be made through the IGIS (s 22 Note). This recognises the statutory oversight structures that apply to national security and intelligence agencies and aligns the data‑sharing method accordingly.

Transitional and repeal effects. The Determination repeals the earlier Public Interest Disclosure Standard 2013 in full (Schedule 1). Section 24 sets transitional rules: ss 8-10 apply to allocation decisions and stop action directions made on or after commencement, while Parts 3 and 4 of the old Standard continue to apply to investigations commenced, but not completed, before commencement day (s 24(1)-(2)). The Determination therefore displaces the old Standard going forward while preserving continuity for ongoing matters.

No new criminal penalties or civil remedies created. The Determination does not purport to create novel offences or civil causes of action, nor does it purport to amend other legislation. Its interaction with other laws is administrative and procedural. Enforcement is through reporting and through existing legal regimes rather than through penalty provisions in the Determination itself.

In sum, the Determination operates within the Act’s delegated standard framework, interacts with allocation and notice provisions of the Act and with stop action directions under the NACC Act, defers to fraud rules created under the PGPA Act in specified circumstances, and respects investigative agency jurisdictional separations (IGIS). Practitioners should therefore read the Determination alongside the Act, the NACC Act stop action provisions, PGPA fraud rules and any agency‑specific separate investigative powers.

This Determination contains limited explicit amendment history within its own text. The instrument replaces the Public Interest Disclosure Standard 2013 by repealing it in whole (Schedule 1). The instrument includes a commencement table that states the whole instrument takes effect on 1 April 2026 (s 2). The instrument’s Part 6 and Schedule 1 set out transitional mechanics arising from the repeal.

Key points from the instrument about amendments and transitions:

• Repeal of the old Standard. Schedule 1 states that "The whole of the instrument" titled Public Interest Disclosure Standard 2013 is repealed (Schedule 1 item 1). The Determination therefore intends to supersede the 2013 Standard in its entirety on commencement, subject to transitional rules (Schedule 1).
• Commencement. Section 2 contains a table identifying the commencement date of the whole instrument as 1 April 2026. The instrument emphasises that the commencement table relates only to the provisions as originally made and will not be amended in that table in the text (s 2(1)-(2)). The clear mechanical effect is that the Determination will apply from the stated date.
• Transitional carryover of parts of the old Standard. Section 24(2) preserves Parts 3 and 4 of the old Standard in relation to investigations that commenced but were not completed before the commencement day. This allows those ongoing investigations to continue under the procedural regime in effect when they began, rather than being disrupted by the immediate application of the new Procedural Part 3 and Part 4 rules.
• Application timing for recordkeeping provisions. Section 24(1) states that ss 8, 9 and 10 of the Determination apply to decisions made under the Act, or a stop action direction given, on or after the commencement day. This provides clarity that the new recordkeeping rules apply to allocation and notice decisions made after commencement, and not to earlier decisions.
• No other amendments listed. The Determination’s Schedule 1 repeals the old Standard but contains no other amendment items. The instrument’s s 4 states that each instrument specified in a Schedule is amended or repealed as set out in the Schedule, and any other item in a Schedule has effect according to its terms (s 4). The only Schedule present is the repeal of the 2013 Standard.

Because the instrument is a fresh Determination made by the Ombudsman, rather than an amendment to primary legislation, the instrument’s amendment history is entirely self‑contained: it replaces the earlier delegated standard and sets limited transitional rules. The Determination does not purport to change the underlying Act or to record prior amendments to the Act. There is no record in the text of any earlier variations to the Public Interest Disclosure Standard 2013 beyond the repeal. The instrument’s own notes indicate that the Agency Guide referenced in s 7 is a separate, published guidance document and that its edition may be updated independently.

Practitioners assessing historical continuity should therefore note that while the old Standard is repealed, the Determination preserves Parts 3 and 4 of the old Standard for ongoing investigations, and the new instrument’s rules apply to allocation decisions and to fresh investigations from the commencement date. For a full legal chronology beyond this instrument, consultees would need to examine the Act’s legislative history and any subsequent instruments or amendments; this Determination itself contains no broader amendment record.

The Determination contains no references to past litigation, cases, judicial interpretations, or mention of any court decisions. It does not cite judicial authority or record any instances in which aspects of the Determination or the earlier Public Interest Disclosure Standard 2013 were the subject of litigation. The instrument’s text is limited to standards, procedures, recordkeeping requirements and reporting obligations and does not recount any dispute history.

Practical implications for litigation risk and likely legal contestation. Although there is no litigation history recorded in the instrument, practitioners should be aware of several areas where disputes might plausibly arise and thus generate litigation or administrative review in future. The Determination itself frames these risks through prescriptive procedural content that creates identifiable compliance checkpoints:

• Allocation and non‑allocation decisions. Sections 8-10 impose precise recordkeeping requirements about allocation, non‑allocation and notice decisions. Disclosers or subjects might seek administrative review or judicial relief if an agency fails to follow the Act’s allocation rules or the Determination’s recordkeeping and notice requirements. The Determination requires that reasons and consultation or consent details be recorded (s 8 item 1 and item 2(c)). Absence of such records could be central to a challenge about whether procedural fairness and statutory requirements were respected.
• Timing of initial information. Section 14 requires that, where reasonably practicable, initial information be given within 14 days after a disclosure is allocated. Disclosers could seek remedies for procedural unfairness or administrative delay where this timeline is not met and the delay causes prejudice.
• Evidentiary standards and findings. Sections 16 and 17 set out the standard of proof (balance of probabilities) and the requirement that findings be based on logically probative and relevant evidence. Parties affected by investigative findings could challenge the sufficiency of evidence or the methodology of an investigation if these standards are perceived to be unmet. The Determination strengthens an evidentiary baseline that may be invoked in subsequent review.
• Interview practice and consent to recordings. Section 15 limits covert audio or visual recording and requires that interviewees be advised of interviewer identities and functions and be given an opportunity for a final statement. Disputes could arise where interviews were recorded without knowledge, or where final statements were not included in records.
• Interaction with fraud rules and separate investigative powers. The Determination acknowledges that where fraud rules under the PGPA Act apply, Part 3 does not apply to the extent of inconsistency (s 13(2)). Disputes about the correct procedural regime for investigations that overlap fraud and public interest disclosure issues could give rise to contested jurisdictional or procedural litigation.
• Reporting and access to Ombudsman information. The Determination requires agencies to provide information to the Ombudsman (s 22). Disputes could arise about the scope of requested information, timing, or confidentiality of data provided, particularly for agencies in the IGIS portfolio where the Ombudsman must liaise through the IGIS (s 22 Note).

Absent from the Determination are provisions about appeal rights, prescribed administrative penalties or internal disciplinary sanctions tied directly to the Determination. Any litigation would therefore be brought under the Act’s remedies architecture, general administrative law, or other statutes depending on the facts. The instrument itself neither creates nor adjudicates disputes; it structures agency behaviour in ways that could become focal points for administrative or judicial review where an agency fails to follow its procedural obligations.

In summary, the Determination contains no litigation history or case law references. It creates procedural frameworks and standards that could be invoked or scrutinised in future litigation, particularly in areas of allocation decisions, timeliness and evidence, but the instrument itself does not document any prior legal disputes.

This Determination contains several operational details and temporal rules that can produce practical pitfalls for agencies and practitioners if not tracked carefully. The instrument is procedural, so implementation errors commonly show up as failures of recordkeeping, missed communications to disclosers, or inconsistent application across overlapping investigative regimes. The following are concrete points to watch.

14‑day initial information timing is qualified by "reasonably practicable". Section 14(2) sets a 14‑day target for giving initial information to disclosers after allocation, but only where it is "reasonably practicable". That qualification is not defined in the Determination. Agencies must therefore document why a deadline was missed; failure to record why the initial information was not given could itself be a compliance gap because s 10 requires agencies to record reasons where notices or reports were not given (s 10 item 1(c)). Also s 14(3) makes the initial information obligation inapplicable if an authorised officer has already given that information in a s 44 notice. Practitioners should therefore track and reconcile s 44 notices with the Determination’s 14‑day rule to avoid duplication or late delivery.

Recordkeeping detail and evidence of consultation or consent. Section 8 requires agencies to document, among other things, the consultation for allocation decisions when the authorised officer belongs to an investigative agency, or the consent given when the authorised officer does not belong to an investigative agency (s 8 item 1(c)-(d)). These are factual matters that may be contested by disclosers or other agencies. Failure to keep those specific records will make it difficult to demonstrate compliance with the procedural framework set by the Act and this Determination.

Stop action directions are treated specially. The Determination requires recording details of stop action directions under the NACC Act including when the direction was made and when it no longer applies (s 8 item 3). It also requires recordkeeping about whether the principal officer considers it reasonably practicable or appropriate to give a copy of the stop action direction to the discloser (s 9(3)). Practically, agencies need processes for receipt and management of stop action directions and for making the pragmatic decision whether to share those directions with disclosers.

Interview recording limitations. Section 15(2)(a) prohibits making an audio or visual recording of an interview without the interviewee’s knowledge. If an interviewer records with the interviewee’s consent, the Determination does not prohibit that, but the agency must ensure the consent is documented. Secret recordings, or inadequate documentation of consent, will create evidential and procedural risks.

Requirement to include final statements of interviewees in the record. Section 15(2)(b)-(c) requires that interviewees be given an opportunity to make a final statement and that any final statement be included in the record. Omitting a final statement or failing to give the interviewee the opportunity is a procedural defect that can be pointed to in administrative reviews.

Balance of probabilities standard and evidence rules. The Determination imposes a civil standard of proof (s 16) and requires findings to be based on logically probative and relevant evidence (s 17). Practitioners who are used to criminal standards or lower evidentiary thresholds need to calibrate investigations accordingly. Report writers must set out a summary of evidence and explicitly explain how findings are supported by the evidence (s 19(d)-(e)). Vague or unsupported findings in reports will be vulnerable to challenge.

Reporting burdens and timing. Section 22 requires principal officers to provide the Ombudsman specified information, including counts of disclosures, types of conduct alleged, numbers allocated, number and duration of investigations, and actions taken in response to recommendations (s 22(1)(a)-(f)). The information must be provided within a time requested by the Ombudsman or as otherwise agreed (s 22(2)). Agencies with poor data systems may struggle to produce consistent metrics on demand. The Determination therefore implicitly requires the investment in data capture systems to meet reporting obligations.

Transitional traps. The Determination repeals the 2013 Standard but preserves Parts 3 and 4 of the old Standard for investigations commenced but not completed before commencement day (s 24(2)). Agencies must therefore run two procedural regimes in parallel during the transition window and ensure that investigations commenced before the commencement day continue under the old rules. Misclassifying an investigation’s start date could lead to incorrect application of procedures or report content.

Scope exclusions. Part 3 does not apply to investigative agencies using separate investigative powers (s 13 and Note 1). Mistakenly applying these procedural requirements to investigations under other statutory powers, or vice versa, risks process errors and potential jurisdictional challenges.

Interaction with PGPA fraud rules. Section 13(2) states that Part 3 does not apply to the extent inconsistent with fraud rules made for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. For investigations that involve alleged fraud, agencies must confirm whether any PGPA fraud rules apply and whether they are consistent with the Act. Failure to check this interaction may lead to inconsistent procedures being applied.

Absence of sanction clauses. The Determination imposes many duties but does not specify sanctions for breach. Enforcement is therefore largely through Ombudsman reporting and internal governance. Agencies should not treat the lack of specified penalties as permission to deprioritise compliance; reputational and administrative consequences can follow from Ombudsman findings.

In short, the "gotchas" are concrete: the 14‑day and "reasonably practicable" qualification, precise recordkeeping obligations, interview recording and final statement rules, data and reporting burdens, transitional dual‑track application, and the need to check for inconsistency with PGPA fraud rules and with separate investigative powers. Agencies should document decisions and reasons exhaustively to avoid the procedural vulnerabilities these rules create.

This Determination is detailed and prescriptive about agency procedures. Compliance requires a structured program across policy, operations, IT, records, training and reporting. The following is a practical compliance checklist tied to specific provisions of the Determination.

Governance and ownership

• Designate the principal officer as the accountable owner for compliance, as the Determination places duties on the principal officer to ensure procedures and records (ss 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 22).
• Establish an internal governance forum (legal, integrity/compliance, HR, records, IT, and communications) to oversee implementation and to sign off on the agency procedures required by subsection 59(3) of the Act.

Procedures and policy documentation

• Draft and approve procedures that implement the recordkeeping requirements for allocation/non‑allocation and investigation decisions as specified in the tables in ss 8 and 10. The procedures must require that when the specified decisions occur, an appropriate written record is kept that covers the matters listed in column 2 of each table.
• Ensure the procedures explicitly set out support offered to disclosers, assistants and persons who are the subject of disclosures as required by s 11. Include contact points, confidentiality safeguards, counselling, and practical adjustments where applicable.
• Include in procedures the rules for initial information to disclosers, namely giving disclosers information about the principal officer’s discretion about whether to investigate, not to investigate further, to use a separate investigative power, or to use another law or power (s 14). Build in a 14‑day target and capture any "reasonably practicable" rationale where missed.

Contact details and accessibility

• Implement an up‑to‑date contact directory and public web page so potential disclosers can find how to contact authorised officers (s 7). Consider phone, email and alternative access channels and ensure they are readily discoverable.

Recordkeeping systems

• Configure records management to capture the items required in ss 8-10. For allocation decisions record: the name of each agency allocated to, the reasons for the decision, and details of consultations or consents under paragraph 43(9) of the Act as relevant (s 8 item 1). For non‑allocation decisions record reasons and details about referrals to other laws or powers (s 8 item 2). For stop action directions, record the direction and its applicable period (s 8 item 3).
• Implement timestamped logs that record when notices and copies of investigation reports are given to disclosers, and the means by which they were provided (s 10 item 1 and s 9(2)). Where notices are not given, require recorded reasons (s 10 item 1(c) and item 2(d)).
• Ensure records are retained in accordance with the agency’s records disposal schedule and are searchable for Ombudsman requests.

Interview and investigation practice

• Train investigators and authorised officers on interview rules: they must inform interviewees of interviewer identity and function, the process, the authority under the Act, and the protections in Part 2 of the Act (s 15(1)). Obtain and document consent before making any audio or visual recording; do not record without the interviewee’s knowledge (s 15(2)(a)).
• Ensure interview practice includes an opportunity for a final statement at the end of the interview and that any final statement is included in the record (s 15(2)(b)-(c)).
• Adopt an evidentiary framework that records which evidence is relied on and why it is logically probative and relevant to findings (ss 16-17). Implement templates for investigation reports that require the summaries and linkages set out in s 19.

Investigation report templates

• Create a s 51 investigation report template that requires the elements of s 19: identification of disclosable conduct, identification of relevant regulations or administrative requirements, steps taken to gather evidence, summaries of evidence and findings, recommendations and an explicit explanation of how findings and recommendations are supported by the evidence (s 19(a)-(e)).
• Cross‑check report templates with any fraud rules under the PGPA Act where the investigation relates to fraud, because s 13(2) makes Part 3 subject to those rules.

Data collection and Ombudsman reporting

• Build or configure case management systems to capture metrics required by s 22(1): number of disclosures received, kinds of disclosable conduct, number of allocations, number of disclosure investigations, time taken to conduct investigations, actions taken in response to recommendations, and field(s) to capture any other information the Ombudsman may request.
• Establish internal timelines and responsibilities to respond to Ombudsman requests for information within the time requested or as agreed (s 22(2)). For agencies in the IGIS portfolio, coordinate responses through the IGIS as required (s 22 Note).

Transitional management

• Identify any investigations that commenced before the commencement day and not yet completed. For those matters, continue to apply Parts 3 and 4 of the old Standard as preserved by s 24(2).
• For decisions made on or after the commencement day, apply ss 8-10 recordkeeping requirements (s 24(1)).

Training and communications

• Provide training for authorised officers, investigators, HR and legal staff on the Determination’s recordkeeping, notice, interview and evidence requirements.
• Publish internal guidance summarising the 14‑day initial information rule, the circumstances where initial information may already have been given under s 44 of the Act (s 14(3)), and processes for stop action directions under the NACC Act.

Audit, monitoring and improvement

• Implement periodic internal audits of compliance with the Determination’s recordkeeping and reporting obligations. Use audit findings to remediate gaps and to provide information to the leadership team and to the Ombudsman where required.
• Maintain a central log of decisions to allocate, reallocate or not allocate disclosures, including reasons and consultations, to ensure readiness for Ombudsman review.

Legal review and interaction with other laws

• Before applying the Determination’s Part 3 procedures to any investigation involving alleged fraud, consult with legal advisers to confirm whether PGPA fraud rules apply and whether any inconsistency exists (s 13(2) and Note 3).
• For investigations that might fall within separate investigative powers or involve an investigative agency, confirm whether the Determination applies to avoid misapplying Part 3 procedures (s 13 and Note 1).

Documentation and defensibility

• Where the Determination uses qualifiers such as "reasonably practicable" (s 14(2)), agencies must document the factual basis that supports any exercise of that qualifier.
• Ensure every instance where a notice is not given, or a report is not provided to a discloser, is accompanied by recorded reasons consistent with the Recordkeeping requirements in s 10.

By following the above checklist and embedding the Determination’s requirements in policy, case management systems and training, agencies can operationalise the instrument. The essential theme is record everything the Determination says you must record, document discretionary choices and reasons, and prepare to provide the specified data to the Ombudsman on request.