Public Information Act 2010

“Public information” is defined in s 4(1) as information given by a public authority to the public using Territory money or other property. It does not include information given to a member’s electorate if funded by an electorate allowance, a media release of an Assembly member, or information prescribed by regulation. The giving of information to the public occurs when the authority makes it “available to the public generally (rather than any particular members of the public) through any medium” (s 4(2)). Examples include newspaper, radio, billboard, cinema advertisements, group emails, recorded telephone messages and text messages. The definition therefore covers a wide range of government communications, but it excludes materials directed to a specific person or group (such as a letter to a single constituent).

“Public authority” is defined exhaustively in s 5. It includes an Assembly member in his or her capacity as a member, Minister, Speaker, Leader of the Opposition, or another office of the Legislative Assembly. It also includes the holder of an office established by Territory law, a person engaged to perform work for a public authority, an Agency, a body established by Territory law, a body corporate with capital or voting power majority owned by public authorities, and any subsidiary of a public authority. However, s 5(3) excludes judicial officers, members of a tribunal, local government councils, Jacana Energy, Power and Water Corporation, Territory Generation, and any person or body prescribed by regulation. The exclusion of local councils is noteworthy: local government advertising campaigns are not subject to this Act.

“Promotes particular party political interests” is defined in s 6(4) as including an image or message that may reasonably be regarded as promoting a particular political party or any of its members, whether expressly or implicitly. The example given is the use of party logos or slogans. This is a broad test; a factual government statement that incidentally aligns with a party’s platform could potentially be captured if an image or message implicitly promotes the party.

The term “advertisement” is defined in s 6(7) to mean an advertisement published by the purchase of media placement under a commercial arrangement, including in traditional paid advertising, on social media platforms, in other digital communication channels, or on signage associated with government-funded construction projects. This definition is critical because the treatment of minister images differs between advertisements and other public information. For advertisements, any image or message of a minister is a contravention unless an exception applies (emergency or primary audience outside the Territory). For non-advertisement public information, only an image or message of a minister other than the Chief Minister or the relevant minister is prohibited.

The “relevant minister” is the minister to whom responsibility for the area of government related to the public information is allotted under the Administrative Arrangement Order. This ensures that when a minister appears in information about their own portfolio, it is generally permitted (unless it fails the public interest test or other grounds).

The Act directly affects every entity that qualifies as a “public authority” under s 5. This includes all NT Government departments (Agencies), statutory office holders (such as the Auditor-General, Ombudsman, Police Commissioner), bodies established by or under Territory law (such as licensing boards and advisory councils), government-owned corporations where the Territory holds more than half the capital or voting power (except Jacana Energy, Power and Water Corporation, and Territory Generation which are expressly excluded), and their subsidiaries. Assembly members in their official capacities are also public authorities. The practical effect is that any government communication using public funds that is directed to the public generally must comply with the Act.

The Ombudsman is the primary decision-maker. The 2025 amendments transferred the review function from the Auditor-General to the Ombudsman, meaning the Ombudsman must now allocate resources to this function. Section 6 gives the Ombudsman discretion over whether to conduct a review, and the decision not to review a requested item is not appealable under the Act. The Ombudsman’s workload and priorities will therefore determine the Act’s practical reach.

Assembly members are affected as potential requesters. Any member may submit a written request for a review of particular public information. If the Ombudsman declines, the member must be notified but has no further recourse under the Act. The ability to request a review gives opposition and crossbench members a tool to challenge government advertising and information campaigns. This can be used for legitimate oversight or for partisan advantage, with the Ombudsman as gatekeeper.

Members of the public are indirectly affected. The Act is designed to ensure that government information is accurate, non-partisan, and sourced. To the extent that it deters misleading or self-promotional government communications, the public receives better information. However, the compliance burden may also lead to delays, increased costs, or more cautious (and potentially less informative) government messaging, which could reduce the flow of useful information to citizens. The free-market lens suggests that government speech is a form of public goods provision; regulating it adds friction, which increases cost and may alter the mix of messages.

The only duty imposed on a public authority is found in s 8(4): when the Ombudsman gives a preliminary notice recommending that the authority withdraw or change public information, the authority “must consider the recommendation” and “may implement the recommendation if the public authority considers it appropriate to do so”. This is a soft obligation: the authority is not bound to comply, but it must turn its mind to the recommendation. Failure to consider it could be a procedural failing, but the Act does not prescribe any consequence. The authority also has the right to give comments to the Ombudsman within ten business days after receiving the notice (s 8(2)(b)). The Ombudsman must consider those comments when preparing the final report (s 8(5)).

The Ombudsman has the right to conduct a review at any time on his or her own initiative (s 6(1)). This right is discretionary; the Ombudsman is not required to review every piece of public information or every request. If an Assembly member requests a review and the Ombudsman decides not to proceed, the Ombudsman must notify the member of the decision (s 6(1A)). The Ombudsman also has the right to determine a contravention based on the seven grounds, and the right to make recommendations in the report (s 7(2)(b)). The Ombudsman can also recommend changes before the report is finalised (s 8(3)).

Assembly members have the right to request a review. There is no requirement to provide reasons or to limit the number of requests, though the Ombudsman may decline. If the Ombudsman conducts a review on the member’s request, the member must receive a copy of the final report (s 7(3)(aa)).

The Speaker must table the report in the Legislative Assembly within six sitting days after receiving it (s 7(5)). This creates a right of the Assembly to be informed, and indirectly the public gains access through parliamentary papers.

There is no express right of review or appeal for any party. A public authority that is aggrieved by a determination cannot seek merits review under the Act, nor is judicial review mentioned. The only avenue would be the general supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but that would be rare.

The Act does not create any criminal offences, civil penalties, or binding enforcement orders. The entire enforcement architecture rests on the requirement to table a report. A determination that the Act has been contravened carries no legal sanction. The public authority can ignore the Ombudsman’s recommendations without risking a fine, prosecution, or administrative penalty.

This is a striking feature. Compare it with electoral expenditure laws or government advertising guidelines in other jurisdictions where there are penalties for breaches. Here, the only consequence is political and reputational. The tabling of a report in the Legislative Assembly may attract media coverage and opposition criticism. The Ombudsman also includes a copy of the report in the annual report under the Ombudsman Act, ensuring ongoing public visibility. Over time, a pattern of adverse determinations could damage a government’s credibility, but there is no effective deterrent for a single breach.

The absence of penalties means the Act functions as a guide rather than a prohibition. A public authority that deliberately runs a campaign that is misleading or party-political faces no legal sanction. The cost of compliance is therefore purely internal: the risk of bad press and the need to respond to Ombudsman inquiries. Some authorities may decide that the political advantage of a certain message outweighs the reputational cost of an adverse finding. The Act’s practical effectiveness depends on the Ombudsman’s willingness to conduct reviews and the willingness of the media and opposition to use the reports.

There is no power for the Ombudsman to compel the withdrawal of information or to impose a stop order. The preliminary notice under s 8 is only a recommendation. The final report may repeat the recommendation, but again it is not binding. The Act does not provide for injunctive relief or any court orders.

The enforcement mechanism is thus entirely soft. For lawyers and compliance professionals, the key point is that a breach of this Act does not expose the public authority or its officers to personal liability. The risk is purely institutional and political. This affects the cost-benefit calculus: the cost of compliance (time, legal vetting, possible delays) must be weighed against the low probability of enforcement and the absence of penalty.

The Act explicitly interacts with the Ombudsman Act 2009. Section 6(1) contains a note directing readers to s 12 of that Act, which likely deals with the Ombudsman’s investigative powers. Section 7(3)(b) requires that a copy of the review report be included in the Ombudsman’s annual report prepared under s 152 of the Ombudsman Act. This ensures that review findings are aggregated and publicly reported outside the immediate tabling in the Legislative Assembly. The Ombudsman Act therefore provides the procedural and reporting framework for reviews under this Act.

There is no explicit interaction with freedom of information laws, electoral laws, or government advertising guidelines. The Northern Territory has a separate Information Act governing access to government documents. Public information under this Act is material that the government chooses to disseminate; it does not create a right to access information. The two regimes are parallel: one controls what the government says; the other controls what the public can demand.

The exclusions from the definition of public authority under s 5(3) create an important interaction with local government law and specific corporations legislation. Local councils are not subject to this Act. Their advertising and public information campaigns are regulated only by local government legislation and any applicable electoral or financial laws. Similarly, Jacana Energy, Power and Water Corporation, and Territory Generation are not public authorities for the purposes of this Act, though they are government-owned. Their communications are not reviewable under this regime.

The Act does not contain a privative clause or exclusive jurisdiction provision. Therefore, nothing prevents a person from bringing a judicial review challenge to the Ombudsman’s decision, or from raising common law claims (such as misleading and deceptive conduct) separately, but such actions would be rare and would involve different legal standards.

The transitional provisions in Part 5 (inserted by the 2025 amendments) govern the transfer of incomplete reviews from the Auditor-General to the Ombudsman. Those provisions interact with the Interpretation Act’s general transitional rules.

The Public Information Act 2010 received assent on 20 May 2010 and commenced on 1 August 2010. It was originally administered by the Auditor-General (the review function has since moved). The first set of amendments came through the Local Government Amendment Act 2014, which amended s 5 (the definition of public authority) to exclude local government councils explicitly. The Territory Insurance Office (Sale) Act 2014 also amended s 5 to remove the Territory Insurance Office from the definition. The Local Court (Related Amendments) Act 2016 made a technical amendment to s 5 in relation to judicial office definitions.

The most significant early amendment was the Public Information Act 2016 (Act No. 34, 2016), which commenced on 14 February 2017. This Act substantially rewrote s 6 and s 7, replacing a mandatory referral process with the current discretionary review model. It also repealed s 9, which had previously dealt with something (not specified in the source). The 2016 amendments likely introduced the ability for the Ombudsman to review on the initiative of an Assembly member and added some of the contravention grounds.

The Public Information Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Act No. 14, 2019) amended s 6 further, possibly refining the grounds or adding the advertisement definition. The source shows s 6 was amended by that Act.

The most recent and far reaching amendments are the Public Information Amendment Act 2025 (Act No. 18, 2025), which commenced on 11 August 2025. This Act transferred the review function from the Auditor-General to the Ombudsman. It inserted a new s 6(2A) allowing the Ombudsman to determine a contravention if the content is not for the purpose of the public interest. It amended the definition of “advertisement” in s 6(7) to include social media platforms and digital communication channels. It also inserted new Part 5 with transitional provisions (ss 12-14) for transferring incomplete reviews and applying old versions of s 7(3) and (5) to reports not yet given to the Speaker. The heading of Part 2 was amended from “Auditor-General’s functions” to “Ombudsman’s functions”. Section 3 was amended to add the definition of “public information” (likely just a cross-reference). Section 5 was amended to add “Territory Generation” to the list of excluded public authorities. The 2025 Act also amended s 7 and s 8 to replace references to Auditor-General with Ombudsman.

The source material does not cite any cases in which the Public Information Act 2010 has been judicially considered. The endnotes and table of provisions contain no reference to litigation. It is plausible that no reported decisions exist. The Act’s enforcement mechanism is soft and does not give rise to court proceedings directly. Most disputes would be resolved informally through the Ombudsman’s review and the tabling of reports. If a judicial review were sought, it would most likely concern the Ombudsman’s decision not to conduct a review (which would be discretionary and unlikely to succeed) or an allegation that a report contained errors of law. No such cases appear in the public record.

It is also possible that the Act’s predecessor or associated provisions were litigated, but the source does not disclose that. Given the Act’s narrow scope and the absence of penalties, the incentive for litigation is low. An aggrieved public authority might prefer to accept the Ombudsman’s determination rather than fight it in court. An Assembly member whose request was declined would need to show a jurisdictional error or failure to consider a mandatory relevant factor, which is a high bar.

Without any cited litigation, the deep dive must note that the Act has generated no reported case law to date. This may change if the Ombudsman’s new powers under the 2025 amendments are used aggressively, particularly the public interest test, which is subjective and could be challenged on grounds of unreasonableness or improper purpose.

Several provisions create traps for the unwary. First, the definition of “public information” is broad but contains critical carve outs. Information given to a member’s electorate using an electorate allowance is not public information, so a member can send partisan material to their constituents without review. However, the same message broadcast to the general public would be covered. A public authority that uses an electorate allowance to fund a general advertisement would lose the exemption and could be found in breach.

Second, the definition of “advertisement” includes paid media placement on social media platforms and other digital channels. A government campaign that boosts a Facebook post or pays for a promoted tweet is an advertisement. This means that any image of a minister in such an ad is prima facie prohibited, regardless of whether the minister is the relevant minister. The only exceptions are for emergency situations (s 6(6)) or where the primary audience is outside the Territory (s 6(5)). An internal government video posted to YouTube without paid promotion is likely not an advertisement, so the rules for non-advertisement public information apply instead. The distinction between paid and unpaid dissemination is therefore crucial.

Third, the “public interest” test in s 6(2A) is entirely subjective and open ended. The Ombudsman can determine a contravention simply by being satisfied that the content is not for the purpose of the public interest. There is no definition of public interest. This grants the Ombudsman a wide discretion that could be used broadly. It may chill government communication if authorities fear that information that could be seen as self-serving or beneficial to the government’s standing might be found to be not in the public interest. The test applies to all public information, not just advertisements.

Fourth, the prohibition on inaccurate facts, comparisons, statistics, or data (s 6(2)(e)) and the requirement to specify their source (s 6(2)(f)) apply even to non-advertising material. A government report or brochure that uses a statistic without providing a reference could be in breach. This imposes a significant compliance burden on every publication, not just paid ads. The note to s 6(2)(f) suggests that a contact person or website that can provide references satisfies the requirement, but this must be included in the information itself.

Fifth, the “promotes particular party political interests” ground includes implicit promotion (s 6(4)). A factual statement that happens to align with a party’s platform and includes a party slogan or logo is clearly caught. But even without logos, an image that subtly associates the information with a party could be enough. The example mentions logo or slogans; anything beyond that is a matter of reasonable interpretation.

Sixth, the exceptions for emergency and outside Territory campaigns are conditional on the Ombudsman’s satisfaction. A public authority cannot rely on these exceptions without a later determination that they apply. The emergency exception requires that members of the public would be likely to expect demonstrated leadership from ministers. This is a vague standard and could be argued either way. The outside Territory exception only applies if the primary audience resides outside the Territory. A campaign aimed at tourists but also visible to locals could be problematic.

Seventh, the Ombudsman’s preliminary notice under s 8 is not required if the Ombudsman believes there is no contravention. The public authority only gets advance warning if the Ombudsman believes a breach exists. The 10 business day comment period is short, especially for complex campaigns. The public authority must decide whether to implement the recommendation before the review is completed. There is no ability to seek an extension.

Eighth, the Act has no statute of limitations. The Ombudsman can review public information at any time. An old campaign could be revisited years later, although the Ombudsman’s discretion likely would consider whether it remains relevant.

Ninth, the definition of “public authority” includes “a person appointed or engaged to perform work for a public authority” (s 5(2)(b)). This could capture contractors and consultants who produce government communications. They could be held to be public authorities for the purpose of the Act, but only when acting within that engagement? The Act does not clearly limit the definition to the capacity in which they perform work. This could create vicarious exposure for individuals.

Compliance begins with identifying whether a proposed communication is “public information”. If it uses Territory money or property and is made available to the public generally through any medium, it is likely covered. Exclude communications funded by an electorate allowance or that are media releases of an individual Assembly member. If the communication is a media release from a Minister’s office, it is still public information because a Minister is a public authority; the exception only applies to “an Assembly member”, not a Minister acting as a Minister. So ministerial media releases are covered. Best practice is to treat all government communications as potentially subject to review unless clearly exempt.

The next step is to classify the communication as an advertisement or not. If the communication involves paid media placement (including social media boosting, paid search ads, signage on government construction projects), the stricter rules for advertisements apply. For advertisements, no image of a minister should be included unless the emergency exception or outside Territory exception is clearly satisfied. Even the Chief Minister and relevant minister are prohibited from appearing in advertisements. For non-advertisement information (such as press releases, web content, brochures distributed in person), images of the Chief Minister and the relevant minister are permitted, but images of any other minister are prohibited.

Every communication must ensure that it does not promote particular party political interests. This means no party logos, slogans, colours associated with a party (if they are being used to suggest party endorsement), or images that could reasonably be regarded as implicitly promoting a party. Avoid comparing the government’s achievements to previous governments if that could be seen as promoting the current government as a political party. The safest approach is to focus on factual information about government services, programs, and public safety without mentioning parties or election platforms.

All facts, comparisons, statistics, and data must be accurate and must specify their source. The source should be included in the communication itself, or at least a means for identifying the source (such as a contact person or a website link). Before publication, verify the accuracy of every statistic and ensure the source can be provided. Keep a record of the original source for future reference.

The public interest test requires that the content of the information be for the purpose of the public interest. This is the most subjective requirement. A practical approach is to ensure that the communication serves a legitimate government purpose, such as informing the public of a new service, warning of a health risk, or explaining a policy. Communications that appear to be self aggrandising, primarily designed to boost the minister’s profile, or that are made close to an election should be scrutinised carefully. Seek legal advice if there is any doubt.

Before launching a campaign, consider requesting an informal opinion from the Ombudsman’s office. Section 6 allows the Ombudsman to conduct reviews on request, but there is no formal pre clearance mechanism. However, informal guidance may reduce the risk. Alternatively, maintain an internal compliance checklist and have communications reviewed by a legal officer trained in the Act.

If the Ombudsman issues a preliminary notice recommending withdrawal or changes, the public authority must consider the recommendation (not comply) but should document the consideration process. Respond within ten business days providing comments and reasons if the recommendation is not accepted. Even if the authority disagrees, engaging constructively may lead to a more favourable final report.

Finally, train all staff involved in creating or approving public information about the Act’s requirements. The 2025 amendments expanded the scope, so existing training materials should be updated. The compliance burden is real: it adds cost and delay to government communications. However, the risk of an adverse Ombudsman report and its attendant political fallout is the only sanction, so the level of caution adopted will depend on the government’s risk appetite.