Statutory bar on challenging interim authorisations (s 15): The Act contains an explicit, broad prohibition on judicial or tribunal challenge to any interim authorisation given by the Commissioner or decisions of the Premier or Commissioner concerning such authorisations (s 15(1)-(2)). That provision removes an avenue of ordinary judicial review for interim authorisations and decisions about them. Practitioners should note the statutory language is wide and applies "on any account", which will affect emergency applications and available remedies in the first 72 hours of an interim Division 3 authorisation (see s 14(2)(a) for the 72 hour limit).
Court secrecy for applications (s 30): Applications to the Supreme Court for orders authorising Division 3 powers must be heard in the absence of the public and the Court may suppress publication of proceedings and evidence as necessary (s 30). That limits public scrutiny of the judicial authorisation process and may complicate counsel’s ability to obtain precedents, procedural guidance or published reasoning in respect of such applications.
Police may act without showing paper authorisation (s 16(2) and s 13): Section 16(2) explicitly allows an officer to exercise powers under the Act regardless of whether the officer has been provided with a copy of the authorisation. Section 13 allows oral interim authorisations, provided they are confirmed in writing "as soon as it is reasonably practicable" and before any application is made to the Supreme Court. In practice, this combination can lead to police exercising powers in the field without immediately producing documented authorisations, while the written authorisation follows. However, s 27 requires an officer to provide his or her name, place of duty and the reason for exercising the power if requested before or at the time, or as soon as reasonably practicable after exercising the power.
Non‑police assistance and distribution of exercise of powers (ss 16, 28): The Act permits non‑police persons to assist and, where authorised, to exercise powers under the Act, subject to direction and control of police (ss 16(1), 28(1)-(2)). Non‑police persons are not permitted to conduct strip searches (s 16(3)), but they may otherwise be involved in stop‑and‑search, cordoning and other activities. This creates operational flexibility but also means private persons or public body staff might be authorised to carry out actions that would otherwise be performed by police.
Broad definition of "public body" and compulsory directions (s 24): The Commissioner may direct a public body "for the purposes of facilitating" the exercise of powers, and the public body is "authorised and required" to comply (s 24(1)-(2)). The definition of public body includes Government Business Enterprises and state‑owned companies (s 24(3)). Those bodies may be required to take actions that intersect with corporate governance or contractual obligations; compliance is mandatory under the Act.
Forfeiture and disposal powers (s 25): Things seized and detained that are no longer required for investigative or evidentiary purposes and are not required under s 25(3) to be returned are forfeited to the Crown and may be disposed of as the Commissioner thinks fit (s 25(4)). The Act therefore creates an administrative disposal route that may extinguish private property interests in items seized, subject to the condition that items be returned if lawful possession is established and the items are no longer required for investigative purposes (s 25(3)).
Designation granularities and identification methods (s 12): Authorisations may designate particular persons by photograph or drawing (s 12(2)), and may designate vehicles of a particular kind or areas described in the authorisation (s 12(1)). That allows targeted designations but also presents evidentiary issues for police identification and for persons who may be stopped on the basis of photographic descriptions.
Vague and recurring "reasonable grounds" standard: The Act repeatedly conditions use of powers on police being satisfied "on reasonable grounds" or having "reasonable grounds" to suspect (see, for example, ss 5(1)(c), 6(5), 7(1)(a), 17(1), 18(2), 19(1), 23(1)). The Act does not define "reasonable grounds", leaving its content to be established by practice and, potentially, by courts in future litigation.
Timing and temporal constraints: Interim Division 3 authorisations given by the Commissioner are limited to 72 hours (s 14(2)(a)), and the Commissioner must apply to the Supreme Court if Division 3 powers are to have effect beyond 72 hours (ss 9(2), 10(2)). Supreme Court authorisations under ss 9 or 10 can run up to 14 days (s 14(2)(b)). Authorisations under ss 7-8 for special sites may run up to 12 months (s 14(2)(c)). Practitioners need to be alert to these deadlines and the procedural steps tied to them.
Obligations to provide identity and the onus of proof: Several offences place the onus of proving reasonable excuse on the person (s 21(7) for entering a cordoned area; s 29(1) for failing to comply with an order). That shifts evidentiary burdens onto individuals in certain contexts and is important for advice regarding compliance with police directions.
Annual reporting obligations and what will be disclosed (s 31): The Minister must prepare an annual report about the operation of the Act and, in relation to each authorisation, include the terms, grounds relied on, a general description of powers exercised and the result (s 31(1)-(2)). That reporting obligation is the Act’s primary transparency mechanism, but the report timing and aggregated nature of disclosure may limit contemporaneous scrutiny.
Expiry and continuity issues (s 34): The Act expires on 31 December 2030 (s 34(1)) and any authorisation in force on that day ceases at the end of the day (s 34(2)). Where planning or ongoing operations span the expiry date, this cessation may require alternative legal bases or transition planning.