Police Assistance Compensation Act 1964

Assisting or attempting to assist a police officer - The central trigger for compensation is not mere presence at an incident. The person must be “assisting or attempting to assist” a police officer in arresting another person, preserving the peace, or otherwise acting in the execution of duty. The assistance can follow an express request, or it can be inferred. Under section 5(1)(b), the person may have acted in circumstances from which they “reasonably inferred that he had been so requested”, or from which he “could have reasonably inferred that he would have been so requested, if the police officer had been aware of those circumstances and had been able to request him to so assist”. This is an objective test: what a reasonable person in the assistant’s position would have concluded about the officer’s need. It does not require the officer to actually form an intention to ask; the key is the assistant’s reasonable perception. This expands coverage to spontaneous intervention where the officer is unconscious, incapacitated, or not yet present, but only if the assistant could have believed the officer would have sought help.

Personal injury - The Act does not define “injury” independently. Section 4(2) provides that expressions used in the Act “have the same respective meanings as in the Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023”. Therefore, injury includes physical and mental harm, disease, and the aggravation of a pre-existing condition, as defined in the WCIMA. The injury must arise “out of or in the course of” the assistance - the standard causal connection from workers’ compensation law. The Act does not require the injury to occur at a particular location or during a particular time window, as long as it is connected to the act of assisting.

Dependants - Entitlements extend to “the dependants of the person so injured” (section 5(1)). Again, the definition of dependant is borrowed from the WCIMA. This means that if the assistant dies from the injuries, the dependants (typically spouse, de facto partner, children, and in some cases other relatives) can claim weekly payments and lump sums as if the assistant were a deceased worker employed by the Crown.

Deemed employment - The Act creates a legal fiction: the injured person is treated as if they were a worker employed by the Crown at the date of injury, with average weekly earnings not less than the basic wage (section 5(2)(b)(i)). This sets a floor for compensation, but the WCIMA may allow or require higher earnings to be taken into account if the assistant had actual earnings above the basic wage? The Act is silent; the WCIMA provisions on calculation of weekly earnings apply. Importantly, the deemed employment only exists for the purpose of compensation; it does not create an employment relationship for other purposes like superannuation, leave, or vicarious liability.

Police officer - Defined narrowly in section 4(1) as “any person appointed under Part I of the Police Act 1892”. This excludes auxiliary officers, special constables, or other persons who may exercise police powers under other enactments unless they are appointed under Part I of the Police Act. The exclusion reinforces that police officers themselves are outside the scheme; they rely on their own workers’ compensation coverage.

Property - The Act covers damage to or destruction of property that “belongs to him or that is in his possession or under his control” (section 5(3)). This includes owned property, leased property, or property held on bailment, but not property of third parties that the assistant happens to be using without permission. The compensation is discretionary and capped (amounts prescribed by regulation, not yet specified in the Act).

Basic wage - A concept inherited from earlier industrial arbitration. It was a floor for male adult wages. Its continued use creates a fixed floor; if the WCIMA currently requires a higher minimum for earnings, that would apply. The basic wage may be lower than modern minimum wages, so the floor is not generous.

Direct beneficiaries - The primary class is any person (other than a police officer) who suffers personal injury while assisting a police officer under the conditions in section 5(1). This includes bystanders, members of the public, security guards, or off-duty workers who aid an officer. It also covers their dependants if the injury results in death. A secondary class is owners of property damaged or destroyed during such assistance (section 5(3)), though they receive only discretionary, capped compensation, not a right to payment.

Funding burden - The Act places the financial burden squarely on the Western Australian taxpayer. Section 9 charges compensation, premiums, and administrative expenses to the Consolidated Account, unless the Minister has obtained insurance from ICWA (in which case premiums come from the same source). The Crown cannot shift this cost to private insurers; only ICWA can issue the policy (section 8), and it is an entity wholly owned by the State. So the risk remains within the public sector. There is no mechanism for the State to recover costs from individual police officers or from the police force’s budget. The subrogation right under section 7 allows recovery from a non-police wrongdoer, but if the injury was caused by the police officer’s own conduct (e.g., accidental use of force), the Crown cannot recover.

Police officers - Explicitly excluded from the scheme. They fall under their own workers’ compensation arrangements (likely the Police (Health and Safety) Act or the government’s self-insurance). They are also the trigger for the scheme: their request or the inference of their request sets the Act in motion. Importantly, police officers cannot be sued by the Minister under section 7; recovery only lies against “some person, other than a police officer”. This creates an incentive for the Crown to bear the cost of injuries caused by police officers’ own actions during an assistance scenario.

Taxpayers and government - The Act effectively socialises the cost of encouraging citizen assistance. There is no user-pays element, no co-payment, and no cap on the potential total liability for personal injury (except as limited by WCIMA). This creates a moral hazard: individuals may be less cautious about intervening when they know the State will pay compensation. Conversely, the Act may encourage more private assistance to police, reducing the need for additional police resources.

Wrongdoers - Section 7 gives the Minister a right to proceed against any third party (other than a police officer) who caused the injury or damage in circumstances giving rise to liability. This is a statutory subrogation; it does not confer any right on the injured person directly. It affects tortfeasors such as fleeing suspects, criminals, or negligent drivers who are not police. Those wrongdoers may face recovery actions from the State after compensation is paid.

Right to compensation for personal injury - This is a statutory right, not discretionary. Section 5(1) says persons who suffer injury in the defined circumstances “are entitled to be paid compensation as provided in this section.” The right is limited by the provisions of the WCIMA, which the Act incorporates. The Minister must pay in accordance with that Act. There is no express cap on the total amount for any given injury (other than the underlying WCIMA caps, such as lump sum for permanent impairment). However, the right is conditional: the injury must arise out of or in the course of assisting a police officer, and the request or inference requirement must be satisfied.

Right to apply for property compensation - This is not a right to payment; it is a right to apply. Section 5(3) provides that the Minister may in his discretion pay such compensation as he thinks reasonable. The decision is not reviewable on its merits under this Act; it is purely administrative. The amount is capped by regulation (section 5(4)), and the cap applies per claim and in aggregate per incident. The Act does not prescribe criteria for the exercise of the discretion.

Duty not to double recover - Section 5(5) prohibits a person from recovering both damages and compensation for the same property damage. If they do, the Minister can recover the compensation as a debt due to the Crown. This prevents a windfall from both a tort judgment and the Act’s payment. For personal injury, the Act does not explicitly bar a civil action against the wrongdoer; but if the person recovers damages, the Minister’s subrogation right under section 7 may capture some of the proceeds. In practice, the WCIMA may contain provisions affecting common law rights.

Duty of the Minister - The Minister must pay compensation to entitled persons, but only after a claim is made and determined under the WCIMA dispute process. The Minister is not personally liable; the payment is on behalf of the Crown. The Minister also holds the subrogation right and may decide whether to exercise it.

Duty not to make false claims - Section 10 makes it an offence to wilfully make a false statement or otherwise mislead in connection with a claim. The penalty is $1,000. This is a criminal provision; it does not affect the civil validity of the claim directly, but a false claim could also be a basis for denial of payment.

Rights of minor recipients - Section 5(6) provides that payment to a person under 21 years of age is a sufficient discharge. The Act does not require parental consent or a guardian’s receipt. This simplifies administration but could expose minors to financial mismanagement.

Right of the Crown to recover from wrongdoer - Section 7 empowers the Minister (representing the Crown) to sue any person (other than a police officer) who caused the injury or damage in circumstances giving rise to liability. This is a right, not a duty. The amount recovered is the compensation paid (or such portion as the court determines). This subrogation right replaces the injured person’s own right to sue? The Act does not extinguish the individual’s right; it merely gives the Crown a concurrent right and a priority right to recover the compensation paid. In practice, the individual may need to account for any Crown recovery.

Offence of false statement or misleading conduct - Section 10 creates a simple offence. A person who “wilfully makes any false statement to or otherwise wilfully misleads or attempts to mislead any other person” in connection with a claim under this Act is guilty. The penalty is fixed at $1,000. This amount has not been updated since the 1995 amendment; it is low by modern standards and may not effectively deter sophisticated fraud. The offence can be prosecuted by the police or the Director of Public Prosecutions. Because the claim process is administered under the WCIMA, false statements could also attract penalties under that Act (e.g., for fraud against the workers’ compensation scheme), but those penalties are not part of this Act. The low penalty under this Act might be used for lesser misconduct, while more serious fraud could be charged under the Criminal Code (e.g., s 409 for obtaining benefit by fraud).

Enforcement of payment - There is no penalty for the Crown’s failure to pay compensation. If the Minister denies a claim or delays payment, the claimant’s remedy is to pursue the dispute resolution process under the WCIMA (section 6). That process may ultimately result in an arbitration award or court order. If the Crown fails to comply with an award, the claimant would need to enforce the award as a judgment debt. Section 9 ensures that funds are appropriated, but it does not impose a timeline or interest for late payment.

Subrogation enforcement - Section 7 allows the Minister to take proceedings “in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover from him the amount of the compensation or such portion thereof as the court determines.” This is a civil remedy, not a penalty. The Minister must prove that the wrongdoer is liable in tort for the injury or damage. The court retains discretion to order a portion rather than the full amount. The Minister has no special enforcement powers beyond those of any civil plaintiff.

Inspections and investigations - The Act does not confer any power to investigate claims or to access premises or records. Investigation of false claims would rely on general police powers. The WCIMA may have its own investigation powers for claims brought under that Act, and those would apply to disputes under this Act via section 6.

Regulatory offences - Section 11 allows the Governor to make regulations, but no regulations are currently in force that prescribe additional offences, at least not publicly available in the Act text. Any regulation-making power would be subject to disallowance by Parliament.

Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WCIMA) - This is the most significant interaction. The Act incorporates WCIMA by reference for: (a) the entitlement amount (section 5(2)(b)), (b) the definition of expressions (section 4(2)), and (c) dispute resolution (section 6). The effect is that any amendment to WCIMA automatically changes the compensation payable under this Act, without any amendment to this Act itself. For example, if WCIMA increases the maximum weekly payment or alters the definition of dependant, the change instantly applies to police assistance claims. Conversely, if WCIMA caps or reduces compensation, the assistant’s entitlement shrinks. This delegated incorporation means that the level of compensation is not fixed by the Police Assistance Compensation Act and can shift over time, giving the executive and Parliament control over the scheme via the WCIMA amendment process. Section 6 further provides that any question under this Act’s personal injury provisions is dealt with “as if it were a dispute that arose under that Act”, meaning the WCIMA’s conciliation, arbitration, and appeal processes apply, including its time limits and costs rules.

Insurance Commission of Western Australia Act 1986 - Section 8 of this Act authorises ICWA to issue a policy to the Minister for Police covering the liability to pay compensation. ICWA is the State’s insurer for motor vehicle and other risks. This authority does not oblige the Minister to obtain insurance; it merely permits it. If insurance is obtained, the premiums are charged to the Consolidated Account (section 9(b)). The policy can cover both personal injury and property compensation. The Minister may choose to self-insure, meaning the Consolidated Account bears the risk directly. The policy’s terms would be subject to section 7 (remedy against wrongdoer), which says that any recovery from a wrongdoer is subject to the terms of the policy. So ICWA may have a right of subrogation under the policy, potentially reducing the Crown’s direct involvement.

Police Act 1892 - Defines “police officer” for the purpose of this Act (section 4(1)). Any person appointed under Part I of that Act qualifies. This is a static reference; future amendments to the Police Act that change the structure of appointments could affect who is covered. The Act does not reference the Police (Health and Safety) Act or similar modern police employment legislation.

Tort law (common law) - The Act does not abolish or limit the assistant’s common law rights. A person injured while assisting police could still sue the wrongdoer in negligence, trespass, or other tort. However, section 5(5) prohibits double recovery for property damage, and section 7 gives the Minister a subrogation right to recover compensation paid from the wrongdoer. If the assistant also sues and recovers damages, they must hold the compensation amount on trust for the Crown (implied by section 7). There is no provision for the assistant to retain both. In practice, the assistant’s tort claim may be impacted by the workers’ compensation deemed employment; under WCIMA, if the Crown is deemed the employer, the assistant might be barred from suing the Crown in tort, but they can still sue third parties. The Act does not create an exclusive remedy against the Crown.

Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) - A person injured while assisting police may also qualify for compensation under that Act if the injury was caused by an offence. The two schemes could overlap. The Act does not prevent a claim under both, but total compensation could not exceed the loss. The Minister might seek recovery from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Assessor if the assistant also receives that compensation? Not provided for in this Act, so likely separate.

The Act was originally enacted as No. 59 of 1964 and came into force on 11 June 1965. It was part of the post-war trend of providing state compensation to good Samaritans. The first reprint in 1982 incorporated only ministerials.

1993 Financial Administration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6 of 1993) s.11 - Changed references from “Consolidated Revenue Fund” to “Consolidated Account” to align with modern financial management terminology.

1995 Sentencing (Consequential Provisions) Act (No. 78 of 1995) s.147 - Repealed the original penalty provision (likely a fine expressed in pounds or dollars) and substituted a penalty of $1,000. Also updated penalty unit references.

1996 Acts Amendment (ICWA) Act (No. 45 of 1996) s.38 - Substituted a reference to the Insurance Commission of Western Australia (previously the State Government Insurance Commission) to reflect the renaming of the insurer.

1996 Financial Legislation Amendment Act (No. 49 of 1996) s.64 - Made minor technical amendments to section 9, likely relating to appropriations.

1999 Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Amendment Act (No. 34 of 1999) s.61 - Updated references to the workers’ compensation legislation (at that time the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981) after its amendment. Also amended section 6 to refer to “the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981” and the dispute resolution provisions.

2004 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act (No. 42 of 2004) s.167 and 175 - Major update: section 167(1) and (5) and 175 commenced on 4 January 2005; section 167(2)-(4) commenced on 14 November 2005. This amendment replaced references to the former Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act with references to the new Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (the earlier name for the current act). It also updated the definition section and removed outmoded language.

2006 Financial Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act (No. 77 of 2006) s.4 - Further minor financial references updated, effective 1 February 2007.

2010 Standardisation of Formatting Act (No. 19 of 2010) s.51 - Made formatting and grammatical changes to conform to modern drafting standards. No substantive change.

2023 Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (No. 21 of 2023) s.709(2) - Updated references from the 1981 Act to the 2023 Act, which replaced the earlier workers’ compensation law. This amendment commenced on 1 July 2024. The effect is that the current compensation regime is now pegged to the 2023 Act.

The pattern shows that the Act’s core has remained untouched since 1964; all amendments have been machinery updates to keep references consistent with changing financial and workers’ compensation legislation. No amendment has altered the scope of eligibility or the nature of the discretion.

The text of the Act does not cite any case law, and no litigation history is recorded in the Act itself. However, because section 6 channel all questions of entitlement into the WCIMA dispute resolution process, any judicial interpretation of this Act likely occurs within the Workers’ Compensation jurisdiction. Reported decisions of the Western Australian Workers’ Compensation Arbitration Service, the District Court, or the Court of Appeal could have interpreted phrases such as “assisting or attempting to assist a police officer”, “reasonably inferred”, or “arising out of or in the course of”. Without specific research, no such cases can be identified here. The Act has been in force for nearly 60 years, so there is almost certainly some case law, but it is not part of the source material. The limited number of claims (compared to general workers’ compensation) may mean that litigation is rare. The discretionary property compensation under section 5(3) is not subject to review under the WCIMA; disputes about that would likely be brought by judicial review in the Supreme Court (arguing that the Minister failed to consider relevant matters). The absence of appellate decisions cited suggests the Act is not a frequent source of litigation. Claimants may prefer to resolve disputes informally or via the WCIMA process. The existence of the subrogation right under section 7 may give rise to litigation where the Crown sues a wrongdoer; those actions would be in tort and could be reported, but they arise from the underlying tort, not the statutory scheme.

No compensation if assistance not requested or reasonably inferred - The most common pitfall. If a civilian spontaneously intervenes without any apparent request or circumstances from which an officer would have been expected to ask, they have no entitlement. The burden of proof is on the claimant to show they either were asked or could reasonably have inferred a request. If the officer was not present or the civilian acted on general impulse, the claim fails.

Property compensation is discretionary and capped - Section 5(3) says the Minister “may” pay what the Minister thinks reasonable. There is no legal right to payment, no criteria, and no right of appeal on the merits. The regulation-prescribed caps (not yet known from the Act text) may be low. Claimants with expensive property (e.g., a vehicle or professional equipment) may receive far less than market value.

No compensation for police officers - The Act explicitly excludes “a police officer” (section 5(1)). But what about off-duty police officers? The definition in section 4(1) only refers to appointment under Part I of the Police Act 1892; off-duty officers remain police officers. They cannot claim under this Act even if they assist in a civilian capacity. They must rely on their own employment-related compensation.

Compensation pegged to workers’ compensation - can change - The amount and conditions are those of the WCIMA at the date of injury. If subsequent amendments reduce benefits, that does not affect existing claims, but future claims will follow the amended regime. Claimants should be aware that the floor of “not less than the basic wage” may be lower than actual earnings, and the WCIMA may limit weekly payments for highly paid individuals.

No time limit in this Act - The Act does not specify a limitation period for claims. However, the WCIMA imposes strict time limits (e.g., notice within 14 or 28 days, claim within certain periods). Section 6 imports those time limits. A claimant who delays reporting may lose entitlement.

False statement offence applies to any person - not just claimants - The offence in section 10 covers “a person who” makes a false statement in connection with a claim. This could include a doctor, an employer, or a witness who misleads the Minister or an arbitrator. The low penalty may not be a deterrent, but it does provide a basis for prosecution in egregious cases.

Subrogation only against non-police wrongdoers - Section 7 prevents the Crown from recovering from a police officer. If the injury was caused by a police officer’s negligent or intentional act (e.g., a police vehicle collision during pursuit, or excessive force), the Crown bears the full cost. This may create a perverse incentive for the Minister not to scrutinise the conduct of police officers, since recovery is impossible.

Insurance is optional - The Minister is not required to obtain a policy from ICWA. If no policy is in force, the Consolidated Account directly funds compensation (section 9(a)). This means the taxpayer is the ultimate insurer. Claimants cannot enforce against ICWA unless a policy exists and covers the claim. The policy terms are not set out in the Act; they could include exclusions (e.g., for intentional acts of the assistant).

No right to legal representation or costs - The Act does not provide for legal costs for claimants. The WCIMA dispute process may allow costs in certain circumstances, but that is not guaranteed. Claimants may have to self-fund legal advice or representation.

For an injured civilian seeking compensation - The first step is to ensure the incident meets the statutory criteria. Document whether a police officer requested assistance, or why you reasonably inferred they would have. Collect contemporaneous statements from the police officer(s) involved, witnesses, and any CCTV. Report the injury to the Minister for Police as soon as possible; although the Act does not specify a notice period, the WCIMA will require prompt notice. Then make a formal claim under the WCIMA dispute process. This may involve completing a claim form and providing medical evidence. The claim will be referred to the workers’ compensation conciliation or arbitration process (section 6). It is prudent to notify the Insurance Commission (if a policy is in place) or the Crown’s legal representatives. Keep all correspondence. If the claim is denied, you can seek review under the WCIMA. Do not make false statements; the penalty is $1,000 and it may affect your claim. For property damage, write to the Minister for Police, setting out the circumstances, the value of property, and how it was damaged or destroyed during the assistance. The decision is discretionary, so provide full evidence. The Minister may require an independent valuation.

For the Minister for Police - The Minister (acting through the relevant department) should have procedures to receive and process claims. If insurance has been obtained from ICWA, the Minister should refer claims to ICWA for initial assessment. Otherwise, the Minister must ensure that disputed claims are referred to the WCIMA dispute process. The Minister should consider exercising the subrogation right under section 7 when compensation has been paid and a non-police wrongdoer is identified. The Minister may also decide whether to obtain insurance under section 8, weighing the cost of premiums against the contingency of claims. All payments must be properly charged to the Consolidated Account (section 9). The Minister should maintain records of claims to assist in budgeting and to detect patterns of false claims.

For police officers - Officers who request civilian assistance should record the request in their official notebook or report. This evidence is critical for the civilian’s claim. Officers should also be aware that they are not personally liable for compensation, but their conduct could affect the entitlement (e.g., if they fail to request assistance appropriately). Officers should not make false statements about the incident.

For ICWA - If a policy is issued, ICWA must administer claims in accordance with the policy terms and the Act. It may exercise subrogation rights on behalf of the Crown. ICWA should ensure that its policy is adequate to cover the full amount of liability (section 8).

General compliance - Any person involved in a claim must avoid any conduct that could be construed as misleading. The offence under section 10 is broad and covers both oral and written statements. The $1,000 penalty is modest, but criminal conviction may have other consequences. There is no specific compliance body under this Act; oversight is provided by the workers’ compensation regulator and the courts.