Personal Violence (Transitional Provisions) Regulation 2025

“Child respondent” is central to the Regulation. The Act as amended by the Regulation defines a child respondent as a person against whom a protection order is sought or made who is under a certain age. Under the original Act, section 220 (as modified by Schedule 2) now uses “protection order” instead of “family violence order” in the definition. The Regulation does not alter the substantive age threshold; that remains set by the Act. However, by revoking orders made against child respondents, the Regulation effectively removes any ongoing legal restraint against those children. “Protection order” is a term defined in the Act and includes interim and final orders made under the Act. The “commencement day” differs between the two parts. For Part 23 modifications, it is 22 November 2023. For Part 24 modifications, it is 1 July 2025. The Regulation thus has a dual temporal effect, meaning that orders against child respondents were revoked at two different points depending on which transitional part applied. “Transitional provisions” in this context refer to Parts 23 and 24 of the Act, which were inserted by the Justice (Age of Criminal Responsibility) Legislation Amendment Act 2023 to manage the transition following the raising of the minimum age of criminal responsibility. The Regulation modifies those transitional provisions to also address protection orders, not just criminal proceedings. The concept of “revocation” here is automatic and does not require a court order. The Regulation does not provide for review, appeal, or reinstatement of revoked orders. It also contains no savings clause for applications that were pending at the commencement date, nor any transitional rule for appeals against orders that may have been revoked retrospectively. The expiry provisions are another key concept. The Regulation sunsets on 1 July 2030, but the Part 23 modifications expire earlier on 22 November 2028. After that date, the modification in Schedule 1 ceases to have effect, meaning that any future protection orders against child respondents made after that date would not be automatically revoked under this Regulation (though they would be subject to whatever transitional rules apply at that time). The Regulation is a delegation of legislative power; it is made by the Executive under section 211(2) and 221(2) of the Act, which expressly allow regulations to modify the transitional parts. It is a subordinate law, not an Act, and is subject to disallowance by the Legislative Assembly.

The Regulation directly affects two primary groups: child respondents and applicants who obtained protection orders against those children. A child respondent is a person under the age specified in the Act (the age of criminal responsibility raise). For persons who were subject to a protection order as a child at the relevant commencement day, the order is revoked without any further step. This means the legal obligation to comply with conditions such as non-contact, non-approach, or restrictions on behaviour is extinguished. For applicants who sought those orders for their own protection or the protection of others, the revocation removes the legal protection they had. They are left without an enforceable order and, if protection is still needed, they must apply for a new protection order under the current regime. That new application must satisfy the ordinary requirements of the Act, including that the respondent is no longer a child (if they have aged out) or that other avenues are available. The Regulation also affects courts and tribunals that made the original orders. They must record the revocation and update their records. Because the revocation is automatic and contained in a regulation, courts do not need to issue fresh orders but must be aware of the change for enforcement purposes. Police and other enforcement agencies are affected because protection orders against child respondents are no longer enforceable. Any breach of a revoked order cannot be prosecuted. This has implications for existing breach proceedings: if the order was revoked before the breach occurred or was revoked retrospectively, prosecutions may be invalid. The Regulation also affects legal practitioners who must advise clients on the status of orders. For example, a lawyer representing a child respondent should be aware that any protection order against their client is likely revoked, depending on the date and the applicable Part. Conversely, a lawyer representing an applicant must determine whether their order has been revoked and whether they need to take fresh proceedings. The definitional change from “family violence order” to “protection order” in section 220 may affect other instruments that cross-reference that definition. Parties to family violence proceedings under other laws that rely on that term may need to adjust their references. The Regulation does not affect protection orders against adults, nor does it affect orders made against children after the commencement day (though those would be caught by the Act’s general rules). The automatic nature of the revocation means that no party receives prior notice of the revocation from the Regulation itself. Practical notice depends on whether the relevant authorities (courts, police, the respondent, the applicant) are aware of the legal change. This creates information asymmetry and potential for confusion.

The Regulation imposes no new duties on any person. It does not require anyone to do anything. The only operative legal effect is the revocation of an existing order, which removes duties that were previously imposed by that order. For child respondents, the revocation restores their right to associate with or approach the protected person, subject only to any other applicable laws (such as criminal law or separate orders). However, that right is reinstated automatically, not through any application or court decision. For applicants, the revocation removes their right to have the order enforced. They lose the statutory right to seek a contravention finding or to rely on the order for protection. The Regulation does not provide a right to be heard before revocation, nor does it create a right to apply for continuation of the revoked order. This is a notable omission. A person who obtained a protection order against a child respondent cannot challenge the revocation under the Regulation itself. They may, however, apply for a new protection order under the Act, but that application will be subject to the usual tests and may not succeed if the circumstances have changed or if the respondent is no longer a child. The Regulation also does not create any right to compensation for loss suffered due to the revocation. For example, if an applicant relied on the order to secure housing or to maintain safety from a child who has since caused harm, the revocation extinguishes that legal protection without remedy. The definitional change in section 220 (substituting “protection order” for “family violence order”) may affect the rights of persons to whom that definition applies in other contexts within the Act. It ensures consistency, but it does not create new rights or duties. The expiry provisions create a limited temporal right to the continued operation of the modifications. After 22 November 2028, the Part 23 modifications cease, meaning that any orders made against child respondents after that date under the Act’s Part 23 transitional provisions would not be automatically revoked by this Regulation. However, if Part 23 itself expires earlier, the point may be moot. The Regulation is silent on what happens to orders made before expiry but after the commencement date. The general law would apply; the Regulation’s effect is only for the period it is in force.

The Regulation contains no new penalties. It does not create any offence. Its only enforcement effect is negative: it removes the enforceability of existing protection orders against child respondents. After revocation, a person who was previously subject to the order cannot be charged with contravening that order, and any such charges pending at the time of revocation may need to be withdrawn or dismissed. However, the Regulation does not expressly address the effect on pending proceedings. This may create uncertainty. Under ordinary principles, if an order is revoked retrospectively (as for Part 23 modifications from 22 November 2023), any prior breach of that order that occurred before revocation might still be punishable if the order was in force at the time of the breach. But the Regulation does not save those provisions. The better view is that the revocation operates prospectively from the commencement day, so breaches that occurred before that date remain enforceable in theory, though prosecutorial discretion may be exercised. The definitional amendment in Schedule 2 does not create penalties but may affect the scope of enforcement under the Act’s existing penalty provisions. The Act contains offences for contravening protection orders. By narrowing the class of orders (by revoking child respondent orders), the scope of potential liability is reduced. There are no specific enforcement mechanisms in the Regulation itself. The underlying Act’s enforcement provisions (such as powers of arrest for breach) are affected only insofar as the orders to be enforced no longer exist. The Regulation’s expiry does not carry penalties; after expiry, the modifications cease to have effect, which may revive the original provisions of the Act (but only if those provisions also have not expired). The Regulation is not subject to its own penalty regime, but as a subordinate law, it is subject to the general penalty provisions for non-compliance with regulations under the Legislation Act 2001, though no contravention is conceivable given that it imposes no duties.

The Regulation operates solely under the Personal Violence Act 2016 and modifies its transitional parts. It is directly linked to the Justice (Age of Criminal Responsibility) Legislation Amendment Act 2023, which inserted Parts 23 and 24 into the Act. The Regulation gives effect to the policy shift behind that amending Act by ensuring that protection orders against child respondents do not survive the raising of the age of criminal responsibility. The Regulation does not directly interact with the Criminal Code, the Children and Young People Act 2008, or the Family Violence Act 2016, but indirectly affects them. For example, the revocation of a protection order may affect concurrent orders under the Family Violence Act if there is an overlap. The definitional change from “family violence order” to “protection order” in section 220 may align with definitions in other ACT laws that distinguish between family violence orders and personal violence orders. However, the Regulation does not amend those other laws. Practitioners must cross-reference. The Regulation is subordinate to the Act itself. If there is inconsistency between the Regulation and the Act, the Act prevails, but the Regulation is expressly authorised by the Act to modify Parts 23 and 24, so within its scope it displaces the default provisions. The Regulation also interacts with the Legislation Act 2001, which governs its making, republication, and expiry. The retrospective commencement of the Part 23 modifications from 22 November 2023 raises questions under common law principles against retrospectivity, but the Legislation Act 2001 permits retrospective regulations unless they affect rights or impose liabilities. Since the Regulation revokes orders (removing a burden on child respondents) rather than imposing a new burden, retrospectivity is likely valid, but it could still affect applicants’ rights to expect continuing protection. The Regulation does not interact with federal family law orders under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), as it is limited to ACT personal violence orders. It may, however, indirectly affect state or territory orders if those orders rely on the existence of a protection order as a trigger for other proceedings (e.g., firearms licence revocation). The expiry of the Regulation on 1 July 2030 means that after that date, the modifications cease, and the original text of Parts 23 and 24 of the Act (if still in force) would apply unmodified. However, Parts 23 and 24 themselves are temporary and may expire before then. The interaction with the Act’s general provisions is also relevant: the Regulation does not affect the power to make new protection orders against children after the commencement day; it only revokes existing ones. The Act’s ordinary rules on who can apply and on what grounds remain unchanged.

The Regulation has not been amended since its notification on 8 July 2025. The republication date is 9 July 2025 and it is Republication No 2, but the amendment history endnote shows no amending laws. The only change reflected in the amendment history is the omission of section 2 (Commencement) under the Legislation Act 2001, section 89(4), which is a standard editorial step for republication. The history also notes that section 3, schedule 1, and subsection 5(2) expire on 22 November 2028. This is not an amendment but a future expiry. The Regulation itself was originally made as SL2025-12. Its legislation history shows that it was made under the Act and that various provisions took effect on different dates: section 1, section 2 taken to have commenced 22 November 2023; section 3 and schedule 1 taken to have commenced 22 November 2023; section 4 and schedule 2 taken to have commenced 1 July 2025; and section 5 commenced on 9 July 2025. The note under legislation history indicates the Regulation expires on 1 July 2030. The amendment history also states that section 3, schedule 1, and subsection 5(2) expire on 22 November 2028. This creates a staggered expiry. The republication history shows an earlier republication on 8 July 2025 (R1) covering the period 22 November 2023 to 8 July 2025, with no amendments. The current republication (R2) updates the effective date to 9 July 2025 due to the commencement of section 5 on that date. No amendments have been made. The Regulation is still young and may be amended in future if the transitional arrangements require adjustment. As of 9 July 2025, it is in full force and effect for the Part 24 modifications, while the Part 23 modifications already have retrospective effect. The lack of amendment history means there are no judicial interpretations or government corrections to date. The Regulation’s short text and clear purpose make it unlikely to require amendment, but the phased expiry may require future legislative action to extend or replace the provisions.

The Regulation is too recent (notified 8 July 2025) to have generated any reported litigation in the ACT courts. The endnotes contain no reference to any court decisions, appeals, or judicial review applications concerning the Regulation. Its retrospective operation and the automatic revocation of protection orders may, however, become the subject of legal challenge. Potential grounds for challenge include whether the regulation-making power under sections 211(2) and 221(2) of the Act authorises the revocation of orders without a hearing, or whether the retrospectivity breaches any implied constitutional guarantees or common law rights. The High Court of Australia has considered similar transitional provisions in other contexts, but no case is named in the source. The absence of litigation history does not mean the Regulation is immune from challenge; it simply means none have been recorded. The Regulation may also be cited in proceedings where a person is charged with breaching a protection order that was in fact revoked retrospectively. In such a case, the defendant may raise the Regulation as a defence. Similarly, an applicant whose order was revoked may seek to argue that the revocation was ultra vires. The definitional change from “family violence order” to “protection order” may be litigated if it affects the interpretation of orders made before the definitional amendment. For example, if an order was originally described as a “family violence order” but the definition now uses “protection order”, a court may need to determine whether the old orders are still covered. However, the Regulation does not purport to amend the orders themselves, only the definition. The Regulation’s interaction with the underlying Act’s existing litigation history is also relevant. The Personal Violence Act 2016 has been the subject of some case law regarding the meaning of “personal violence” and the threshold for making orders. That case law may influence how courts treat the revocation provisions, especially if a dispute arises over whether a particular order was actually made against a child respondent. The Regulation does not provide a mechanism for determining whether a person qualifies as a child respondent as of the commencement day; that determination may itself be contested. As of the republication date, no litigation is noted. Practitioners should monitor the ACT Supreme Court and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal for any challenges.

Several aspects of the Regulation may trap unwary practitioners or parties. First, the retrospective commencement of the Part 23 modifications to 22 November 2023 means that any protection order made against a child respondent that was in force on that date was automatically revoked without any notification process. Many applicants may not know their order has been revoked and may continue to rely on it, potentially placing themselves at risk if the child respondent becomes aware of the revocation. Similarly, the child respondent may not know the order is gone, and may continue to comply with conditions out of habit or fear. Second, the two different commencement days (22 November 2023 for Part 23, 1 July 2025 for Part 24) create a patchwork effect. An order made against a child respondent could be revoked under one part but not the other, depending on which transitional part applies. Practitioners must identify which part of the Act governs a particular order. The Regulation does not provide a table or cross-reference. Third, the definitional amendment in Schedule 2 changes the term “family violence order” to “protection order” in section 220. This may inadvertently affect the interpretation of other provisions in the Act that cross-reference that definition, especially if the term “family violence order” appears elsewhere and is not updated. The Regulation only amends the definition, not every occurrence. Fourth, the expiry provisions are subtle. Section 3, Schedule 1, and subsection 5(2) expire on 22 November 2028, but section 4, Schedule 2, and the rest of the Regulation continue until 1 July 2030. This means that after 22 November 2028, the Part 23 modifications cease to have effect, while the Part 24 modifications remain in force. If the Act’s Part 23 itself expires on that date (as suggested by the note in legislation history: “s 3, sch 1 exp 22 November 2028 (s 5 (2))”), then the Regulation’s expiry of those sections may be concurrent with the expiry of the underlying Part. But if Part 23 is extended, the Regulation’s modification would no longer apply. This could cause confusion. Fifth, the Regulation does not include any savings or transitional provisions for applications that were pending at the commencement day. If a protection order application against a child respondent was filed but not decided before the commencement day, the Regulation does not automatically revoke it (since it revokes only orders “made”). But the application may be affected by the change in law. Sixth, the Regulation is silent on the effect on interim orders that were made before the commencement day. The term “protection order” in the Act includes interim orders, so they are presumably revoked as well, but the Regulation does not specify. Seventh, the Regulation does not address the enforceability of conditions that were attached to the revoked order, such as surrender of firearms or compliance with counselling. Those conditions may have ongoing legal effect under other laws, but the order itself is gone. Eighth, the retrospective effect from 22 November 2023 means that any enforcement action taken after that date for a breach of an order that had been revoked would be invalid, but the Regulation does not nullify such actions. A person may have been convicted of contravening a protection order that was no longer in force, but the Regulation does not provide for setting aside such convictions. That would require separate legal action. Finally, practitioners should note that the Regulation applies only to protection orders made “against a child respondent”. If the child was aged out by the time of revocation, the order is still revoked because the respondent was a child at the time the order was made. The age at the time of revocation is irrelevant.

Compliance with the Regulation is largely passive, as it operates automatically. However, several practical steps are necessary to ensure that all affected parties understand their legal position and to avoid inadvertent breaches or reliance on revoked orders. First, any person who has been named as a respondent to a protection order and who was a child at the time the order was made should verify whether that order has been revoked. If the order was made before the relevant commencement day (22 November 2023 for orders under Part 23, or 1 July 2025 for orders under Part 24), the order is revoked. The respondent should keep a record of the Regulation and the commencement dates for future reference. They should be aware that the revocation is automatic and no court order is needed. However, they should also check whether any other orders (such as a separate family violence order or a criminal justice order) remain in force. Second, applicants who sought protection orders against child respondents should confirm the status of those orders. If the order has been revoked, the applicant should consider whether they still require protection. If so, they must apply for a new protection order under the current law. The new application will be assessed on its merits, and the respondent may now be an adult or still a child but subject to the Act’s ordinary rules. Applicants should act promptly, as the revocation is effective immediately, leaving a gap in protection. Third, legal practitioners should review all active files involving protection orders where the respondent was a child at the time of the order. They should advise clients of the revocation and of the need to take fresh proceedings for applicants, or of the restoration of liberty for respondents. Practitioners should also ensure that court records are updated if necessary, though the Act places the onus on the registrar to correct records. Fourth, police and enforcement agencies should audit their databases to remove revoked orders from active enforcement systems. Officers should be trained to check the effective date of any protection order before taking enforcement action. A breach alleged to have occurred after the commencement day but in relation to a revoked order cannot be prosecuted. Fifth, courts and tribunals should update their case management systems to reflect the automatic revocation. They should also consider issuing notices to the parties where possible, though the Regulation does not require this. Sixth, when drafting new protection order applications, practitioners should note that the definition of “child respondent” now uses “protection order” rather than “family violence order”. This may affect eligibility for certain provisions. Seventh, compliance with the Regulation also means monitoring its expiry. After 22 November 2028, the Part 23 modifications expire. Practitioners should be aware that after that date, any new protection orders against child respondents made under Part 23 would not be automatically revoked by this Regulation, but the underlying Part 23 may itself have expired. After 1 July 2030, the entire Regulation expires, and no automatic revocation will occur. Future amendments or new regulations may address the situation then. Eighth, any pending proceedings for contravention of a protection order that has been revoked should be reviewed. If the alleged breach occurred after the commencement day, the prosecution should be withdrawn. If it occurred before, the order was still in force at the time, so prosecution may proceed, but the Regulation does not address this. Practitioners should seek guidance from the Director of Public Prosecutions. Finally, all parties should document their understanding of the Regulation’s effect for their records. Because the Regulation is a legislative instrument with retrospective effect, a paper trail showing compliance or reliance may be useful in future disputes.