The Act pivots on several key definitions and structural distinctions. A “Committee” includes any committee of the Council or Assembly and, by virtue of s 14, a joint committee of both Houses. The “Council” is the Legislative Council (the upper house) and the “Assembly” is the Legislative Assembly (the lower house). “President” and “Speaker” mean the presiding officers of each house respectively. The Act applies only to persons who are not members of either House (s 4). Members are dealt with separately: their attendance “shall be procured in conformity (so far as practicable) with the mode of procedure observed in the British House of Commons” (s 5). That provision is deliberately vague and imports an unwritten body of practice rather than statutory rules.

A central concept is the distinction between initial attendance and subsequent conduct. The summons procedure under s 4 requires personal service of a written order. The witness must be paid expenses at the time of service (s 6(1)). If the witness fails to attend, the old system under ss 7 9 allowed the President or Speaker to certify that failure to a Supreme Court judge, who would then issue a warrant for arrest and detention so the person could be produced before Parliament. With those sections now invalid, there is no statutory power to arrest or detain a person solely for non attendance. The Act therefore does not define what constitutes a “just cause or reasonable excuse” for failure to attend, because that phrase appeared only in the now invalid s 7. The lack of a statutory definition means that any internal parliamentary process for non attendance would have to rely on inherent contempt powers, which are not codified in this Act.

Contempt of Parliament under s 11 is a separate concept: it applies when a witness “refuses to answer any lawful question during the witness’s examination”. The term “lawful question” is not defined. The provision carves out an exception for questions that would require disclosure of a religious confession protected by s 127 of the Evidence Act 1995. The penalty is committal to custody of the usher of the black rod or the serjeant at arms, and if the House orders, to gaol for up to one month. The warrant for committal is issued by the President or Speaker alone, without any judicial oversight. Section 11(3) grants immunity from civil or criminal liability for anyone acting under the authority of that section.

False evidence under s 13 is a standalone statutory offence punishable by up to five years imprisonment. It applies “whether such statement amounts to perjury or not”, meaning it is broader than the common law offence of perjury and does not require the statement to be made in a judicial proceeding or to be material to an issue. The Act also addresses oaths: witnesses before a House or Committee of the Whole are sworn at the bar by the Clerk; witnesses before other committees are sworn by the Chair (s 10). A witness who would be permitted to make a solemn declaration instead of an oath in the Supreme Court may do so before Parliament.

Privilege against defamation is absolute under s 12: no action lies for defamatory words spoken while giving evidence. The section expressly states it operates in addition to the absolute privilege defence provided by s 27(2)(a)(iii) of the Defamation Act 2005. The note to s 12 clarifies that a parliamentary body includes a parliament, a house of parliament, or a committee. This privilege attaches only to the witness, not to the committee members or the publication of evidence by others.

Finally, expenses: witnesses summoned at the instance of a party are paid by that party; witnesses summoned for a public inquiry are paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the authority of the Clerk or Chair (s 6(2)). The scale of expenses is “the scale in force for the time being for the payment of witnesses in actions in the Supreme Court”. That external reference means the amount changes automatically when the Supreme Court scale is updated.

The primary class of persons affected are individuals who are not members of the Legislative Council or Assembly but who are required to give evidence before either House or a committee. This includes public servants called to answer about policy implementation, private sector executives summoned to explain commercial conduct, journalists asked to reveal sources, expert witnesses giving technical evidence, and ordinary citizens who may have witnessed events relevant to an inquiry. In practice, the most frequent targets are senior government officials, but the power extends to any person, regardless of rank or nationality, provided they are within the jurisdiction.

Members of Parliament themselves are not directly subject to the summons provisions of this Act. Section 5 directs that their attendance be procured “in conformity (so far as practicable) with the mode of procedure observed in the British House of Commons”. That is a reference to a non statutory, Westminster derived practice. In effect, members can be required to attend by a resolution of the House or by an order of a committee made under standing orders, but they cannot be arrested or penalised under ss 7 9 or s 11 in the same way as non members. Members who refuse to attend may be dealt with by the House as a contempt, but the procedure is not codified in this Act.

The Act also affects several categories of officials. The Clerk of the Parliaments and the Clerk of the Assembly are responsible for signing and serving summonses when the House itself orders a witness (s 4(1)). The Chair of a committee signs orders for committee witnesses (s 4(2)). The President and Speaker play a critical role: they certify failures to attend (under the now invalid s 7), issue committal warrants under s 11 for refusal to answer, and order remand or discharge under the former s 9. After the invalidity of ss 7 9, the President and Speaker are no longer required to certify non attendance for judicial enforcement, but they still issue warrants under s 11.

Supreme Court judges were previously required by s 8 to issue an arrest warrant upon receiving a certificate from the President or Speaker. That duty has been removed by the declaration of invalidity. Judges are now no longer involved in the parliamentary witness enforcement process unless a separate proceeding, such as an application for prerogative relief, is brought.

The Colonial Treasurer is named in s 6(2) as the payer of expenses for public inquiries. That is an anachronism: the reference is now to the Treasurer of New South Wales. The Consolidated Revenue Fund bears the cost. The Sheriff, constables, and other officers were potential actors under the now invalid warrant provisions. Gaolers and officers may still be required to hold a person committed under s 11. Anyone acting under the authority of s 11 is immunised from liability, civil or criminal, by s 11(3). That immunisation creates a class of persons (gaolers, ushers, serjeants at arms) who can detain a person without risk of suit, provided they act within the terms of the warrant.

Finally, the Act indirectly affects those who rely on the evidence given before Parliament: journalists reporting on inquiries, litigants using transcripts, and regulators who build on findings. The privilege under s 12 ensures that witnesses cannot be sued for defamation, but the privilege does not extend to republication outside the hearing. Defamation claims may still arise from media reporting or official reports, but those are governed by other legislation.

The Act imposes a series of duties on witnesses and confers a narrower set of rights, most of which are qualified or limited in scope.

The primary duty is to attend and give evidence when summoned. That duty is created by s 4: a person who is personally served with a notice or order signed by the relevant officer “may be summoned to attend and give evidence”. The use of “may” suggests a power in the House or committee to issue the summons, not a discretion in the witness. The duty is explicit, though the consequences for breach have been removed by the invalidity of ss 7 9. A witness who does attend must then answer “lawful questions” during examination. The duty to answer is qualified only by the exception for religious confessions under s 127 of the Evidence Act 1995 (s 11(1)). No other privileges are recognised in the Act: there is no statutory protection for legal professional privilege, privilege against self incrimination, or public interest immunity. A witness who refuses to answer on a ground not recognised by s 127 risks committal for contempt under s 11. That is a significant gap: the Act does not import the evidentiary privileges that apply in court proceedings.

The duty not to give false evidence is imposed by s 13. It is an offence to wilfully make a false statement knowing it to be false. The offence does not require that the falsehood be material or that it amount to perjury at common law. A witness who mistakenly gives false evidence is not caught; the mens rea is wilfulness and knowledge of falsity.

Rights conferred by the Act are limited. A witness has the right to be paid reasonable expenses at the time of service of the summons (s 6(1)). The expenses are to be calculated according to the Supreme Court scale, which provides a metric but may be outdated for long hearings. If the expenses are not paid at the time of service, the witness arguably has a ground to resist the summons, though the Act is silent on the legal effect of non payment. A witness summoned for a public inquiry does not have to pay their own costs; the Consolidated Revenue Fund bears them under s 6(2).

A witness has a right to make a declaration instead of taking an oath if they would be permitted to do so in the Supreme Court (s 10(3)). That accommodates conscientious objectors and those for whom an oath has no binding force. The chair or clerk must administer the oath or declaration as appropriate.

The right to privilege against defamation is absolute under s 12. No action for defamation lies for words spoken while giving evidence under the Act. That right is in addition to the absolute privilege that applies to parliamentary proceedings under the Defamation Act 2005. The right attaches only to the giving of evidence; it does not protect statements made outside the hearing or republication of the evidence.

A witness has no statutory right to be represented by a lawyer during the hearing, nor a right to cross examine other witnesses, nor a right to remain silent beyond the religious confession exception. The Act does not provide for an adjournment to seek legal advice if a question is objected to. Those procedural matters are left to the standing orders and practice of each House, which vary and are not codified in this Act.

Finally, a witness who is committed under s 11 has a right to be released after the expiry of the term stated in the warrant (max one month), or earlier if the President or Speaker orders discharge. The warrant must state the term. There is no statutory right to challenge the committal by habeas corpus, although that common law remedy would still be available in the Supreme Court. The invalidity of ss 7 9 does not affect the s 11 committal process, which operates without judicial involvement.

The Act creates two principal penal provisions and one defunct enforcement mechanism. Since the invalidity of ss 7 9, the only live coercive power is contempt for refusal to answer a lawful question, set out in s 11, plus the standalone offence of false evidence under s 13.

Section 11(1) provides that if a witness refuses to answer any lawful question during examination, the witness “shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of Parliament” and “may be forthwith committed for such offence into the custody of the usher of the black rod or serjeant at arms, and, if the House so order, to gaol, for any period not exceeding one calendar month”. The committal is by a warrant signed by the President or Speaker. The warrant is sufficient authority for the gaoler to hold the person for the stated term (s 11(2)). There is no requirement for a hearing before an independent tribunal; the President or Speaker essentially adjudicates and issues the warrant in the same instrument. Section 11(3) immunises anyone acting under the authority of the section from civil or criminal liability. This creates a significant risk of executive detention without judicial review, though the common law remedy of habeas corpus remains theoretically available.

The maximum penalty for contempt is one month imprisonment. That is relatively short but can be imposed repeatedly for continuing refusal, because each refusal on a different day or at a different question could be a fresh contempt. The Act does not cap the total period of detention across multiple warrants.

The false evidence offence under s 13 carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. That is a serious criminal offence. It applies to any witness who “wilfully makes any false statement, knowing the same to be false”. The section specifies that the statement need not amount to perjury. That means the elements are: (a) the person is a witness under the Act, (b) the person makes a statement, (c) the statement is false, (d) the person knows it is false, and (e) the making is wilful. The offence is not limited to oral testimony; it would cover written statements or answers given on oath or declaration. The prosecution would be before a court, not a parliamentary body. The same conduct could also constitute perjury under the Crimes Act, but s 13 provides an alternative with a lower threshold because materiality is not required.

The old enforcement ladder for non attendance under ss 7 9 was a two step process: the President or Speaker certified the failure to a Supreme Court judge, and the judge then issued a warrant for arrest and detention. The witness could be held until they gave evidence or until the President or Speaker ordered discharge. That scheme has been declared invalid. As a result, there is currently no express penalty for failing to attend a hearing. The Act does not create a direct offence of non attendance. A committee or House could theoretically refer the matter to the Supreme Court on some other basis, or could seek to punish the non attendance as a contempt under inherent parliamentary power, but that power is not defined in the Act and its exercise is uncertain. The practical upshot is that a witness who simply ignores a summons faces no immediate statutory consequence, though they risk reputational damage and possible referral to the privileges committee.

Enforcement of the s 11 committal warrant relies on the usher of the black rod, the serjeant at arms, and gaolers. Those officers are immune from suit. The warrant must be under the hand of the President or Speaker. There is no prescribed form for the s 11 warrant in the Act, unlike the schedules for ss 7 and 8. That leaves open the possibility of challenge if the warrant is insufficiently precise.

The expenses provisions under s 6 are not penal. A witness who is not paid expenses at the time of service may have a defence to a charge of non attendance, but since there is no current charge for non attendance, the issue is moot. If a party fails to pay the expenses of a witness they summoned, the witness could refuse to attend, but the Act does not say whether that refusal would be excused.

The Act sits within a web of Commonwealth and State legislation and common law principles. The most explicit cross reference is to the Evidence Act 1995. Section 11(1) creates an exception for questions that would require disclosure of a religious confession protected by s 127 of that Act. That is the only privilege expressly imported. The Act does not incorporate other privileges from the Evidence Act, such as legal professional privilege (s 118), privilege against self incrimination (s 128), or public interest immunity (Part 3.10). A witness who refuses to answer on those grounds cannot rely on s 11(1) as a defence and may be committed for contempt. That creates a tension: a witness who would be protected in a court proceeding has no statutory protection before a parliamentary committee under this Act. The common law may imply some protections, but the Act is silent.

The Defamation Act 2005 is referenced in s 12 and the note. Section 12(1) provides that no defamation action lies for words spoken while giving evidence under this Act. Section 12(2) says that operates “in addition to, and not in derogation of” any defence under the Defamation Act 2005. The note explains that s 27(2)(a)(iii) of the Defamation Act confers absolute privilege on the publication of defamatory matter while giving evidence before a “parliamentary body”, which includes a parliament, a house, or a committee. The note does not form part of the Act per s 3(2), but it is a useful statutory pointer. The effect is that a witness has dual coverage: the specific privilege under s 12 and the general absolute privilege under the Defamation Act.

The Act interacts with the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) through s 13. The false evidence offence under this Act is separate from and additional to the offence of perjury under s 327 of the Crimes Act. Prosecutors could choose which charge to bring, or both, subject to double jeopardy principles. The maximum penalty of five years under s 13 matches the current maximum for perjury (also five years), but s 13 does not require the false statement to be material, making it easier to prove.

The Supreme Court Act 1970 and the Civil Procedure Act 2005 are relevant to the now invalid warrant process: the form of the warrant and the judge’s role were prescribed by this Act and the schedules. With ss 7 9 invalid, no further warrants can be issued. The Supreme Court retains its inherent jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus or injunctive relief if a person is detained under a s 11 warrant.

The Act also interacts with the standing orders of each House. The standing orders typically govern the procedure for issuing summonses, the conduct of hearings, and the process for dealing with contempts. This Act provides the statutory skeleton; the standing orders fill the procedural gaps. For example, the Act does not specify what constitutes a “lawful question” - that would be determined by the Chair and subject to the standing orders. The Act also does not specify whether a witness can be accompanied by a legal adviser, or whether the committee can sit in private. Those matters are left to each House’s internal rules.

The Act interacts with the common law of parliamentary privilege. The Bill of Rights 1689 (Imperial) and article 9 of that Bill, which provides that proceedings in Parliament cannot be impeached or questioned in any court, underpins the absolute privilege for parliamentary proceedings. Section 12 of this Act is consistent with that principle. However, the invalidity of ss 7 9 may have implications for the balance between parliamentary privilege and judicial power. The Court of Appeal’s declaration likely rested on constitutional grounds, possibly that the warrant process impermissibly required a judge to act in a non judicial capacity or breached the separation of powers. The Act’s remaining provisions (s 11 in particular) may face similar constitutional challenges in future, since they allow a presiding officer to order detention without judicial oversight.

Finally, the Act refers to “the Colonial Treasurer” and “His Majesty’s officers”. These are anachronistic but are interpreted as references to the current Treasurer and the Crown. The Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) would update those references. The Act does not incorporate the NSW Government Sector Employment Act 2013 or procurement rules, but the payment of expenses from the Consolidated Revenue Fund would need to comply with the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

The Parliamentary Evidence Act 1901 began as a short statute at Federation and has been amended eight times across more than a century. The original text contained sections 1 through 13 and two schedules. The most significant structural change was the insertion of s 14 by the Parliamentary Evidence (Amendment) Act 1939 (No 8). That section extended the definition of “committee” to include joint committees of the Council and Assembly, and provided that the provisions of the Act apply to a joint committee as if it were a committee of the House in which the proposal for its appointment originated. Without that amendment, joint committees would have fallen outside the statutory framework.

The next major cluster of amendments occurred in the 1990s and 2000s. The Evidence Act 1995 (No 27) amended s 11 to insert the reference to s 127 (religious confessions). That brought the Act into line with the new uniform evidence law. In 1999, the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 94) increased the penalty in s 13 from an unspecified original term (likely two years) to five years imprisonment. That harmonised the penalty with the perjury maximum.

The 2001 statute law revision (No 56) was a housekeeping amendment: it repealed the original s 2 and the First Schedule (which contained forms) and substituted modern heading styles for the schedules. It also amended ss 7 and 8 to replace “a Judge of the Supreme Court” with “a Judge of the Supreme Court” in plural form and updated the schedule references. That same amending Act retrospectively validated certain acts done under the old forms.

The Defamation Act 2005 (No 77) amended s 12 by adding a new s 12(2) and the note, making clear that the privilege under this Act operates alongside the absolute privilege under the new uniform defamation law. That was a protective provision to avoid any argument that the Defamation Act impliedly repealed the narrower privilege.

The Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2007 (No 27) amended ss 4 and 6 to replace references to “the Clerk of the Parliaments” and “Clerk of the Assembly” with “the respective Clerks or their delegates” - the precise amendment is not shown but the s 4 heading changed and s 6 was updated. The Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 (No 56) made a further minor amendment to s 11, likely updating a cross reference.

The most critical recent development is not a legislative amendment but a judicial declaration. On 23 December 2025, the Court of Appeal in Cullen v President of the Legislative Council of New South Wales [2025] NSWCA 278 declared ss 7, 8 and 9 invalid. The editorial note in the current legislative text records that declaration. This effectively excises the entire arrest and detention framework for non attendance. No legislative amendment has yet been passed to replace those provisions. The Act therefore operates in a judicially truncated form.

The original s 2 and the First Schedule were repealed in 2001. The current s 2 is a placeholder noting “(Repealed)”. The Second Schedule (now Schedule 2) and Third Schedule (now Schedule 3) contain the forms for the certificate and warrant, which are now redundant since the sections that refer to them are invalid. The forms are still printed in the Act but are legally inoperative.

The only litigation expressly noted in the source text is Cullen v President of the Legislative Council of New South Wales [2025] NSWCA 278, decided on 23 December 2025. The Court of Appeal declared ss 7, 8 and 9 of the Act invalid. The editorial note does not give the reasoning. The case presumably raised constitutional issues concerning the separation of judicial and legislative power. Section 8 required a Supreme Court judge to issue an arrest warrant upon receiving a certificate from the President or Speaker. That process arguably required the judge to act in a ministerial capacity without the independent adjudicative function required of a court under Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution or the New South Wales Constitution. If the judge had no discretion, the provision may have been an invalid attempted conferral of non judicial power on a court. Alternatively, the case may have concerned the scope of parliamentary privilege and whether the Act impermissibly interfered with the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The declaration that s 7 is invalid suggests that the mere act of certifying a failure to attend to a judge was itself unconstitutional. The invalidity of s 9 follows logically: if the warrant cannot be issued, the authority to act under the warrant is also void.

No other litigation is mentioned in the source text. The Act is old and rarely litigated. There may be historical cases about the meaning of “lawful question” or about the immunity under s 11(3), but the source does not provide them. The absence of litigation may reflect the fact that witnesses usually comply voluntarily, or that committees rarely push enforcement to the point of arrest. The invalidity declaration may change that: now that the arrest power is gone, committees may be less able to compel reluctant witnesses, leading to more disputes about whether parliamentary contempt powers can fill the gap. Future litigation may test whether s 11 survives constitutional scrutiny, given that it allows the President or Speaker to order detention without judicial involvement. That would raise issues about the Kable doctrine (requiring courts to maintain institutional integrity) and about whether a parliamentary officer can exercise punitive detention powers consistently with the rule of law.

The editorial note confirms that the declaration was made by the Court of Appeal, which is the highest court in New South Wales for non federal matters. Unless an appeal lies to the High Court on a constitutional matter, the declaration is final. The State government may amend the Act to restore a constitutionally valid enforcement mechanism, or it may leave the gap for inherent parliamentary contempt to handle. Litigation over the scope of that inherent power is likely.

No other judicial pronouncements are cited in the Act. The schedules contain forms that were presumably used for decades without challenge. The Cullen case appears to be the first direct constitutional challenge to the Act’s core enforcement provisions.

Several traps lie in the Act for unwary witnesses, practitioners, and committees. The most urgent is the invalidity of ss 7 9. Anyone reading the Act as printed without noting the editorial note might assume a witness can still be arrested for failing to attend. That is no longer the law. A person who is summoned can simply ignore the summons with no immediate statutory penalty. However, the committee may refer the matter to the House, and the House may find the person in contempt under its inherent powers. The scope of that power is uncertain and may be tested. The safest course is to attend, but the coercive edge has been removed.

A second trap is the narrowness of the privilege against self incrimination. The Act does not incorporate s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995, which protects a witness in court proceedings from being compelled to answer questions that may incriminate them. A witness before a parliamentary committee who refuses to answer on self incrimination grounds may be committed under s 11. The only statutory excuse is religious confession. That means a witness could be jailed for up to one month even though they would have had a valid objection in court. The committee may grant an undertaking not to use the evidence against the witness, but there is no statutory basis for that, and the prosecution for false evidence under s 13 would not be bound by a committee undertaking.

Third, the false evidence offence under s 13 does not require the false statement to be on oath. It applies to any statement made while giving evidence under the Act, whether on oath, affirmation, or declaration. That is broader than perjury. A witness who makes a mistaken statement that they later realise is false may be at risk if the prosecution can prove wilfulness and knowledge at the time. The mens rea is high, but the absence of a materiality element widens the net.

Fourth, the expense provisions require payment at the time of service (s 6(1)). If the person serving the summons does not have the cash or a cheque, the service may be defective. The Act does not say that failure to pay renders the summons invalid, but a witness who is not paid could argue that they are not bound to attend. The committee could contest that, and the issue is untested. For a party who summons a witness at their own instance, the party must pay the expenses; if they do not, the witness may refuse without penalty.

Fifth, the Act does not address legal representation. A witness has no statutory right to have a lawyer present during questioning. The committee may permit it as a matter of grace, but it has no obligation. A witness who is unrepresented may not understand the potential criminal exposure and may inadvertently incriminate themselves or make false statements that lead to prosecution under s 13.

Sixth, the definition of “lawful question” is left to the presiding officer. A question could be unlawful if it seeks a religious confession (s 11(1) exception), or if it is irrelevant to the inquiry, or if it violates the standing orders. But a witness who refuses on the ground that the question is not lawful takes a risk: if the committee disagrees, the witness is committed. There is no interlocutory appeal.

Seventh, the immunity under s 11(3) protects those acting under the authority of s 11, including the usher of the black rod and gaolers. That immunity is broad: “no person acting under the authority of this section shall incur any liability, civil or criminal, for such act.” That means a gaoler who holds a person for longer than the warrant specifies may still be protected if they acted under the authority of the section. The warrant itself must be accurate. A clerical error in the warrant could lead to unlawful detention, but the gaoler’s immunity may still apply if they followed the warrant.

Eighth, the Act does not limit the number of times a committee can issue a summons to the same witness. A witness who attends and answers questions on one day could be summoned again the next day for further examination. The contempt provisions apply to each occasion.

Ninth, joint committees are treated as committees of the House in which the proposal originated (s 14). That determines which presiding officer signs warrants and which clerk serves summonses. If the proposal originated in the Assembly, the Speaker and Clerk of the Assembly handle the process; if in the Council, the President and Clerk of the Parliaments. A witness summoned by a joint committee needs to know which regime applies to ensure correct service.

Tenth, the Act refers to “Colonial Treasurer” and “His Majesty’s officers”. These are historical and are read as the Treasurer and the Crown, but a service user might be confused. The schedules still use “His Majesty” and “one thousand nine hundred” as if the forms were never updated after 1901.

Finally, the Act does not provide for compensation for wrongful committal under s 11. If a witness is committed for refusing a question that is later found not to be lawful, the witness has no statutory right to damages. The immunity under s 11(3) would protect the officers, and the President or Speaker is likely protected by parliamentary privilege. The witness would need to seek a declaration from the Supreme Court that the committal was invalid, which is a costly and uncertain process.

If you are an individual who receives a summons to appear before the Legislative Council, Legislative Assembly, or a committee, the first step is to verify that the summons complies with s 4: it must be signed by the Clerk of the Parliaments or Clerk of the Assembly (for a House summons) or by the Chair of the committee (for a committee summons), and it must have been personally served on you. If it was left in your mailbox or emailed, that is not personal service under the Act. You should check whether expenses were paid at the time of service. If not, you have a strong argument that the summons is not enforceable, though the safest course is to contact the committee secretariat to arrange payment before the hearing date. Keep a record of any refusal to pay.

If the summons appears valid, you must decide whether to attend. The arrest and detention provisions under ss 7 9 are invalid, so you cannot be arrested or detained for failing to attend. However, the House may refer the matter to its privileges committee and may ultimately find you in contempt under its inherent powers. The consequences of that are uncertain but could include a formal reprimand, suspension of rights, or other sanctions. If you have a legitimate reason not to attend (e.g., illness, conflicting statutory duty), you should write to the President or Speaker or the committee chair explaining the reason and seeking an adjournment or exemption. There is no statutory procedure for this, but it is prudent.

If you decide to attend, you should consider legal representation. The Act does not guarantee a right to a lawyer, but most committees allow a legal adviser to be present. You should ask the committee secretariat in advance. Your lawyer may not be able to address the committee or object to questions, but they can advise you during breaks. You may need to decide whether to answer a question you consider unlawful or incriminating. If you refuse, the presiding officer may warn you and then issue a committal warrant under s 11. That warrant can be executed immediately, and you could be held for up to one month. You should therefore only refuse to answer if you are confident the question is not “lawful” within the meaning of the Act and the standing orders. The only safe harbour under the Act is for questions seeking disclosure of a religious confession (s 127 Evidence Act 1995). If you refuse on any other ground, you take a significant risk.

Before the hearing, you should review any relevant documents and ensure that any evidence you intend to give is truthful and accurate. The false evidence offence under s 13 carries up to five years imprisonment. If you do not know the answer to a question, say so. Do not guess. If you realise during the hearing that you have made an inaccurate statement, correct it immediately. The offence requires wilfulness and knowledge of falsity, so a prompt correction may negate the mens rea.

If you are asked to take an oath and you have a conscientious objection, you may request to make a solemn declaration instead, under s 10(3). The chair should grant that request if you would be permitted to declare in the Supreme Court. Be prepared to state your objection.

After the hearing, you should obtain a copy of the transcript and review it for any potential false statements. If you find an error, notify the committee in writing as soon as possible. Do not discuss your evidence with others in a way that could lead to accusations of conspiracy or false evidence.

If you are a party who summons a witness at your own instance, you must pay their reasonable expenses at the time of service. Calculate them according to the Supreme Court scale. If you fail to pay, the witness may not attend, and the committee may blame you for the delay.

If you are a committee chair or clerk, ensure that the summons is personally served and that expenses are paid. Record the time, method of service, and receipt. If a witness refuses to attend, you cannot now ask the President or Speaker to certify the failure to a Supreme Court judge. You may instead consider reporting the matter to the House for a potential contempt proceeding. If a witness refuses to answer a question, you should state clearly that the question is lawful and that failure to answer will be treated as contempt. If the witness persists, the chair can issue a committal warrant under s 11 for up to one month. The warrant should state the term and be signed and sealed. You should ensure the witness is taken into custody by the usher of the black rod or serjeant at arms, and if the House so orders, to gaol. The gaoler must hold the person for the term specified. Keep a copy of the warrant and a record of the detention.

If you are a gaoler or officer who receives a person under a s 11 warrant, you are immune from liability under s 11(3) provided you act in accordance with the warrant. Check the warrant for the correct name and term. Do not hold the person beyond the term stated. If the order appears irregular, seek legal advice before acting.

For compliance practitioners advising clients who are summoned, the key message is that the Act is outdated and partially invalid. Advise clients to attend voluntarily to avoid the uncertainty of inherent contempt proceedings. If they have concerns about self incrimination, explain that the Act provides no statutory protection and that a refusal may lead to committal. Suggest that they seek an undertaking from the committee not to use the evidence in any subsequent prosecution, but note that such an undertaking may not be legally binding on a future prosecutor. Given the five year maximum for false evidence, any client who intends to give evidence should prepare thoroughly and be accompanied by a lawyer even if the lawyer cannot speak. The invalidity of ss 7 9 means that the client cannot be arrested for non attendance, but the House may apply political pressure or use other informal sanctions. Monitor any developments in the Cullen aftermath: the government may introduce amending legislation to restore a constitutional enforcement mechanism, or new case law may clarify the scope of s 11.