The Act organises several interlocking legal and administrative concepts around the election period.

• Independent officer of Parliament: The PBO is created as an independent officer of Parliament (s 5(1)), but with a statutory limitation that only functions conferred by statute attach to that office (s 5(2)). This defines the scope of statutory independence: independence exists as a status, but not as a source of implied powers beyond those in the Act.

• Appointment and term structure: The Presiding Officers appoint the PBO for each State general election (s 6(1)). The appointment must be from a list recommended by a panel consisting of the Ombudsman, the Information Commissioner and the Chair of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (s 6(2)). The appointment is full‑time and the term cannot extend beyond three months after the relevant election (s 7(1); s 6(4)). Acting PBOs can be appointed from Parliamentary Budget Office staff (s 8).

• Operational plan and parliamentary oversight: The PBO must prepare an operational plan setting objectives and a schedule of activities; it must be provided to and approved by the Presiding Officers and tabled in each House (s 14). The Public Accounts Committee may monitor and review the PBO and receive the operational plan and a post‑election report (s 15).

• Election costing regime: The core operational concept is a statutory process for election policy costings. Parliamentary leaders may request costings only for policies to be implemented after the next State general election (s 18(2)); requests must be written and detailed (s 18(5)). The PBO must prepare costings and provide them to the requesting leader “as soon as possible” (s 21(1)). The PBO must publicly release costings when the leader notifies that the policy has been publicly announced (s 22(2)), and must prepare consolidated budget impact statements showing the assessed impacts on the current year and forward estimates, including sectoral financial indicators (s 23(1)-(2B)).

• Information access and confidentiality: The PBO has a statutory power to request information from government agencies (s 16(1)). Heads of agencies must respond within prescribed business‑day timeframes (s 16(2)), but may refuse where disclosure is contrary to an overriding public interest under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 or otherwise denied under that Act (s 16(3)). The Act imposes strict limits on disclosure of information obtained under s 16: agency heads, agency staff and Department staff are forbidden from disclosing such material except to specified persons (ss 16(4)-(5)) and face a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units for unauthorised disclosure. The PBO and PBO staff are similarly subject to confidentiality obligations in relation to material provided by parliamentary leaders or prepared for costings, again with a 50‑penalty‑unit maximum for unauthorised disclosure (s 17).

• Timetabled public release: The Act sets a timetable for the PBO’s consolidated public outputs. Draft budget impact statements are provided to leaders 15 days before the poll is due; leaders supply final lists by the ninth last day; the PBO publicly releases final budget impact statements and associated costings and requests on the fifth last day (s 23(3)-(6)). The Secretary of the Treasury must publish a pre‑election budget update statement on or soon after the commencement of the caretaker period (s 24).

• Limits and revisions: The PBO may issue guidelines about requests and preparation of costings (s 25), may revise costings or budget impact statements to correct errors at any time (s 26), and may refuse to produce a costing if it cannot be done and must inform the leader of the reasons (s 21(2)). The Act also provides that PBO staff are employed by the Presiding Officers but directions in relation to the PBO’s functions may only be given by the PBO or an authorised PBO staff member (s 11(1)-(3)).

These concepts combine statutory rights to information, time‑tabled outputs to influence the pre‑election information environment, and confidentiality and control mechanisms that allocate responsibilities across parliamentary, executive and departmental actors.

Primary actors and the material effects the Act imposes on them:

• Parliamentary Budget Officer and Parliamentary Budget Office staff: The PBO is the central actor, appointed by the Presiding Officers (s 6). The PBO must work full time during his or her term and cannot take paid employment outside the office without Presiding Officers’ approval (s 6(4)). The PBO must prepare an operational plan (s 14), prepare election policy costings on request (ss 12, 21), issue budget impact statements (s 23) and keep certain information confidential (s 17). PBO staff are employed by the Presiding Officers and are under their joint control, but operational directions in relation to PBO functions may only be given by the PBO or an authorised PBO staff member (s 11(1)-(3)). Acting PBOs must be staff of the Parliamentary Budget Office (s 8(3)) and are entitled to remuneration as determined by the Presiding Officers (s 8(4)).

• Presiding Officers (President of the Legislative Council and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly): They appoint the PBO and or acting PBO (ss 6, 8), approve the PBO’s operational plan (s 14(4)), and have joint control of Parliamentary Budget Office staff (s 11(2)). If both Presiding Officers were last elected as endorsed candidates of the same registered party, they must include a deputy Presiding Officer from another registered party for decisions under the Act (s 4(2)); joint decisions are required (s 4(1)). The Presiding Officers may remove the PBO for misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence (s 9(2)).

• Parliamentary leaders (Premier and Leader of the Opposition): They may request election policy costings (s 18(1)). Subsection 18(1A) places a non‑enforceable obligation on parliamentary leaders to have costed all their party’s policies likely to impact the forward estimates and to advise the PBO on the fifth last day before the election that they have notified all such policies; the Act explicitly states that this obligation is not enforceable in a court or tribunal. Parliamentary leaders decide which policies to release publicly and thereby trigger the PBO’s public release obligations (s 22(2)); they must notify the PBO of a policy announcement (s 21(4)) and must supply detailed requests and final lists within the statutory timetable relevant to the budget impact statement (s 23(3)-(5)). A leader may withdraw a request before the PBO has publicly released the costing (s 20).

• Government agency heads and agency staff: They must respond to PBO requests for information within prescribed business‑day timeframes (s 16(2)) unless disclosure is contrary to an overriding public interest under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 or otherwise denied under that Act (s 16(3)). Agency heads and staff are subject to restrictions on disclosing material provided under s 16, with a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units for unauthorised disclosure (s 16(4)-(5)). The PBO may share copies of a request and response with the Secretary or Department staff (s 16(3A)).

• Secretary and Department staff: The Secretary may receive copies of requests and responses and is limited in onward disclosure: only to Department staff, the Secretary, or to an incoming government after an election if it relates to that incoming party’s election policies (s 16(3A), s 16(5)). The Secretary faces the same 50‑penalty‑unit limit on unauthorised disclosure (s 16(5)).

• The Treasurer / Secretary of the Treasury: The Secretary of the Treasury must publicly release a pre‑election budget update statement on or soon after the commencement of the caretaker period, with specified content and format (s 24(1)-(4)). This imposes a timetable and content obligation on Treasury officials.

• Political parties and registered parties: The Act uses the concept of a “registered party” in definitions (s 3). Registered parties’ policies become subject to the PBO system when announced by parliamentary leaders or their nominated representatives (s 18(6)).

• Incoming Government: The Secretary or Department staff may disclose information provided under s 16(3A)(b) to an incoming Government following a State general election, but only if the information relates to election policies of a party forming that incoming Government (s 16(5)(b)).

Secondary effects and likely operational burdens:

• Agency compliance burden: Agencies must find and supply information within compressed timeframes (10 business days pre‑caretaker, 6 business days during caretaker) and justify refusals under GIPA if they claim an overriding public interest against disclosure (s 16(2)-(3)). This creates a resource allocation question for agency information management and legal assessment.

• Presiding Officers’ procedural load: Presiding Officers must approve operational plans, appoint the PBO from recommended lists and exercise removal powers; they also control staff employment though day‑to‑day directions are limited (ss 6, 9, 11, 14).

• Electoral information environment: The Act creates a predictable public timetable for consolidated budget impact statements and related costings, affecting campaign publication strategies (s 23).

The Act therefore affects executive agency resourcing, parliamentary administration, political leaders’ campaign behaviour, and the PBO’s own staffing and operational arrangements.

This section describes the statutory duties on key actors and the rights the Act creates.

Duties of the Parliamentary Budget Officer

• Prepare costings: The PBO must prepare a costing “as soon as possible” after receiving an election costing request and provide it to the parliamentary leader who made the request (s 21(1)). If unable to provide a costing, the PBO must inform the leader of the inability and reasons (s 21(2)). The PBO may seek further written information from the requesting leader (s 21(3)).

• Operational plan: The PBO must prepare an operational plan detailing objectives and a schedule of activities, present a draft to the Presiding Officers within one month of appointment, take the approved plan into account when exercising functions and table the approved plan in each House via the Presiding Officer (s 14(1)-(6)).

• Publication duties: The PBO must publicly release election costing requests and the corresponding election policy costings when a leader notifies that the policy has been publicly announced (s 22(2)). The PBO must prepare separate budget impact statements for each parliamentary leader’s costed policies, showing assessed financial impacts on the current year and forward estimates and certain sectoral indicators (s 23(1)-(2B)). The PBO must provide a draft budget impact statement to each leader 15 days before the poll is due, accept final lists by the ninth last day, and publicly release final budget impact statements and related costings and requests on the fifth last day before the poll (s 23(3)-(6)). The PBO may publicly release revisions to a final budget impact statement after the final release if further costings are made thereafter (s 23(7)).

• Information requests: The PBO has the right to request information from the head of any government agency to assist in preparing a costing (s 16(1)). The PBO may provide copies of requests and responses to the Secretary or Department staff (s 16(3A)).

• Guidelines and revision: The PBO may issue guidelines on making requests and preparing costings (s 25) and is permitted to revise costings or budget impact statements to correct errors at any time (s 26).

Duties of parliamentary leaders

• Requesting costings: A parliamentary leader may request costings for policies announced or proposed by that leader, limited to policies implemented after the next State general election (s 18(1)-(4)). Requests must be written, fully outline each policy and state the purpose (s 18(5)).

• Notification obligations: A parliamentary leader must notify the PBO in writing on the fifth last day before the poll that all party policies likely to impact the forward estimates have been notified to the PBO, but that obligation is non‑justiciable (s 18(1A)). The leader is required to notify the PBO of the public announcement of policies that have been costed (s 21(4)). Leaders must advise the PBO of their final list of costed policies by the ninth last day to be included in the consolidated budget impact statement (s 23(4)).

• Withdrawal right: A leader may withdraw a request in writing at any time before the PBO publicly releases the corresponding costing (s 20(1)-(2)).

Duties of government agency heads and staff

• Response duty: The head of a government agency must respond to a PBO information request within 10 business days if requested before caretaker commencement, within 6 business days if on or after commencement, or within any other period agreed between the head and the PBO (s 16(2)). The head is not required to provide information if there is an overriding public interest against disclosure under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 or if access would otherwise be denied under that Act, and must inform the PBO of the reason for not providing information (s 16(3)).

• Confidentiality duty: The head and any member of staff must not disclose information provided under s 16 except to specified persons within the agency or to the Secretary/Department staff (s 16(4)). There is a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units for breaches of ss 16(4) and (5).

Duties of the Secretary/Department staff

• Limited disclosure: The Secretary or Department staff who receive copies of requests/responses may not disclose the material other than to Department staff or the Secretary, and may disclose to an incoming Government after an election only if the material relates to the incoming Government’s election policies (s 16(5)).

Rights and controls held by Presiding Officers

• Appointment and removal: Presiding Officers appoint the PBO from panel‑recommended candidates and may remove the PBO for misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence (ss 6(1)-(3); 9(2)). They approve and may request changes to the PBO's operational plan (s 14(3)-(5)). Where both Presiding Officers were last elected as endorsed candidates of the same registered party, they must act jointly with a deputy Presiding Officer from a different party for the relevant actions (s 4(2)).

Rights of Treasury and the public sector

• Pre‑election update duty: The Secretary of the Treasury must publicly release a pre‑election budget update statement on or soon after commencement of the caretaker period setting out specified projections, revisions and explanations and using consistent format and forecast assumptions (s 24(1)-(4)). This duty places an obligation on Treasury officials to prepare baseline fiscal information timed to the electoral period.

Enforcement rights and constraints

• Confidentiality penalties: Unauthorised disclosure by agency heads/staff, Department staff or PBO staff of material in defined categories can attract a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units (ss 16(4)-(5); 17(2)). Proceedings for offences under the Act are to be handled summarily in the Local Court (s 28). Removal of the PBO is an internal parliamentary decision by Presiding Officers (s 9(2)).

The Act therefore creates a procedurally detailed rights‑and‑duties matrix: a right for the PBO to obtain information and produce independent costings, duties on agencies to respond swiftly unless a statutory GIPA exception applies, duties on leaders to engage with the timetable if they want their policies included in consolidated public statements, and confidentiality duties backed by penalty units.

The Act contains a limited set of enforcement mechanisms, primarily directed at protecting confidential information and prescribing how breaches are to be dealt with.

Confidentiality and criminal penalties

• Agency and Department disclosure offences: Section 16(4) and (5) make it an offence for the head of a Government agency, any member of staff of a Government agency, the Secretary or a member of staff of the Department to disclose information or documents provided under s 16, except as expressly permitted by the section. The maximum penalty for contravening subsections (4) or (5) is 50 penalty units (s 16 final line). The text does not specify aggravated forms of disclosure or separate civil remedies; it prescribes a single maximum monetary penalty expressed in penalty units.

• PBO confidentiality offences: Section 17(2) imposes the same maximum penalty , 50 penalty units , on the Parliamentary Budget Officer and any member of staff of the Parliamentary Budget Office who disclose information or documents covered by that section except in specified circumstances (s 17(2)). Section 17(1) delineates the kinds of information and documents subject to this confidentiality rule (information provided by parliamentary leaders for costings and material prepared by the PBO for costings), and s 17(2) permits disclosure only to the requesting leader (in the case of an election costing request by a parliamentary leader) or to another member of PBO staff, with specific exceptions set out in s 17(3).

Proceedings and forum

• Summary proceedings: Proceedings for any offence under this Act are to be dealt with summarily before the Local Court (s 28). The Act therefore channels criminal enforcement through the Local Court as summary proceedings, implying no indictable pathways are specified in the Act.

Non‑criminal mechanisms

• Removal of the PBO: The Presiding Officers have power to remove the Parliamentary Budget Officer from office for misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence (s 9(2)). The Act does not prescribe a formal process or independent tribunal for such a removal; the power is lodged with the Presiding Officers, and the Act does not set out procedural guarantees, review rights or a required standard of proof for removal within its text.

• Procedural transparency: The Act requires the PBO to inform parliamentary leaders if a costing cannot be provided and of the reasons (s 21(2)); it requires agency heads who refuse to provide requested information under s 16(3) to inform the PBO of the reason. Those requirements create administrative transparency obligations but do not, in the Act, provide a binding dispute resolution or review mechanism where disagreements arise concerning refusals to disclose information.

• Regulatory scope and review: The Act empowers the Governor to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act for carrying it into effect (s 29). The Minister must review the Act as soon as possible after five years from assent and table a report within 12 months after that five‑year period (s 30). Those provisions allow the legislative and executive branches to refine enforcement and operational detail over time.

Limits and implementation characteristics

• Penalty unit basis: The Act specifies maximum penalties by reference to penalty units rather than fixed monetary sums. The amount of a penalty unit is set by separate legislation; the Act itself does not state the dollar equivalent.

• Summary jurisdiction only: The Act confines judicial enforcement of offences under it to summary proceedings in the Local Court (s 28), which typically carry limits on penalties and are procedurally quicker and less formal than higher court or indictable processes. The Act does not identify civil penalties, injunctions or administrative sanctions aside from removal of the PBO or the ordinary operation of departmental discipline.

In short, the Act’s enforcement architecture focuses on preventing unauthorised disclosure (substantial monetary penalties by reference to penalty units), places removal power for the PBO with the Presiding Officers, channels enforcement through summary Local Court procedures, and leaves adequacy of administrative review mechanisms for refusals of information to the parties and to possible regulation or future legislative review.

The Act contains express cross‑references to a number of existing statutes and constitutional provisions and situates its regime within that broader legal framework.

Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA)

• Overriding public interest and refusal of disclosure: Section 16(3) expressly allows the head of a government agency to refuse to provide information requested by the PBO if “there is an overriding public interest against the disclosure of the information for the purposes of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 or if access to the information would otherwise be denied under that Act.” This imports the GIPA Act’s public interest balancing and refusal grounds into the PBO’s information access regime. The head of agency must inform the PBO of the reason for non‑provision (s 16(3)). The PBO’s access right is therefore not absolute; it is subject to existing public access law.

Government Sector Finance Act 2018 and Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012

• Forward estimates and pre‑election updates: The Act’s definition of “pre‑election half‑yearly budget review” references the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (s 3 definitions). The content requirements for the pre‑election budget update statement include an update of matters required by section 8(b) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (s 24(2)(f)). This links the PBO/Treasury outputs to the accounting and fiscal disclosure framework established by those Acts and ensures consistency of format, assumptions and policy across statutory fiscal reporting instruments.

Constitution Act 1902

• Presiding Officers’ deputies and continuity: Section 4 refers to sections of the Constitution Act 1902 concerning acting and deputy Presiding Officers (noting sections 22G and 31A of the Constitution Act 1902), indicating how substitution operates if Presiding Officers are absent or acting. The Act therefore presumes the constitutional arrangements for parliamentary officeholders.

Electoral Act 2017

• Registered party concept: The definition of “registered party” in s 3 is taken from Part 6 of the Electoral Act 2017. This ensures that the Act’s references to parties and the requirement in s 4(2) about deputy Presiding Officers interact with the electoral registration framework.

Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975

• Remuneration: The PBO’s pay is to be determined in accordance with that Act (s 10(a)), so the Act defers to the general statutory framework for remunerating statutory officeholders.

Regulations and review

• Regulation‑making power: Section 29 allows the Governor to make regulations to give effect to the Act, including savings and transitional provisions consequent on amendments. That creates a route to implement detailed procedural requirements or modifications consistent with the Act. Section 30 requires a statutory review of the Act within five years, enabling a legislatively mandated interaction between this Act and subsequent policy or statutory reforms.

Operational interactions

• Departmental confidentiality and incoming governments: Section 16(5) permits the Secretary or Department staff to disclose information received under s 16 to an incoming government after a State general election only if the information relates to election policies of a party forming the incoming Government. That provision interacts with normal public sector transition arrangements and the release of cabinet or policy material during handover periods.

Limitation and primacy features

• No implied functions: The Act specifies that the PBO’s functions are only those conferred by the Act or other Acts and that no implied rights, obligations or immunities arise from the PBO’s status as an independent officer (s 5(2)). This positions the PBO’s statutory functions within the legislative framework and avoids read‑in implied powers that might otherwise derive from independence.

In practice, the Act places the PBO’s information access and publication timetable inside the existing statutory architecture governing public information, remuneration, electoral parties and parliamentary constitution. The GIPA Act is the primary statutory constraint on the PBO’s reach into agency information, while other fiscal and constitutional statutes provide content and institutional cross‑checks on the PBO’s products and personnel arrangements.

The Act’s text includes footnotes indicating a series of amendments across multiple years. The source identifies amendments and repeals applied to numerous sections, and certain sections or schedules have been repealed. The Act as provided includes direct footnotes noting specific amendment instruments and years; these are the statutory markers available in the source.

Key recorded amendments and repeals in the source

• 2013 reforms: Multiple sections show amendment annotations to 2013. For example, s 3 carries a footnote that records amendments in 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [1]-[3]. Sections 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23 and s 29 show amendment footnotes pointing to the 2013 amending instrument (Sch 1 entries). Specifics in the Act indicate that s 6 was amended (s 6: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [4]), s 7 substitution (s 7: Subst 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [5]), and s 9 amendments (s 9: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [6] [7]). Sections 14 and 15 were amended or substituted (s 14: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [9]; s 15: Subst 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [10]). Section 16 was amended (s 16: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [11]). Section 17 was amended (s 17: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [12] [13]). Section 18 amended (s 18: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [14]). Section 19 substituted (s 19: Subst 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [15]). Section 23 amended (s 23: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [16]-[20]). Section 29 amended (s 29: Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [21]). The Act’s structure shows that a significant omnibus set of modifications occurred in 2013.

• 2017 annotation: The definition section s 3 includes a footnote indicating an amendment by 2017 No 66, Sch 8.18. That suggests at least definitional adjustments to link with other Acts or updated terminology occurred in 2017.

• 2018 amendments: Several sections identify amendments in 2018. Section 3 has footnotes referring to 2018 No 52 and 2018 No 70, and s 14, s 16, s 20, s 23 and s 24 carry explicit 2018 amendment annotations (for example, s 14: Am 2018 No 52, Sch 1 [3]; s 16: Am 2018 No 52, Sch 1 [4]-[6]; s 20: Am 2018 No 52, Sch 1 [7]; s 23: Am 2018 No 52, Sch 1 [8] [9]; s 24: Subst 2018 No 52, Sch 1 [10]). These amendments include adjustments to operational plan provisions, timeframes and the pre‑election budget update statement. Section 24 was substituted by 2018 No 52.

• 2023 amendment: Section 3 and s 16 show amendments linked to 2023 No 35, Sch 4.31 [1] [2] and [2] respectively, indicating more recent refinements affecting definitions and the PBO’s access/ confidentiality provisions.

Repeals and removals

• Section 13: The Act records that s 13 has been repealed (s 13: Rep 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [8]).

• Section 31 and Schedule 1: The Act notes that s 31 has been repealed and that Schedule 1 is repealed (s 31: Rep 1987 No 15, sec 30C; sch 1: Rep 1987 No 15, sec 30C). Those repeals pre‑date many of the later amendments and reflect earlier legislative housekeeping.

Limitations of the source annotation

• The source provides sectional amendment footnotes but not the full text of the amending Acts or the explanatory memoranda. The annotations show the years and schedule references for amendment instruments (for example, “Am 2013 No 25, Sch 1 [11]”), but do not provide the detailed content of those amendments beyond what appears in the consolidated text before you. The source therefore confirms that substantial amendments were enacted in 2013, 2017, 2018 and 2023, and that specific provisions (e.g. s 24) were substituted in 2018, while other sections were repealed or replaced, but it does not supply the legislative history narrative or the original text versions.

Practical reading

• From the Act text and footnotes it is clear that the statutory framework has been reviewed and updated at multiple points, and that the present consolidated form reflects amendments affecting appointment mechanics, operational plan duties, information access timeframes and pre‑election reporting obligations. Any practitioner seeking the precise historical sequence of textual changes or the reasons for each amendment should consult the specified amending Acts (for example, 2013 No 25, 2018 No 52, 2017 No 66, 2023 No 35) and their explanatory materials cited in the footnotes.

The Act as provided contains no case citations, no references to judicial interpretation, and no annotated litigation history. The statutory text mentions only internal parliamentary oversight and administrative processes; it does not cite any judgments or decisions.

What the source allows us to say, factually:

• The Act itself does not identify any judicial proceedings interpreting its provisions, nor does it list any cases. The only enforcement references are to summary proceedings in the Local Court for offences under the Act (s 28), removal of the PBO by the Presiding Officers for misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence (s 9(2)), and the 50 penalty‑unit maximum for specified disclosure offences (ss 16(4)-(5); 17(2)).

• Therefore, based on the text provided, there is no internal record in this instrument of litigation or judicial determination concerning the PBO’s powers, confidentiality obligations, or the information‑access regime created by the Act.

How to proceed if litigation history is required

• To determine whether courts have considered or interpreted this Act, a practitioner should search court databases and legal reporting services for decisions referencing the Parliamentary Budget Officer Act 2010 or its provisions (for example, searches for s 16, s 17, s 21, s 23 or s 9 decisions), and review parliamentary and departmental records for any legal disputes concerning refusals to provide information under s 16 or alleged unauthorised disclosures. The Act itself provides no litigation references to draw on.

This Act contains a number of technical features and operational traps for the unwary. The following points identify specific provisions that can generate compliance, timing, discretion or institutional tensions.

Non‑justiciable leader obligation

• Section 18(1A) creates an obligation on a parliamentary leader to have costed all party policies likely to impact current and forward estimates and to advise the PBO on the fifth last day before the election that all such policies have been notified. The Act expressly states that this subsection does not place an obligation enforceable in a court or tribunal. This means that the statutory timetable and consolidated release regime are dependent on voluntary compliance by leaders for comprehensiveness; the PBO’s remit to include policies in the consolidated budget impact statement depends on the leader’s cooperation (s 18(1A) contrasted with s 23(4)-(6)).

Timing and compressed response windows

• Agency response windows: Agency heads must respond to PBO information requests within 10 business days before the caretaker period, but within 6 business days once the caretaker period has commenced (s 16(2)). The PBO must prepare costings “as soon as possible” after receipt of a request (s 21(1)). The compressed timeframes, particularly during caretaker, can create practical difficulties for agencies required to assemble material, perform legal GIPA assessments and provide quality inputs on short notice. The Act provides that the head may agree a different period with the PBO, but absent agreement the default windows apply.

Confidentiality exceptions and GIPA overlay

• GIPA exceptions: Section 16(3) permits agency heads to refuse to provide information where disclosure would be contrary to an overriding public interest under GIPA or otherwise denied under GIPA. That means the PBO’s access is not absolute and may be frustrated for legitimate public interest or secrecy reasons. Agencies must inform the PBO of reasons for refusal, but the Act does not specify a dispute resolution mechanism. Practitioners should be alert to the potential for contested GIPA assessments to delay or limit costings.

Limits on disclosure by Department and PBO staff

• Restricted sharing: Information provided under s 16 can be shared by an agency head only within the agency or with the Department Secretary/staff (s 16(4)). The Secretary may only disclose to Department staff or to an incoming Government where the material relates to that incoming party’s election policies (s 16(5)(b)). The PBO and PBO staff are separately prohibited from disclosing certain material except to the requesting leader or PBO staff (s 17(2)). Breaches attract a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units. These limits require careful internal record‑keeping and tightly controlled information flows; inadvertent disclosure by staff can carry criminal exposure.

Presiding Officers’ control and appointment constraints

• Appointment from panel list: The Presiding Officers must appoint the PBO from a list recommended by a panel comprising the Ombudsman, Information Commissioner and Chair of IPART (s 6(2)); if Presiding Officers decline a candidate they require a further list (s 6(3)). The requirement for joint action (s 4(1)) and the deputy Presiding Officer rule where both were last elected from the same registered party (s 4(2)) can complicate or delay appointment. Presiding Officers also approve the operational plan and may remove the PBO (ss 14(3)-(5); 9(2)). These structural features concentrate key appointment and removal decisions in parliamentary officeholders.

Short, election‑tied term and continuity risk

• Appointment per election and limited term: The PBO is appointed for each State general election, with each appointment effective on or soon after 1 September before the election and term limited to no more than three months after the election (ss 6(1); 7(1)). This election‑centric, time‑limited model reduces the PBO’s continuity between elections and may inhibit long‑term capacity building inside the Parliamentary Budget Office. Acting PBOs may be appointed from staff, but continuity between electoral cycles is constrained by design.

Publication triggers and sequencing

• Public release inconsistencies: There are multiple triggers for public release. Section 22(2) requires the PBO to publicly release a request and the costing when the leader notifies that the policy has been publicly announced. Section 23(6) requires the PBO to publicly release costing requests and costings for all policies listed in a budget impact statement when releasing that statement on the fifth last day. A leader’s failure to notify an announcement or to meet the final list deadline could exclude policies from the consolidated release, even if the PBO has prepared costings. Practitioners should map the precise sequencing obligations (draft 15th last day, final list by ninth last day, public release on fifth last day) to ensure inclusion (s 23(3)-(6)).

Direction of PBO staff vs. Presiding Officers’ employment control

• Employment and direction split: PBO staff are employed by the Presiding Officers and are under their joint control (s 11(1)-(2)), yet directions to PBO staff in relation to PBO functions may only be given by the PBO or an authorised PBO staff member (s 11(3)). This creates a structural separation between employment control and operational direction that can lead to tensions in day‑to‑day management, HR matters and accountability if Presiding Officers and the PBO disagree about operational needs or staff allocation.

Removal and lack of prescribed process

• Removal without detailed process: The Presiding Officers may remove the PBO for misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence (s 9(2)), but the Act does not prescribe an independent tribunal, evidentiary standard or appeal mechanism for such a removal. That could raise questions about removal process fairness or the scope of review.

Local Court summary processes and penalty unit references

• Penalty and forum implications: The maximum penalties are expressed in penalty units (ss 16(4)-(5); 17(2)), and offences are to be prosecuted summarily in the Local Court (s 28). Practitioners should confirm the current dollar value of a penalty unit and the Local Court’s maximum sentencing regime to calculate practical exposure.

In short, the main operational “gotchas” are timing pressures, confidentiality‑driven information controls, the dependence on leader cooperation for inclusion in consolidated statements, the Presiding Officers’ central appointment and removal powers, and the short, election‑linked appointment model that limits continuity.

This section sets out practical, source‑grounded steps for the main actors to comply with the Act and manage operational risk. All compliance measures refer directly to the statutory provisions cited.

For government agency heads and agency staff (responding to s 16 requests)

• Establish rapid response procedures: Because s 16(2) requires a response within 10 business days before the caretaker period and within 6 business days during the caretaker period, agencies should establish a standing PBO request response protocol, with nominated officers, checklists for common data sets and ready access to legal advice on GIPA public interest tests.

• GIPA assessment workflow: Where a potential overriding public interest against disclosure exists under the GIPA Act, document the legal analysis and the reason for refusal in writing and promptly inform the PBO as required by s 16(3). Maintain contemporaneous records of searches for relevant documents, legal advice obtained and communications with the PBO.

• Confidential handling and internal notices: Implement controlled information handling procedures to ensure that material provided to the PBO under s 16 is not disclosed beyond the authorised recipients (s 16(4)). Mark documents clearly, maintain limited distribution lists and train staff on the 50‑penalty‑unit exposure set out in ss 16(4)-(5).

For the Parliamentary Budget Officer and PBO staff

• Operational plan priority: Prepare the operational plan promptly after appointment and provide a draft to the Presiding Officers within one month (s 14(2)-(3)). Ensure the plan includes realistic timelines that align with the statutory deadlines (draft budget impact statements 15 days before poll, final list by ninth last day, public release on fifth last day) (s 23(3)-(6)).

• Manage agency interactions: When issuing information requests under s 16, set out the scope, format and rationale clearly. Use the statutory timeframes as the baseline (s 16(2)), and where more time is necessary negotiate a different period with the agency (s 16(2)(c)). Keep records of requests and responses and exercise s 16(3A) to provide copies to the Secretary where appropriate.

• Confidentiality compliance: Ensure strict internal protocols for handling information provided by parliamentary leaders (s 17(1)). Disclosures must be limited to the requesting leader (for election costing requests) or to PBO staff (s 17(2)). Use document classification, access controls and training to mitigate the risk of unauthorised disclosure and associated 50‑penalty‑unit exposure.

• Publication timetabling: Maintain a publication calendar keyed to the statutory timetable in s 23 and s 24. Provide draft budget impact statements to leaders on the fifteenth last day (s 23(3)), request final lists by the ninth last day (s 23(4)), and prepare for public release on the fifth last day (s 23(5)-(6)). Track any revisions and use s 26 to correct errors post‑release if necessary.

For parliamentary leaders and their nominees

• Early engagement and completeness: Prepare and submit election costing requests after the PBO’s operational plan has been approved and tabled (s 19(1)). To ensure inclusion in the consolidated budget impact statement, meet the statutory deadlines: expect the draft statement 15 days before the poll and provide the final list by the ninth last day (s 23(3)-(5)). Note the non‑enforceable obligation in s 18(1A) to have all material policies costed and to advise the PBO on the fifth last day, but plan practical compliance if inclusion in consolidated public statements is desired.

• Request drafting: Ensure requests are in writing and fully outline each policy with relevant details and the purpose of the policy, as required by s 18(5). If PBO asks for additional information under s 21(3), respond promptly to avoid delaying costings.

• Withdrawal and publicity coordination: If withdrawing a request, deliver written notice prior to public release (s 20(1)-(2)). Coordinate public announcements with the PBO to trigger public release under s 22(2) and to ensure the costing is released in tandem with the announcement where desired.

For the Secretary of the Treasury and Treasury staff

• Pre‑election budget update statement: Prepare the pre‑election budget update statement promptly at the commencement of the caretaker period as required by s 24(1). Ensure the statement includes the specified projections, revised forward estimates, economic projections, explanations of significant variations, revised financial statements and an update of matters required under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (s 24(2)(a)-(f)). Use consistent format and accounting policies as required by s 24(4).

For Presiding Officers

• Appointment process and operational plan review: Conduct the appointment process in accordance with s 6: appoint the PBO from a panel‑recommended list and ensure the panel composition in s 6(2) is followed. Approve or request changes to the PBO’s operational plan within the statutory timeframe (s 14(3)-(4)). If both Presiding Officers were last elected as endorsed candidates of the same registered party, ensure a deputy Presiding Officer from another registered party is engaged for joint decisions under s 4(2).

Cross‑cutting measures

• Training and record‑keeping: Implement mandatory training across the PBO, Treasury and agencies on the Act’s confidentiality regimes (ss 16 and 17), information request processes and publication timetables. Keep auditable records of all requests, legal assessments under GIPA, internal approvals, communications with leaders and publication templates.

• Legal and risk review: Because the Act ties to GIPA and other fiscal statutes, secure legal advice on the interaction between GIPA refusals and the PBO’s information needs. Maintain a legal escalation pathway to resolve contested refusals where possible in advance of key publication deadlines.

• HR and continuity planning: Given the PBO’s election‑timed appointment and short term, plan for staff retention and knowledge transfer between electoral cycles. Use the Act’s provision for acting PBOs drawn from staff (s 8(3)) to preserve institutional memory.

• Compliance with penalties and prosecution process: Note the maximum 50‑penalty‑unit sanctions in ss 16(4)-(5) and 17(2) and the requirement that offences be dealt with summarily in the Local Court (s 28). Ensure staff understand the consequences of unauthorised disclosure and the procedural forum for enforcement.

Following these concrete steps, and aligning internal processes with the statutory timelines and confidentiality controls spelled out in ss 16, 17, 21, 23 and 24, will assist each actor to meet the Act’s duties and manage operational risk.