DefinitionsDefinitions

#### Definitions As used in this Statute: 1. The term “special fissionable material” means plutonium‑239; uranium‑233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term “special fissionable material” does not include source material. 2. The term “uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233” means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature. 3. The term source material means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from to time to time determine. Schedule 2—Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Section 4 The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty”, Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking to co‑operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by‑products which may be derived by nuclear‑weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear‑weapon or non‑nuclear‑weapon States, Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co‑operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co‑operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each nuclear‑weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non‑nuclear‑weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II Each non‑nuclear‑weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III 1. Each non‑nuclear‑weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non‑nuclear‑weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co‑operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non‑nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180‑day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co‑operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non‑nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non‑nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non‑discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non‑nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non‑nuclear‑weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non‑nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one‑third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear‑weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty‑five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. Schedule 3—Agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Section 4 WHEREAS Australia is a Party to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaty”) opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970; WHEREAS paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty reads as follows: “Each non‑nuclear‑weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere”; RECALLING that pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty; RECALLING that according to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; WHEREAS it is the desire of Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) to avoid unnecessary duplication with regard to Australia’s accounting and control activities; WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) has approved a comprehensive set of model provisions for the structure and contents of agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non‑nuclear‑weapon States Party to the Treaty; WHEREAS the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article III of its Statute, to conclude such agreements; NOW THEREFORE Australia and the Agency have agreed as follows: PART I BASIC UNDERTAKING Article 1 Australia undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS Article 2 The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Australia, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. CO‑OPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE AGENCY Article 3 Australia and the Agency shall co‑operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS Article 4 The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed: (a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Australia or international co‑operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; (b) To avoid undue interference in Australia’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and (c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. Article 5 (a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement. (b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement. (ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if Australia agrees thereto. Article 6 (a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost‑effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguard under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. (b) In order to ensure optimum cost‑effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as: (i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes; (ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and (iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verfication procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the implementation of this Agreement. NATIONAL SYSTEM OF MATERIALS CONTROL Article 7 (a) Australia shall establish and maintain a national system (hereinafter referred to as Australia’s system) of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. (b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of Australia’s system. The Agency’s verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of Australia’s system. PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY Article 8 (a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, Australia shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. (b) (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement. (ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. (c) If Australia so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on premises of Australia design information which Australia regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on premises of Australia. AGENCY INSPECTORS Article 9 (a) (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of Australia to the designation of Agency inspectors to Australia. (ii) If Australia, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to Australia an alternative designation or designations. (iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of Australia to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Director General”), with a view to its taking appropriate action. (b) Australia shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement. (c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: (i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the Australian authorities concerned and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and (ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES Article 10 Australia shall apply the relevant provisions as accepted of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency to the Agency (including its property, funds and assets), and to its inspectors and other officials performing functions under this Agreement. TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS Article 11 Consumption or dilution of nuclear material Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practically irrecoverable. Article 12 Transfer of nuclear material out of Australia Australia shall give the Agency notification of intended transfers of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of Australia, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall terminate safeguards on nuclear material under this Agreement when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as provided for in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re‑application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material. Article 13 Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non‑nuclear activities If Australia wishes to use nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in non‑nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such nuclear material may be terminated. NON‑APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON‑PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES Article 14 If Australia intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply: (a) Australia shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear: (i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non‑proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking Australia may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and (ii) That during the period of non‑application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) Australia and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in Australia and of any export of such nuclear material; and (c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, and shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein. FINANCE Article 15 Australia and the Agency shall bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if Australia or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE Article 16 Australia shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of Australia. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Article 17 Any claim by Australia against the Agency or by the Agency against Australia in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law. MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON‑DIVERSION Article 18 If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by Australia is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon Australia to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this Agreement for the settlement of a dispute. Article 19 If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Statute”) and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford Australia every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Article 20 Australia and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. Article 21 Australia shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite Australia to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. Article 22 Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by Australia and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: Australia and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either Australia or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either Australia or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on Australia and the Agency. SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS Article 23 The application of Agency safeguards in Australia under other safeguards agreements with the Agency shall be suspended while this Agreement is in force. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE AGREEMENT Article 24 Australia and the Agency shall, at the request of either, review jointly the operation of this Agreement. In any event such a review shall take place five years after the entry into force of this Agreement. AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT Article 25 (a) Australia and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each other on amendments to this Agreement. (b) All amendments shall require the agreement of Australia and the Agency. (c) Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force on the same conditions as entry into force of the Agreement itself. (d) The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any amendment to this Agreement. ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION Article 26 This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by or for the Director General and by the authorized representative of Australia. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement. Article 27 This Agreement shall remain in force as long as Australia is party to the Treaty. PART II INTRODUCTION Article 28 The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS Article 29 The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. Article 30 For this purpose material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Article 31 The technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated. NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL Article 32 Pursuant to Article 7, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of Australia’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of Australia’s accounting and control activities. Article 33 Australia’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as: (a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; (b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty; (c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements; (d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory; (e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses; (f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area; (g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and (h) Procedures for the submission of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 60 to 70. STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS Article 34 Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities. Article 35 (a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is directly or indirectly exported to a non‑nuclear‑weapon State, Australia shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non‑nuclear purposes; (b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is imported, Australia shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non‑nuclear purposes; and (c) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into Australia, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement. TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS Article 36 (a) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of that Article are not met, but Australia considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, Australia and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied. (b) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that Australia and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable. EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS Article 37 At the request of Australia, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from safeguards, as follows: (a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments; (b) Nuclear material, when it is used in non‑nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and (c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium‑238 exceeding 80%. Article 38 At the request of Australia the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in Australia in accordance with this Article may not at anytime exceed: (a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following: (i) Plutonium; (ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and (iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment; (b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%); (c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and (d) Twenty metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application. Article 39 If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, Australia and the Agency shall make arrangements for the reapplication of safeguards thereto. SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS Article 40 Australia and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between Australia and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement. Article 41 The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. Australia and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within ninety days of the entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between Australia and the Agency. Australia shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 42. INVENTORY Article 42 On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 63, the Agency shall establish a unified inventory of all nuclear material in Australia subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to Australia at intervals to be agreed. DESIGN INFORMATION General provisions Article 43 Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility. Article 44 The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility, when applicable: (a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes; (b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material; (c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and (d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking. Article 45 Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility, in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control, and shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, as required. Australia shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall comply at the facility. Article 46 The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 45, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary. Article 47 Purposes of examination of design information The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes: (a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; (b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria: (i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; (ii) In determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points; (iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and (iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of Australia around a process step involving commercially sensitive information; (c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes; (d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures; (e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and (f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied. The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 48 Re‑examination of design information Design information shall be re‑examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to Article 47. Article 49 Verification of design information The Agency, in co‑operation with Australia, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Articles 43 to 46, for the purposes stated in Article 47. INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE FACILITIES Article 50 The Agency shall be provided with the following information when nuclear material is to be customarily used outside facilities, as applicable: (a) A general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user’s name and address for routine business purposes; and (b) A general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control, including organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control. The Agency shall be informed, on a timely basis, of any change in the information provided to it under this Article. Article 51 The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 50 may be used, to the extent relevant, for the purposes set out in Article 47(b) to (f). RECORDS SYSTEM General provisions Article 52 In establishing its national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7, Australia shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. The records to be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 53 Australia shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by inspectors. Article 54 Records shall be retained for at least five years. Article 55 Records shall consist, as appropriate, of: (a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (b) Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material. Article 56 The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards. Accounting records Article 57 The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area: (a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time; (b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and (c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories. Article 58 For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated. Article 59 Operating records The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area: (a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; (b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; (c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and (d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur. REPORTS SYSTEM General provisions Article 60 Australia shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 61 to 70 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. Article 61 Reports shall be made in English. Article 62 Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 52 to 59 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports. Accounting reports Article 63 The Agency shall be provided with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The initial report shall be dispatched by Australia to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month. Article 64 Australia shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area: (a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and (b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the physical inventory has been taken. The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required. Article 65 Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes: (a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 59(a); and (b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. Article 66 Australia shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change. Article 67 The Agency shall provide Australia with semi‑annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement. Article 68 Material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by Australia and the Agency: (a) Beginning physical inventory; (b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); (c) Ending book inventory; (d) Shipper/receiver differences; (e) Adjusted ending book inventory; (f) Ending physical inventory; and (g) Material unaccounted for. A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material indentification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report. Article 69 Special reports Australia shall make special reports without delay: (a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead Australia to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or (b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible. Article 70 Amplification and clarification of reports If the Agency so requests, Australia shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards. INSPECTIONS Article 71 General provisions The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Articles 72 to 83. Purposes of inspections Article 72 The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to: (a) Verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the initial report; and (c) Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material in accordance with Articles 94 and 97 before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into Australia. Article 73 The Agency may make routine inspections in order to: (a) Verify that reports are consistent with records; (b) Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. Article 74 Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 78, the Agency may make special inspections: (a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or (b) If the Agency considers that information made available by Australia, including explanations from Australia and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement. An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 79 to 83 or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 77 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both. Scope of inspections Article 75 For the purposes specified in Articles 72 to 74, the Agency may: (a) Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 52 to 59; (b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment; (d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and (e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible. Article 76 Within the scope of Article 75, the Agency shall be enabled: (a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples; (b) To observe that the measurement of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved; (c) To make arrangements with Australia that, if necessary: (i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency’s use; (ii) The Agency’s standard analytical samples are analysed; (iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and (iv) Other calibrations are carried out; (d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to install such equipment; (e) To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper‑indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (f) To make arrangements with Australia for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency’s use. Access for inspections Article 77 (a) For the purposes specified in Article 72(a) and (b) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present; (b) For the purposes specified in Article 72(c) the inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified pursuant to Articles 93(d)(iii) or 96(d)(iii); (c) For the purposes specified in Article 73 the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 52 to 59; and (d) In the event of Australia concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, Australia and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board. Article 78 In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 74, Australia and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may: (a) Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 79 to 83; and (b) Obtain access, in agreement with Australia, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 77. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22; in case action by Australia is essential and urgent, Article 18 shall apply. Frequency and intensity of routine inspections Article 79 The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most economical use of inspection resources available to it. Article 80 The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms. Article 81 The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows: (a) For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man‑year of inspection for each such facility; (b) For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30×E man‑days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man‑years of inspection; and (c) For facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a man‑year of inspection plus 0.4×E man‑days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. Australia and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable. Article 82 Subject to Articles 79 to 81 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility shall include: (a) The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility; (b) The effectiveness of Australia’s national accounting and control system, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the national accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 33 have been implemented by Australia; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency’s independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency; (c) Characteristics of Australia’s nuclear fuel cycle, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated; (d) International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which Australia’s peaceful nuclear activities are interrelated with those of other States; and (e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material. Article 83 Australia and the Agency shall consult if Australia considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities. Notice of inspections Article 84 The Agency shall give advance notice to Australia before arrival of inspectors at facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows: (a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 72(c), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Article 72(a) and (b) as well as the activities provided for in Article 49, at least one week; (b) For special inspections pursuant to Article 74, as promptly as possible after the Agency and Australia have consulted as provided for in Article 78, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and (c) For routine inspections pursuant to Article 73, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 81(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases. Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside Australia the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in Australia. Article 85 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 84, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 81 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided by Australia pursuant to Article 65(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall advise Australia periodically of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for Australia and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 45 and 90. Similarly Australia shall make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors. Designation of inspectors Article 86 The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors: (a) The Director General shall inform Australia in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for Australia; (b) Australia shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal; (c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by Australia as one of the inspectors for Australia, and shall inform Australia of such designations; and (d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by Australia or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform Australia of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for Australia. However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 49 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 72(a) and (b) the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis. Article 87 Australia shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each inspector designated for Australia. Conduct and visits of inspectors Article 88 Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 49 and 72 to 76, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular, inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of Articles 75 and 76, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor. Article 89 When inspectors require services available in Australia, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, Australia shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors. Article 90 Australia shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their inspections by representatives of Australia, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions. STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY’S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES Article 91 The Agency shall inform Australia of: (a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in Australia, in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS Article 92 General provisions Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is transferred internationally shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of Australia: (a) In the case of import into Australia, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the material reaches its destination; and (b) In the case of export out of Australia, up to the time at which the recipient State assumes such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination. The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in accordance with suitable arrangements to be made by the States concerned. Neither Australia nor any other State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over its territory or its territorial waters, or that it is being transported on a ship under its flag or in its aircraft. Transfers out of Australia Article 93 (a) Australia shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of Australia of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to be made to the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram. (b) Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping. (c) Australia and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance notification. (d) The notification shall specify: (i) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come; (ii) The State for which the nuclear material is destined; (iii) The dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping; (iv) The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and (v) At what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached. Article 94 The notification referred to in Article 93 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of the nuclear material before it is transferred out of Australia and, if the Agency so wishes or Australia so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification. Article 95 If the nuclear material will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State, Australia shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive, within three months of the time when the recipient State assumes responsibility for the nuclear material from Australia, confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer. Transfers into Australia Article 96 (a) Australia shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into Australia of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or if within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to be received from the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram. (b) The Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the nuclear material, and in any case not later than the date on which Australia assumes responsibility for the nuclear material. (c) Australia and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance notification. (d) The notification shall specify: (i) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material; (ii) At what point of the transfer Australia will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached; and (iii) The expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the nuclear material is intended to be unpacked. Article 97 The notification referred to in Article 96 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material at the time the consignment is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification. Article 98 Special reports Australia shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 69 if any unusual incident or circumstances, including the occurrence of significant delay, lead Australia to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material during an international transfer. DEFINITIONS Article 99 For the purposes of this Agreement: A. Adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for. B. Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 80 and 81, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity. C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items. D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as follows: (a) Grams of contained plutonium; (b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium‑235 plus uranium‑233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and (c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium. For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit. E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken. F. Correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains. G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking: (a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms; (b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; (c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and (d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005. H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium‑233 and uranium‑235 to that of the total uranium in question. I. Facility means: (a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or (b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following: (a) Increases: (i) Import; (ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a non‑safeguarded (non‑peaceful) activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards; (iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and (iv) De‑exemption: re‑application of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity. (b) Decreases: (i) Export; (ii) Domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for a non‑safeguarded (non‑peaceful) activity; (iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions; (iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use; (v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored; (vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and (vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft. K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas. L. Man‑year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 81, 300 man‑days of inspection, a man‑day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours. M. Material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that: (a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and (b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures, in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established. N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory. O. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by Australia. P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures. Q. Shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area. R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated. S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed. DONE in Vienna on the 10th day of July 1974 in duplicate in the English language. For AUSTRALIA: J. R. ROWLAND (signed). For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: JOHN A. HALL (signed). Schedule 4—Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material Section 4 The States Parties to this Convention, Recognizing the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy, Convinced of the need for facilitating international co‑operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, Desiring to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material, Convinced that offences relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave concern and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment of such offences, Aware of the need for international co‑operation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material, Convinced that this Convention should facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, Stressing also the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, Recognizing the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material used for military purposes, and understanding that such material is and will continue to be accorded stringent physical protection, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 For the purposes of this Convention: (a) “nuclear material” means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium‑238; uranium‑233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore‑residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; (b) “uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233” means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotopes 238 is greater than the ratio of isotopes 235 to the isotope 238 occuring in nature; (c) “international nuclear transport” means the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material by any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the State where the shipment originates beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that State and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the State of ultimate destination. Article 2 1. This Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. 2. With the exception of articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 3 of article 5, this Convention shall also apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and transport. 3. Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties in the articles covered by paragraph 2 with respect to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and transport, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State regarding the domestic use, storage and transport of such nuclear material. Article 3 Each State Party shall take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I. Article 4 1. Each State Party shall not export or authorize the export of nuclear material unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will be protected during the international nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I. 2. Each State Party shall not import or authorize the import of nuclear material from a State not party to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will during the international nuclear transport be protected at the levels described in Annex I. 3. A State Party shall not allow the transit of its territory by land or internal waterways or through its airports or seaports of nuclear material between States that are not parties to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances as far as practicable that this nuclear material will be protected during international nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I. 4. Each State Party shall apply within the framework of its national law the levels of physical protection described in Annex I to nuclear material being transported from a part of that State to another part of the same State through international waters or airspace. 5. The State Party responsible for receiving assurances that the nuclear material will be protected at the levels described in Annex I according to paragraphs 1 to 3 shall identify and inform in advance States which the nuclear material is expected to transit by land or internal waterways, or whose airports or seaports it is expected to enter. 6. The responsibility for obtaining assurances referred to in paragraph 1 may be transferred, by mutual agreement, to the State Party involved in the transport as the importing State. 7. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of a State, including that over its airspace and territorial sea. Article 5 1. States Parties shall identify and make known to each other directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency their central authority and point of contact having responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for co‑ordinating recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of credible threat thereof. 2. In the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or of credible threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance with their national law, provide co‑operation and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and protection of such material to any State that so requests. In particular: (a) a State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other States, which appear to it to be concerned, of any theft, robbery or other unlawful taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof and to inform, where appropriate, international organizations; (b) as appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information with each other or international organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear material, verifying the integrity of the shipping container, or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material and shall: (i) co‑ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels; (ii) render assistance, if requested; (iii) ensure the return of nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequence of the above‑mentioned events. The means of implementation of this co‑operation shall be determined by the States Parties concerned. 3. States Parties shall co‑operate and consult as appropriate, with each other directly or through international organizations, with a view to obtaining guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in international transport. Article 6 1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provisions of this Convention from another State Party or through participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties provide information to international organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. 2. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material. Article 7 1. The intentional commission of: (a) an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property; (b) a theft or robbery of nuclear material; (c) an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; (d) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any other form of intimidation; (e) a threat: (i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage; or (ii) to commit an offence described in sub‑paragraph (b) in order to compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or to refrain from doing any act; (f) an attempt to commit any offence described in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); and (g) an act which constitutes participation in any offence described in paragraphs (a) to (f), shall be made a punishable offence by each State Party under its national law. 2. Each State Party shall make the offences described in this article punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature. Article 8 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 7 in the following cases: (a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State. 2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 11 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1. 3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. 4. In addition to the States Parties mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2, each State Party may, consistent with international law, establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 7 when it is involved in international nuclear transport as the exporting or importing State. Article 9 Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall take appropriate measures, including detention, under its national law to ensure his presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. Measures taken according to this article shall be notified without delay to the States required to establish jurisdiction pursuant to article 8 and, where appropriate, all other States concerned. Article 10 The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Article 11 1. The offences in article 7 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include those offences as extraditable offences in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of those offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize those offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of the States Parties required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 8. Article 12 Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offences set forth in article 7 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings. Article 13 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 7, including the supply of evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases. 2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not affect obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual assistance in criminal matters. Article 14 1. Each State Party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to this Convention. The depositary shall communicate such information periodically to all States Parties. 2. The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall, wherever practicable, first communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the States directly concerned. The State Party shall also communicate the final outcome to the depositary who shall inform all States. 3. Where an offence involves nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage or transport, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material remain in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring that State Party to provide information concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offence. Article 15 The Annexes constitute an integral part of this Convention. Article 16 1. A conference of States Parties shall be convened by the depositary five years after the entry into force of this Convention to review the implementation of the Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation. 2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of State Parties may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective. Article 17 1. In the event of a dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, such States Parties shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation, or by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to all parties to the dispute. 2. Any dispute of this character which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 shall, at the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary‑General of the United Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. In case of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the Secretary‑General of the United Nations shall have priority. 3. Each State Party may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2\. The other States Parties shall not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2, with respect to a State Party which has made a reservation to that procedure. 4. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the despositary.