National Disability Insurance Scheme (Children) Rules 2013

The Rules centre on a small set of interlocking legal constructs taken from the Act and given operational rules here. The primary concepts are:

• Child’s representative: A person or entity who undertakes acts and makes decisions under the Act on behalf of a child. The Rules stress that a child’s representative need not be an individual, and could be a State or Territory government agency (3.1, 3.2). The Rules describe when a person with parental responsibility will be the representative, and when the CEO may appoint a different person (3.2-3.5).

• Parental responsibility, parental condition 1 and parental condition 2: The Rules define parental responsibility in two parental conditions. Parental condition 1 is being a parent of the child who has not ceased to have parental responsibility by a court or State or Territory order. Parental condition 2 is a person who is identified in a parenting order under the Family Law Act 1975 as someone the child lives with, spends time with, or who is responsible for the child’s long-term or day-to-day care, welfare and development (4.2). These conditions map to paragraphs 75(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, as the Rules note.

• CEO discretion and determinations: The CEO of the NDIS has a two-track discretion. First, the CEO may determine that a person other than the person(s) with parental responsibility should be the child’s representative, in exceptional circumstances such as uncertainty about who has parental responsibility (3.3-3.5). Second, where more than one person has parental responsibility, the CEO may determine that one or more of them have parental responsibility for NDIS purposes, after considering listed factors (4.8-4.9). When a State or Territory Minister, or departmental head, has parental responsibility, the CEO’s determination is only effective with the written agreement of that person (3.4; 4.5).

• Child capacity and self-determination: The Rules permit the CEO to decide that a child does not need a child’s representative if the CEO is satisfied that the child is capable of making their own decisions and that it is appropriate in the circumstances to exclude certain Act provisions (5.1). The CEO must consult with the child and the child’s representative and consider specified criteria about the child’s understanding, communication, ability to use information, and the existence of supporters (5.2-5.3).

• Duties of child’s representatives: The Rules restate the Act’s guidance that a child’s representative must ascertain the wishes of the child and act in a manner that promotes the child’s best interests, and that the representative will not breach the duty if they reasonably believe they have ascertained the child’s wishes and reasonably believe their action promotes the child’s best interests (6.2-6.3). There is a further duty to consult, wherever practicable, with the guardian, persons with parental responsibility, and other people who assist the child to manage day-to-day activities and decisions (6.4).

• Interaction with guardianship and other laws: The Rules distinguish situations where a child has a guardian appointed under Commonwealth, State or Territory law, noting that a guardian normally has parental responsibility for NDIS purposes, but the CEO may determine otherwise, after written consultation with the guardian and consideration of the guardian’s willingness and ability to perform the representative duties (4.3-4.6). Paragraph 7.3 confirms that definitions and interpretation rules from the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 and the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 apply, and paragraph 7.2 flags which parts of the instrument are summaries rather than operative law.

These concepts are framed against the Act’s principles, especially the primacy of the child’s best interests, the role of family and carers, promoting participation and development, and taking account of cultural, linguistic and other personal circumstances (1.2-1.4). The Rules therefore create a framework that balances parental responsibility presumptions, CEO assessment and administrative checks, and a duty-centred approach that requires consultation and consideration of the child’s wishes.

The Rules affect a bounded set of actors connected to children who are participants or potential participants of the NDIS. The instrument identifies and allocates roles and obligations as follows:

• The child: Central to these Rules is the child, defined by the Act, whose wishes must be ascertained and considered in decision-making under the NDIS, and who may, in some cases, be found capable of making their own NDIS decisions (1.2; 5.1-5.3; 6.2).

• Child’s representatives: Persons or entities who are responsible for doing acts and making decisions under the Act on behalf of a child. These will commonly be persons with parental responsibility, but may be other persons or State or Territory agencies in exceptional circumstances (3.1-3.5; 4.1-4.2). Child’s representatives are subject to the duties in Part 6, including ascertaining the child’s wishes and promoting best interests (6.2-6.4).

• Guardians: Persons appointed under Commonwealth, State or Territory law with guardianship over a child. Guardians normally have parental responsibility for NDIS purposes and are presumed to be the child’s representative unless the CEO is satisfied otherwise. The CEO must consult in writing with a guardian before making determinations and consider the guardian’s willingness and ability to perform representative functions (4.3-4.6).

• Parents and people with parental responsibility: People who satisfy parental condition 1 or parental condition 2 under the Rules are treated as having parental responsibility for NDIS purposes unless displaced by a guardian, or unless the CEO makes a determination otherwise. Where multiple people have parental responsibility, the CEO may decide which of them will be the child’s representative (4.1-4.9).

• The CEO of the NDIS: The Chief Executive Officer is the decision-maker empowered to determine who is the child’s representative in exceptional circumstances, to decide whether a child does not require a representative, and to determine which of multiple persons with parental responsibility will act for NDIS purposes. The Rules prescribe consultation and matters the CEO must have regard to when exercising these discretions (3.3-3.5; 4.4, 4.8-4.9; 5.1-5.3).

• State and Territory Ministers and departmental heads: If a State or Territory Minister or head has parental responsibility or guardianship, the CEO may only make determinations that displace that person’s role with that person’s written agreement, which creates a procedural check where government agencies are involved (3.4; 4.5).

• Other supporters and carers: The Rules require consultation, where practicable, with persons who assist the child to manage day-to-day activities and make decisions, which brings informal carers and non-legal supporters within the consultative loop (6.4).

Practical effects on these actors are procedural. Parents, guardians and others who could be child’s representatives must be ready to engage with CEO requests for information, which may include consenting to release of criminal history or other suitability information; the Rules make clear that such answers or refusals are relevant to CEO determinations (3.5(d)(iv); 4.9(f)). The child’s representative role imposes duties that are not absolute commands but are qualified by reasonableness and consultation standards (6.2-6.3). The Rules also state that the appointment of a child’s representative does not affect other carers’ duties imposed under State or Territory law (1.3; 7.5), which preserves existing statutory arrangements outside the NDIS.

The Rules prescribe a compact set of duties, decision points and procedural rights. They are expressed as summaries of the Act’s operative subsections, and where the Rules refer to the Act these references are explicit.

Duties of the child’s representative

• Ascertain the child’s wishes and act in the child’s best interests. Paragraph 6.2 captures subsections 76(1) of the Act as summarised in the Rules: the representative must ascertain the wishes of the child, and act in a manner that promotes the child’s best interests. The qualification in 6.3, which summarises subsections 76(2)-(3), provides that the duty is not breached if the representative reasonably believes they have ascertained the child’s wishes and reasonably believes that their actions promote the child’s best interests. The governing standard is therefore reasonableness in belief.

• Consult, wherever practicable, with guardians, persons satisfying parental conditions, and people who assist the child to manage daily activities and decisions. Paragraph 6.4 imposes an ongoing consultative obligation that extends beyond the immediate circle of legal guardianship to informal supports.

CEO duties and decision-process constraints

• Consultative requirement before substituting a representative where a guardian exists. If a child has a guardian, the CEO must consult in writing with the guardian and have regard to several factors, including the guardian’s recommendation and willingness and ability to perform representative functions, when deciding whether to appoint someone else as representative (4.4-4.6).

• Factors to consider in discretionary appointments. When considering appointments that depart from parental responsibility or when faced with multiple persons with parental responsibility, the CEO must have regard to the child’s preferences, preservation of family relationships, who is best placed to carry out duties in section 76 of the Act and Part 6 of these Rules, existing arrangements, day-to-day parenting responsibility, the ability to act in conjunction with other supporters, responses to CEO requests for information including consent to release criminal history, and any relevant convictions or suitability matters (3.5; 4.9).

Child’s rights and procedural safeguards

• Child participation and consultation. The Rules emphasise that a child’s ability to make decisions increases with development and that children should be consulted and involved in decision-making affecting them. This is embedded in the Act principles reproduced in the Rules, which require that, where acts are done on behalf of a child, the child should be involved in decision-making to the extent possible and their judgements taken into account (1.2; 1.4(d)(i-iii)).

• Potential to act for oneself. The Rules permit the CEO to decide a child does not need a representative if satisfied the child can make their own decisions and it is appropriate in the circumstances; the CEO must consult with the child and the child’s representative and have regard to specific capacity-related matters and the existence of supporters (5.1-5.3).

Limits, rights and non-operative text

• Non-operative summaries. Paragraph 7.2 warns that some text in the Rules summarises provisions of the Act and those boxed notes do not form part of the operative law. Practitioners must therefore cross-check Act provisions if precise legal force is required.

• Preservation of other legal duties. Paragraphs 1.3 and 7.5 explicitly state that having a child’s representative for NDIS purposes does not affect duties or responsibilities of carers under State or Territory law; this is a right-preserving clause that prevents the Rules from displacing other statutory obligations.

Taken together, the Rules create duties focused on consultation, reasoned decision-making based on the child’s wishes and best interests, and procedural obligations the CEO must follow when exercising discretion. The operative standards in the Rules pivot on reasonable belief, consultative processes, and specified factors the CEO must have regard to.

The Rules themselves do not create or specify criminal offences, fine regimes, or express civil penalties within the text supplied. Instead, they set out decision-making rules, duties and consultative procedures for the identification and conduct of child’s representatives and for CEO determinations, and they repeatedly reference relevant provisions of the Act for legal effect. Specific observations from the instrument are:

• No penalties in these Rules. The text contains no express penalties, infringement notices, or enforcement mechanisms within the Rules document provided. Paragraphs across Parts 3 to 6 set out duties, factors to be considered, consultation requirements and discretionary decision-making frameworks, but they are framed as summaries and operational directions rather than penal provisions.

• Enforcement by administrative decision-making. The primary instrument of implementation is the CEO’s administrative power to determine who is a child’s representative and whether a child can act for themself. The Rules prescribe what the CEO must consult and what matters the CEO must have regard to (see 3.5; 4.6; 4.9; 5.2-5.3). Administrative enforcement, therefore, will operate through the CEO’s exercise of those statutory discretions and through the processes the CEO establishes to require information from potential representatives, for example requests for answers or consent to release criminal-history or suitability-to-work-with-children information, the responses to which are relevant to decisions (3.5(d)(iv); 4.9(f)).

• Legal standards and reviewability left to the Act and general administrative law. The Rules flag that they summarise parts of the Act, and so the Act’s substantive legal obligations and any remedies or sanctions in the Act are the operative legal source. Paragraph 7.2 identifies that boxed notes are non-operative summaries of the Act. Practitioners seeking enforcement or remedies will need to look to the Act itself for specifics of enforceability and to administrative law remedies for review of CEO decisions. The Rules do not set out appeal rights or merits review pathways in the text provided.

• Procedural checks when State bodies are involved. Where a State or Territory Minister or departmental head is the guardian or has parental responsibility, the CEO may only make certain determinations with that person’s written agreement (3.4; 4.5). That procedural requirement functions as a check, limiting unilateral administrative action by the CEO in those circumstances.

• Interaction with other laws that do carry penalties. The Rules require the CEO to consider, when relevant, any convictions under Commonwealth, State or Territory law and any information relating to suitability to work with children (3.5(d)(v-vi); 4.9(f)). Any legal consequences attached to those convictions or suitability findings will arise under other laws, not under these Rules.

In summary, the instrument provides administrative rules, duties and consultative procedures but does not itself create penalty regimes. Enforcement will principally be administrative, through CEO determinations, and legal remedies will depend on the Act and general administrative law rather than on penalties specified in these Rules.

The Rules are explicitly designed to operate in conjunction with the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 and other Commonwealth, State and Territory laws that deal with parenting, guardianship, criminal records and child protection. The Rules both incorporate and preserve external legal arrangements. Key points of interaction, as set out in the text, include:

• Direct mapping to the Act. The Rules are made for the purposes of sections 74, 75 and 76 of the Act. Many provisions in the Rules are summaries of statutory subsections, for example, the CEO’s capacity to determine child’s representatives and capacity for a child to act for themselves summarise subsections 74(1), 74(1A) and 74(5) respectively; the parental responsibility rules summarise subsections 75(1) to (3A); and the duties of a child’s representative summarise subsections 76(1) to (3) (see Parts 3 to 6). Paragraph 7.2 warns that summary text does not form part of the operative Rules where it is a boxed note, so precise legal effect is in the Act.

• Family Law Act 1975 parenting orders. The parental condition 2 in paragraph 4.2 explicitly uses the Family Law Act 1975 concept of a parenting order, and parental condition 1 refers to cessation of parental responsibility by an order made under the Family Law Act 1975 or State or Territory law. Thus, family court orders and parenting orders under the Family Law Act directly affect who is treated as having parental responsibility for NDIS purposes.

• Guardianship under State and Territory law. The Rules recognise guardians appointed under State or Territory laws, and make guardianship decisive in many cases. If a child has a guardian under State or Territory law, that guardian normally has parental responsibility for NDIS purposes, and the CEO’s authority to appoint someone else is subject to written consultation with the guardian and to the guardian’s preferences and willingness to act (4.3-4.6). Where a State or Territory Minister or head has guardianship, additional written agreement is required (3.4; 4.5).

• Criminal history and suitability checks under other regimes. The Rules authorise the CEO to ask persons under consideration for appointment about criminal history or suitability to work with children and to have regard to any answers or refusals, relevant convictions under Commonwealth, State or Territory law, and any other relevant information (3.5(d)(iv-vi); 4.9(f)). The Rules therefore rely on existing criminal-record regimes and suitability-to-work-with-children frameworks as inputs into CEO decision-making.

• Preservation of State and Territory statutory obligations. Paragraphs 1.3 and 7.5 explicitly state that having a child’s representative for NDIS purposes does not alter duties or responsibilities of carers appointed under State or Territory law. This preserves the operation of State and Territory statutory regimes in matters such as delegated parental functions and child protection.

• Interpretative Acts. Paragraph 7.3 places the Rules within the general scaffolding of Commonwealth interpretation law, stating that terms and expressions used in the Act have the same meaning in the Rules unless a contrary intention appears, and that the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 and the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 apply. This confirms that ordinary Commonwealth rules of statutory construction and instrument interpretation apply.

The Rules therefore operate as a tailored administrative layer that relies on, and does not displace, existing Family Law Act parenting orders, State and Territory guardianship instruments, criminal history frameworks and other related laws. For practitioners, this means that family law determinations, guardianship orders and criminal records will be central inputs to NDIS determinations about child’s representation, and that cross-jurisdictional coordination and information flows between Commonwealth and State/Territory systems will be relevant to operationalising the Rules.

The instrument as provided bears the following recorded dates and maker information:

• Made on 18 June 2013 by The Hon Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Minister for Disability Reform (front matter).

• Commencement date recorded as 1 July 2013 (front matter).

The Rules state they are made for the purposes of sections 74, 75 and 76 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (preface and Part 7.4 definitions). The body sets out Parts 1 to 7 and contains interpretative provisions, commencement information, and the ministerial signature. Paragraph 7.2 notes the presence of boxed notes that summarise the Act and do not form the operative part of the Rules.

There is no amendment record included in the text supplied. The instrument does not list subsequent amendments, revocations, or replacement instruments within the provided document. Where a practitioner needs to know whether the Rules were subsequently amended, re-issued or repealed after 18 June 2013 or whether consequential amendments to the Act occurred, the text here does not supply that information. The appropriate sources to check for amendment history would be the Federal Register of Legislation, the Commonwealth Gazette, or consolidated versions of the NDIS Act and Rules; those sources are external to the instrument provided and should be consulted to confirm the current form and any later modifications.

The Rules also cross-reference the Act and external laws such as the Family Law Act 1975 and State or Territory guardianship legislation; any amendments to those instruments will affect how the Rules operate in practice, but such amendment histories are not contained within this instrument. Paragraph 7.3’s reliance on the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 and the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 remains a standing interaction point for any future amendments.

In short, the document records the initial making and commencement dates and the statutory purpose, but does not include any internal amendment history in the text provided. Users should verify whether later amending instruments exist.

The Rules themselves do not document litigation or judicial interpretation. The instrument contains no decision summaries, case citations, or references to judicial reviews in its text. Paragraph 7.2 expressly explains that some text summarises the Act and does not form part of the operative Rules; there are no boxed note references to court decisions.

Because the Rules are administrative and procedural, disputes that arise under them would typically be litigated as:

• challenges to CEO determinations under administrative law, for example by seeking merits review or judicial review of a decision that appoints or refuses to appoint a particular child’s representative, or that refuses to find a child capable of self-determination for NDIS purposes. The Rules prescribe factors the CEO must have regard to in such decisions (3.5; 4.6; 4.9; 5.2-5.3).

• disputes arising from the interaction of these Rules with family law orders or State/Territory guardianship determinations, where there may be conflict or uncertainty about who has parental responsibility for NDIS purposes. The Rules direct reference to Family Law Act parenting orders and State/Territory guardianship laws (4.2-4.6).

• disputes concerning the CEO’s use of information about criminal history or suitability, for example where a person refuses to provide information or is excluded because of convictions, which are matters the CEO is instructed to have regard to (3.5(d)(iv-vi); 4.9(f)).

None of the above litigation pathways are exemplified or recorded in the instrument supplied. The text does not name cases, and it does not reference jurisprudence interpreting the Act or these Rules. Practitioners looking for litigation history must therefore consult external case law databases and administrative law decisions concerning the NDIS Act, CEO determinations under sections 74-76, and related Family Court or State guardianship proceedings. The Rules themselves do not provide that material.

This instrument contains several drafting features and procedural hooks that create practical pitfalls and points of attention for practitioners, agencies and families. The principal ones, grounded in the text, are:

• Boxed notes and summaries are not operative law. Paragraph 7.2 warns that parts of the Rules summarise provisions of the Act and that boxed notes identifying such text do not form an operative part of the Rules. Practitioners should not treat summary language as replacing the Act. When legal certainty is required, consult the Act itself for the operative statutory wording.

• CEO discretion with broad, but structured, factors. The CEO can depart from the default rule that parental responsibility decides who is the child’s representative (3.3-3.5), and can determine which parent or persons have parental responsibility where more than one exists (4.8-4.9). Those discretions are guided by listed factors but the exercise of "satisfaction" by the CEO is an administrative threshold that can create uncertainty and may be susceptible to legal challenge if procedural obligations are not followed.

• Written agreement required when State or Territory Ministers are involved. Where a State or Territory Minister or head has parental responsibility or guardianship, the CEO can only make particular determinations with that person’s written agreement (3.4; 4.5). This creates a formal intergovernmental coordination point that can delay or block NDIS decisions if the required written agreement is not promptly obtainable.

• Requests for criminal-history and suitability information, and relevance of refusals. The CEO may ask persons being considered for appointment to answer questions or consent to the release of criminal history or suitability-to-work-with-children information; both answers and refusals are explicitly matters the CEO must have regard to (3.5(d)(iv); 4.9(f)). A refusal to provide information is therefore a material factor, and potential representatives must be aware that non-cooperation may adversely affect their prospects.

• Ambiguity over what "reasonably believes" requires in practice. The duty in paragraph 6.3 is qualified by a reasonable belief test: a representative does not breach duties if they reasonably believe they have ascertained the child’s wishes and reasonably believe their action promotes the child’s best interests. The Rules do not spell out evidentiary thresholds or record-keeping standards to demonstrate that reasonable belief. Practitioners advising representatives should note that in any dispute, proof of reasonableness will be fact-driven and documentation will be important, even though the Rules do not mandate specific record-keeping.

• "Wherever practicable" consultation obligations may be contested. Paragraph 6.4 requires consultation with guardians and other assistants wherever practicable. What is practicable can vary with circumstances; differences of view may arise about whether adequate consultation occurred before a CEO decision or a representative action.

• Potential multiplicity of persons with parental responsibility. Where more than one person has parental responsibility, the CEO may decide which of those persons have parental responsibility for NDIS purposes (4.8). This can create family friction and practical coordination burdens for NDIS planning and service providers, particularly if parents live separately or contest who should act.

• Child capacity determinations are discretionary and contextual. The CEO must be satisfied that a child is capable of making their own decisions and that it is appropriate for certain Act provisions not to apply (5.1-5.3). The Rules set factors to consider about understanding, use of information, and communication, and about the availability of supporters. But they do not set a fixed age or bright-line test, so outcomes will depend on case-specific assessments.

• Preservation of other statutory obligations. Paragraphs 1.3 and 7.5 confirm that appointment as a child’s representative for NDIS purposes does not affect duties or obligations that carers have under State or Territory law. Practitioners must therefore ensure advice takes account of concurrent legal duties that may impose different standards or obligations.

• The Rules do not specify appeals, penalties, or timeframes. There is no express pathway in the Rules text for appeal or review of CEO decisions, no penalties, and no specified timeframes for CEO consultation, requests for information, or determinations. Practitioners should therefore check the Act and general administrative law mechanisms for timeframes and remedies.

These features create practical risks around delay, coordination, evidence, and cross-jurisdictional complexity. The Rules place procedural duties on the CEO to consult and have regard to specified factors, but they leave significant room for administrative judgement and operational design at the CEO level.

Compliance with these Rules requires understanding the allocation of decision-making authority, preparing to engage with CEO processes, and documenting the child-centred considerations the Rules require. The Rules do not impose detailed statutory checklists, but the text identifies concrete steps and evidentiary inputs the CEO will expect when exercising discretion. Practical compliance steps, grounded in the text, include:

• Establish parental status and guardianship documentation. Because parental condition 1 and parental condition 2 determine parental responsibility for NDIS purposes (4.2), persons likely to be child’s representatives should assemble and keep available proof of parentage, family law parenting orders, or State/Territory guardianship orders. Where more than one person may have parental responsibility, prepare to show which persons have day-to-day parenting responsibility and existing arrangements that bear on who is best placed to act (4.9(c)(i-ii)).

• Respond promptly and fully to CEO information requests. The CEO may ask potential representatives to answer questions and to consent to the release of criminal history or information about suitability to work with children, and responses or refusals are material to CEO decisions (3.5(d)(iv); 4.9(f)). A considered, timely response that includes necessary consents where appropriate will reduce the risk that refusal or delay adversely impacts the person’s appointment prospects.

• Keep records that evidence consultation and the child’s wishes. The representative’s duty centres on ascertaining the child’s wishes and reasonably believing that actions promote the child’s best interests (6.2-6.3). Maintain contemporaneous records of consultations with the child, how the child’s wishes were ascertained, and the reasoning that led the representative to conclude that a decision promoted the child’s best interests. Although the Rules do not prescribe specific record-keeping, such documentation will be central if the CEO later reviews a decision or if a dispute arises.

• Be prepared to demonstrate willingness and ability to perform representative duties. The CEO must have regard to whether a guardian or a person with parental responsibility is willing and able to carry out the duties set out in section 76 of the Act and Part 6 of these Rules (4.6(b)(iv-v)). Prospective representatives should prepare statements or evidence of their capacity to perform day-to-day parenting and decision-making functions, including any support structures they will use.

• Engage in writing with the CEO and guardians where required. The Rules require the CEO to consult in writing with a guardian before making certain determinations (4.6(a)). If a State or Territory Minister or departmental head is involved, written agreement is required for CEO determinations that displace that person’s parental responsibility (3.4; 4.5). Practitioners should ensure correspondence is in writing and that records of any written agreements or consultations are retained.

• Prepare to support a child’s capacity assessment. If seeking to have a child recognised as able to act for themselves under the Act, the CEO must be satisfied the child can understand relevant information, use it in decision-making, understand consequences, and communicate decisions, and must consider people who can support the child (5.2). Gather evidence from allied professionals, psychologists, speech therapists or educators that speaks to the child’s cognitive and communication abilities and the availability of supports.

• Coordinate with other carers and service providers. The Rules call for consultation with other people who assist the child to manage day-to-day activities and make decisions (6.4). Service providers and informal carers should have procedures for confirming who is the child’s representative for NDIS engagements so that providers know who to contract with and who must be consulted in planning. This reduces the risk of conflicting instructions.

• Preserve compliance with State and Territory obligations. The Rules do not alter carers’ obligations under State or Territory law (1.3; 7.5). Prospective representatives must ensure they continue to meet any statutory duties or delegated powers imposed by State or Territory instruments, even when acting under the NDIS.

• Anticipate potential delay where government parties are involved. If a State or Territory Minister or departmental head is the guardian or has parental responsibility, the CEO requires written agreement to make certain determinations (3.4; 4.5). Prepare for intergovernmental correspondence and allow time for written agreements in timelines for plan development or appeals.

• Consult the Act and other relevant instruments for operative law. Paragraph 7.2 warns that some text in the Rules summarises the Act. For precise legal obligations, remedies, or challenge possibilities, consult the operative provisions of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 and any relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 and State/Territory guardianship laws.

Following these steps aligns the behaviour of parents, guardians, carers and service providers with the matters the CEO must have regard to under the Rules, reduces the risk of exclusion from the representative role for procedural reasons such as non-cooperation with information requests, and provides documentary evidence to support decisions about the child’s representation and capacity.