Several aspects of the Act are easy to misunderstand or overlook. First, the Act does not itself grant mutual recognition rights. A practitioner cannot point solely to this Act to justify practising in Tasmania; they must rely on the Commonwealth Mutual Recognition Act 1992 as adopted. The Tasmanian Act is the jurisdictional hook; the substantive rights are elsewhere. Many readers may skip the Commonwealth Act and think the Tasmanian Act is the whole scheme. It is not.
Second, the Act has two separate adoptions (section 4(1) and 4(3)). The adoption of the original Commonwealth Act and the adoption of the 2021 amendments are severable. A termination of the 2021 amendments under section 4A(1)(b) does not affect the earlier adoption. This means that if Tasmania terminates only the 2021 amendments, the mutual recognition scheme would revert to the pre-2021 version (unless the pre-2021 version has itself been repealed or amended by the Commonwealth). A government or practitioner could be caught out if they assume that termination of the 2021 adoption ends the whole scheme.
Third, the reference of power under section 5 is not the same as the adoption. The reference refers matters to the Commonwealth; the adoption gives the Commonwealth Act force. If the reference is terminated, the Commonwealth Act may still apply in Tasmania if it is still adopted under section 4, but the Commonwealth might lose the constitutional authority to amend the Act further without Tasmania’s consent. But the reference can be terminated by proclamation with parliamentary approval. Practitioners should not assume the scheme is permanent.
Fourth, disclosure under section 6A is permissible but not mandatory. Many will read the section and assume registration authorities must disclose adverse events. The word “may” means they have discretion. An individual could argue that if an authority chooses not to disclose, they are not in breach of any duty. But if the authority does disclose, they are protected. This creates a regime where disclosure decisions are unpredictable. A risk-averse authority might choose to disclose everything for fear of being criticised for not disclosing, even though there is no duty. This could lead to over-disclosure, harming individuals’ privacy.
Fifth, good faith is the only safeguard. Section 6B protects only information given in good faith. If an authority discloses information recklessly or maliciously, the individual may have a claim. However, proving bad faith is difficult. The Act does not define good faith, leaving it to the courts. Authorities should have policies to ensure that disclosures are made for proper purposes (e.g., protecting public safety) and not for vendettas or ulterior motives.
Sixth, the override of confidentiality laws is absolute for disclosures under section 6A. It is not limited to “except where it would be contrary to public interest”. This means even if disclosure would endanger the individual or breach health privacy laws, the authority may still do it. There is no balancing test. This is a significant loss of privacy protection.
Seventh, the protection from liability extends to the State (section 6B(2)). This is broader than just the individual officer. If an officer gives information in good faith, the State is protected. This could limit the possibility of suing the State under vicarious liability if the officer acted in good faith. Even if the officer acted in bad faith, the State might still be liable, but the Act does not say; it only relieves the State of liability it “might otherwise have had for another person having done anything as described in subsection (1)”. If the officer acted in bad faith, the action is not “as described in subsection (1)” (which requires good faith). So the State may be liable if the officer acted in bad faith, but the individual must prove that.
Eighth, the temporary exemptions for goods power (section 7) might be broader than readers think. It allows regulations for the purposes of section 15 of the Commonwealth Act. That section allows exemptions from mutual recognition for goods on certain grounds. Companies that import goods into Tasmania from other states might think they are automatically covered by mutual recognition, but the Governor can temporarily exempt certain goods. This could create uncertainty for businesses that rely on a single national market for goods. The exemption power is not self-executing; it requires regulations, but its existence means the market is not completely free.
Ninth, administration is assigned to the Treasurer only until an order under the Administrative Arrangements Act 1990 is made. If that order changes the administering department, practitioners may need to find the new responsible body. The Act does not automatically transfer; it simply defaults to Treasury until an order is made. If no order is made, the Treasurer remains responsible. But a practitioner searching for the correct regulator should check current administrative arrangements.
Tenth, the Act has been proclaimed, but the source does not show the proclamation date. That means the Act is in force, but the date is not given. For practitioners needing to know when mutual recognition commenced in Tasmania, they would need to look up the proclamation in the Tasmanian Government Gazette. The Act itself does not provide that information.