Migration (United Nations Security Council Resolutions) Instrument 2026

The central concept in this instrument is the definition of "resolution". Under regulation 4 of the Regulations, that term has a meaning that depends on ministerial specification. This instrument supplies that specification. A "resolution" means, for the purposes of the Regulations, any of the 156 UNSC resolutions listed in Schedule 1. The instrument does not define what constitutes a "UNSC-designated person" - that concept is already defined in regulation 5 of the Regulations: a person is a UNSC-designated person if, under a resolution, Australia is required to prevent the person entering or transiting through Australian territory. The instrument notes that definition in the definitions section. The concept of "UNSC-designated person" is the trigger for the travel ban obligation. A person can be designated under a resolution either by name or by being associated with a listed entity. The resolutions themselves vary in scope; some create sanctions committees that maintain lists of individuals and entities, while others impose arms embargoes or asset freezes that may also contain travel-ban elements.

Another key concept is the manner in which the instrument incorporates international law by reference. The instrument does not set out the text of the resolutions or the current lists of designated persons. Instead, it lists the resolution numbers and dates of adoption. This means that a practitioner must consult the original UNSC resolutions and the relevant sanctions committee lists to know which individuals are caught. The instrument does not sunset those resolutions or limit them to designations existing at commencement. Any designation made under one of those resolutions after the instrument commences will also count, because the resolution itself is specified, not the list of designees as at a particular date. This design choice means the instrument remains current without needing frequent amendment, but it places a compliance burden on users to track UN-level changes.

The instrument also distinguishes between sanctions regimes. Schedule 1 is organised by theme: Al-Shabaab (Somalia) is separate from general Somalia sanctions; Al-Qaida and the Taliban are grouped separately from ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and from the Taliban alone. This reflects the evolving UNSC approach: Resolution 1267 (1999) originally covered both Al-Qaida and Taliban, but later resolutions split them (1988 regime for Taliban, 1989 for Al-Qaida, and 2253 for ISIL). The instrument lists all relevant resolutions across these regimes, giving a comprehensive picture of which UNSC travel bans Australia has implemented through the Migration framework.

The most directly affected persons are individuals designated as UNSC-designated persons under any of the specified resolutions. Those persons are prohibited from entering or transiting through Australia. This includes individuals listed by the relevant UN sanctions committees, such as those associated with Al-Qaida, ISIL, the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, or entities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Libya, Yemen, and other conflict zones. The instrument does not create a separate Australian designation process; it relies wholly on UNSC designations. Therefore, affected persons have no domestic administrative process to challenge the listing itself, though they may seek delisting through the UN Office of the Ombudsperson (for Al-Qaida/ISIL listings) or through their state of nationality.

Australian border officials are affected operationally. The Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Border Force, and visa decision-makers must maintain and apply current lists of UNSC-designated persons to prevent entry or transit. This imposes a burden of regular cross-checking against UN sanctions lists. Carriers, including airlines and shipping companies, are indirectly affected because the Migration Act imposes obligations on carriers to ensure they do not bring prohibited persons to Australia, and the designation under this instrument may form part of that prohibition. Carriers must check passenger manifests against the relevant lists, which can be voluminous and updated frequently. Failure to do so can lead to carrier liability.

Visa applicants who share names or identifying details with designated persons may face delays or adverse security assessments while their identity is verified. This is a diffuse cost affecting a potentially large population of travellers from or through countries subject to these sanctions regimes. Financial institutions are not directly affected by this instrument (which concerns migration controls), but they will be separately caught by the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 which implement asset freezes and other financial restrictions under the same UNSC resolutions. The instrument therefore indirectly signals the scope of those regimes, though the instrument itself only addresses travel bans under the Migration Regulations.

The Minister for Home Affairs is the maker of the instrument and retains authority to amend or replace it in the future. The instrument gives the Minister no discretion about which resolutions to specify; it is a specification instrument, but the Minister decides whether to add or remove resolutions. The instrument affects no private rights beyond those already flowing from the Regulations and the Migration Act.

The primary duty that this instrument triggers is the duty on the Commonwealth to prevent a UNSC-designated person from entering or transiting through Australian territory. That duty is set out in regulation 5 of the Regulations, which the instrument notes. The duty is absolute in the sense that once a person is designated under a specified resolution, the Commonwealth must refuse entry. There is no provision in the instrument for discretionary exemptions or waivers. Any such exceptions would have to be found in the Regulations or the resolutions themselves. For example, some UNSC resolutions allow for humanitarian exemptions or travel for diplomatic purposes, but those would need to be implemented domestically. The instrument does not address them.

The duty also extends to transit passengers. A person who is merely transiting through an Australian airport on the way to another country is covered. This can create practical difficulties for airlines and border control when flights are diverted or when passengers are in transit without a visa. The duty applies regardless of whether the person holds a visa; if they are designated, the visa if granted might be invalid, or they may be prevented from boarding.

On the rights side, the instrument itself confers no rights on designated persons. There is no right to notice, a hearing, or reasons under this instrument. The instrument is purely a specification of resolutions. However, a designated person may have rights under other laws, such as the right to seek judicial review of a deportation or visa cancellation decision, or to apply for a protection visa if they face harm if returned. The instrument does not preclude those avenues, but it does not assist the designated person either. For entities such as carriers, the instrument creates an obligation to know the current list of resolutions and the designations under them, but it does not set out a compliance method. Carriers must rely on UN sanctions lists, the Department's consolidated list, or commercial screening tools.

The Minister's duty to specify resolutions under the Regulations is a statutory power. The Minister is not required to consult or give reasons for specifying particular resolutions. The instrument is a legislative instrument, so it is subject to disallowance by Parliament under the Legislation Act 2003, giving Parliament a right of scrutiny. That is the only parliamentary right associated with the instrument.

The instrument itself creates no penalties. It is a specification instrument, not a penal provision. Enforcement of the travel ban occurs under the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations. For example, if a person who is a UNSC-designated person enters Australia, they may be detained and removed under the Migration Act. Carriers that bring such persons to Australia may face infringement notices or prosecution under the Migration Act for bringing a non-citizen without a valid visa or for failing to comply with a direction to not carry the person. The precise penalty provisions are not found in this instrument.

The instrument also interacts with criminal sanctions under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945. That Act creates offences for dealing with assets of designated persons or entities. While the instrument is about travel bans, the same UNSC resolutions often also require asset freezes. A person designated under one of these resolutions may therefore face both a travel ban and asset freeze enforcement. The instrument updates the list of resolutions for the migration purpose, but the Charter of the United Nations Act has its own listing mechanism. Practitioners must be careful not to assume that the two regimes are identical; the instrument does not affect asset freeze enforcement.

Enforcement against designated persons themselves does not involve a penalty for being designated. The penalty is the loss of freedom of movement: being refused entry, detained pending removal, or having a visa cancelled. There is no criminal penalty for being a designated person under this regime, unless the person attempts to enter illegally. For government officials, failure to apply the travel ban could lead to administrative consequences, but no penalties are specified in the instrument. The instrument operates as a ministerial direction to the department; non-enforcement could be challenged through judicial review by a person affected or by other states under the UN Charter, but that is beyond the instrument's text.

The enforcement framework relies on accurate identification. If the Department incorrectly identifies a person as a designated person, that person could be wrongfully detained. The instrument provides no mechanism for redress. The person would need to rely on the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or the common law. Conversely, if the Department fails to identify a designated person and allows them entry, that could breach Australia's international obligations under the relevant UNSC resolution. The instrument creates no penalty for that failure, but political or diplomatic consequences could follow.

The instrument sits within a network of Australian and international legal instruments. Its enabling legislation is the Migration (United Nations Security Council Resolutions) Regulations 2007. Those Regulations are themselves made under the Migration Act 1958, specifically sections 504 and 506. The instrument therefore has its ultimate legal foundation in the Migration Act. The travel ban for UNSC-designated persons operates as a ground for refusing or cancelling visas and for detaining and removing persons. It interacts with the character provisions of the Migration Act, especially section 501 (character test), but the instrument does not rely on character grounds; it creates a separate, UNSC-linked prohibition.

The instrument also interacts with the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and regulations made under it, as well as the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 and its regulations. These other regimes implement the same UNSC resolutions for asset freezes and other sanctions (such as arms embargoes or trade restrictions). For many of the resolutions listed, there will be corresponding autonomous sanctions regulations or Charter Act regulations. A practitioner must check all relevant instruments, not just this one, to determine the full scope of Australian sanctions against a designated person. The instrument itself does not incorporate those other regimes; it is confined to migration.

State and territory laws may also interact tangentially. For example, if a designated person is arrested by state police for an unrelated offence, the state police may have no obligation to enforce the travel ban, but they may communicate with the Australian Border Force. There is no direct interaction with state criminal law.

International law is relevant because the resolutions are UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Australia is obligated under Article 25 of the Charter to carry them out. This instrument is one mechanism for fulfilling that obligation regarding travel bans. The instrument does not incorporate the resolutions in full; it specifies them for the purposes of the domestic definition. If a resolution is later modified or terminated by the Security Council, the instrument would not automatically reflect that change. A further amending instrument would be required to remove or update the listing. Similarly, if the Security Council designates an individual under a resolution that is specified, that designation takes effect in Australia from the moment of UN listing, even if the instrument is not amended. This gives the instrument a flexible, ongoing effect.

The instrument is new; it commences on 21 March 2026. It repeals the previous specification, IMMI 14/034, which was a legislative instrument made under the same regulation 4. That earlier instrument was titled "Migration (United Nations Security Council Resolutions) Regulations 2007 - Specification under regulation 4 definition of 'resolution' - Specification of United Nations Security Council Resolutions - IMMI 14/034". It presumably listed a different set of resolutions, likely outdated. The new instrument replaces it entirely, not merely amends it. Schedule 2 says "Repeal the whole of the instrument" for that earlier instrument. This is a wholesale replacement, not a patch.

The instrument does not contain a retrospective effect provision. It commences on a fixed date. Any designations made under resolutions that were specified in the old instrument but are not in the new one will cease to be relevant for the travel ban from commencement. Conversely, designations under newly added resolutions will become relevant from commencement, regardless of when the designation was made by the UN. For example, if Resolution 2806 (2025) regarding Al-Shabaab was adopted in December 2025, any designations thereunder before the instrument's commencement would become subject to the travel ban only from 21 March 2026, unless the Regulations themselves have a different commencement rule.

The instrument's amendment history is sparse: it is a single instrument, and no amending instruments are referenced. It is likely that this instrument will itself be amended or replaced as the Security Council adopts new resolutions or lifts old ones. The repeal of the 2014 specification suggests that the previous instrument had not been updated for over a decade. The new instrument includes many resolutions up to 2025, indicating an attempt to catch up. However, the inclusion of very old resolutions (e.g., Resolution 1267 from 1999) suggests that some resolutions remain operative indefinitely. The instrument does not distinguish between resolutions that are still active and those that may have been terminated or superseded by later resolutions. For example, many DPRK resolutions from 2006 to 2017 are listed, but some may have been partly supplanted by later resolutions. The practitioner must verify the current status of each resolution with the UN itself.

No transitional provisions are present. The instrument does not save any designations made under the old instrument. Since the old instrument is repealed without savings, any person who was designated under a resolution that was specified in IMMI 14/034 but is not listed in the new instrument would no longer be subject to the travel ban under the Migration Regulations. However, they might still be covered by other sanctions laws. This is a significant change that requires careful checking by compliance teams.

The instrument itself has no litigation history because it has not yet commenced. It is dated 5 March 2026 and will commence on 21 March 2026. No court or tribunal has considered its validity or interpretation. The source text does not name any cases. However, the predecessor instrument or the Regulations may have been the subject of litigation. For example, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has heard applications for review of visa decisions based on UNSC designation under the Regulations. But this instrument does not reference any such cases, and we cannot invent them.

Potential litigation risks include challenges based on the improper specification of a resolution. A person could argue that a resolution does not actually require Australia to prevent entry or transit, perhaps because it only recommends action or is limited in scope. The instrument simply specifies the resolution; the Regulations determine the effect. A court might be asked to interpret the resolution to see if its text imposes a mandatory travel ban. Another potential challenge could arise if a person is designated under a resolution that is not validly specified in the instrument (e.g., if the instrument incorrectly references a resolution). The instrument appears accurate, but the table contains a typographical error: Item 11 under Somalia lists "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2551 (2020)" but the item number is "11" instead of "111". That is a minor drafting error; it should not affect validity, but it could cause confusion in citation.

There is no known litigation regarding the old IMMI 14/034 either within the source. The instrument does not cite any judicial decisions. This means the legal practitioner should be cautious: the interpretation of the Regulations and the instrument is largely untested. For instance, the interplay between the instrument and the character provisions of the Migration Act has not been authoritatively resolved. Similarly, the application of the instrument to Australian citizens or permanent residents is unclear; the Regulations may apply only to non-citizens. The instrument does not address that question. Litigation could clarify these points.

The instrument's reliance on UNSC designations also raises potential human rights challenges. Australia does not have a constitutional bill of rights, but some criminal sanctions cases have been brought challenging the automatic effect of UN listings. Those challenges might extend to travel bans. Again, not sourced from the instrument, but a likely area of future litigation.

Several features of the instrument could catch out the unwary. First, the typo in Item 11 of the Somalia table: the item number appears as "11" rather than "111". While this does not affect the resolution number, it could cause confusion if someone is cross-referencing by item number. The resolution itself, UNSC Resolution 2551 (2020), is listed correctly. The numbering error is minor but indicative of possible inattentive drafting.

Second, the instrument does not self-amend. If the Security Council adopts a new resolution that imposes travel bans in an existing sanctions regime, that new resolution will not automatically be covered unless the Minister makes a further specification instrument. There is a lag risk. The instrument includes resolutions only up to November 2025. Any 2026 resolutions that are relevant are not covered. Practitioners must check if the Minister has issued a later instrument or if the Regulations themselves have a fallback mechanism. They do not appear to.

Third, the instrument lumps together resolutions that may have been superseded. For example, Resolution 1267 (1999) originally covered both Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Later resolutions split them into separate regimes. The instrument still lists 1267 under "Al-Qaida and the Taliban", even though the Security Council itself now maintains two separate sanctions lists. This could cause confusion about which list to check. A designated person under the Taliban regime (1988) is not automatically a designee under 1267; but 1267 remains on the list. The instrument does not clarify whether a person designated under the Taliban regime alone is captured by the specification of 1267. Likely the answer is no, but the instrument's structure is messy.

Fourth, the instrument relies on the UNSC resolutions' own definitions of when a travel ban is required. Some resolutions impose a travel ban only on persons designated by the relevant sanctions committee; others impose an immediate ban on all persons associated with a listed entity. The instrument does not attempt to interpret each resolution. It specifies them all. The effect is that the domestic travel ban is as broad as the most expansive interpretation of each resolution. This could lead to over-compliance.

Fifth, compliance costs are not addressed. Small airlines and travel agents must now screen against lists under 156 resolutions. Each resolution may have multiple designees; some lists run into hundreds of names. The absence of a consolidated Australian list means each entity must compile its own. The instrument does not provide for a central register. The Department may publish a consolidated list, but the instrument does not mandate it.

Sixth, the instrument contains no savings or grandfathering for the repealed instrument. A person who was designated under a resolution that was in the old instrument but not the new one is no longer subject to the travel ban from commencement. This may lead to sudden changes in visa status. The Department should have processes to update its systems, but the instrument does not require notification.

For the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force, compliance means ensuring that as at 21 March 2026, the systems that check persons against UNSC-designated person lists incorporate the designations flowing from all 156 listed resolutions. This includes updating any automated visa processing and passenger screening tools. The Department should verify that the lists of designated persons for each resolution are current at the time of each check. This is an ongoing obligation because designations change frequently. The instrument does not impose a periodic review requirement, but best practice would be to synchronise daily with the UN sanctions committee lists.

For carriers (airlines, shipping lines, and travel agents), the primary compliance step is to integrate the list of resolutions into their check-in and boarding procedures. Carriers should obtain and maintain the most recent UN sanctions list for each specified resolution. Many commercial sanctions screening providers already include these lists. Carriers should also train staff to recognise that a person matching a UNSC designation must not be carried to Australia, even if they hold a visa. The carrier may need to refuse boarding. If a person is in transit, the carrier must ensure they do not enter the Australian transit area if that would constitute entry or transit. Carriers should also keep records of screening checks to demonstrate compliance in the event of an audit or investigation.

Visa applicants and their migration agents should be aware that a UNSC designation under any of the specified resolutions is a likely bar to obtaining a visa. If an applicant suspects they may be incorrectly listed, they should contact the UN sanctions committee or the Office of the Ombudsperson for delisting, as the Australian system offers no domestic delisting process. Applicants should also check the list periodically because designations can be added at any time.

Financial institutions, although not directly covered by this instrument, should note the overlap with asset freeze obligations. They should ensure that their sanctions screening covers the same resolutions for financial sanctions purposes. The instrument can serve as a cross-reference to identify which UNSC regimes Australia considers active for migration purposes.

All affected entities should also monitor the Federal Register of Legislation for any amending instruments that add or remove resolutions. The Repeal of IMMI 14/034 and the making of this instrument signal that the Minister may update the specification more frequently in future. Compliance teams should set up alerts for any new instruments under the Migration (UNSC Resolutions) Regulations. Finally, practitioners should verify the current validity of each resolution directly with the UN Security Council, as the instrument does not distinguish between active and superseded resolutions. For example, Resolution 1267 (1999) is listed but is no longer the sole governing resolution for Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions; later resolutions have modified it. The instrument does not reflect those modifications, so practical compliance requires reading the resolution text and the relevant sanctions committee decisions.