Migration (Access to Movement Records) Instrument 2025

The instrument builds on two linked regulatory concepts in the Migration Regulations: (1) prescribed legislation for which the Minister may authorise use of movement records under subregulation 3.10A(1), and (2) prescribed agencies, employees and purposes under subregulation 3.10A(2) (s 6-7). The instrument treats movement records as data that can lawfully be made available for non‑migration statutory administration and enforcement functions when the legislative preconditions in the Regulations and the Migration Act are met.

Key definitional concepts in the instrument:

• Movement records are not defined within the instrument itself, but the instrument operates under subregulation 3.10A of the Migration Regulations (s 3; s 6-7). The instrument therefore prescribes recipients and purposes for movement records as that term is used in the Regulations and Act framework. The instrument does not redefine the substantive scope of “movement records” in the Migration Act or Regulations.

• Security vetting is explicitly defined as including pre‑employment screening and ongoing assessment of eligibility and suitability for employment by an agency (s 4(1)). That definition is used repeatedly in Schedule 2 where courts, intelligence and vetting agencies are authorised to use movement records to assist with vetting.

• APS levels are recorded as abbreviations for Public Service Classifications (s 4(2)). Schedule 2 uses those abbreviations to identify permissible grades of employees who may be specified for access.

Functional concepts and structure:

• Specified legislation (Schedule 1). The instrument enumerates 258 items of legislation spanning Commonwealth, State and Territory Acts and regulations (s 6; Schedule 1). The list ranges from criminal law and intelligence statutes (for example, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth)) through revenue, social security, health and administrative law (for example, Taxation Administration Acts, Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), Administrative Review Tribunal 2024 (Cth)).

• Specified agencies, employees and purposes (Schedule 2). Schedule 2 maps particular agencies to permitted employee grades and to precise purposes for which movement records may be used. That mapping is granular. For example, item 13 specifies ATO employees in particular business lines and ties their permitted purpose to administration of a long list of tax and social security Acts; item 24 identifies particular functions in the Department of Home Affairs (including consular assistance, APEC card assessment, and migration litigation) (s 7; Schedule 2).

• Ministerial authorisation references. The instrument repeatedly notes that the Minister may authorise officers to perform actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) of the Migration Act for the purposes described (note to s 6; note to s 7). The instrument therefore operates inside the authorisation mechanism in the Act at s 488(2), in particular subparagraph 488(2)(a)(vii) and paragraph 488(2)(g) (notes).

Constraints and boundaries:

• The instrument’s authority is expressly the Regulations (s 3). It does not itself amend the Migration Act. Its mechanical effect is to specify lists for the operation of regulation 3.10A.

• The instrument does not create new investigative powers, penalties or data‑handling standards beyond those already embedded in the Acts listed. It specifies recipients and purposes; how recipients must handle records is left to their governing statutes, internal policies and any applicable privacy laws.

• The instrument replaces the 2023 instrument in whole (Schedule 3), meaning the current specified lists supersede prior specifications.

The instrument affects three sets of actors directly and a fourth set indirectly.

Directly affected actors

1. Agencies and employees named in Schedule 2. The instrument expressly specifies numerous Commonwealth agencies (for example, Australian Federal Police, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Taxation Office, Department of Home Affairs), State and Territory police and revenue agencies, and regulatory bodies (for example, ASIC, ACCC, Fair Work Ombudsman, AUSTRAC, Services Australia) with specified employee grades and roles authorised to access movement records for specified purposes (s 7; Schedule 2). Each Schedule 2 item identifies the agency, the employee categories (often by APS level or specific office holders), and the statutory purposes.

2. Minister and delegated officers within the Department of Home Affairs (the instrument is made by a delegate of the Minister) who will administer authorisations under the Migration Regulations (preamble; s 3; notes to ss 6-7). The instrument gives operative substance to the ministerial authorisation power under the Migration Act and Regulations by listing legislation, agencies and employee categories for which authorisations may be made.

3. Departments holding movement records and operational staff who disclose or support disclosures of those records. The instrument creates an administrative pathway that requires custodians of movement records to respond to requests made by the specified agencies and employees under the Regulations. The instrument does not itself name the record custodian, but its operation presumes an existing mechanism for disclosure under subregulation 3.10A.

Indirectly affected actors

4. Individuals whose movement records exist in the relevant systems. Movement records will include information about the movements of non‑citizens and possibly citizens and permanent residents where migration record systems record such data. The instrument authorises access for a wide set of enforcement, revenue, health, social security, vetting and consular purposes (Schedule 2). Individuals therefore may have their movement information accessed by a broad cross‑section of public agencies for those specified purposes.

Who pays and who decides

• Decision makers. The instrument designates the Minister (and delegates) to authorise actions otherwise prohibited under s 488(1) of the Migration Act for the specified purposes (notes to s 6-7). For day‑to‑day access by specified agencies and employees, the instrument operates as the list that enables authorisations under the Regulations; operational decisions about particular disclosures will be made by Departmental officers and delegates acting under the Regulations and the Migration Act.

• Costs. The instrument itself does not allocate funding. Costs of implementing the list, processing requests, and meeting any additional compliance obligations (for example, security vetting, recordkeeping and IT access controls) will fall on the agencies specified in Schedule 2 and on the Department that holds the movement records. The instrument does not provide additional resourcing or a financing mechanism.

Geographic and sectoral reach

• Nationwide. The instrument specifies Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation and agencies from every jurisdiction (Schedules 1-2). The reach extends to national regulators, police forces, revenue offices, health and social services agencies, intelligence and national security agencies, and specialist agencies such as Sport Integrity Australia and the National Anti‑Corruption Commission.

• Sector impact. Specified purposes cover law enforcement, intelligence and security (police, ASIO, AFP), revenue and taxation administration (ATO, state revenue offices), entitlement and social security administration (Services Australia, DVA, NDIA), health and public health emergency functions (Department of Health, AIHW), vetting and personnel security (AGSVA, ASIS, ASD, AGC cross‑references), consular and passport functions (DFAT), and regulatory compliance across sectors (ASIC, ACCC, AUSTRAC).

In sum, the instrument affects a wide administrative ecosystem of public authorities that are authorised to obtain movement records for a defined set of statutory purposes, and it puts individuals whose movements are recorded at risk of access by many different administrative actors when the statutory conditions are met.

The instrument does not create freestanding duties or rights in the manner of primary legislation. Instead it defines who may be authorised under the Migration Regulations to access movement records and for what purposes. The principal legal duties and enabling rights flow from the interaction of the Migration Act, the Migration Regulations and this instrument.

Specified duties and enabling authorities

• Ministerial and delegated authorisation. The instrument is made under subregulations 3.10A(1) and (2) of the Migration Regulations (s 3). Notes attached to s 6 and s 7 remind that the Minister may authorise officers to perform actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) of the Migration Act for the purposes of the specified legislation and that prescribed employees of prescribed agencies may be authorised to perform actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) of the Act (note to s 6; note to s 7). Those cross‑references anchor the instrument to the Act’s prohibition and authorisation regime.

• Specification obligations. The instrument has the procedural effect of telling decision makers which legislation (Schedule 1) and which agencies, employees and purposes (Schedule 2) qualify for access to movement records under subregulation 3.10A. Agencies and delegates therefore have the duty to ensure any disclosure they make is to a specified entity and for a specified purpose as listed.

• Personnel and classification constraints. Schedule 2 often limits access to particular employee grades or specific officeholders (for example, APS 3 to EL 2, or named office positions). That creates a duty on agencies to map internal positions to the APS‑level or specified office set out in Schedule 2 (s 4(2) provides the APS abbreviations).

Rights, procedural protections and limits (as provided in the instrument)

• Instrument scope as limit. The instrument operates as a limit on permitted disclosures by listing only specified legislation, agencies, employees and purposes. If a proposed recipient or purpose is not in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, the instrument does not authorise disclosure under subregulation 3.10A.

• No new statutory privacy rights or review mechanisms are created in this instrument. The instrument does not itself provide a notice requirement to the person whose movement records are accessed, nor does it create a statutory right to be informed. Any procedural protections would need to be found in the governing Acts listed in Schedule 1, in the Migration Act and Regulations and in privacy or administrative law outside the instrument.

• Security vetting. The instrument defines security vetting to include pre‑employment screening and ongoing assessment of eligibility and suitability to be employed by an agency (s 4(1)). Where Schedule 2 specifies that employees are authorised to assist with security vetting, that use is explicitly within the instrument’s permitted purposes.

Operational duties that fall on agencies

• Ensure authorised employee categories only act within specified purposes. For example, Services Australia entries specify APS 4 and above for particular functions including verification of immigration status and prevention of incorrect payments (Schedule 2, item 46). Agencies have an operational duty to limit access to employees and purposes as specified.

• Cross‑agency cooperation for particular statutory aims. The instrument lists consular, police, and intelligence cooperation purposes (for example, DFAT, AFP, ASIO assistance with vetting) which creates duties of coordination where movement records are exchanged for those ends.

Absence of penalties in the instrument

• The instrument does not set out penalties for misuse. Any sanctions or consequences for misuse would be provided by the underlying Acts governing the recipient agency or by administrative discipline mechanisms. The instrument does not itself create or declare enforcement mechanisms; its effect is to specify valid recipients and purposes under the Regulations.

In sum, the instrument imposes definitional constraints and a list of authorised recipients and purposes, thereby creating operational duties on custodians and requesting agencies to act only within the specified scope. It relies on the underlying Migration Act, the Regulations and the recipient agencies’ governing laws for enforcement, record‑handling obligations and remedies.

The instrument does not itself create criminal penalties, civil penalties or an enforcement regime. It is an administrative instrument that specifies recipients, employees and purposes for access to movement records under the Migration Regulations. Enforcement and penalty frameworks, where relevant, remain located in the Migration Act, the Migration Regulations and the primary legislation that governs the recipient agencies listed in Schedules 1 and 2.

Prohibition and authorisation context

• Subsection 488(1) of the Migration Act is referenced in the instrument’s notes (see note to s 6 and note to s 7). That subsection creates a general prohibition on certain actions under the Act. The instrument signals that the Minister may authorise actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) for the purposes of the specified legislation (note to s 6) and may authorise prescribed employees of prescribed agencies to perform actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) (note to s 7). The instrument therefore operates within the Act’s authorisation exception to the prohibition.

• The instrument’s authority is the Migration Regulations 1994, subregulations 3.10A(1) and (2) (s 3). Enforcement of compliance with the Regulations and the Migration Act sits with the administrative machinery, including departmental oversight and any internal sanctions that attach to misuse.

Where penalties and enforcement will arise

• Governing legislation for recipient agencies. Many of the recipient agencies have statutory enforcement powers and penalty regimes in their own Acts. For example, AUSTRAC administers the Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (schedule items) and police agencies administer criminal statutes. Any inappropriate use of records by such agencies would be subject to those agencies’ legal obligations and potential sanctions under their statutes and human resources frameworks. The instrument does not specify or alter those enforcement regimes.

• Administrative discipline and integrity frameworks. The instrument does not create a new integrity regime for misuse of movement records. Administrative discipline for public servants who misuse access will be handled under the Public Service Act 1999 and their agency’s employment frameworks, where applicable. The instrument does not itself prescribe employment consequences.

• Privacy and information‑handling obligations. The instrument does not explicitly impose privacy or data‑security obligations. Those obligations will be derived from the recipient agencies’ statutory frameworks and the Privacy Act 1988 where it applies to the agency. The instrument does not create or diminish remedies available to individuals under privacy law.

Practical enforcement implications

• Operational control is a compliance lever. Because Schedule 2 restricts access to named employee grades and officeholders, enforcement of authorised use in practice depends on organisational access controls, audit logs, vetting and access permissions under each recipient agency’s IT and personnel systems. The instrument does not itself mandate auditing or reporting arrangements.

• Ministerial oversight. Notes to ss 6-7 reference ministerial authorisation powers under subsection 488(2). Any decision to authorise an action otherwise prohibited must be taken by the Minister or an appropriate delegate. Administrative review of those decisions may be available under general administrative law principles, but the instrument does not provide a bespoke review mechanism.

In conclusion, the instrument is an enabling administrative list rather than an enforcement code. Penalties and enforcement pathways remain those in the Migration Act, the Regulations and the various recipient agencies’ constituting legislation and internal disciplinary regimes.

The instrument explicitly interacts with a broad range of Commonwealth, State and Territory statutes by specifying them in Schedule 1 and linking them to agency functions in Schedule 2 (s 6-7). It therefore functions as an inter‑statutory bridge that authorises movement record disclosures to support the administration, enforcement and regulatory functions of those listed laws.

Direct statutory cross‑references

• The instrument’s list of specified legislation (Schedule 1) includes criminal law, revenue, social security, health, intelligence, immigration, civil procedure, coronial, and regulatory statutes. Examples include the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (item 90), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (item 27), the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) (item 25), the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (item 222), the Income Tax Assessment Acts (items 157-158), and the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (item 76).

• Schedule 2 maps those laws to agency responsibilities. For example, item 13 (ATO) links ATO officers to administration of multiple taxation Acts and to the Privacy Act 1988 (as listed in the ATO item), thereby authorising movement record use for tax and social security administration (Schedule 2, item 13). Item 24 (Department of Home Affairs) lists functions including assistance with consular enquiries and migration litigation. Item 11 (ASIO) and item 12 (ASD) explicitly tie movement record use to national security and intelligence statutes.

Mechanisms of interaction

• Authorised purpose alignment. The instrument requires that access to movement records be connected to the administration of the listed laws or the specified purposes. For each agency, the Schedule states the specific Acts or the specific purposes for which movement records may be used. Thus the instrument creates an explicit legal pathway permitting movement records to be used as operational inputs to enforcement and administration across a wide legal map.

• Cross‑agency cooperation. The Schedule includes multiple agencies that perform overlapping functions. For instance, security vetting is a recurring purpose and multiple agencies (ASIO, AGSVA, AFP, ASIS, ONI, Department of Home Affairs) are authorised to assist with vetting. That creates a lawful basis for inter‑agency exchanges of movement information to support vetting under various personnel security frameworks.

• No modification of other laws. The instrument does not modify the substance of the listed statutes. It specifies the circumstances in which movement records may be disclosed to support those statutes. Any limits or obligations in the primary statutes continue to apply; the instrument simply identifies the purposes for which movement records may lawfully be used under the Migration Regulations.

Potential overlays and compliance considerations

• Multiple statutory obligations may apply to a single disclosure. A movement record disclosed to a health agency for contact tracing (Schedule 2, item 23) will be handled under the Health Insurance Act 1973 and the National Health Security Act 2007, while the disclosure mechanism remains the Migration Regulations and this instrument. Agencies must therefore manage compliance with both the Migration disclosure regime and the recipient statute’s obligations, including privacy and recordkeeping requirements where applicable.

• Data sharing and privacy interfaces. While the instrument lists many Acts and agencies, it does not create or alter privacy obligations. Agencies that are subject to the Privacy Act will need to manage disclosures consistent with privacy law, and agencies not bound by the Privacy Act will follow their governing statutes and internal policies. The instrument does not resolve conflicts between statutory secrecy or confidentiality provisions in a recipient agency’s law and the Migration disclosure authorisation; those legal tensions will be resolved by application of the underlying law and departmental legal advice.

• Repeal of prior instrument. Schedule 3 repeals LIN 23/015 2023, meaning the lists here replace any prior specifications. Implementing agencies must therefore reconcile change with their existing procedures and intergovernmental arrangements.

In sum, the instrument is a connector between the Migration disclosure framework and a broad set of other statutory regimes. It creates an administrative authorisation that allows movement records to be used across many areas of public administration without changing the substantive rules of those other laws.

This instrument is presented as LIN 25/001 and dated 10 September 2025 in the heading and signature block. It is made by a delegate of the Minister (Belinda Conn, Commander Border Capability Delivery Branch, Australian Border Force) and is stated to commence the day after registration (s 2). The instrument declares its authority under subregulations 3.10A(1) and 3.10A(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (s 3).

Specific amendment and repeal actions

• Schedule 3, titled Repeals, expressly repeals the whole of Migration (Access to Movement Records) Instrument (LIN 23/015) 2023. Schedule 3 states: "The whole of the instrument , Repeal the instrument." That is a clean replacement: the 2025 instrument supersedes the 2023 instrument in its entirety (Schedule 3).

• Section 5 provides a general drafting formula: "Each instrument that is specified in a Schedule to this instrument is amended or repealed as set out in the applicable items in the Schedule concerned, and any other item in a Schedule to this instrument has effect according to its terms." That establishes the instrument’s method for effecting multiple schedule entries and completes the replacement of earlier material referenced in the Schedule.

What changed compared with prior instruments

• The instrument does not reproduce LIN 23/015 in full within its text, but Schedule 3’s total repeal indicates an update to the list of specified legislation, agencies, employees and purposes. The text itself does not provide a side‑by‑side comparison or annotate additions and removals. To determine specific changes from the 2023 instrument, a practitioner must compare the two instruments directly.

Commencement and registration

• The instrument’s commencement is immediate in the sense that it commences the day after it is registered (s 2). That provides a short lead time from registration to effect. The instrument does not list transitional arrangements, savings or grandfathering clauses; the unqualified repeal in Schedule 3 replaces the prior instrument and the new lists take effect on commencement.

Authority and legislative basis

• The instrument is made under subregulations 3.10A(1) and (2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (s 3). Those Regulations provide the permissive mechanism in the Migration framework for the Minister to authorise access to movement records for specified purposes. The instrument does not amend the Regulations themselves; it exercises the Regulation’s specification power.

Record of authorship and signature

• The instrument is made by a delegate of the Minister and signed by Belinda Conn, Commander Border Capability Delivery Branch, Australian Border Force, and dated 10 September 2025. The preamble confirms the delegate status and provides the administrative record of who executed the instrument.

Practical implication for amendment tracking

• Because the instrument replaces the earlier LIN 23/015 in whole, practitioners and agencies must treat the 2025 instrument as the operative specification. Any internal policies, memoranda of understanding or inter‑agency arrangements that referenced the 2023 lists must be reviewed and, if necessary, updated to reflect the 2025 Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 entries.

The instrument itself does not record any litigation history. It is an administrative instrument that amends and replaces prior specification instruments; it contains no case citations, no judicial decisions and no mention of court‑imposed modifications or challenges. Schedule 3 repeals Migration (Access to Movement Records) Instrument (LIN 23/015) 2023, but the instrument does not contain any account of litigation arising under the prior instrument.

What the absence of litigation references means for counsel

• No cases are named within the instrument (the instrument is silent on litigation). Practising lawyers should not infer from that silence that there has been no litigation challenging the underlying Migration Act, Regulations or disclosure practice; it simply means the instrument does not annotate its own adjudicative history.

• Availability of administrative review and judicial review. The instrument sits within the Architecture of the Migration Act and Regulations. Decisions made under the Migration Act and the Regulations are subject to administrative law principles. This instrument effects administrative authorisation pathways; specific authorisation decisions by the Minister or delegates may be amenable to judicial review or merits review if the Act and Regulations provide for such review or if general administrative law grounds apply. The instrument does not itself create or exclude review rights.

Practical points for litigators and compliance advisers

• Challengeable acts will be the specific authorisation decisions and any improper disclosure of movement records rather than the instrument itself. Because the instrument lists specified agencies and purposes, a potential legal challenge would typically focus on whether a particular disclosure fell within the instrument’s lists and whether the Minister had lawfully exercised the authorisation power under subsection 488(2) as referenced in the instrument’s notes. The instrument does not set procedure for making those authorisations.

• Evidence and disclosure in litigation. Where movement records are used in enforcement or litigation arising under any of the listed Acts, parties and courts will have to address evidentiary provenance and admissibility of movement records obtained under the Migration disclosure framework. The instrument does not address evidentiary status; that is governed by the receiving tribunal or court rules and by the relevant substantive statute.

• Transitional litigation risk. Because the instrument repeals the 2023 instrument entirely (Schedule 3), there may be disputes about actions taken during any transitional window between instruments. The instrument contains no transitional provisions; practitioners should check administrative records and any authorisation documents for dates and legality of specific disclosures.

In short, while the instrument contains no litigation history itself, its operation will affect actions and decisions that may be the subject of administrative or judicial review. Counsel should locate the specific authorisation decision, the Migration Act provisions applied, and any contemporaneous ministerial instruments when assessing litigable issues.

This instrument is a listing instrument that appears straightforward at first glance, but it contains several features and drafting choices that can produce practical traps for implementers, legal advisers and compliance officers.

1. Granular employee‑level specifications

• Schedule 2 frequently limits authorised access to particular APS levels or specific office titles (for example, "APS 3 to EL 2", named Assistant Commissioners or "APS 6, EL 1 or EL 2, with responsibility for the collection, compilation, analysis and dissemination of migration statistics"). Agencies must map their internal position classifications correctly against the abbreviations in s 4(2). Failure to ensure the accessing officer matches the authorised classification risks an unauthorised disclosure under the Migration Regulations.

2. Purpose specificity

• Schedule 2 ties access to narrow purposes. Some entries list statutory Acts to be administered; others list operational tasks such as "to assist in missing persons investigations" or "to validate eligibility for COI and CDT travel documents" (for example, DFAT, item 22). A disclosure that is facially similar but outside the listed purpose may not be authorised. Agencies must document the statutory purpose and ensure the disclosure aligns with the Schedule text.

3. Wide cross‑agency authorisations

• The instrument authorises many agencies across different policy domains to access movement records. That breadth can create overlapping requests for the same records. Custodians of movement records will need procedures to prioritise, reconcile and audit multiple requests, and to check that each request fits the Schedule.

4. Security vetting uses

• "Security vetting" is defined broadly to include pre‑employment screening and ongoing assessments (s 4(1)). Several Schedule 2 entries rely on that definition to authorise access. Agencies conducting vetting must ensure they have appropriate internal vetting standards and safeguard handling of movement records used for sensitive personnel decisions.

5. No express privacy or notice regime in this instrument

• The instrument does not specify notice to individuals, retention periods, or specific safeguards such as minimisation or deletion. Where privacy obligations apply (for example, ATO and the Privacy Act as referenced in Schedule 2 item 13), agencies must reconcile this instrument’s authorisation with their privacy obligations. There is no explicit statement in this instrument that privacy requirements are waived or diminished.

6. Repeal without transitional provisions

• The instrument repeals the entire 2023 instrument (Schedule 3) but provides no transitional provisions or grandfathering. Agencies relying on older specifics must review whether any prior authorisations remain in effect and whether replacement action is required after commencement.

7. Reliance on ministerial authorisation

• The notes to ss 6-7 reference the Minister’s ability to authorise actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) of the Act (note to s 6; note to s 7). Some disclosures will therefore require a discrete ministerial or delegated authorisation under the Act, not merely reliance on this instrument’s lists. Implementers must ensure ministerial or delegate decision records exist where the Act requires them.

8. Potential tension with secrecy provisions in recipient statutes

• The instrument does not address how to resolve conflicts between the Migration disclosure regime and secrecy or confidentiality obligations in some of the recipient statutes. Agencies should seek legal advice when a listed recipient’s governing statute contains express secrecy provisions that might constrain receipt of movement data.

9. Classification and jurisdictional differences

• Schedule 1 lists both Commonwealth and State/Territory statutes. Different privacy regimes and administrative frameworks apply in different jurisdictions. An interstate disclosure authorised under this instrument may still face constraints under State law or particular statutory confidentiality provisions.

10. Audit trails and access controls not mandated

• The instrument restricts who may access movement records, but does not mandate specific auditing or reporting requirements. Effective compliance therefore depends on operational controls within the custodian and recipient agencies.

Each of these “gotchas” arises from features of the instrument’s drafting and from the operational context in which it will be used. They are matters of implementation and legal risk mitigation; the instrument provides the list‑based authorisation but leaves operational, privacy and procedural detail to the agencies involved and to the underlying statutory frameworks.

For agencies that will request, receive, or handle movement records pursuant to this instrument, and for custodians of movement records, the following practical steps and processes are necessary to operate within the instrument’s specification and to manage legal and operational risk.

1. Map authorised personnel to Schedule 2 entries

• Review Schedule 2 entries relevant to your agency and identify which employee grades and specific officeholders are authorised to receive movement records for specified purposes (s 7; Schedule 2). Use the APS level abbreviations provided in s 4(2) to match internal classifications. Create a maintained register mapping position descriptions to the instrument’s authorised categories.

2. Validate statutory purposes before each disclosure

• Before making or accepting a disclosure, confirm that the purpose of the request matches the purpose set out in Schedule 2 for that agency and employee category. Document the legal basis (the item number in Schedule 2 and the specific statutory purpose) and the Migration Regulations provision authorising disclosure (subregulation 3.10A and any ministerial authorisation under subsection 488(2) if required).

3. Obtain ministerial or delegate authorisation when required

• The instrument signals that some actions otherwise prohibited under subsection 488(1) of the Migration Act require ministerial authorisation (note to s 6; note to s 7). Ensure that where the legal test requires a ministerial authorisation, a formal written authorisation is in place, recorded in the decision file, and available for audit and legal review.

4. Implement role‑based access controls and audit logging

• Because the instrument authorises specific employee grades and purposes, implement role‑based access controls in IT systems that hold movement records. Activate and retain audit logs that record who accessed what records, when, for what purpose, and under which Schedule 2 item or ministerial authorisation. Given that the instrument does not mandate retention periods, agencies must determine retention and deletion policies consistent with their statutory and privacy obligations.

5. Align with privacy and confidentiality obligations

• Assess whether your agency is subject to the Privacy Act 1988 or to jurisdictional privacy laws and ensure disclosures are compliant. If your agency is a recipient, check that retention, use and onward disclosure of movement records are permitted under your governing statutes. Document legal advice where there is potential tension between receiving movement records and statutory secrecy obligations.

6. Security vetting and personnel security

• For agencies using movement records for security vetting (as that term is defined in s 4(1) and as referenced repeatedly in Schedule 2), ensure vetting policies specify the nature of movement record checks, the level of applicant consent required, and how movement data will be stored and protected. Limit access to those roles expressly authorised in Schedule 2.

7. Inter‑agency agreements and memoranda of understanding

• Where movement records will be shared across agencies, create or update memoranda of understanding that set out the legal basis under this instrument, responsibilities for data protection, permitted secondary uses, retention, disposal, and breach notification. Cross‑agency agreements should also specify auditing rights and dispute resolution processes.

8. Training and compliance programs

• Provide targeted training for staff with access to movement records on the scope of authorised purposes, the need to check Schedule 2, the requirement to obtain any necessary ministerial authorisation, and privacy and security obligations. Establish compliance monitoring to identify unauthorised accesses.

9. Document decision records for each access

• Keep contemporaneous records for each disclosure event that identify: the requesting agency, the authorised employee, the Schedule 2 item and purpose relied upon, any ministerial authorisation used, the specific migration record accessed, and the operational reason for access. These records are essential for responding to audits or legal scrutiny.

10. Review internal policies in light of the repeal

• Because Schedule 3 repeals LIN 23/015 2023, review existing operational policies and legal advice that referenced the 2023 instrument. Update policies to reflect the 2025 listings and to capture any substantive differences identified by comparing instruments.

11. Seek legal advice when in doubt

• Where the purpose of a request is ambiguous, where the recipient’s governing statute contains secrecy provisions, or where cross‑jurisdictional privacy issues arise, obtain legal advice before proceeding. The instrument does not resolve conflicts between the Migration disclosure regime and other statutory confidentiality obligations.

12. Plan for audits and records of authorisations

• Anticipate administrative and parliamentary oversight. Keep Ministerial and delegate authorisation files, and ensure accessibility for internal audit, Inspector‑General functions, or Freedom of Information requests where permitted.

In short, compliance requires a combination of legal verification against Schedule 2, operational access controls, ministerial delegation checks, privacy alignment, and disciplined documentation. The instrument provides the authorised lists; effective, risk‑managed use of movement records depends on robust implementation by custodians and recipient agencies.