No guarantee of funding - The Act only authorizes an agreement; it does not guarantee any particular funding level. Section 6(2)(d) says the agreement may include “details of the department’s funding allocation to the Mater for each financial year”, but the agreement itself is renegotiable. If the department fails to allocate sufficient funds, the Mater’s only recourse is through the agreement’s dispute resolution or contract law. The guiding principle that funding be “consistent with the funding of public sector health services” (s 4(d)) is not legally enforceable.
Guiding principles are not binding - Section 4’s principles use the word “should”. This is aspirational, not mandatory. A party hoping to rely on them to compel behaviour (e.g., “the Mater should use best endeavours to serve patients’ best interests”) will likely fail. They may be used to interpret ambiguous terms in the agreement but cannot create independent obligations.
Existing agreement continues indefinitely - Section 9(1)(b) continues the 2002 funding agreement “until it expires under its terms or is otherwise terminated”. If the original agreement had no sunset or termination clause, it could persist indefinitely. The annual agreement also continues. This means the 2002 contract’s terms (which are not published in the Act) govern until the parties vary or replace them. There is no statutory mandate to renegotiate or review regularly, beyond what the agreement itself provides.
Regulation can impose mandatory content - Under section 6(4), a regulation may prescribe matters that must be included in the agreement relating to funding for staff entitlements. This regulation can be made at any time, potentially imposing new financial obligations on both parties. The Act does not require consultation or agreement. If the regulation comes after the agreement is signed, the parties would need to vary the agreement to comply, or risk the agreement being inconsistent with the prescribed matters. The regulation does not automatically amend the agreement, but failure to include the prescribed matters could leave the agreement defective.
Information disclosure permission is narrow - Section 8(1) and (2) only permit disclosure “for the care or treatment of the individual”. This is a limited purpose. Disclosures for research, administration, billing, or public health surveillance are not authorised by this Act (they may be authorised under other laws). The disclosure must be to a “health professional engaged to deliver a public patient health service for a Mater hospital” or “a health professional engaged to deliver a public sector health service on behalf of the department”. Disclosures to other staff (e.g., receptionists, managers, lawyers) are not covered.
Transitional provision may not cover all agreements - Section 9 only deals with the 2002 funding agreement and annual agreements made under it. If the parties had entered into side letters or subsidiary agreements before commencement, those may not be preserved unless they fall within the definition of “existing agreement”. The Act does not provide a general transitional rule for all prior instruments.
No statutory override of other laws - The Act does not expressly provide that it prevails over other Acts. The information disclosure provisions might be subject to other secrecy provisions in legislation such as the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011, the Health Ombudsman Act, or the Child Protection Act 1999. A designated person should ensure that the HHBA’s disclosure provisions also permit the disclosure, or that the Mater Act’s authorisation is sufficient. There is no clause stating “this Act has effect despite any other Act”.
Staff entitlements funding - The regulation power (s 6(4)) may sound benign but could be used to require the department to fund particular staff entitlements (e.g., accrued leave, superannuation) that the Mater would otherwise have to bear. This could shift costs to the State, increasing the public funding commitment. For the Mater, it may guarantee that staff costs are covered, reducing its financial risk. For the department, it creates a mandatory funding obligation that may not have been in the original agreement.