Local Government (Development Assessment Panels) Regulations 2025

The regulations implement a small but specific set of governance and operational rules. The main concepts the instrument uses and the statutory functions they govern are these.

• Relevant DAP function. The regulations do not define a new substantive category; rather, “relevant DAP function” is the label the instrument gives to the function of a local government under regulation 12 of the DAP regulations (reg 3, definition of relevant DAP function; reg 4(2)). In plain terms, the regulations only bind local government activity that falls within that particular provision of the DAP regulations. The instrument therefore maps its duties and prohibitions to a circumscribed set of DAP-related tasks, rather than to all things DAP-related.

• DAP application. The instrument adopts the DAP regulations’ definition of “DAP application” by reference to regulation 3(1) of the DAP regulations, and expressly includes applications made under regulation 17(1) of the DAP regulations (reg 3, definition of DAP application). The definition is imported rather than reproduced, meaning that the scope of who or what counts as a DAP application depends on the 2011 DAP regulations.

• Authorised employee. An authorised employee is an employee of the local government whom the CEO has authorised in writing to perform relevant DAP functions for and on behalf of the local government (reg 3, definition of authorised employee; reg 6(1)-(2)). Authorisations may be general or limited to specified classes of DAP applications (reg 6(2)). For class 1 and class 2 local governments, there is an additional operational requirement that the CEO must, so far as reasonably practicable, ensure there is at least one employee with a general authorisation at all times (reg 6(3)).

• Responsible authority report. The term is defined by reference to the report referred to in regulation 12 of the DAP regulations (reg 3). The instrument places responsibility for preparing that report on the CEO or an authorised employee, while permitting the CEO to engage external assistance in preparing it (reg 5(2)(a)-(b)).

• CEO centralisation and council non‑direction. The regulations make the CEO, or an employee authorised by the CEO, the sole internal local government decision maker or action taker for relevant DAP functions. Councils and their committees are specifically excluded from performing those functions in any other manner, including directing the CEO or authorised employees about how to perform them, or directing the CEO to engage or not engage a particular external person (reg 5(1)(a)-(b), 5(3)-(4)).

• Conflicts of interest regime. The instrument applies the Act’s conflicts framework for members to the CEO and authorised employees by adopting ss 5.59 to 5.63, as if the definition of “relevant person” in s 5.59 included the CEO and authorised employees and as if references to s 5.71 in s 5.63 included a reference to the new regulation (reg 7(5)). Operationally, if the CEO or an authorised employee is aware they have an interest in a matter they must not perform or continue to perform the relevant DAP function and must disclose the nature of the interest , the CEO to the mayor or president, authorised employees to the CEO , with specified fines for failure to comply (reg 7(1)-(4)).

Each of these concepts is narrowly tied to particular regulation numbers. The regulations do not enlarge the substantive planning law that governs DAP merits decisions; they reorganise which local government actors carry out certain administrative and reporting functions connected to DAP applications and set procedural constraints and conflict rules for those actors.

The regulations allocate duties and constraints across a defined set of actors within and around local government, and also create third‑party touchpoints. The primary affected actors are these.

• The CEO of each local government. The CEO becomes the central actor who must act for and on behalf of the local government in performing relevant DAP functions, and is explicitly empowered to perform them and to authorise employees to do so (reg 5(1)(a); reg 6(1)). The CEO is also the required disclosure recipient where the authorised employee has an interest, and the disclosure recipient when the employee is the one with the interest (reg 7(3)(b)). Where the CEO has an interest, the regulations allow the CEO to arrange for an authorised employee to perform the function, to authorise an employee for that purpose, or to engage an external person to assist (reg 7(4)(a)-(c)).

• Authorised employees. These are local government employees authorised in writing by the CEO to perform relevant DAP functions (reg 3; reg 6(1)-(2)). They will prepare responsible authority reports and otherwise act on behalf of the local government for the specified DAP functions (reg 5(2)(a)). They are subject to the conflict rules: if they have an interest they must not perform or continue to perform the function and must disclose to the CEO (reg 7(1)-(3)).

• Councillors, council as an entity, and council committees. Councils and committees are specifically excluded from performing relevant DAP functions in any other manner, for example by making the decisions or preparing the reports themselves (reg 5(1)(b)). They also cannot direct the CEO, an authorised employee, or an engaged external person in relation to the performance of a relevant DAP function (reg 5(3)). Councils are further prevented from directing the CEO to engage, or not to engage, an external person to assist with a responsible authority report (reg 5(4)).

• Mayors or presidents. The regulation allocates to the mayor or president the role of recipient of conflict disclosures made by the CEO (reg 7(3)(a)). This places those mayors or presidents in the procedural chain for managing CEO conflicts.

• External consultants or persons engaged by the CEO. The CEO may, for and on behalf of the local government, engage a person who is not an employee and who the CEO believes is suitably qualified to assist in preparing a responsible authority report (reg 5(2)(b)). Those persons will operate under the CEO’s engagement and are not to be directed by council or committee (reg 5(3)-(4)).

• Applicants and proponents whose DAP applications are lodged on or after 1 May 2025. The regulation applies only to DAP applications made on or after that date (reg 4(3)), and for those applications the responsible authority report will be prepared by the CEO or an authorised employee (reg 5(2)(a)).

• Class 1 and class 2 local governments. These local government classes are identified by reference to the Local Government (Constitution) Regulations 1998; when a local government falls into class 1 or class 2 the CEO must, as far as reasonably practicable, ensure continuous availability of at least one employee with a general authorisation to carry out relevant DAP functions (reg 6(3)). This imposes a staffing and continuity obligation on CEOs of those classes.

Entities not directly named remain indirectly affected. For example, the council loses internal control over particular DAP procedural actions; external legal advisers and planning consultants engaged by local governments will need to coordinate with the CEO rather than council for the functions regulated, and internal HR and governance teams will be required to document written authorisations and conflict disclosures. The regulations therefore reallocate who within the local government is operationally responsible and accountable for certain DAP-related functions.

The regulations create particular statutory duties and procedural rights for the CEO and authorised employees, and they impose constraints on councils, committees, and conflicted officials. The duties and rights are concrete and are expressed in regulatory terms.

Duties imposed on the CEO

• Sole performance or delegation: A relevant DAP function must be performed for and on behalf of the local government by the CEO or an authorised employee; it cannot be performed in any other manner, including by the council or a committee (reg 5(1)(a)-(b)). This is a positive duty to ensure those functions are not performed by excluded bodies.

• Preparation of responsible authority reports: A responsible authority report must be prepared by the CEO or an authorised employee (reg 5(2)(a)). The CEO therefore holds the obligation to ensure reports are prepared within that framework.

• Engagement power: The CEO has the right to engage a non‑employee person whom the CEO believes is suitably qualified, to assist in preparing a responsible authority report (reg 5(2)(b)). This is expressed as a CEO power “for and on behalf of the local government”.

• Authorisation power: The CEO may authorise an employee to perform relevant DAP functions; the authorisation must be in writing and may be general or limited (reg 6(1)-(2)). For class 1 and class 2 local governments, the CEO must ensure that, so far as reasonably practicable, at least one employee has a general authorisation (reg 6(3)).

• Conflict management: If the CEO becomes aware they have an interest in a matter, the CEO must not perform or continue to perform the relevant DAP function and must disclose the nature of the interest to the mayor or president as soon as practicable (reg 7(1)-(4)). Where the CEO has an interest, the CEO may arrange for an authorised employee to perform the function, may authorise an employee under reg 6, or may engage a suitably qualified external person (reg 7(4)(a)-(c)).

Duties imposed on authorised employees

• Performance: An authorised employee authorised in writing by the CEO performs relevant DAP functions for and on behalf of the local government (reg 6(1)-(2); reg 5(1)(a)).

• Report preparation: Responsible authority reports must be prepared by an authorised employee where the CEO delegates that task (reg 5(2)(a)).

• Conflict management: If an authorised employee becomes aware they have an interest in a matter, they must not perform or continue to perform the relevant DAP function and must, as soon as practicable, disclose the nature of the interest to the CEO (reg 7(1)-(3)). Failure to comply attracts a fine (reg 7(3)).

Constraints on councils and committees

• Exclusion from performing relevant DAP functions: Councils and their committees cannot perform relevant DAP functions in any other manner, including preparing or approving responsible authority reports (reg 5(1)(b)).

• No directions: The council or a committee has no power to direct the CEO, an authorised employee, or an engaged external person regarding the performance of relevant DAP functions (reg 5(3)). The council also cannot direct the CEO about whether to engage a particular external person (reg 5(4)).

Conflict-of-interest framework

• The instrument applies the Act’s members’ conflict-of-interest provisions (ss 5.59 to 5.63) to the CEO and authorised employees by deeming them to be included in the “relevant person” definition where necessary, and by importing a related cross-reference to section 5.71 (reg 7(5)). As a practical effect, the statutory tests and processes in those sections govern whether the CEO or authorised employee has an interest in the matter.

• Penal consequences: The regulations impose monetary penalties for breach of two obligations: performing or continuing to perform the relevant DAP function where the CEO or authorised employee has an interest (fine $10,000 under reg 7(2)); and failing to disclose the nature of the interest as required (fine $10,000 under reg 7(3)).

Rights retained by the CEO

• Delegation and engagement rights: The CEO retains discretion to authorise employees and to engage external assistance; when the CEO has an interest they also retain the right to arrange for another authorised employee to perform the function or to make use of external engagement to discharge the local government’s responsibilities (reg 7(4)).

• Operational autonomy from the council: The CEO and authorised employees, and persons engaged by the CEO, are insulated from council or committee direction in relation to relevant DAP functions; the CEO therefore gains a statutory right to operational autonomy in these matters (reg 5(3)-(4)).

The duties and rights are specific, procedural, and enforced by the fine structure where applicable. They regulate who may act, how authorisations must be documented, how conflicts are handled, and the limits of council involvement.

The regulations create direct monetary penalties for breach of conflict obligations and operate within a broader statutory frame by applying for the purposes of section 9.69B(2) of the Act (reg 4(1)). The only monetary penalties expressly set out in the instrument are the two fines contained in regulation 7.

• Prohibition on performance where there is an interest: If the CEO or an authorised employee is aware, or becomes aware, that they have an interest in the matter, regulation 7(2) requires that they must not perform or continue to perform the relevant DAP function. The instrument attaches a civil monetary penalty for contravention, namely a fine of $10,000 (reg 7(2)).

• Disclosure obligation: Regulation 7(3) requires disclosure of the nature of the interest as soon as practicable: the CEO must disclose to the mayor or president, and an authorised employee must disclose to the CEO. There is a statutory fine of $10,000 for failure to make that required disclosure (reg 7(3)).

The instrument does not specify other sanctions, injunctive remedies, or supervisory mechanisms within the text. It also does not set out how fines are to be recovered, who enforces them, or whether proceedings for the fines are to be handled under particular provisions of the Act or another enforcement framework. However, the instrument’s opening application clause ties it to section 9.69B(2) of the Act (reg 4(1)), so that the regulations should be read in the statutory context of the Act; the instrument itself does not reproduce or restate enforcement procedural detail beyond the specified fines.

Two practical enforcement consequences follow from the text. First, conduct by the CEO or an authorised employee that continues despite knowledge of an interest risks exposure to a $10,000 fine under reg 7(2). Second, failure to disclose that interest triggers a separate $10,000 fine under reg 7(3). The instrument treats these obligations as statutory duties with monetary consequences, thereby creating a compliance and enforcement lever focused on conflicts.

The regulations incorporate the Act’s member conflict provisions by reference for determining whether an interest exists (reg 7(5)), which imports the analytical and procedural apparatus of ss 5.59 to 5.63 of the Act into these decisions. The regulations do not themselves provide, for example, appeal rights against a finding of interest, nor do they provide for internal review of a CEO decision to engage an external person; such mechanisms, if any, will be found in the Act or other rules referenced by the instrument.

The regulations operate as a subordinate instrument and explicitly cross‑reference multiple other statutory instruments and sections. Understanding interaction requires tracing those cross-references.

• Local Government Act 1995. The regulations state they apply for the purposes of section 9.69B(2) of the Act (reg 4(1)). The instrument therefore functions as subordinate law under the Act and must be read in that statutory context. The regulations also import sections 5.59 to 5.63 of the Act for the purpose of determining whether the CEO or an authorised employee has an interest in a matter, modifying those sections as set out in regulation 7(5). The instrument does not reproduce the content of those sections, it incorporates their operation as if the definition of “relevant person” included the CEO and authorised employees and as if a particular cross‑reference to section 5.71 included a reference to this regulation (reg 7(5)).

• Planning and Development (Development Assessment Panels) Regulations 2011 (the DAP regulations). The instrument relies upon and links to the 2011 DAP regulations in several ways. It defines “DAP application” by reference to regulation 3(1) of the DAP regulations, and it expressly includes an application under regulation 17(1) of the DAP regulations (reg 3). The scope of the instrument’s application is limited to the function under regulation 12 of the DAP regulations (reg 4(2)). Further, “responsible authority report” is the report referred to in regulation 12 of the DAP regulations (reg 3). In short, the 2025 regulations remove or reallocate certain administrative and reporting responsibilities for the specific DAP functions governed by the 2011 instrument.

• Local Government (Constitution) Regulations 1998. The instrument references the class definitions for class 1 and class 2 local governments by noting the meanings given in regulation 2A(a) and (b) of the Constitution Regulations (reg 6(3) note). That reference determines which local governments are subject to the CEO’s staffing continuity obligation to maintain, as far as reasonably practicable, at least one employee with a general authorisation to perform relevant DAP functions.

• Conflict-of-interest provisions in the Act. The regulations apply the member conflict-of-interest provisions in sections 5.59 to 5.63 of the Act, as if the CEO and authorised employees were included within the definition of “relevant person” and as if references to section 5.71 in section 5.63 included a reference to this regulation (reg 7(5)). This imports the Act’s substantive tests, disclosure processes, and any other procedural elements contained in those sections into the decision framework for CEOs and authorised employees handling DAP matters.

• Fines and enforcement regime. The instrument itself prescribes fines for breaches of two duties (reg 7(2) and reg 7(3)); any procedural or recovery mechanisms for those fines will interact with the enforcement and penalty provisions of the Act or the broader sanctions framework relevant to regulations. The instrument does not, however, independently establish enforcement procedures beyond specifying the monetary amounts.

By importing and adapting parts of the Act and the DAP regulations, the instrument alters the governance arrangements for particular DAP functions without changing the substantive planning rules in the DAP regulations. The regulations therefore sit as an operational, procedural overlay that reallocates internal local government responsibilities, embeds the Act’s conflict rules into CEO/employee conduct for DAP matters, and constrains council involvement for that narrow set of functions.

This instrument is the Local Government (Development Assessment Panels) Regulations 2025 and appears in the compilation table as SL 2025/48, published 2 April 2025 (compilation table). The instrument’s commencement is staged: regulations 1 and 2 (citation and commencement) commenced on 2 April 2025, the date of publication on the WA legislation website, while the remaining regulations commenced on 1 May 2025 (reg 2(a)-(b); compilation table).

There are no amendments recorded within the text supplied other than the initial enactment and the compilation table entry. The instrument includes a notes section that records the citation, publication, and commencement particulars, but no later amending instruments or variant versions are listed in the compilation table provided. The defined terms list at the end of the instrument is self‑contained and identifies the regulation numbers where terms are defined; it does not show any past definitions or amendments.

Because the instrument incorporates provisions from the Local Government Act 1995 and the Planning and Development (Development Assessment Panels) Regulations 2011 by reference, any amendments to those instruments will affect interpretation and operation of the 2025 regulations to the extent the cross-referenced provisions are altered. For example, changes to the DAP regulations’ regulation 12 or to the Act’s sections 5.59-5.63 or 9.69B(2) would change the legal background against which these regulations operate. The 2025 regulations themselves, as provided, do not supply a history of prior versions or amending acts beyond the initial regulation number and commencement dates.

Users should consult the official legislation database for any subsequent amending instruments or consolidations after the publication date. The compilation table in the instrument gives the base reference for the original regulation, and any later compilations would be recorded through the statutory publishing process.

The instrument as supplied contains no reported judicial or tribunal decisions, case names, or litigation record. The compilation table and notes do not exhibit any litigation history, and no cases are cited within the text. Therefore there is no litigation history recorded in the instrument to summarise.

Although the instrument contains provisions that could give rise to disputes in practice, the instrument itself does not identify or report any such disputes. The regulatory points most likely to generate disagreement, from a legal risk perspective, are matters the instrument explicitly imports or delegates to other statutory texts. Those potential points of dispute would include, subject to the Act and DAP regulations, the following mechanisms:

• Whether a CEO or authorised employee has an “interest” in a matter, given that the instrument imports sections 5.59 to 5.63 of the Act for that determination (reg 7(5)). Litigation could arise over how those sections apply when included persons are CEOs or authorised employees, or about the evidentiary threshold for “awareness” of an interest.

• The scope of what constitutes the “relevant DAP function” by virtue of the instrument’s application to regulation 12 of the DAP regulations (reg 4(2)). Disputes could arise about whether a particular task falls within the function the instrument governs.

• The extent of the council’s inability to direct the CEO, authorised employees, or engaged persons under regulations 5(3) and 5(4), such as where the council alleges a CEO action exceeded statutory authority or failed to follow broader local government governance obligations under the Act.

• Whether the CEO’s engagements with third-party consultants meet the standard “suitably qualified” as required by regulation 5(2)(b), or whether a CEO’s exercise of a power under reg 6(1) to authorise employees was unreasonable or procedurally defective.

None of these theoretical dispute areas are documented as litigated matters within the instrument itself. Practitioners seeking current litigation should check case law databases and administrative tribunal records for post‑commencement decisions that interpret the interaction between these regulations, the Act, and the DAP regulations.

The regulations are short and precise, but they contain a number of practical and legal nuances that may produce unintended consequences if overlooked. The following points are facts grounded in the text and indicate areas where local governments should pay particular attention.

1. Narrow scope of application. The regulations apply only to a function of a local government under regulation 12 of the DAP regulations (reg 4(2)). They do not apply to every activity connected to DAPs. Local governments and practitioners must therefore identify whether a task is indeed a “relevant DAP function” under reg 12 of the DAP regulations before assuming these rules apply.

2. Date cutoff. The regulations expressly do not apply to a DAP application made before 1 May 2025 (reg 4(3)). Applications lodged before that date are outside the scope of these regulations. That temporal boundary will require administrative checks to determine which applications are subject to the new regime.

3. CEO centralisation and council non‑direction. The CEO or authorised employee must perform relevant DAP functions for and on behalf of the local government, and councils and their committees cannot perform the functions in any other manner (reg 5(1)(a)-(b)). Councils and committees also cannot direct the CEO, an authorised employee, or an engaged external person regarding these functions (reg 5(3)). In practice this alters internal control pathways and may require changes to governance protocols and minutes to ensure councils do not inadvertently give direction that the statute prohibits.

4. Written authorisations requirement. Authorisations of employees must be in writing and may be general or limited to specified classes of DAP applications (reg 6(2)). Verbal delegations or undocumented understandings will not meet the regulation’s form requirement, which could leave actions vulnerable to challenge.

5. Continuity obligation for class 1 and class 2 local governments. The CEO must ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, that at least one employee has a general authorisation at all times in class 1 and class 2 local governments (reg 6(3)). The statutory phrase “so far as is reasonably practicable” introduces a flexible standard that will depend on operational realities, staffing constraints, and reasonable steps taken. Local governments should document efforts to comply with that standard.

6. Conflict obligations carry fines. If the CEO or an authorised employee is aware they have an interest in the matter, the person must not perform or continue to perform the relevant DAP function and must disclose the interest (reg 7(1)-(3)). Each of the non‑performance and disclosure obligations carries a statutory fine of $10,000 for breach (reg 7(2)-(3)). The separate fines make non‑disclosure and continuing to act distinct offences with significant exposure.

7. Disclosure recipients differ by position. The CEO must disclose to the mayor or president, whereas an authorised employee must disclose to the CEO (reg 7(3)(a)-(b)). This asymmetry has governance implications: disclosure by the CEO goes to the political head, while employee disclosure is internal executive reporting.

8. Conflict test imported from the Act. The regulation requires use of sections 5.59 to 5.63 of the Act for determining whether an interest exists, as if the CEO and authorised employees were included as “relevant persons” (reg 7(5)). Understanding the boundaries of “interest” therefore requires consulting the Act; the regulation itself does not define that threshold.

9. CEO may engage external persons, but council cannot dictate engagement. The CEO may engage a suitably qualified outside person to assist with a responsible authority report, and neither the council nor a committee can direct the CEO about engagement choices, including directing the CEO to engage or not to engage a specific person (reg 5(2)(b), 5(3)-(4)). This concentrates procurement and engagement discretion in the CEO for these tasks.

10. “Perform for and on behalf of” phrasing. The repeated formulation that functions must be performed “for and on behalf of the local government by the CEO or by an authorised employee” (reg 5(1)(a)) creates an express connection between the officer’s action and the local government as principal. This has implications for representation, legal responsibility, and record-keeping; practitioners should ensure documentation shows that actions were taken as the local government, by the CEO or authorised employee.

11. Responsible authority report requirement. The instrument specifies that responsible authority reports under reg 12 of the DAP regulations must be prepared by the CEO or authorised employee (reg 5(2)(a)). Any local government practice of having council approve or author the responsible authority report will need to be adjusted.

12. Ambiguity on enforcement mechanics. The instrument sets fines but does not specify enforcement mechanics or which authority will prosecute or recover the fines. That omission places emphasis on local governments to adopt internal compliance measures to prevent breaches rather than relying on enforcement after the fact.

These are not legal conclusions but operationally important points grounded in the regulation text. Each is apt to influence governance, staffing, conflict management, procurement, and record-keeping practices.

To implement and comply with the regulations, local governments should follow a short, concrete checklist that translates statutory obligations into operational steps. The following actions are tied directly to the regulation numbers and are designed to produce documentary evidence of compliance.

1. Identify in-scope DAP matters.

• Review all DAP applications and map them to the DAP regulations to determine whether they fall under regulation 12 of the DAP regulations, thereby constituting a “relevant DAP function” for the purposes of these regulations (reg 3; reg 4(2)). Exclude any DAP applications made before 1 May 2025 (reg 4(3)).

• Maintain a register of DAP applications showing submission dates to establish whether the regulations apply.

2. Document CEO authorisations in writing.

• Use a written authorisation instrument for any employee authorised to perform relevant DAP functions. The authorisation must be in writing and may be general or limited to a specified class of DAP applications (reg 6(2)).

• Where authorisations are limited, document the scope precisely (for example, classes of applications by value, land use, or other defined criteria) so it is clear what an authorised employee may and may not do.

• Keep a central repository of authorisations, dates, and any limitations, and ensure HR and legal teams have copies.

3. Ensure continuity in class 1 and 2 local governments.

• If the local government is class 1 or class 2 per the Constitution Regulations, adopt a staffing continuity plan to ensure that, so far as reasonably practicable, at least one employee holds a general authorisation at all times (reg 6(3)). The plan should include leave coverage, training for multiple employees, and succession planning.

• Document the steps taken to satisfy the “reasonably practicable” standard, including recruitment, cross‑training, and contingency arrangements.

4. Assign responsibility for preparing responsible authority reports.

• Ensure responsible authority reports required by regulation 12 of the DAP regulations are prepared by the CEO or by an authorised employee (reg 5(2)(a)). Create internal SOPs indicating report authorship, approvals, and file storage.

• If the CEO intends to engage an external person to assist with the report, document the engagement and the CEO’s belief that the person is suitably qualified (reg 5(2)(b)). Retain CVs, scope of engagement, and written engagement letters.

5. Implement conflict-of-interest identification and disclosure procedures.

• Adopt a conflict checklist that operates in line with sections 5.59 to 5.63 of the Act, as applied to CEOs and authorised employees under reg 7(5). Although the instrument imports those sections, local governments must operationalise the tests to ensure awareness.

• Require immediate disclosure “as soon as practicable” when the CEO or an authorised employee becomes aware of an interest. The CEO must disclose to the mayor or president, and an authorised employee must disclose to the CEO (reg 7(3)(a)-(b)). Maintain a disclosure ledger that records who disclosed, the nature of the interest, date of disclosure, and action taken.

• Ensure that once an interest is disclosed, the person does not perform or continue to perform the relevant DAP function (reg 7(2)). Record who takes over the task, whether another authorised employee or an external person was engaged under reg 5(2)(b).

6. Control council and committee interactions.

• Amend council and committee procedure notes and decision templates to avoid any direction in relation to the performance of relevant DAP functions, and avoid motions that would have the operational effect of directing the CEO about engagement choices (reg 5(3)-(4)).

• Provide a briefing to councillors and committees, explaining that the council cannot direct the CEO, authorised employees, or engaged persons in relation to these functions, and advise on acceptable oversight that does not amount to prohibited direction.

7. Procurement and engagement documentation.

• When engaging external persons to assist with responsible authority reports, ensure engagement contracts or letters set out the consultant’s role, scope, deliverables, qualifications, confidentiality and indemnities as appropriate. Record the CEO’s decision that the person is “suitably qualified” (reg 5(2)(b)).

• Keep invoices, competency evidence and work products linked to the responsible authority report file.

8. Training and internal controls.

• Train the CEO, authorised employees, senior managers and councillors on the new rules, with particular emphasis on the written authorisation requirement, non‑direction by council, conflict identification, and the $10,000 fines for breaches (reg 6(2); reg 5(3)-(4); reg 7(2)-(3)).

• Integrate the conflict test from ss 5.59-5.63 of the Act into HR and governance policies so that employees can recognise reportable interests.

9. Record-keeping and audit trail.

• Maintain documentary evidence that each responsible authority report was prepared by the CEO or an authorised employee, or that an external person was engaged as authorised by the CEO (reg 5(2)(a)-(b)). Keep contemporaneous records of authorisations, disclosures, staff coverage plans, and council briefings.

• Prepare an internal compliance checklist for each DAP matter documenting applicable regulations, who performed the function, any disclosures made, procurement steps, and final sign-off.

10. Legal review and policy alignment.

• Review existing local government delegations and policies to align them with the written authorisation requirement, the CEO’s engagement powers, and the prohibition on council direction.

• Consult the Local Government (Constitution) Regulations 1998 to confirm whether the local government is class 1 or class 2 for reg 6(3) purposes. Document the classification and the steps taken to comply with the continuity duty.

11. Contingency for CEO conflicts.

• Develop an escalation protocol for when the CEO has an interest: the CEO should immediately disclose to the mayor or president, arrange for an authorised employee to perform the matter, or lawfully authorise an employee or engage an external person to act (reg 7(3)-(4)). Document each step so the local government evidences compliance with the non‑performance and disclosure requirements.

These compliance steps are grounded in the regulations’ operative provisions. Following them will create the documentary and operational architecture that the regulations envisage: written staff authorisations, an evidentiary record of who prepared responsible authority reports, conflict identification and disclosure records, and procurement documentation for external assistance. The focus of compliance should be prevention, documentation, and training because the instrument imposes monetary fines for failure to disclose or for continuing to act where an interest exists (reg 7(2)-(3)).