The Act operates around a small number of core concepts and mechanisms: Commission, Commissioner, Reference, inquiry powers, reporting obligations, appointment and tenure rules, employment conditions, and preserved rights.

• Definitions and roles. The Act defines Chairperson, Commission, Commissioner and Reference (s 2). A Commissioner includes the Chairperson (s 2). The Chairperson is appointed by the Governor on the Minister’s view of suitability and must meet the qualifications specified (s 3(3)). Commissioners other than the Chairperson must also meet qualifications or be considered suitable by the Minister (s 3(4)). The Minister’s view is therefore the statutory gate to senior appointments.

• Full-time and part-time commissioners. Section 3A requires that the instrument of appointment specify whether a commissioner is full-time or part-time (s 3A(1)). Full-time commissioners, except where section 4, section 9, or the Minister otherwise allows, must devote the whole of their time to the duties of the office (s 3A(2)). This distinction determines time commitment, remuneration source and certain employment consequences (s 8(1)-(2)).

• Term limits and reappointment. A commissioner’s term is capped at seven years and the commissioner is eligible for reappointment (s 3B). The instrument of appointment must specify the term.

• Powers and scope of work. The Commission’s duties flow from Ministerial references. Section 10(1) frames the purpose-claims: identify defects, repeal obsolete enactments, consolidate or codify, modernise, adopt new administrative methods, and systematically develop law. The Commission must act “in accordance with any reference to it made by the Minister” (s 10(1)). It may also hold inquiries “as it thinks fit” for the purposes of a reference (s 10(1)(c)).

• Procedural powers drawn from Royal Commissions Act. For inquiries, the Commission and Chairperson have certain powers and immunities from Division 1 of Part 2 of the Royal Commissions Act 1923, and that Act applies, mutatis mutandis, to witnesses with specified exceptions (s 10(2)(a)-(c)). The Act therefore imports into the Commission some statutory mechanisms for evidence collection and witness compulsion through cross-reference rather than restating them.

• Internal governance. Meetings, quorum (two commissioners), voting and the Chairperson’s role are prescribed (s 12(1)-(5)). The Chairperson can constitute Divisions (s 12A), enabling the Commission to treat a constituted Division, when dealing with a particular reference or part of it, as the Commission for that purpose (s 12A(3)). Detailed quorum and voting rules for Divisions are in s 12B.

• Reporting and Parliamentary interface. The Commission must make interim and final reports on references and an annual report each year (s 13(1)-(3)). Reports furnished to the Minister must be tabled within 14 sitting days (s 13(5)), and there are provisions for presentation to the Clerk and deemed laying when Houses are not sitting (s 13(5A), (5B)). The Minister or the Commission (with written Ministerial consent) may publish reports before tabling (s 13(6)). Reports published under that power are treated as parliamentary documents for the Parliamentary Papers (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1975 (s 13(7)).

• Employment, remuneration and rights preservation. Full-time commissioners not holding judicial office receive remuneration consistent with the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975 (s 8(1)). Part-time commissioners receive allowances and fees the Minister determines (s 8(2)). The Government Sector Employment Act 2013 is inapplicable to commissioner appointments and commissioners are not subject to that Act while holding office (s 8(6)). Schedule 1 provides preservation of rights for persons who immediately prior to appointment were Public Service employees, contributors to superannuation schemes, or staff of specified statutory bodies (Schedule 1 cl 2-5). Schedule 1 also contains anti-double-benefit provisions (cl 4) and sets consequences where a commissioner becomes a contributor to to another superannuation scheme (cl 3).

• Removal and resignation. Different removal pathways apply to judicial-office holders and non-judicial commissioners. Judicial-office holders are subject to the higher removal threshold, namely removal only upon the address of both Houses (s 9(1)). Non-judicial commissioners may be removed by the Governor for specified reasons including inability, misbehaviour, breach of employment terms, unauthorised external paid employment for full-time commissioners, bankruptcy, certain mental health statuses under the Mental Health Act 1958, or conviction of offences punishable by 12 months or more imprisonment (s 9(2)(a)-(e)). Commissioners may resign by writing to the Governor (s 9(2A)).

These main concepts structure incentives and constraints. The Minister drives the Commission’s work through references (s 10(1)). Commissioners’ independence in practice will be shaped by appointment mechanics (s 3), removal rules (s 9), terms and reappointment prospects (s 3B), and control over remuneration and leave by the Minister (s 8(1)-(2), (2A)). The Commission’s evidence-gathering and witness compulsion tools are not autonomous but rely on the Royal Commissions Act material imported by s 10(2), subject to the exceptions the Act specifies.

The Act creates legal and operational effects for a range of actors. The principal groups affected are commissioners and Chairpersons, the Minister and Governor, witnesses and persons whose laws and proposals are under review, public service and statutory-body employees who take up commissionership, the Parliament, and, indirectly, members of the public and regulated communities subject to any eventual law reform proposals.

• Commissioners and Chairperson. Appointment, status and duties follow from ss 3, 3A, 3B and 8. Full-time commissioners must normally devote all their time to the office (s 3A(2)). Commissioners who are not judicial office holders have their remuneration, leave and terms set as per the instrument of appointment and, for full-time commissioners, in accordance with the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975 or as determined by the Minister (s 8(1), (2), (2A), (5)). A person appointed as a commissioner who is also a holder of a judicial office retains judicial tenure and rights, and may exercise judicial powers, though service as commissioner is taken as service in the judicial office for all purposes (s 4).

• Minister and Governor. The Minister directs the Commission’s work by making references which trigger the Commission’s obligations under s 10(1). The Governor is the appointing authority for the Chairperson and commissioners and may appoint a Deputy Chairperson (ss 3(2); 5(1)). The Governor also removes commissioners under the statutory conditions set out in s 9.

• Witnesses and persons summoned. The Act imports the powers and protections from the Royal Commissions Act for inquiries and applies that Act mutatis mutandis to witnesses, with specified exceptions (s 10(2)(a)). Persons summoned to appear before the Commission are therefore affected by the enforcement and compulsion provisions of the Royal Commissions Act to the extent that it is applied.

• Public Service employees and staff of statutory bodies. Schedule 1 applies to full-time commissioners who immediately before appointment were Public Service employees, contributors to superannuation schemes or members of staff of declared statutory bodies (Schedule 1 cl 1-2). Such persons retain rights accrued or accruing to them in those capacities, may remain contributors to certain superannuation schemes (subject to cl 3), and are treated as continuing employees for certain purposes (Schedule 1 cl 2(e)-(i)). The Government (for superannuation purposes) is taken to be the employer under Schedule 1 cl 2(i).

• Parliament. The Commission’s reporting obligations engage Parliament directly. Reports must be furnished to the Minister and tabled in each House within 14 sitting days of receipt by the Minister (s 13(5)). Parliamentary procedures for publication and recording of such documents are engaged by ss 13(5A)-(5B) and 13(7).

• The public and regulated entities. Any person whose statutory scheme, administrative process or regulated activity is the subject of a reference is affected indirectly. The Act expressly tasks the Commission with reviewing enacted law to eliminate defects and simplify or modernise law and administration (s 10(1)(a)(i)-(vi)), which creates the prospect of legal change that may alter regulatory compliance costs, contractual relationships and sectoral practices. The Act does not itself change substantive legal rights without further legislative or administrative action; it creates the mechanism for review and recommendation.

• Government departments and personnel administering the Commission. Section 14 authorises employment in the Public Service to enable the Commission to exercise its functions. The Government Sector Employment Act 2013 is stated not to apply to commissioner appointments and commissioners are not subject to that Act in their capacity as commissioners (s 8(6)). This affects HR governance, pay administration and statutory entitlements for staff supporting the Commission.

Who pays. Financial consequences fall on public finances: remuneration for full-time commissioners is set against statutory remuneration frameworks (s 8(1)), part-time commissioners receive Minister-determined allowances and fees (s 8(2)), and staff may be employed under the Public Service for Commission support (s 14). Reporting obligations impose administrative work on the Commission and the Minister’s office.

Who decides. The Minister decides on references and has approval powers over publication of reports (s 13(6)), the Minister determines part-time fees and allowances (s 8(2)), and the Governor appoints and removes commissioners subject to the Act’s rules (ss 3(2), 9). The appointment criteria incorporate ministerial judgment of suitability (s 3(3)-(4)).

Behavioural effects. Commissioners’ conduct is constrained by full-time/time commitments, removal provisions, and remuneration and superannuation arrangements. Potential witnesses face statutory compulsion backed by Royal Commissions Act powers as applied (s 10(2)(a)). Departments and stakeholders may time or tailor submissions and consultations to the Minister’s reference and the Commission’s terms of reference because the Commission acts only under reference (s 10(1)).

This section sets out the principal duties the Commission and its officers owe under the Act, and the statutory rights conferred on appointees and affected persons.

Duties of the Commission

• Act on Ministerial reference. The Commission’s primary duty is to consider the law "in accordance with any reference to it made by the Minister" (s 10(1)). The Act lists purposes the Commission shall aim for in carrying out a reference, including eliminating defects and anachronisms, repealing obsolete enactments, consolidating, codifying or revising law, simplifying or modernising law, adopting more effective methods for the administration of law and dispensation of justice, and systematically developing and reforming the law (s 10(1)(a)(i)-(vi)).

• Consider proposals. The Commission must consider proposals relating to matters within the Legislature’s competence (s 10(1)(b)).

• Hold inquiries. For the purposes of a reference the Commission may "hold and conduct such inquiries as it thinks fit" (s 10(1)(c)). The Commission must also make interim reports when directed by the Minister, final reports at the end of work on a reference, and an annual report on its proceedings each year (s 13(1)-(3)).

• Furnish reports to the Minister and ensure tabling. All reports are to be furnished to the Minister and tabled in each House within 14 sitting days after the Minister receives them (s 13(5)). If a House is not sitting, presentation to the Clerk accomplishes deemed laying (s 13(5A)-(5B)). The Commission or the Minister may publish a report prior to tabling with the Minister’s written approval (s 13(6)), and such publication is treated for Parliamentary Papers Act purposes as publication under a House’s authority (s 13(7)).

Duties of officers and internal governance

• Chairperson’s duties. The Chairperson presides at meetings when present, has a deliberative and, in the event of equal votes, a casting vote, and directs meeting times and places (s 12(1), (3)). The Chairperson may constitute Divisions for particular references (s 12A(1)) and specify a presiding member for Division meetings (s 12B(1)).

• Commissioners’ duties. Commissioners are required to perform the functions imposed by the Act and to meet quorum and voting duties (s 12). Full-time commissioners must, except where otherwise authorized, devote their whole time to the office (s 3A(2)).

Rights and statutory protections

• Powers, authorities and immunities. For inquiries, the Commission and Chairperson hold the powers and immunities conferred by Division 1 of Part 2 of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (s 10(2)(a)). That Act is applied mutatis mutandis to witnesses appearing before the Commission, with specified exceptions (s 10(2)(a)). This confers on the Commission statutory tools for evidence-gathering and legal protections for officers exercising inquiry functions.

• Preservation of prior employment and superannuation rights. Schedule 1 cl 2 preserves rights for commissioners who immediately before appointment were Public Service employees, contributors to superannuation schemes, or statutory body staff. Such commissioners retain accrued and accruing rights and may continue to contribute to the superannuation scheme to which they were immediately prior contributors, subject to Schedule 1 cl 3 (Schedule 1 cl 2(e)-(i)). The Schedule ensures service as commissioner is taken to be service as an employee or staff member for the purposes of the relevant laws (Schedule 1 cl 2(h)).

• Remuneration and leave. Full-time commissioners not being holders of judicial office are entitled to remuneration under the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975 (s 8(1)). Part-time commissioners receive fees and allowances as determined by the Minister (s 8(2)). Leave for full-time commissioners is subject to Ministerial determination (s 8(2A)). These provisions give the Minister a measure of control over pay and leave for commissioners.

• Protection of judicial office. Appointment of a judicial-office holder as commissioner does not affect the person’s tenure, rank, title, status, precedence, salary or other rights as a judicial officeholder (s 4(1)). Judicial officers who serve as commissioners continue to hold and may exercise judicial powers (s 4(2)).

Constraints and limitations

• Applicability of the Government Sector Employment Act. The Government Sector Employment Act 2013 does not apply to appointment of commissioners by the Governor, and a person appointed is not subject to that Act while holding office as a commissioner (s 8(6)). This exclusion affects the statutory employment framework that would otherwise regulate such appointments.

• Removal conditions and rights to resign. Judicial-office holders enjoy removal only on address of both Houses (s 9(1)). Non-judicial commissioners may be removed by the Governor on enumerated grounds (s 9(2)). A commissioner may resign by writing to the Governor (s 9(2A)). These removal and resignation rules set limits on tenure security, with higher protection for judicial officials.

• Double-benefit and superannuation constraints. Schedule 1 cl 4 prevents a commissioner from claiming benefits under this Act and another Act for the same period of service. Schedule 1 cl 3(1) prevents entitlement to preserved superannuation rights upon becoming a contributor to another scheme while in office. These clauses enforce exclusivity of benefit claims and limit double entitlements.

These duties and rights allocate responsibilities across the Commission, Minister and Governor, condition tenure and remuneration, and set out the treatment of employment and superannuation entitlements. Practitioners should note the interaction between the Act’s reporting and inquiry duties and the powers derived from the Royal Commissions Act as applied by s 10(2), and the Minister’s role in driving references and approving report publication, which materially shapes the Commission’s work program and public communications.

The Act itself is not framed as a penal statute and contains no standalone fines or criminal sanctions applicable to the Commission or to private parties for non-compliance with the Commission’s processes. Enforcement and compulsion mechanisms in relation to inquiries are therefore located in the parts of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 that this Act imports by reference, subject to the exclusions this Act specifies.

• Imported enforcement powers. Section 10(2)(a) states the Commission and Chairperson shall have the "powers, authorities, protections and immunities conferred on a commissioner by Division 1 of Part 2 of the Royal Commissions Act 1923" and that the Royal Commissions Act "shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to any witness summoned by or appearing before the Commission", except that section 13 and Division 2 of Part 2 of that Act are excepted. The practical consequence is that statutory mechanisms for summonsing witnesses, compelling documents, administering oaths and giving evidence, and protections for officers exercising inquiry functions are available by cross-reference to the Royal Commissions Act, but a user must consult that Act to identify exact coercive and enforcement powers and any penalties for non-compliance with a summons or for giving false evidence.

• Specified exclusions and conditional applications. The Act explicitly carves out section 13 and Division 2 of Part 2 of the Royal Commissions Act from the mutatis mutandis application to witnesses (s 10(2)(a)). The Act also provides that Division 2 of Part 2 applies in certain circumstances where the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson presiding is a Supreme Court judge (s 10(2)(b)), and section 17(1)-(3) of the Royal Commissions Act applies when the Minister has declared those provisions to apply in relation to the reference and the presiding commissioner is a judge of the Supreme Court (s 10(2)(c)). These nuances change which enforcement or disclosure mechanisms are active for a given inquiry and depend on the nature of the presiding officer and Ministerial declarations.

• Removal on criminal conviction. The Act provides that a commissioner may be removed by the Governor where the commissioner is convicted in New South Wales of a crime or offence punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or more, or convicted elsewhere of an equivalent offence (s 9(2)(e)). This is a statutory disciplinary consequence tied to criminal law outcomes, but the Act does not itself create the criminal offence,rather it conditions tenure on the absence of such convictions.

• Mental health and insolvency grounds for removal. The Act lists mental health statuses under the Mental Health Act 1958 and bankruptcy or insolvency procedures as grounds for removal (s 9(2)(c)-(d)). Removal on these grounds is a disciplinary and administrative enforcement mechanism rather than criminal sanction.

• Parliamentary accountability and publication. The Commission’s report tabling obligations require reports be tabled in each House within specified timeframes (s 13(5)). The Act treats reports published prior to tabling with the Minister’s approval as parliamentary documents under the Parliamentary Papers (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1975 (s 13(6)-(7)). Non-compliance with tabling timeframes would be a parliamentary procedure matter with political consequences rather than a penalty created by this Act.

• Practical enforcement implications for witnesses and third parties. Because enforcement and compulsion powers are sourced through the Royal Commissions Act as applied, persons summoned to appear or produce documents should be advised to consult the Royal Commissions Act to determine the precise statutory consequences of non-attendance, failure to produce documents, or giving false evidence. The current Act indicates that such statutory mechanisms exist but clarifies that certain parts of the Royal Commissions Act are not applied generally to witnesses (s 10(2)(a)), and that additional provisions apply only where specified conditions obtain (s 10(2)(b)-(c)).

In short, the Act relies on cross-referencing to the Royal Commissions Act for inquiry enforcement and for protections and immunities. It sets administrative enforcement measures for tenure through removal provisions which react to criminal convictions, insolvency, mental incapacity and failure to comply with employment conditions (s 9). For any enforcement strategy or advice to a witness, legal teams must read the Royal Commissions Act provisions cited in s 10(2) and account for the exclusions and conditional applications the Act specifies.

The Act operates through a network of cross-references and exclusions that shape its interaction with other statutory regimes. The cross-references define both powers the Commission may exercise and limits on the employment framework that applies to commissioners and staff.

• Royal Commissions Act 1923. Section 10(2) is the primary point of interaction. The Commission and Chairperson have the powers, authorities, protections and immunities conferred on a commissioner by Division 1 of Part 2 of the Royal Commissions Act 1923, and that Act, except for specified sections, applies mutatis mutandis to witnesses. This imports evidence-gathering, summons and procedural powers from the Royal Commissions Act into the Commission’s inquiries, subject to the Act’s explicit exclusions (s 10(2)(a)-(c)). Users must therefore read the Royal Commissions Act in tandem to ascertain exact powers, protections and limitations.

• Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975. Section 8(1) specifies that a full-time commissioner, not being the holder of a judicial office, is entitled to be paid remuneration in accordance with the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975. This links commissioners’ pay to existing statutory remuneration frameworks.

• Government Sector Employment Act 2013. Section 8(6) provides that the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 does not apply to or in respect of the appointment of a commissioner by the Governor and that a person so appointed is not, in that person’s capacity as a commissioner, subject to that Act while holding office. This creates an exclusion from the usual public sector employment legislation for commissioner appointments and means that statutory processes, appeals and obligations under the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 are not automatically engaged for commissioners during their tenure.

• Mental Health Act 1958. Removal grounds reference the Mental Health Act 1958 concepts of temporary patient, continued treatment patient, protected person, incapable person, and detention under Part 7 of that Act (s 9(2)(d)). The Act therefore interacts with mental health statutory classifications to determine disqualification or removal from office.

• Parliamentary Papers (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1975. Section 13(7) deems reports published under s 13(6) to be published under the authority of either House for the purposes of the Parliamentary Papers Act 1975. This affects how printed reports are treated and their status as parliamentary documents.

• Other Acts and superannuation law. Schedule 1 interacts with superannuation schemes and other Acts under which rights accrued for Public Service employees or staff of statutory bodies. It explicitly takes service as a commissioner to be service for the purposes of the law under which those rights accrued (Schedule 1 cl 2(h)). Schedule 1 also restricts concurrent claims to benefits under different Acts for the same period of service (cl 4), and contains a specific provision cutting off preserved entitlements where a commissioner becomes a contributor to another superannuation scheme (cl 3(1)).

• Statute specific to judicial office. Section 4 protects judicial officeholders’ tenure, rank, salary and other rights from being affected by appointment as a commissioner. It treats service as a commissioner as service in the judicial office for all purposes (s 4(1)-(3)). This preserves compatibility between judicial office statutes and commission appointment consequences.

• Proclamations and declarations. Schedule 1 cl 6 gives the Governor a power to declare bodies constituted under any Act to be "statutory bodies" for Schedule 1 purposes, linking the Schedule’s preservation rules to executive proclamations.

Practical points on interactions

• Because the Act delegates inquiry enforcement to the Royal Commissions Act by reference, practitioners must read both Acts together to determine what coercive measures, immunities or protections apply to a particular inquiry (s 10(2)(a)). The Act’s exceptions and conditional applications mean that some Royal Commissions Act mechanisms will apply only in specific configurations (e.g. presiding officer is a Supreme Court judge) (s 10(2)(b)-(c)).

• The Government Sector Employment Act 2013 exclusion (s 8(6)) means that standard public sector employment protections, grievance procedures and potentially merit-based appointment obligations may not be directly engaged; however other statutory or contractual protections may remain in force or be preserved by Schedule 1 for particular employees.

• Remuneration and leave are tied to statutory remuneration schemes and Ministerial determination (s 8(1)-(2A)). That affects budgeting and payroll administration and may interact with other public finance laws.

• Superannuation, pension and deferred leave rights are preserved in Schedule 1 but subject to conditions, anti-double-dipping constraints and the risk of losing preserved entitlements on joining another scheme (Schedule 1 cl 2-4). Employers and HR advisers must coordinate between the Act, relevant superannuation scheme rules and any applicable public service legislation.

• Removal interacts with criminal law, insolvency law and mental health law because those are the grounds upon which removal may occur (s 9(2)(c)-(e)). The Act does not set standards for criminal prosecutions or insolvency procedures but makes those external legal outcomes relevant to tenure.

Overall, the Act functions as a hub statute that relies on other statutes to supply enforcement tools, remuneration mechanisms and employment frameworks. Users must therefore map the Act’s provisions to the external instruments it cites when advising on powers, liabilities, employment consequences or procedural steps.

The text contains amendment annotations that identify a sequence of statutory changes. The Act has been subject to insertions, substitutions and repeals over time. The statutory notes included in the text provide the following amendment references and enactment history.

• Section 2. The definition provisions in s 2 were amended in 1981 as indicated by the note "s 2: Am 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (1)". That indicates a 1981 amendment to the Definitions section reflected in Schedule 1 of the amending Act No 1 of 1981.

• Section 3. The constitution of the Commission under s 3 records amendments "Am 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (2); 2006 No 30, Sch 9.9". This shows s 3 was amended by an Act in 1981 and again by Act No 30 of 2006 (Schedule 9.9). The 1981 entries correspond with a suite of insertions and structural changes noted elsewhere in the Act.

• Sections 3A and 3B. Both ss 3A and 3B were inserted in 1981, as shown by "s 3A: Ins 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (3)" and "s 3B: Ins 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (3)". These insertions introduced the concept of full-time and part-time commissioners and capped terms of appointment.

• Section 4. No separate amendment note appears in the text for s 4, implying retention since enactment, but s 8 contains an amendment note referring to later changes that interact with s 4 as a referenced provision.

• Section 5. The Deputy Chairperson provision has the note "s 5: Am 1981 No 1, Schs 1 (4), 2 (1)" showing amendments in 1981.

• Sections 6 and 7. Both sections are shown as repealed: "s 6: Rep 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (5)" and "s 7: Rep 1981 No 1, Sch 2 (2)". The 1981 Act removed these provisions.

• Section 8. The remuneration and conditions section carries multiple amendment notes: "s 8: Am 1976 No 4, Sch 5. Subst 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (6). Am 1987 No 48, Sch 30; 2015 No 15, Sch 3.39 [1]." This shows an amendment in 1976, a substitution in 1981, further amendment in 1987, and changes in 2015. The 2015 note indicates a schedule amendment to s 8.

• Section 9. The removal provisions have amendment history: "s 9: Am 1980 No 187, Sch 1; 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (7); 1990 No 99, Sch 4." This shows changes in 1980, 1981 and 1990.

• Section 10. The powers and duties section notes "s 10: Am 1981 No 1, Schs 1 (8), 2 (3)." That reflects 1981 amendments affecting s 10.

• Section 11. The provision numbered 11 was amended in 1974 and later repealed in 1984, as shown by "s 11: Am 1974 No 18, Sch 1. Rep 1984 No 117, Sch 1 (1)."

• Sections 12 and 13. Section 12 has insertion of Division/Divisions via 1981 amendments, and s 13 carries amendment notes: "s 13: Am 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (10); 1984 No 117, Sch 1 (2); 2009 No 37, Sch 1.7; 2011 No 8, Sch 1.5." That indicates successive changes in 1981, 1984, 2009 and 2011 affecting reporting and related provisions.

• Sections 12A-12C. These sections were inserted in 1981, noted as "ss 12A-12C: Ins 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (9)." They established Divisions and rules for their meetings.

• Section 14. The staff provision shows substitution in 2015, evidence in "s 14: Am 1981 No 1, Schs 1 (11), 2 (4). Subst 2015 No 15, Sch 3.39 [2]." That indicates the staff provisions were substantially revised in 2015.

• Schedule 1. The Schedule titled "Provisions relating to the preservation of rights of certain persons on their appointment as full-time commissioners" was inserted in 1981: "sch 1: Ins 1981 No 1, Sch 1 (12). Am 2015 No 15, Sch 3.39 [3]-[5]." This indicates 1981 insertion and 2015 amendments to the Schedule.

• Repeals elsewhere. The notes show that several small sections were repealed in the 1981 amending Act and in 1984: s 6 and s 7 (1981) and s 11 (1984). The text indicates other amendments in 1974, 1976, 1980, 1987, 1990, 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2015 with schedule references.

What the amendment notes do not provide. The annotations give dates and schedule references for amendments, insertions and repeals but do not specify the full text of the earlier provisions or the detailed content of each amending change. To trace the substantive content change for each amendment, one must consult the amending statutes referenced (for example, the 1981 No 1 Act, 2015 No 15 Act, etc.) and the consolidated versions showing the pre- and post-amendment text. The Act’s notes indicate that the major structural changes occurred in 1981, including insertion of full-time/part-time mechanics, divisions, the Schedule preserving rights, and other governance provisions, and that more recent changes (2006, 2009, 2011, 2015) adjusted specific sections such as s 3, s 8, s 13 and Schedule 1.

For practitioners preparing historical compliance or advising on transitional entitlements, the amendment notes flag which years to inspect for changes to appointment qualifications, remuneration and preservation of rights, and these should be cross-checked against the actual amending Acts cited for authoritative legislative history.

The legislative text supplied contains no recorded judicial decisions, case names, or statutory interpretation disputes related to the Act. There are no cases cited in the Act or in its amendment notes. Consequently, the Act’s own text does not record litigation history, and the following observations flow from that absence in the source rather than from external research.

• No cases cited in the Act. The Act’s provisions and amendment annotations do not identify any judicial determinations that interpret or apply the Act. The Act’s application of parts of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 means that litigation arising from Commission inquiries, such as challenges to summonses, claims for privilege, or disputes over immunities, would involve the Royal Commissions Act as well as the Law Reform Commission Act where relevant; however no such matters appear in this text.

• Practical implications for research. Because the Act’s text contains no litigation references, practitioners wishing to understand how courts have interpreted particular provisions (for example, the limits of ministerial discretion in making references, the ambit of protection conferred by s 10(2), or the interplay between Schedule 1 superannuation preservation and other statutory schemes) must search case law databases for adjudications mentioning the Law Reform Commission Act 1967, and for decisions that interpret the sections of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 imported by s 10(2). The Act’s text itself does not provide judicial context.

• Points likely litigated in other contexts. Based on the Act’s structure, litigation that could arise,though no examples are in the source,would typically involve (a) challenges to compulsory processes under inquiries invoking the Royal Commissions Act provisions applied by s 10(2), (b) employment disputes about the effect of the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 exclusion under s 8(6), (c) superannuation rights and reappointment claims under Schedule 1 cl 2-5, and (d) the validity or scope of references made by the Minister under s 10(1). Practitioners should note that because the Act limits the Commission’s work to Ministerial references (s 10(1)), disputes may hinge on administrative law principles applied to the Minister’s decision to refer a matter, the terms of a reference, or the Minister’s declaration under s 10(2)(c).

• Recommended next steps for litigation research. To assemble a litigation history, one must search Australian and New South Wales case law for (i) decisions that mention the Law Reform Commission Act 1967 by name or section, (ii) judgments interpreting powers and immunities under the Royal Commissions Act 1923 in relation to law reform commissions, and (iii) decisions on employment, superannuation and removal that involve Schedule 1 protections. The Act’s amendment notes provide years and amending Act identifiers that will help limit searches to timeframes when relevant textual change occurred (e.g. 1981, 2006, 2015).

In the absence of cases in the Act text, legal advice about the Act’s interpretation should proceed on the basis of the statute’s plain language and on cross-reference to the Royal Commissions Act and other statutes cited, then be validated against case law located through external legal databases.

The Act contains several provisions and cross-references that create potential practical traps for appointing authorities, commissioners, witnesses, employers and advisers. These "gotchas" arise from allocation of discretion, cross-referenced exclusions, interaction with other statutes, and conditional preservation of rights. Each point below cites the relevant provision.

• Commission acts only on Ministerial reference (s 10(1)). The Commission’s duty to review law is triggered "in accordance with any reference to it made by the Minister". If the Minister does not make a reference, the Commission’s statutory remit is limited. Practitioners and stakeholders should not assume the Commission can self-initiate wide-ranging reviews: the Minister sets the work program. This concentrates agenda-setting power in the Minister’s hands.

• Ministerial discretion in qualification and remuneration decisions (s 3(3)-(4), s 8(2), s 8(2A)). The Act makes appointment suitable-ness a matter of the Minister’s view and leaves part-time fees and allowances and leave for full-time commissioners to Ministerial determination. This creates discretionary levers that affect commissioners’ incentives, reappointment prospects and workload. Advisers should document Ministerial authorisations and approvals (for example, any written approval permitting external paid employment contrary to s 3A(2) for a full-time commissioner).

• Government Sector Employment Act 2013 exclusion (s 8(6)). Commissioner appointments by the Governor are explicitly outside the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 and commissioners are not subject to that Act while holding office. That means many public sector employment protections, grievance procedures and employment standards under that Act do not automatically apply. Employers and advisers should check what alternative entitlements and procedural protections remain available, including those preserved by Schedule 1 for particular employees.

• Preservation of rights conditional and defeasible (Schedule 1 cl 2-3). Schedule 1 preserves prior employment and superannuation rights for persons who were Public Service employees, contributors to superannuation schemes, or statutory body staff immediately before appointment as full-time commissioners. However clause 3(1) terminates this preservation if the commissioner becomes a contributor to another superannuation scheme after appointment. Clause 4 bars claiming a benefit under this Act and another Act for the same period. Practitioners must track superannuation contributions and any changes to ensure preserved rights are not unintentionally forfeited.

• Reappointment rights subject to retiring age and manner of cessation (Schedule 1 cl 5). Clause 5 provides a right to reappointment to former employment if a person ceases to be commissioner otherwise than pursuant to s 9(2) and has not reached "retiring age" as defined. This is a conditional right, not an unconditional entitlement, and depends on the reason for cessation. Employers and candidates should document the terms of cessation and retirement status to determine reappointment rights.

• Removal of judicial office holders more protected (s 9(1)). Judicial-office holders who are commissioners can be removed only on the address of both Houses of Parliament. That is a higher threshold than for other commissioners (s 9(2)). Appointment of judges as commissioners therefore alters removal risk calculations and may influence how the Commission structures inquiries involving politically sensitive matters.

• Complex rules for Divisions (ss 12A-12C, 12B(3)). The Chairperson may constitute Divisions for particular references (s 12A(1)). Voting and quorum rules for Divisions include an odd-even arithmetic rule that may be overlooked in practice: where a Division has an even number of members the quorum is half that number; if not even, the quorum is half the even number next above that number (s 12B(3)(a)-(b)). In meetings of only two members, disagreement forces postponement (s 12B(5)). Failing to apply these detailed rules can render decisions procedurally vulnerable.

• Limits on Royal Commissions Act application (s 10(2)(a)-(c)). The Act imports the Royal Commissions Act powers and applies parts of it mutatis mutandis to witnesses, but excludes section 13 and Division 2 of Part 2 of that Act from the general application. Division 2 applies only where the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson presiding is a Supreme Court judge (s 10(2)(b)). Section 17(1)-(3) applies only where the Minister has declared those provisions to apply and the presiding commissioner is a Supreme Court judge (s 10(2)(c)). Parties and advisers must not assume the whole suite of Royal Commissions Act powers is automatically available; they should identify which parts are in force for a given inquiry.

• Publication before tabling permitted but conditional (s 13(6)-(7)). The Minister or the Commission with Ministerial written approval may publish a report before it is tabled. Such pre-tabling publication is treated as a parliamentary document under the Parliamentary Papers Act 1975 (s 13(7)). Publishing without the required approval, or misunderstanding the parliamentary status of the document, could create procedural or parliamentary complications.

• Appointment instrument controls key obligations (s 3A(1), s 8(5)). The instrument of appointment determines whether a commissioner is full-time or part-time (s 3A(1)) and sets terms and conditions (s 8(5)). Mis-drafting or failure to specify these terms can create legal uncertainty about leave, remuneration, ability to undertake outside employment and the application of Schedule 1 protections.

• Delegation and continuation despite vacancy (s 12(6), s 12C). The Commission may delegate powers to any commissioner (s 12(6)). Proceedings are not vitiated by a vacancy so long as there are two or more commissioners (s 12C). That reduces the procedural risk of ancillary vacancy-related challenges but requires careful attention to delegation instruments and quorum compliance.

• Interaction with insolvency and mental health law for removal (s 9(2)(c)-(d)). Removal grounds include bankruptcy, insolvency arrangements, and certain mental health classifications under the Mental Health Act 1958. These external legal processes intersect with tenure and can result in involuntary loss of office. Advisers should coordinate with insolvency and health law specialists where relevant.

These gotchas highlight that proper compliance requires awareness of ministerial discretion, precise terms in appointment instruments, the specific parts of external Acts that apply by cross-reference, and the conditional nature of preserved employment and superannuation rights. Practitioners should audit processes for appointment, remuneration, and inquiry procedure against the Act’s specific provisions to avoid unintended forfeitures of rights or procedural errors.

This section offers a concrete compliance checklist and operational guidance for the main actors under the Act: the Minister and Ministerial offices, the Governor’s appointments office, the Chairperson and commissioners, Commission staff, employers and HR professionals for public servants becoming commissioners, and legal counsel advising witnesses or affected third parties. Each compliance action is tied to the relevant provision.

For the Minister and Ministerial office

• Make clear references. Ensure that any reference to the Commission is issued in writing and specifies the scope and purposes in line with s 10(1)(a)-(c). The Act conditions the Commission’s duties on references made by the Minister (s 10(1)); crafting precise terms of reference prevents scope disputes.

• Consider Ministerial declarations under s 10(2)(c). If the Minister intends for additional parts of the Royal Commissions Act to apply, ensure that the Minister makes the declarations contemplated by s 10(2)(c) where the presiding commissioner is a judge of the Supreme Court.

• Approve publication where necessary. If the Minister wishes the Commission or the Minister to publish a report before tabling, provide written approval as required by s 13(6), and ensure printed copies are handled as parliamentary documents under the Parliamentary Papers (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1975 (s 13(7)).

• Tabling. Record receipt date for any report furnished by the Commission and arrange tabling in each House within 14 sitting days (s 13(5)). If Parliament is not sitting, present to the Clerk to effect deemed laying (s 13(5A)-(5B)).

For the Governor’s appointment and HR office

• Appointments instrument. Specify in the instrument whether a commissioner is full-time or part-time (s 3A(1)), the term (not exceeding seven years) under s 3B, remuneration and leave conditions consistent with s 8 and the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975 where applicable (s 8(1)-(2A)). Record any Ministerial approvals regarding outside employment.

• Judicial officeholders. Where appointing a judicial officeholder, include language preserving judicial tenure and express that the appointment does not affect judicial rights (s 4(1)), and confirm how judicial duties are to be managed while the person serves as commissioner (s 4(2)).

• Documentation for part-time commissioners. For part-time commissioners, document the fees and allowances determined by the Minister (s 8(2)), and ensure compliance with s 8(3) if the person is subject to other statutory time commitments.

For Chairperson and commissioners

• Observe the terms of appointment. Abide by the full-time/part-time requirements in the instrument and s 3A(2): full-time commissioners should devote their whole time to duties except where the Minister otherwise approves (s 3A(2)). Ensure written evidence of any Ministerial permission to engage in outside paid employment if applicable.

• Maintain quorum and meeting procedures. Convene meetings as the Chairperson directs (s 12(1)), maintain a quorum of two commissioners (s 12(2)), and keep minutes (s 12(5)). For Divisions, follow the quorum arithmetics and voting rules in s 12B.

• Use delegation power carefully. If delegating powers under s 12(6), formalise delegation instruments, and confirm that delegated powers are lawful and consistent with the terms of any reference.

• Ensure compliance with inquiry powers. Before invoking compulsory measures for witnesses or document production, cross-check which Royal Commissions Act provisions have been applied to the inquiry by the Act (s 10(2)(a)-(c)). Seek legal advice on the application of excluded sections and any Ministerial declarations that may engage additional provisions.

For staff administration and payroll

• Remuneration and leave set-up. Implement payment arrangements for full-time commissioners under the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act 1975 where applicable (s 8(1)), and for part-time commissioners apply Ministerially determined fees and allowances (s 8(2)). Pay leave for full-time commissioners as per Minister’s determination (s 8(2A)).

• Superannuation management. For appointees who were contributors to a superannuation scheme immediately before appointment, document preserved rights under Schedule 1 cl 2, and avoid enrolling them in a different superannuation scheme while they wish to preserve those rights, unless the consequences under Schedule 1 cl 3 are intended. Coordinate with the relevant superannuation fund administrators to record the retention of entitlements and employer status as required by Schedule 1 cl 2(i).

• Record keeping for preservation and reappointment. Maintain records about prior employment status, contributors to superannuation schemes, deferred or extended leave entitlements and any agreements about reappointment under Schedule 1 cl 5, to facilitate compliance with reappointment and benefit preservation rules.

For employers and HR for returning public servants

• Reappointment procedures. If a commissioner ceases office otherwise than pursuant to s 9(2) and has not attained the retiring age, implement re-employment arrangements under Schedule 1 cl 5 ensuring the work level and salary are not lower than the level immediately before appointment as commissioner.

• Avoid double benefits. Ensure that no person claims benefits under this Act and another Act for the same period of service (Schedule 1 cl 4). Check entitlements and counsel staff on the impact of joining other superannuation schemes during commissionership (Schedule 1 cl 3).

For legal counsel advising witnesses and third parties

• Check which Royal Commissions Act provisions apply. Before advising a witness on compulsion, privilege or immunity, confirm which parts of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 are applied to the inquiry under s 10(2)(a)-(c) and which are excluded. Particular attention should be paid to the exceptions to the mutatis mutandis application and to Ministerial declarations that may alter applicability.

• Counsel on scope and limits of references. When advising third parties or affected entities, analyse the instrument of reference the Minister issued and identify whether the review relates to elimination of defects, consolidation, repeal, modernisation, administrative methods or systematic reform (s 10(1)(a)(i)-(vi)). Tailor submissions and legal arguments to the statutory purposes the Commission has been directed to pursue.

Operational checklist

• For any appointment: prepare the instrument specifying full/part‑time status, term up to seven years, remuneration and leave, and any special conditions (ss 3A, 3B, 8(5)).

• Before conducting an inquiry: confirm the Minister’s reference in writing; determine applicable Royal Commissions Act provisions to define coercive powers; publish and circulate procedural rules for witnesses; and confirm the presiding officer’s status (judge or not) for the conditional application of Division 2 materials (s 10(2)(a)-(c)).

• For reports: schedule interim reports where directed by the Minister, prepare final reports for each reference, compile annual report for the year ending 30 June, and ensure timely furnishing to the Minister and tabling within the prescribed 14 sitting days (s 13(1)-(5)).

• For staff and superannuation: document pre-appointment employment and superannuation status, implement preservation measures under Schedule 1 cl 2, and advise commissioners about the consequences of contributing to another superannuation scheme under Schedule 1 cl 3.

• For removals and resignations: if removal is contemplated, ensure legal thresholds are satisfied,address of both Houses for judicial-office holders (s 9(1)) or proper grounds for non-judicial commissioners under s 9(2). For resignation, accept and record written notification to the Governor (s 9(2A)).

Complying with the Act therefore requires coordination between Ministerial policy, appointments administration, legal counsel advising on inquiry powers, HR handling remuneration and superannuation, and the Commission’s own secretariat to manage procedural requirements and tabling obligations. Documentation at each decision point is essential to avoid disputes over scope of references, application of external Acts, and preservation or forfeiture of employment-related rights.