Interactive Gambling (Cost Recovery Levy) Act 2026

The Act organises a few tightly defined concepts and mechanisms. The primary institutional actor is the Australian Communications and Media Authority, abbreviated ACMA. The primary taxable base is the provision of a "licensed interactive wagering service", where that phrase is defined by reference to section 61GB of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. The key time unit is the "levy period", which is either the initial partial year from commencement to the next 30 June or any subsequent financial year. The critical financial concept is "cost", defined in section 6 as "an amount that, in accordance with accrual‑based accounting principles, is treated as a cost of the ACMA." That definition pushes accounting treatment into billing outcomes and implies disputes about timing could rest on accounting recognition rather than cash flows.

The levy has a delegated computational mechanism. Section 9(1) delegates to the ACMA the power to determine the method for calculating the individual levy amounts "by legislative instrument." That delegation separates the Act’s policy parameters from the technical allocation method, giving ACMA discretion to design formulas and allocation keys consistent with the statutory cap and definitions. Section 9(2) requires ACMA to consult the Minister before finalising the method.

A central structural limit is the cap on aggregate levies for a levy period in section 10(1). The cap is calculated as the sum of three elements: non‑upfront Opt‑out Register costs for the levy period (10(1)(a)), ACMA costs relating to performance of functions or exercise of powers under a Part 7D provision (10(1)(b)), and, only for designated levy periods, an applicable percentage of ACMA’s upfront Opt‑out Register costs (10(1)(c)). Section 10(2) parses what is included in "the cost of the Opt‑out Register", listing payments to the Opt‑out Register operator, ACMA management and procurement costs, compliance monitoring and investigations, actions under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 so far as they relate to Opt‑out Register provisions, and preparatory or operational costs even if no Opt‑out Register arrangement exists.

Section 11 authorises ACMA to identify "designated levy periods" and to allocate fractions of the ACMA’s upfront Opt‑out Register costs across those periods through "applicable percentages", with the constraint that the percentages across all designated levy periods must not exceed 100 per cent. ACMA must consult the Minister before making such a determination.

Several definitional cross‑references are main concepts by linkage. "Opt‑out Register arrangement" references subsection 62ZZD(1) of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001; "Opt‑out Register operator" and "Opt‑out Register rules" are given the same meanings as in Part 7E of that Act; "Part 7D provision" is defined as a provision of Part 7D (restrictions on inducements etc.) of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001, related provisions, or legislative instruments made for those purposes. The "Wagering Advertising Opt‑out Register" is the register kept under Part 7E of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. These cross‑links embed this levy Act within the regulatory architecture for interactive gambling, with cost recovery explicitly tied to the establishment and operation of the Opt‑out Register and to enforcement activity under inducement restrictions.

Jurisdictional reach is another main concept. The Act binds the Crown in right of States and the two Territories but does not bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. It extends to external Territories and explicitly applies extra‑territorially to acts and omissions outside Australia. Those choices allocate who is subject to the levy and provide ACMA with the authority to treat non‑domestic activity as within scope where the provision of the service meets the statutory definition.

Mechanically, the Act establishes who pays (persons who provided licensed interactive wagering services during a levy period), who decides the method and timing (ACMA, by legislative instrument, after consulting the Minister), what costs are recoverable (structured in section 10 and 10(2)), and how upfront establishment costs are handled (spread across designated levy periods through applicable percentages up to 100 per cent).

Section 7 sets the primary scope: "Levy is imposed on a person for a levy period if the person provided licensed interactive wagering services during the whole or a part of the levy period." The Act therefore directly affects any natural person or legal entity that provided a service falling within the statutory phrase "licensed interactive wagering service". The Act does not itself define that phrase; instead section 6 states it "has the meaning given by section 61GB of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001." Accordingly, affected entities will be those that hold licences or otherwise fall within that cross‑referenced definition under the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. Because the Act extends extra‑territorially (section 5), the reach can cover relevant acts and omissions outside Australia where the statutory criteria are satisfied.

Section 8 makes clear that the levy "is payable by the person" on whom it is imposed. The burden therefore falls on the service provider rather than on, for example, users or advertising intermediaries, unless those intermediaries themselves also provided a licensed interactive wagering service during the levy period.

Government entities are treated specially. Section 3 provides that "This Act binds the Crown in right of each of the States, of the Australian Capital Territory and of the Northern Territory. However, it does not bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth." That means State and Territory governments, and their agencies, are subject to the levy where they provided a licensed interactive wagering service, but Commonwealth entities are not bound by the Act. This is a statutory carve‑out that will influence who is within reach; any analysis of affected parties must account for this exception.

The Act’s cost recovery focus means it primarily impacts organisations that will be required to contribute to costs associated with the Wagering Advertising Opt‑out Register and ACMA’s enforcement and regulatory actions under Part 7D provisions of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. Section 10 enumerates cost categories that levies may recover, including amounts paid by ACMA to an Opt‑out Register operator under an Opt‑out Register arrangement, ACMA’s procurement and management costs, compliance monitoring and investigations, and other costs of preparing or operating the Wagering Advertising Opt‑out Register.

Intermediaries that operate the Opt‑out Register operator role are referenced. Section 10(2)(a) includes "the amounts paid by the ACMA (on behalf of the Commonwealth) to the Opt‑out Register operator under an Opt‑out Register arrangement." That signals that the Act will finance third‑party operators through levies on licensed interactive wagering service providers.

Because the Act permits the ACMA to treat certain periods as "designated levy periods" and to spread "the ACMA’s upfront Opt‑out Register costs" across those periods via "applicable percentages" (section 11), providers active in early years could face levies that include allocations of setup costs. Section 10(3) explicitly defines the ACMA’s upfront costs as those incurred from commencement to the day before the Opt‑out Register proclaimed start day, meaning early providers during the period when the Register is established can be subject to cost recovery for those upfront expenditures, but only to the extent ACMA designates levy periods and applies percentages.

Finally, because the Act delegates the calculation method to ACMA by legislative instrument (section 9(1)), the practical distribution of costs among providers will depend on the design choices ACMA makes in that instrument. Affected persons will need to monitor ACMA legislative instruments, notifications and any associated consultation processes.

The Act imposes a limited set of statutory duties and recognises a narrow set of statutory rights through definitions and process requirements. The primary duty is payment of the statutory levy. Section 7 imposes the levy on a person who provided licensed interactive wagering services in a levy period, and section 8 states "Levy imposed on a person for a levy period is payable by the person." The Act does not specify filing, assessment, or payment procedures in the text provided. Rather, it delegates the method for calculating the levy to the ACMA "by legislative instrument" under section 9(1), subject to a consultation requirement with the Minister under section 9(2). Those delegated instruments will be the primary source of operational duties such as invoicing, payment dates, record keeping, and dispute resolution, to the extent they address these topics.

ACMA has duties under the Act to make certain determinations and to consult the Minister. Section 9(2) requires the ACMA to consult the Minister before making the instrument that determines the method of calculating levy amounts. Section 11(4) likewise requires that "Before making a determination under subsection (1), the ACMA must consult the Minister" when designating levy periods and setting applicable percentages. These consultation requirements are statutory duties to consult before exercising the specified powers.

Section 10 imposes a statutory constraint on ACMA and limits the aggregate levy revenue recoverable in a levy period. The duty implied for ACMA is to ensure that levies imposed in aggregate do not exceed the cap expressed in section 10(1). That cap specifies a particular accounting base: costs of the Opt‑out Register during the levy period (excluding ACMA’s upfront Opt‑out Register costs), ACMA costs for performance of functions or exercise of powers under Part 7D provisions, and where the levy period is designated, an applicable percentage of ACMA’s upfront Opt‑out Register costs. Section 10(2) gives a detailed breakdown of what counts as the cost of the Opt‑out Register, which creates a statutory duty to identify, allocate and account for those cost elements consistently with the definition.

The Act confers definitional rights of reference by tying key terms to the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. For example, "licensed interactive wagering service" is given the meaning in section 61GB of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. Parties have the right to rely on those cross‑references when determining whether the levy applies to their activities. The Act also provides rights of predictability in that ACMA must consult the Minister before making material legislative instruments under sections 9 and 11, which creates a procedural barrier to unfettered administrative change on those points.

There are no express statutory rights in the Act text for review, objection, remission, or appeal against a levy notice. The Act also does not specify enforcement powers, sanctions, or collection mechanisms. These gaps mean duties and rights relating to collection, administrative review and penalties will depend on the ACMA’s legislative instruments, other applicable general administrative law, and possibly other Commonwealth statutes, although those are not stated in this Act.

Other key duties implicit from section 6 include accounting treatment. The definition of "cost" as amounts treated as a cost of the ACMA "in accordance with accrual‑based accounting principles" imposes a duty on ACMA to use accrual accounting when identifying recoverable costs. That accounting choice affects when costs are recognised and hence which levy periods may be allocated those costs.

Finally, the jurisdictional clauses create duties and limits about who is bound. Section 3 states the Act "binds the Crown in right of each of the States, of the Australian Capital Territory and of the Northern Territory. However, it does not bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth." That is a statutory rule limiting to whom duties may attach.

The Act as provided contains no express penalty, sanction, offence, or civil enforcement mechanism for non‑payment of the levy. The operative levy provisions are declarative and monetary: section 7 imposes a levy on providers, section 8 makes it payable by the person so imposed, and section 9 delegates calculation to the ACMA. Section 10 sets an aggregate cap on total levies. Nowhere in the text does the Act specify a criminal offence, civil penalty, interest on unpaid amounts, recovery procedures, liens, or powers for ACMA to enforce collection.

Because the Act delegates the "method" of calculating levy amounts to ACMA by legislative instrument under section 9(1), enforcement and collection procedures might be included in that delegated instrument. The Act requires ACMA to consult the Minister before making the calculation method (9(2)) and before designating levy periods or specifying applicable percentages (11(4)). However, absent the content of any legislative instruments made under sections 9 and 11, the Act itself does not prescribe due dates, statements of account, audit rights, or dispute processes. That leaves a gap in the statutory text between liability and enforcement. Persons facing a levy will therefore need to consult the ACMA instruments and any administrative guidance they issue to understand enforcement arrangements.

Section 10(2)(c)(iii) explicitly references actions under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 "so far as that Act relates to an Opt‑out Register provision." This cross‑reference suggests that where ACMA takes action under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 in relation to Opt‑out Register provisions, the costs of those actions can be included in the Opt‑out Register costs recoverable through the levy. It does not, however, import the enforcement powers from that Act into this levy Act. It is a cost‑inclusion clause, not an enforcement mechanism.

Because the Act binds States and Territories but not the Commonwealth (section 3), enforcement against the Commonwealth may be constrained by that clause. The Act’s extra‑territorial application (section 5) extends its substantive reach, but enforcement practicalities for extra‑territorially situated persons will depend on the mechanisms established in the ACMA instruments and general Commonwealth enforcement powers, which are not described in the Act text.

In short, the Act creates a monetary obligation but leaves enforcement design, sanctions for non‑payment, and procedural protections to ACMA legislative instruments and other legal frameworks. The Act itself sets the ceiling for recoverable costs and the process of consultation with the Minister for key determinations, but does not specify penalties or enforcement steps within the body of the Act.

The Act is explicitly interwoven with the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 and the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 through numerous cross‑references. Section 6 ties key terms to the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. "Licensed interactive wagering service" is defined by section 61GB of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. The Act repeatedly references Part 7E of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001: "Opt‑out Register arrangement" is an arrangement under subsection 62ZZD(1) of that Act; "Opt‑out Register operator" and "Opt‑out Register rules" have the same meanings as in Part 7E; "Opt‑out Register provision" is defined to include a provision of Part 7E, other provisions of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 that relate to that Part, and legislative instruments made under or for the purposes of such provisions; and "Wagering Advertising Opt‑out Register" is the register kept under Part 7E. The Act thereby sits as an ancillary cost‑recovery instrument to the regulatory architecture that establishes the Opt‑out Register in the Interactive Gambling Act 2001.

Section 10(2)(c)(iii) expressly includes within recoverable Opt‑out Register costs "taking action under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014, so far as that Act relates to an Opt‑out Register provision." That clause creates a mechanism by which enforcement or regulatory action taken under the Regulatory Powers Act in relation to Opt‑out Register provisions can be funded by the levies. The text does not, however, import the Regulatory Powers Act’s enforcement powers into this levy Act. Rather, it permits costs arising from the use of those powers to be included in the cost base for recovery.

The Act contains its own jurisdictional rules that interact with general Crown immunity principles and external Territories law. Section 3 binds the Crown in right of each State and Territory but not the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. That selective binding interacts with the broader Commonwealth power to legislate and raises intergovernmental implications because State and Territory agencies are explicitly liable under this Act while Commonwealth agencies are not. Section 4 extends the Act to external Territories and section 5 applies the Act extra‑territorially, which interacts with other laws governing activities outside Australia and with the definitions of "person" and "service" in external contexts.

The Act also imports an accounting standard through its definition of "cost" in section 6 as "an amount that, in accordance with accrual‑based accounting principles, is treated as a cost of the ACMA." That pushes interaction to accounting and finance law and standards, including public sector accounting frameworks, though those frameworks are not stated in the Act. Because cost recognition affects which costs can be recovered in which levy periods, accounting rules will interact materially with levy outcomes.

Legislative instruments play a central role. Sections 9 and 11 give ACMA authority to make determinations "by legislative instrument." Those instruments will interact with the legislative instruments framework that governs Commonwealth legislative instruments, including procedural and disallowance rules, though the Act itself does not state those procedural rules.

Finally, the Act’s establishment of a cost‑recovery levy interacts with other fiscal and regulatory instruments that might apply to interactive wagering providers, such as taxes, licence fees, or other regulatory levies. The Act does not address such interaction, so in practice operators and advisers will need to reconcile multiple obligations across statutes and instruments outside the Act’s text.

The Act as supplied is in its original enacted form and contains a commencement table in section 2. The commencement table records that "The whole of this Act" commences on "The day after this Act receives the Royal Assent" and shows the commencement date as "27 August 2026." That indicates the Act’s operative date and that the entirety of the text came into force immediately after Royal Assent. The note following the table states: "This table relates only to the provisions of this Act as originally enacted. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this Act." No subsequent amendments are recorded in the text provided.

There is a marginal note referencing the Minister’s second reading speech made in the House of Representatives on 17 August 2026 and the Senate on 19 August 2026. That material is an explanatory or political record rather than a statutory amendment, but it situates the Act in parliamentary timelines and may be relevant to legislative history for statutory interpretation. The footnote marker "(113/26)" appears to be an internal or parliamentary identifier.

Because the supplied text contains no schedules, transitional provisions beyond the commencement mechanics, or later amendment notes, the Act’s legislative history as presented is limited to its enactment and commencement. There are two further structural features relevant to potential future amendments. First, sections 9 and 11 delegate substantial operational detail to ACMA by legislative instrument. Changes to collection methodology, designated levy periods, or applicable percentages can therefore occur through delegated instruments rather than through primary legislation, subject to the constraints within this Act such as the section 10 cap and the requirement to consult the Minister. Second, section 11(3) imposes a substantive limit on the total of applicable percentages, requiring they "must not exceed 100%." That constraint is a durable feature that could only be removed or altered by amending the Act.

Given that the Act binds State and Territory Crowns but not the Commonwealth Crown (section 3), any future amendment that expands or reduces who is bound would require formal amendment to section 3. Also, section 6’s reliance on defined terms from the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 means that changes to that Act could indirectly change application of this levy Act even without amendment here, since key operative terms are cross‑referenced.

No textual record of repeal, transitional or saving provisions, or prior versions is present in the supplied material. The absence of penalties, offence provisions, or enforcement mechanics in the current text suggests that future amendments or ACMA legislative instruments could be the vehicle to add operational enforcement detail.

The supplied Act text contains no recorded litigation history, case citations, or references to judicial decisions. It is a freshly enacted statutory instrument with internal references to other statutes but no court proceedings or interpretive authority included. The marginal reference to the Minister’s second reading speech provides parliamentary context but does not constitute litigation history.

Because the Act creates a delegated rule‑making power for ACMA to determine calculation methods and designated levy periods by legislative instrument, disputes that might give rise to litigation could later focus on the content of those instruments, on ACMA’s consultation with the Minister under sections 9(2) and 11(4), on the proper accounting treatment of costs under the definition of "cost" in section 6, or on the interaction with the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 and the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 when enforcement actions give rise to recoverable costs. However, none of that is present as litigation history in the text provided.

The Act’s jurisdictional choice in section 3,binding the Crown in right of States and Territories but not the Crown in right of the Commonwealth,could be a locus for future legal challenge or litigation if questions arise about constitutional power to impose a levy or about Crown immunity, but the text contains no litigation outcomes or precedents.

If and when ACMA makes legislative instruments under sections 9 and 11, those instruments and ACMA’s administrative conduct could generate judicial review proceedings, statutory interpretation disputes, or controversies over cost allocations. At present, however, there is no litigation record embedded in the Act as presented.

The Act contains several drafting and structural features that create legal and operational pitfalls for affected parties and regulators. The following are concrete points to watch, grounded in the text.

1. Delegation of calculation to a legislative instrument. Section 9(1) states the levy amount "is the amount worked out in accordance with a method determined by the ACMA by legislative instrument." The Act does not specify the method, timing, payment mechanics, or appeal procedures. The substantive operation of the levy therefore depends heavily on the content of delegated instruments, which may not be evident until ACMA publishes them. Parties cannot determine exact financial exposure from the Act alone.

2. Aggregate cap complexity. Section 10(1) caps total levies at the sum of several cost categories. The definitions in section 10(2) are detailed and include many types of costs. Calculating the cap will require clear accounting and allocation. The definition of "cost" in section 6 as determined by "accrual‑based accounting principles" means timing of recognition matters. Disputes may arise about whether a particular expense is an ACMA cost, whether it falls within the enumerated subparagraphs, and how to allocate shared costs between the Opt‑out Register and other ACMA functions.

3. Upfront costs allocation. Section 10(3) defines "the ACMA’s upfront Opt‑out Register costs" as costs incurred from commencement to the day before the Opt‑out Register proclaimed start day. Section 11 allows ACMA to designate levy periods and allocate applicable percentages of those upfront costs across them, with the total not exceeding 100 per cent. That mechanism gives ACMA discretion to spread upfront costs across multiple levy periods. The "gotcha" is that early levy payers may face disproportionate shares of setup costs depending on ACMA’s choices. The Act allows ACMA to include upfront costs "even if there is no Opt‑out Register arrangement" (10(2)(f)), which can be counterintuitive.

4. Crown non‑binding at Commonwealth level. Section 3 explicitly excludes the Commonwealth Crown from being bound. Entities that are Commonwealth agencies or otherwise part of the Commonwealth may not be liable under this Act. This carve‑out could produce allocation asymmetries where private sector providers fund costs from which Commonwealth entities benefit.

5. No enforcement or penalty provisions in the Act. The Act imposes a payable levy but sets out no enforcement, interest, or penalty regime. That omission means that procedural and remedial protections and collection powers will need to be found in ACMA legislative instruments or other laws, and there may be uncertainty until those instruments are published.

6. Heavy reliance on external statutory definitions. Key terms such as "licensed interactive wagering service", "Opt‑out Register arrangement", and "Opt‑out Register operator" are defined by reference to the Interactive Gambling Act 2001, creating dependency on any changes or interpretive disputes under that Act. Practitioners must consult those provisions to determine scope.

7. Accrual accounting requirement. Section 6 defines "cost" by reference to accrual‑based accounting principles. This ties recoverability to accounting recognition standards rather than cash payments. Entities and auditors will need to align on recognition conventions, and timing disputes may be complex.

8. Extra‑territorial scope. Section 5 extends the Act "to acts, omissions, matters and things outside Australia." That raises complexities about enforcing levies against foreign‑based providers and about double recovery where foreign jurisdictions also tax or charge regulatory fees.

9. Uncertainty around legislative instruments' interaction with parliamentary oversight. The Act mandates ACMA instruments but does not set out whether or how the instruments will be subject to parliamentary disallowance or other controls. Until instruments are made, the degree of administrative flexibility is uncertain.

10. Possible double counting or overlap. Section 10(2) includes costs such as procurement, management, monitoring, investigations, and actions under the Regulatory Powers Act. Care is required to ensure costs recovered through the levy are not also being recovered by other funding mechanisms, grants, or appropriations, but the Act itself does not address cross‑subsidy or duplication.

These are not conclusions about legality or outcomes. They are concrete, statute‑based points a reader should check against ACMA instruments, the Interactive Gambling Act 2001, and applicable accounting and public finance rules.

Based on the Act’s text, complying with the levy regime requires being able to identify whether the provider is within scope, monitoring ACMA legislative instruments for calculation and payment rules, and accounting for relevant levy liabilities under accrual accounting principles. The Act itself assigns the substantive calculation method to ACMA by legislative instrument (section 9(1)) and requires the ACMA to consult the Minister before making that instrument (9(2)). In the absence of that instrument, the Act only establishes the liability, not the administrative process.

Practical, statute‑grounded steps an affected person would want to take to be in a position to meet statutory obligations include the following information tasks, which are descriptions of likely necessary compliance measures rather than instructions to act:

• Confirm scope under the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. Section 6 links "licensed interactive wagering service" to section 61GB of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001. Determining whether an activity is a "licensed interactive wagering service" is the statutory threshold for levy liability under section 7. Affected persons should therefore review the cross‑referenced statutory definition and any associated administrative guidance.

• Monitor ACMA instruments. Section 9(1) makes ACMA’s legislative instrument the determinant of individual levy amounts. Section 11 allows ACMA to designate levy periods and set applicable percentages. Parties must therefore review those instruments carefully when made to learn the calculation method, allocation keys, payment timing, invoicing procedures, and any reporting obligations.

• Keep accounting records aligned with accrual recognition. The Act defines "cost" in section 6 as an amount treated as an ACMA cost "in accordance with accrual‑based accounting principles." That suggests ACMA will recognise (and therefore seek to recover) costs when incurred rather than when paid. Providers should be prepared to reconcile ACMA’s cost recognition with their own accounting, noting the potential for timing differences if ACMA recognises costs across financial periods.

• Prepare for potential allocation of upfront costs. Section 10(3) and section 11 permit ACMA to allocate "upfront Opt‑out Register costs" across designated levy periods by applicable percentages not exceeding 100 per cent in total. Entities should be aware that setup costs incurred by ACMA between commencement and the Opt‑out Register proclaimed start day may be recovered over time.

• Understand the scope of recoverable costs. Section 10(2) enumerates recoverable Opt‑out Register costs, including amounts paid to an Opt‑out Register operator under an Opt‑out Register arrangement, procurement, management, monitoring and enforcement costs, and other preparatory or operational costs. Parties should be ready to reconcile line items in ACMA’s cost base, because those categories will determine the aggregate cap in section 10(1).

• Track jurisdictional exposure. The Act binds State and Territory Crowns but not the Commonwealth (section 3). Entities associated with State or Territory governments may be within scope, while Commonwealth entities may not. The extra‑territorial application in section 5 means that non‑Australian activities can be captured depending on the statutory definition of the service.

• Anticipate administrative detail in ACMA instruments. Because the Act omits enforcement, penalty, timetable and procedural provisions, compliance obligations such as filing requirements, objection or review processes, payment terms, interest on late payments and consequences of non‑payment will likely appear in ACMA’s legislative instruments or other regulatory instruments. Affected persons will need to consult those instruments to comply fully.

• Monitor associated statutory instruments and regulatory actions. Section 10(2)(c)(iii) allows inclusion of costs from actions taken under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 "so far as that Act relates to an Opt‑out Register provision." Providers should therefore monitor not only ACMA instruments but also any relevant regulatory activity under the Regulatory Powers Act that may expand the cost base.

The Act mandates consultation by ACMA with the Minister for key determinations (sections 9(2) and 11(4)). That procedural step may influence timing and content of instruments. Complying in practice therefore depends on a two‑step monitoring approach: watch for ACMA’s legislative instruments and for ACMA’s published cost bases and notifications that implement the charging regime.

I can help draft a checklist or a first draft compliance plan that organises the documents, accounting entries and enquiries you will likely need, but I can only produce that as a starting point. Treat any draft as a beginning, not legal advice. Before you rely on it, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you act on this, rely on it, or use any draft, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.