Industry Research and Development (Australian Centre for Quantum Growth Program and Critical Technologies Challenge Program) Instrument 2023

The instrument rests on a small set of discrete legal concepts and programmatic choices, all stated in the text.

• Prescribed programs (s 5). The instrument prescribes two programs under the Act, identified by name: the ACQG program and the CTC program (s 5(1)). Prescribing a program under s 33(1) of the Act is the stated legal vehicle for enabling funding to be provided under the Act; the instrument does not itself carry out payments or set out grant conditions beyond the high-level descriptions.

• Funding for research and development (s 5(2)-(3)). Both programs are expressly about funding research and development. The CTC program provides funding for grants to undertake R&D into the use of quantum and other advanced technologies to address nationally significant problems (s 5(2)). The ACQG program funds a grant to operate a single institution, the Australian Centre for Quantum Growth, and describes the Centre’s objectives and activities focusing on industry-led solutions, coordination, education, ethical and security considerations, international collaboration, and inclusive participation (s 5(3)).

• Constitutional trade or commerce (s 4). The instrument defines “constitutional trade or commerce” by reference to categories that mirror the constitutional allocation of power over trade and commerce, including (a) trade between Australia and places outside Australia; (b) among the States; (c) between a State and a Territory; (d) between two Territories; and (e) within a Territory (s 4). That definition is invoked specifically in the ACQG objective to foster and encourage constitutional trade or commerce in quantum technology (s 5(3)(a)).

• Communications security and ethics (s 5(3)(d)). The ACQG objectives explicitly include promoting the ethical and secure adoption and development of quantum technology. This objective is subdivided into addressing risks to the security of communications services (s 5(3)(d)(i)), collecting and disseminating information (s 5(3)(d)(ii)), promoting consistent national ethical or security standards (s 5(3)(d)(iii)), and addressing other ethical or security issues with national or international implications (s 5(3)(d)(iv)). The instrument refers back to “communications service” as used in paragraph 51(v) of the Constitution in its definitions (s 4).

• Target groups and equity objectives (s 5(3)(f); s 6(d)). The ACQG program includes an objective to “facilitate the equal participation of women and First Nations Peoples in the quantum industry” (s 5(3)(f)). The instrument also specifies, as a constitutional power, the Parliament’s power with respect to “the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws” (s 6(c)), and links external affairs power to assisting Australia meet obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, particularly Articles 2, 3 and 11 (s 6(d)). Those references indicate that gender and race-based measures, and external treaty obligations, are being invoked as legal conceptual foundations.

• Specified constitutional powers (s 6). The instrument lists the heads of power the Parliament may rely on in enabling the programs: trade and commerce with other countries and among the States; postal and like services; race-based special laws; external affairs tied to the CEDAW Convention; enterprises and activities “peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation”; and government of a Territory (s 6(a)-(f)). The instrument does not translate those powers into operational rules but records them as the constitutional bases for Commonwealth action related to the programs.

• Procedural and commencement mechanics (s 2). The instrument takes effect the day after registration (s 2(1)), and contains the usual table note that the commencement table relates only to the instrument as originally made (s 2 note).

These concepts are stated at a high level and the instrument intentionally focuses on objectives and constitutional foundations rather than implementation details. Where the instrument defines a program objective, it also uses phrases such as “to facilitate” and “to contribute,” which set directional goals rather than prescriptive operational duties. The instrument therefore sets program boundaries and policy intentions while leaving grant design, eligibility, conditions and administrative implementation to other instruments, guidelines or the Act’s administrative mechanisms.

The instrument affects a limited set of actors directly, and a wider set indirectly, through the grant programs it prescribes.

Directly affected actors

• The Commonwealth executive. The instrument is made by the Minister for Industry and Science under s 33 of the Act (s 3). It prescribes programs that empower the executive to provide funding for grants under the Act (s 5). The Minister and the administering department will be responsible for implementing these programs, setting grant rules, and operating any selection and funding processes consistent with the Act and the prescribed program objectives. The instrument itself names the Minister who made it: Ed Husic (instrument header and signature block).

• Recipients of grants. The instrument expressly provides that the CTC program “provides funding for grants” (s 5(2)) and that the ACQG program “provides funding for a grant to operate the Australian Centre for Quantum Growth” (s 5(3), opening). That means entities that apply for and receive grants, and any single institution selected to operate the Centre, are directly affected. The instrument does not set eligibility criteria or conditions; those are left to the Act’s grant-making processes and any implementing instruments or program guidelines.

Indirectly affected actors

• Industry participants in quantum and advanced technologies. The ACQG program objective to contribute to the growth of the Australian quantum industry by fostering constitutional trade or commerce (s 5(3)(a)), and the CTC objective to fund R&D into quantum and other advanced technologies for nationally significant problems (s 5(2)), both implicate firms, start-ups, research organisations and investors in the quantum and adjacent advanced technology sectors. Those actors will be the target beneficiaries of funding, coordination efforts and awareness and education activities as described in the ACQG objectives (s 5(3)(b)-(c)).

• Users of communications services. The ACQG objective to promote ethical and secure adoption and development of quantum technology explicitly includes addressing risks to the security of communications services (s 5(3)(d)(i)). Because “communications service” is referenced via paragraph 51(v) of the Constitution in the definitions (s 4), activities under the ACQG may engage entities and systems involved in postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other similar services, insofar as quantum developments pose security risks to those services.

• Women and First Nations Peoples. The ACQG program includes an objective “to facilitate the equal participation of women and First Nations Peoples in the quantum industry” (s 5(3)(f)). That objective identifies these demographic groups as intended beneficiaries of targeted participation measures, though the instrument itself does not specify the shape of those measures.

• International collaborators. The ACQG objective to collaborate and build relationships with international participants in the quantum industry (s 5(3)(e)) signals an intended effect on foreign research institutions, firms, and governments that might participate in research collaborations, exchanges or co-funded activities facilitated by the Centre.

• Legal and policy actors. The instrument’s specification of constitutional powers (s 6), including external affairs tied to the CEDAW Convention, and the race-based power in paragraph 51(xxvi), implicates how programs will be framed legally and may involve legal advisers and policy teams in framing program rules to fit within the stated constitutional bases.

Who pays and who decides

• Who pays. The instrument states the programs “provide funding for grants” (s 5(2)-(3)). It does not specify the budget source, appropriation, or amounts; those will be provided under the Commonwealth’s budgetary and administrative arrangements and the Act’s grant-making rules. The instrument itself does not appropriate funds.

• Who decides. The instrument is made by the Minister under the Act (s 3) and so the executive (the Department and Minister) will exercise decision-making authority in designing program rules and awarding grants under the authority of the Act and the prescribed programs. The instrument does not specify selection panels, assessment criteria, or administrative review mechanisms.

What behaviour changes

• Applicants and industry actors will be incentivised to align proposals and organisational strategies with the objectives stated for the ACQG and CTC programs, including industry-led R&D, commercialisation, security and ethical frameworks, participation targets for women and First Nations Peoples, and international collaboration (s 5(2)-(3)).

• Entities involved in communications services and national security may face increased engagement, information-gathering and standard-setting processes arising from the ACQG’s objective to address risks to the security of communications services (s 5(3)(d)(i)-(iii)).

• Research institutions and firms may adjust collaborative and commercial strategies to pursue grant funding under the two prescribed programs.

The instrument names the affected cohorts and the broad channels by which they are impacted, while leaving operational detail to subsequent program documentation or the Act’s grant-making framework.

This instrument primarily prescribes program objectives and constitutional foundations. It does not itself create a detailed statutory list of duties, fines, or private rights of action. The clearest legally operative provisions are the prescription of programs under s 5 and the specification of constitutional heads of power under s 6. From the instrument text, the following duties and rights can be extracted or reasonably identified as arising directly from the instrument.

Duties created or implied by the instrument

• Ministerial duty to specify programs under the Act. The instrument is made pursuant to s 33 of the Act (s 3) and therefore reflects an executive duty to prescribe programs under that statutory power. The instrument prescribes the ACQG and CTC programs for the purposes of subsection 33(1) of the Act (s 5(1)). The instrument does not itself set out administrative duties such as application processes, but the making of the instrument is an exercise of the duty to identify programs under the Act.

• Duty to pursue the stated objectives in program implementation. While the instrument does not impose enforceable duties on third parties, it prescribes the objectives for the ACQG program (s 5(3)(a)-(f)) and the scope of the CTC program (s 5(2)). Administrators of the programs, when designing grant rules and assessing proposals, will be expected to act consistently with those objectives. The instrument itself does not specify judicially enforceable obligations for administrators or grantees; it sets program boundaries and aims.

Rights created or implied by the instrument

• Entitlement to be considered for grants under the prescribed programs. The instrument states the programs “provide funding for grants” (s 5(2)-(3)). This creates an administrative framework under which eligible entities may apply for funding, though the instrument does not create a statutory right to funding for any applicant. Any right to procedural fairness or merits review would arise from the Act’s wider administrative law context and not from this instrument alone.

• Rights to have the program’s objectives considered. Applicants and stakeholders can reasonably expect that the objectives listed for the ACQG (s 5(3)(a)-(f)) and the CTC program’s scope (s 5(2)) will be taken into account in the design and assessment of grants. The instrument does not create enforceable private rights but provides public notice of the policy aims that will inform program administration.

Notable absences

• No penalties, offences or enforcement mechanisms are set out in the instrument. There are no provisions in the instrument creating criminal, civil penalty, or administrative sanctions for breach of program objectives or related conduct. The instrument also does not set reporting, auditing or compliance regimes for grantees. Any such duties, rights or sanctions would need to be set out in the Act or in grant agreements or regulations made pursuant to the Act, none of which are included in the instrument text.

• No eligibility criteria, IP arrangements, or security clearance requirements. The instrument does not specify who is eligible to apply, how intellectual property generated from funded projects will be owned or managed, or whether security vetting or information handling requirements will apply. Those matters are left to program-level instruments or grant agreements.

Practical consequence

• The instrument functions primarily as a high-level legal and policy boundary-setting device. It identifies what types of activities the Commonwealth intends to fund and the constitutional bases for doing so, and in that sense creates expectations for applicants and administrators. It does not itself create detailed statutory obligations, enforcement regimes or private rights enforceable directly against the Commonwealth beyond those the Act provides elsewhere.

The instrument contains no express penalties, offences, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms. It prescribes programs and program objectives but does not itself create enforcement powers or specify compliance mechanisms. The text provides the following bases from which to draw a clear statement about enforcement and penalty arrangements.

• No penalty provisions. The instrument does not create criminal offences, civil penalty provisions, administrative enforcement provisions, or prescribed sanctions. There is no language conferring power to impose fines, exclude participants, cancel grants, or require restitution in this instrument.

• Enforcement and compliance would be implemented elsewhere. Because the instrument operates under s 33 of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (s 3), any enforcement, compliance, reporting, or sanctioning mechanisms will depend on the Act, and on grant agreements, program guidelines, or other legislative or contractual instruments not included in the text of this instrument. The instrument itself does not specify these matters.

• Administrative control rests with executive designers of the programs. The Minister and administering department that will implement the prescribed programs will need to put in place grant agreements and program rules that set compliance obligations, reporting requirements, IP ownership, audit rights, conditions precedent, termination rights and sanctions. None of those are stated in the instrument, so they are not enforceable by reference to this instrument alone.

• Remedies and review. The instrument does not create procedural review or merits review rights. Any procedural fairness obligations, merits review mechanisms, or judicial review avenues would arise under the Act, general administrative law (including judicial review principles), or contractual remedies in grant agreements. Those avenues are outside the instrument text.

• Implication for prospective applicants. Entities considering participation should expect that compliance and enforcement terms will be set out in program rules or grant contracts; the instrument signals the policy scope but not the compliance regime. Any obligation to comply, or penalty for non-compliance, must be found in subsequent program materials or the underlying Act.

In short, the instrument prescribes the scope and objectives of two grant programs without establishing enforcement tools. The practical enforcement architecture will be built into program-level instruments, grant agreements and the administrative practice of the department and Minister administering the grants, none of which are contained in the instrument text.

The instrument explicitly links itself to several existing legal frameworks and constitutional powers, thereby indicating how it is intended to sit in the legal landscape.

• Industry Research and Development Act 1986. The instrument is made under s 33 of the Act (s 3). It expressly states that it prescribes programs “for the purposes of subsection 33(1) of the Act” (s 5(1)) and that it specifies legislative powers “for the purposes of subsection 33(3) of the Act” (s 6). The instrument therefore functions as a s 33 instrument that fits within the Act’s grant-making architecture. The instrument does not reproduce other provisions of the Act, nor does it set out details that the Act or regulations may prescribe. Any interaction with the Act’s eligibility, grant-making, compliance, or review provisions will depend on those provisions in the Act and implementing instruments, which are not included here.

• Constitutional heads of power. Section 6 lists specific heads of constitutional power the Parliament may rely upon in making laws in support of the programs (s 6(a)-(f)). Those heads are: trade and commerce with other countries and among the States (s 6(a)); postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services (s 6(b)); race-based special laws under paragraph 51(xxvi) (s 6(c)); external affairs, with an express link to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women and Articles 2, 3 and 11 (s 6(d)); enterprises and activities peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation (s 6(e)); and government of a Territory under section 122 (s 6(f)). By specifying these powers, the instrument records the legal bases the Commonwealth considers appropriate in relation to the programs.

• International obligations. The instrument refers specifically to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, done at New York on 18 December 1979, and notes that it is “as in force for Australia from time to time” (s 4). Section 6(d) links the external affairs power to measures that would assist Australia to meet obligations under that Convention, particularly Articles 2, 3 and 11. The instrument thereby places part of its constitutional justification within external affairs and treaty compliance.

• Communications law and security. The ACQG program objectives include addressing “any potential risks posed by quantum technology to the security of communications services” (s 5(3)(d)(i)). In definitions the instrument references “communications service” via paragraph 51(v) of the Constitution (s 4). That indicates a potential intersection with federal laws governing postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services, and with national security or telecommunications regulatory regimes, insofar as those regimes deal with the security of communications services. The instrument itself does not assert authority to alter telecommunications law; it identifies communications security as an area to be addressed under the Centre’s activities.

• Race and equality law. The ACQG’s objective to “facilitate the equal participation of women and First Nations Peoples in the quantum industry” (s 5(3)(f)), together with the instrument’s specification of race-based constitutional power (s 6(c)) and the external affairs link to CEDAW (s 6(d)), exhibits explicit attention to statutory and treaty-based equality obligations. The instrument signals that measures intended to promote participation by these groups will be considered within the programs’ scope, and that the Commonwealth views constitutional powers as available to support such measures.

• Territories. Section 6(f) specifies the government of a Territory as a relevant power (s 6(f)), which means the instrument contemplates that activities under the programs could be lawfully supported in relation to Territories pursuant to section 122 of the Constitution.

• Absence of express interaction with other statutes. The instrument does not reference specific statutes beyond the Act and the Constitution and the Convention. It does not state, for example, how funded projects should align with privacy law, export controls, defence procurement or national security legislation. Those interactions will depend on the content of grant agreements, program rules and other applicable Commonwealth laws, which the instrument does not incorporate.

Taken together, the instrument situates the programs within the Act’s grant-making power and specifies several constitutional heads of power as legal foundations. It identifies the potential interface points with communications security, equality obligations, international treaty obligations and Territory governance, while leaving detailed cross-references to other statutory regimes to subsequent administrative instruments and program rules.

The instrument contains minimal material on amendment history. The text includes a commencement table and a note about the table’s scope, but it contains no record of amendments to the instrument after its making.

Key historical facts recorded in the instrument

• Date and maker. The instrument is dated 15 November 2023 and signed by Ed Husic, Minister for Industry and Science. That is the recorded date of the instrument in the text provided.

• Commencement. The commencement provision states that the whole instrument commences “the day after this instrument is registered” (s 2(1)). The commencement table in the instrument reiterates that “The whole of this instrument” commences the day after registration (s 2 table).

• Note about the commencement table. The instrument includes the standard note that the commencement table “relates only to the provisions of this instrument as originally made. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this instrument” (s 2 note). This is a statement about how the instrument’s published commencement information is to be treated rather than an amendment to substantive provisions.

• No amendment entries or sequencing. The instrument, as provided, contains no sections that amend prior instruments or that have been subsequently amended. Section 5 prescribes programs and section 6 specifies powers; there are no later sections adding, repealing, or modifying these provisions. The instrument therefore appears to be a stand-alone s 33 instrument made on the date shown.

Practical implications for amendment tracking

• If one needs to track changes to this instrument, the instrument itself indicates the commencement mechanics and cautions that the commencement table will not be updated to reflect later amendments. Any amendments would require an amending instrument or repeal instrument, neither of which are present in the supplied text.

• The instrument does not provide transitional provisions, savings clauses, or sunset clauses. It prescribes programs in perpetuity unless and until amended or revoked by a later instrument under the Act.

• Any future amendments would need to be traced through instrument registers or the Federal Register of Legislation for later instruments made under the Act. The instrument itself contains no historical record beyond its date of making and commencement method.

In short, the instrument as provided shows no amendment history beyond its initial making on 15 November 2023 and its commencement the day after registration. Any subsequent modifications are not recorded in this text.

The instrument contains no litigation history. It does not cite cases, judicial decisions, or any pending or resolved litigation. The only international instrument referenced is the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, which the instrument cites for constitutional grounding of certain measures (s 4; s 6(d)). Beyond that, the instrument does not mention, rely on, or record judicial determinations.

What the instrument records

• No court references. The instrument does not name any court decisions or cite any judicial authority as part of its reasoning or legal foundation.

• No recorded challenges. There are no notes, schedules or other text indicating that the instrument has been, or is subject to, litigation, challenge, or review.

Implications for practitioners

• Absence of recorded authority. Because the instrument does not cite or rely upon judicial decisions, practitioners working with the instrument should not expect to find case law interpreting the specific s 33 prescription content within the instrument text itself.

• Potential for future litigation. The instrument does specify constitutional powers used to support the programs (s 6). If a future party were to litigate the constitutional basis for particular measures implemented under the programs, those challenges and any resulting case law would appear separately; they are not anticipated or recorded in the instrument.

• Reliance on the Act and subsequent program material. Any legal questions about the operation, legality or administration of grants under these programs are likely to be litigated with reference to the Industry Research and Development Act 1986, the particular grant agreements, program rules, and the constitutional powers identified in s 6. The instrument itself is a foundational instrument that lists program objectives and constitutional powers but contains no litigation-linked material.

Therefore, for present purposes, there is no litigation history to record within the instrument. Any future litigation arising from the administration or legal basis of these programs would need to be identified from case law or proceedings external to the instrument.

The instrument sets policy direction and constitutional justification but leaves many operational and legal details unspecified. Those absences create several practical issues and implementation risks that practitioners should note, each tied explicitly to provisions or omissions in the instrument.

1. High-level objectives without operational detail (s 5). The ACQG program lists multiple objectives (s 5(3)(a)-(f)) and the CTC program describes the scope of grants (s 5(2)). The instrument does not set eligibility criteria, selection criteria, funding amounts, grant conditions, IP or data-sharing rules, reporting obligations, or compliance regimes. Practitioners should not presume that the instrument itself creates binding operational rules for applicants or grantees. Implementation will depend on subsequent program rules or grant agreements.

2. Broad scope that may raise boundary and overlap issues (s 5(2)). The CTC program funds R&D into “the use of either or both quantum technology and other advanced technologies to solve problems of national significance” (s 5(2)). The phrase “other advanced technologies” is broad and could overlap with other Commonwealth programs, departmental initiatives, or existing funding streams. Absent specific exclusions or coordination mechanisms in the instrument, there is risk of duplication, inconsistent funding incentives, and contestation between agencies or programs.

3. Constitutional and race-based measures (s 6(c); s 5(3)(f)). The instrument specifies the race power as a constitutional basis (s 6(c)) and contains an ACQG objective to facilitate equal participation by women and First Nations Peoples (s 5(3)(f)). That combination suggests the Commonwealth may design targeted measures using race-based legal authority. Practitioners should note that such measures rest on particular constitutional foundations and the instrument itself does not articulate the legal thresholds or safeguards for implementing race-based programs.

4. External affairs and treaty linkage is narrow and explicit (s 6(d)). The instrument ties the external affairs power to measures assisting Australia to meet obligations under CEDAW, particularly Articles 2, 3 and 11. The instrument does not reference other treaties or international instruments. Where a program designer intends to rely on other external obligations, a separate legal basis may be needed.

5. Communications security objective is broad but undefined (s 5(3)(d)(i)-(iv); s 4). The ACQG objective includes addressing risks to the security of communications services, collecting and disseminating information, and promoting ethical or security standards (s 5(3)(d)). The instrument does not define the meaning of “security” in this context, nor does it state the relationship between program activities and existing telecommunications, defence, or national security law. Entities involved in communications services may need clarity on information sharing, classified research, export controls, and security clearances, none of which are specified.

6. International collaboration unspecified (s 5(3)(e)). The ACQG objective to collaborate internationally is stated without further detail on permissible forms of collaboration, foreign participation limits, vetting of partners, or requirements related to foreign investment or national security. That creates implementation uncertainty for applicants seeking international partners.

7. Single-centre funding model for the ACQG (s 5(3) opening). The instrument says the ACQG program “provides funding for a grant to operate the Australian Centre for Quantum Growth” (s 5(3) opening). That implies a single institutional operator is envisaged, but the instrument does not set governance, accountability structures, procurement rules, or how the Centre will be selected and funded over time.

8. No enforcement or sanction provisions (see “Penalties and enforcement” section). Because the instrument lacks compliance and enforcement clauses, grantees will need to rely on grant agreements and the Act for enforceable obligations. Practitioners should not assume this instrument creates statutory penalties.

9. Commencement only and no transitional or sunset clauses (s 2). The instrument commences the day after registration (s 2(1)) and contains no sunset date, review triggers, or transitional provisions. Once in force, the prescribed programs remain in place until amended or repealed by further instrument action.

10. Apparent reliance on departmental implementation. The instrument sets policy objectives but assumes that departmental and ministerial processes will fill in necessary program design. That creates discretion and implementation risk. Applicants and stakeholders should plan for consultation and engagement with administrators to clarify program rules.

Each of these points flows from text present in, or omitted from, the instrument. They represent practical issues that arise when an instrument sets high-level objectives and constitutional bases but defers operational implementation to subsequent administrative action.

Because the instrument prescribes programs and objectives rather than operational rules, compliance for prospective applicants, grantees, and administrators requires attention to subsequent program materials and the Act. The instrument itself provides a map of programme aims; aligning proposals and governance to those aims will be the most reliable route to being eligible and successful when program rules are released.

Steps and considerations grounded in the instrument

1. Align proposals with stated objectives (s 5(2)-(3)). Applicants should structure proposals to align with the program descriptions. For the CTC program, that means demonstrating how proposed R&D uses quantum technology, other advanced technologies, or both, to address problems of national significance (s 5(2)). For the ACQG, applicants (or the Centre’s operator) should show capacity to pursue the listed objectives: fostering constitutional trade or commerce in quantum technology; facilitating industry-led R&D coordination; increasing awareness and education; promoting ethical and secure adoption and standards; collaborating internationally; and facilitating equal participation of women and First Nations Peoples (s 5(3)(a)-(f)).

2. Prepare for program-specific rules. The instrument does not specify eligibility criteria, funding amounts, IP arrangements, or reporting obligations. Prospective applicants should monitor the administering department and Minister for program guidelines, selection criteria, grant agreements and contractual conditions that will set compliance obligations. Do not assume the instrument’s list of objectives is a substitute for program-level compliance requirements.

3. Address ethics, security and communications risks (s 5(3)(d); s 4). Because the ACQG has an objective to address risks to communications service security and to promote consistent national ethical or security standards (s 5(3)(d)(i)-(iii)), proposals should include risk assessments, data handling plans, and ethical frameworks relevant to quantum-related impacts on communications. Applicants working with communications infrastructure should be ready to engage with any security-related conditions or liaison with communications regulators, noting that the instrument points specifically to communications services via constitutional reference (s 4).

4. Demonstrate plans for inclusive participation (s 5(3)(f); s 6(d)). The ACQG objective to facilitate equal participation by women and First Nations Peoples means applicants should prepare concrete plans to increase participation, such as outreach, recruitment, training, governance representation, and measurable targets where appropriate. The instrument links these aims to constitutional powers including external affairs and race-based laws (s 6(c)-(d)); program designers may therefore expect to see measures framed to meet equality obligations.

5. Consider international collaboration governance (s 5(3)(e)). The ACQG identifies international collaboration as an objective. Applicants that intend to include foreign partners should prepare governance arrangements addressing IP, export controls, confidentiality, and national security considerations, even though the instrument does not specify these matters. Anticipate that program rules may require disclosure of international partnerships and compliance with Australian obligations.

6. Expect single-centre governance scrutiny (s 5(3) opening). The ACQG funding is for “a grant to operate the Australian Centre for Quantum Growth” (s 5(3) opening). Applicants seeking to be the operator should prepare robust governance arrangements, transparent accountability frameworks, clear articulation of activities mapped to the objectives, and proposals for how coordination with industry, research institutions, and government will be managed.

7. Prepare for administrative discretion. The instrument’s design leaves much to administrative action. Applicants and grantees should plan for selection panels, assessment criteria, and contractual conditions determined by the administering department. Practising lawyers and compliance professionals should be ready to advise on contractual negotiation points once grant terms are released.

8. Monitor commencement and subsequent instruments (s 2). The instrument commences the day after registration (s 2(1)). Stakeholders should watch for program guidelines, requests for proposals, funding announcements, and any amending instruments. The instrument warns that the commencement table will not be amended to reflect later amendments (s 2 note), so keep internal records of subsequent materials.

9. Engage early with relevant stakeholders. Because the instrument indicates coordination and industry-led solutions as objectives (s 5(3)(b)), industry associations, research organisations and potential partner firms should engage with the Department and Minister to understand program priorities and to shape collaborative proposals.

10. Legal review of grant agreements. Once grant agreements or program rules are published, have them reviewed for IP provisions, reporting obligations, confidentiality, termination rights, audit and compliance clauses, and any security-related conditions that may affect operations. The instrument does not set these elements, so they will be crucial in the grant agreements.

In short, compliance under this instrument is primarily about aligning with the policy and objectives set out in s 5 and preparing for the administrative and contractual rules that will follow under the Industry Research and Development Act 1986. The instrument gives the frame; program guidelines and grant agreements will set the detailed obligations.