High Court Justices (Long Leave Payments) Act 1979

The Act is compact in concepts; the principal terms and concepts that govern application are set out in s 3 and s 4. They should be read together with the recipient, funding and exclusion rules in ss 5-7.

Key statutory concepts

• Justice. The Act uses the defined term “Justice” to mean a Justice of the High Court (s 3). The statute is therefore limited in scope to High Court Justices; lower court judges are not within the definition provided here.
• Judicial salary. The Act measures entitlements by reference to a weekly “judicial salary”, defined as one fifty‑second of the annual salary that was payable immediately before the Justice’s retirement or death (s 3). That definition confines the payment to a fraction of base annual salary immediately prior to the terminating event; the Act does not expand the term to include allowances, superannuation contributions, or ancillary payments.
• Retirement. For the purposes of the Act, “retirement” means ceasing to be a Justice otherwise than by death (s 3). The Act then differentiates retirement that gives rise to the 52‑week potential payment (s 4(1)(a)) from other cessations that may qualify under ss 4(2A)-(2C).
• Qualifying service and service as a Justice. “Qualifying service” is service as a Justice excluding any period in respect of which the Justice has taken long leave or been paid in lieu of such leave (s 4(3)). “Service as a Justice” is to be regarded as service as a Judge for the purposes of s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 (s 4(3)), so calculation of years uses that cross‑reference for the definition of service.
• Calculation methods. There are two calculation formulas in play:
  • For a Justice who retires after completing at least 10 years’ service or on death, the amount equals judicial salary for either 52 weeks or for a period equal to 5.2 weeks for each completed year of qualifying service, whichever yields the lesser number of weeks (s 4(2)). The 5.2 weeks per year formula is numerically equivalent to 5.2 × years, so a Justice with 10 years would produce 52 weeks under that formula. For those with fewer than 10 years, the 5.2×years may be less than 52 weeks; for those with more than 10 years, the 52‑week cap will limit the payment.
  • For a Justice who ceases to hold office on attaining a specified age with at least 6 years’ service, or who retires due to certified disability or infirmity with at least 6 years’ service, the amount is the judicial salary multiplied by the 5.2 weeks per completed year formula (s 4(2C)); there is no express 52‑week maximum in these subsections.
• Recipient hierarchy and administrative discretion. The Act sets a hierarchical distribution rule for death cases (s 5(2)), gives the Attorney‑General power to direct distribution between multiple spouses/partners and dependants (s 5(2A)-(3)), and enables the Attorney‑General to authorise payment to trustees for beneficiaries under legal disability (s 5(4)). These are administrative discretions expressed as powers of the Attorney‑General, not duties to follow a statutory formula for apportioning among multiple claimants.
• Funding and exclusion. Payments are expressly funded from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s 6). The statute also provides that removal under s 72 of the Constitution does not entitle a person to payment unless the Governor‑General directs otherwise (s 7).

Conceptual interactions

• The Act deliberately limits what counts as service by excluding long leave or payment in lieu when calculating qualifying service (s 4(3)). That exclusion reduces the base number of completed years available for the 5.2‑weeks‑per‑year formula.
• Several operational determinations depend on other statutes. The Act is explicit that service is to be regarded under the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 (s 4(3)) and that “de facto partner” adopts the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 meaning (s 5(5)). Those cross‑references will determine how administrators count service periods and identify eligible partners.

The Act is narrowly focused on a single financial entitlement and on a small set of definitional and administrative rules. It does not create ongoing administrative machinery or dispute resolution processes within its text.

Primary persons and entities affected

• High Court Justices. The statute applies only to Justices of the High Court as defined in s 3. Any entitlement to payment on retirement or death arises solely from the individual’s status as a High Court Justice.
• Survivors and dependants. On death, the Act prioritises a surviving spouse or de facto partner, then dependants, then the legal personal representative (executor or administrator) of the estate (s 5(2)). The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 definition of “de facto partner” is adopted by reference (s 5(5)).
• Attorney‑General. The Attorney‑General is a central decision‑maker under the Act. The Attorney‑General may:
  • Direct the distribution between multiple surviving spouses or de facto partners where more than one survives (s 5(2A));
  • Direct the distribution among dependants when the payment is payable to dependants (s 5(3));
  • Appoint trustees and authorise payment to trustees for persons under legal disability, and direct the trusts on which such funds are to be held (s 5(4)). These powers place the Attorney‑General in the role of administering discretionary distribution outcomes where statutory hierarchy yields multiple potential recipients, or where beneficiaries lack legal capacity.
• Governor‑General. The Governor‑General retains a specific power to authorise payment where a Justice has been removed under s 72 of the Constitution. Unless the Governor‑General directs otherwise, removal under s 72 disqualifies a person from payment (s 7). That is an affirmative role for the Governor‑General in a narrowly defined exception to the entitlement.
• Commonwealth finance authorities. Payments are to be met from the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the Fund is appropriated accordingly (s 6). This affects budgetary treatment and the executive’s fiscal administration: treasury or relevant finance agencies will be required to make payments when instructed under the Act.
• Persons under legal disability. Where an intended recipient is under legal disability, the Attorney‑General may withhold direct payment and instead appoint trustees to hold the amount on directed trusts for the benefit of that person (s 5(4)). That places trustees within the affected set of parties and gives the Attorney‑General supervisory control over trusteeships created under the Act.

Indirectly affected parties

• Estates and legal personal representatives. If the Justice leaves no surviving spouse, de facto partner or dependants, the payment goes to the legal personal representative (s 5(2)(c)). Estates therefore may receive funds when the primary categories are absent.
• Administrators and records officers within the Attorney‑General’s Department and the Department of Finance. They will be responsible for identifying eligible recipients, making calculations based on judicial salary and qualifying service, and effecting payments from government accounts. The Act does not specify administrative procedures or timelines, so government practice will determine many operational aspects.
• The Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 administrators. The Act explicitly requires reliance on s 6 of that Act for the meaning of “service as a Justice” and for disability certification (s 4(2B) referencing s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act) , therefore agencies administering judges’ pensions play a role in certifying particular causal statuses (permanent disability or infirmity) that trigger payment under s 4(2B)-(2C).

Who does not gain rights under this Act

• Persons other than High Court Justices. The definition of Justice makes it clear that the statutory entitlement is not available to judges of other courts.
• Justices removed under s 72 of the Constitution, unless the Governor‑General directs otherwise (s 7).
• Surviving persons or dependants who do not meet the statutory priority order and where the Attorney‑General does not exercise discretion to include them.

In short, the Act creates a limited, financially quantified entitlement tied to the office of High Court Justice, assigns specific administrative discretion to the Attorney‑General and the Governor‑General for edge cases, and relies on existing pension certification mechanisms and definitions in other statutes to determine eligibility and service length.

The Act creates a set of statutory rights to payments and corresponding administrative duties on the executive. Those rights and duties are succinct and statutory; there are few procedural specifications.

Statutory rights

• Right to payment on retirement (s 4(1)(a), s 5(1)). A Justice who retires after completing at least 10 years’ service has a right under the Act to receive an amount calculated in accordance with s 4(2). The payment is payable to the Justice (s 5(1)).
• Right to payment on death (s 4(1)(b), s 5(2)). On the death of a Justice an amount is payable regardless of the length of service; the Act prescribes the priority of recipients: first a surviving spouse or de facto partner, otherwise dependants, otherwise the legal personal representative (s 5(2)). The Act thus confers a statutory entitlement to certain classes of survivors and dependants on the death of a Justice.
• Right to pro‑rata payments in other cessations (ss 4(2A)-(2C)). A Justice who ceases to hold office because of attainment of a specified age after at least 6 years’ service, or who retires due to permanent disability or infirmity with certification under s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 and with at least 6 years’ service, has a right to a payment calculated on the 5.2 weeks per completed year of qualifying service formula (s 4(2C)).

Statutory duties and powers

• Duty of payment out of Consolidated Revenue Fund (s 6). The Commonwealth is required to make payments under the Act from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which the Act appropriates accordingly. This imposes a funding duty on executive agencies charged with effecting the payment.
• Attorney‑General’s discretionary powers (s 5(2A)-(4)). The Attorney‑General has power and therefore responsibility to:
  • Direct the distribution among multiple surviving spouses or de facto partners (s 5(2A));
  • Direct distribution among dependants when the payment is payable to dependants (s 5(3));
  • Authorise payment to trustees for persons under legal disability and appoint those trustees and direct the trusts (s 5(4)). These are administrative powers rather than mandatory distribution formulas; the Attorney‑General therefore bears the decision‑making burden when multiple beneficiaries or legal incapacity are present.
• Governor‑General’s direction regarding removal (s 7). The Governor‑General has the power to direct that an amount be payable notwithstanding removal under s 72 of the Constitution. Absent such direction, removal disqualifies a person from entitlement. That is an affirmative power to override the statutory bar, and thus a decision‑making duty if invoked.
• Calculation duties. Administrative officers must calculate the weekly “judicial salary” by dividing the annual rate payable immediately before the retirement or death by 52 (s 3), determine qualifying service excluding periods of long leave or payment in lieu (s 4(3)), and apply the correct formula depending on which subsection of s 4 applies.
• Reliance on external certification (s 4(2B)). For retirements due to permanent disability or infirmity, payment requires certification under s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968. That creates a duty to obtain and rely upon a statutory certification from the appropriate body under that Act.

Constraints on rights and duties

• Qualifying service exclusions. Periods of long leave or payment in lieu are excluded from qualifying service (s 4(3)). Administrators must adjust the years used in the 5.2 weeks per year calculation downward when such periods exist.
• 10‑year threshold for retirement payments. Retirement after less than 10 years does not create entitlement under s 4(1)(a); instead, a cessation under s 4(2A) or certified disability under s 4(2B) may qualify only where at least 6 years’ service exists.
• Removal under s 72. Removal under s 72 of the Constitution ordinarily disqualifies the person from payment unless the Governor‑General directs otherwise (s 7).

Absent duties and procedural rights

• The Act does not create procedural claim forms, timelines, evidence standards, appeals mechanisms or penalties for non‑payment. It therefore places the administration of claims and dispute management into the executive domain by implication, leaving detailed process design to administrative practice.

Overall, the Act balances a narrowly framed entitlement for retiring or deceased High Court Justices against executive discretion in distribution and exception cases, with delegation to pension certification regimes and reliance on the Consolidated Revenue Fund for payment.

The Act contains no penal provisions, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms. It establishes an entitlement and administrative powers but does not prescribe remedies, penalties for non‑payment, or a statutory process for enforcing disputes about entitlement. The consequences of that textual absence are concrete for administrators and practitioners.

What the Act provides and what it does not

• No statutory penalties. There are no sections creating criminal offences, administrative penalties, fines, or sanctions for failures to comply with the Act’s payment obligations. The Act places a duty on the executive to make payments out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s 6), but does not set out consequences for failing to do so.
• No express enforcement pathway. The Act does not specify a tribunal, court process, timing rules, application forms, evidence standards, or internal review mechanisms for claimants. The practical enforcement pathway for an aggrieved person likely therefore depends on general administrative law remedies and the courts’ jurisdiction to enforce statutory rights, but those remedies are not created by or described in the Act itself.
• Discretionary executive roles that affect enforceability. The Attorney‑General’s powers to direct distributions among multiple spouses, partners, and dependants, and to appoint trustees for those under legal disability (s 5(2A)-(4)), could create factual disputes within administration. The Act does not constrain how the Attorney‑General must exercise those powers, and does not prescribe procedures for challenging the Attorney‑General’s decisions in this context.
• No timeline or mandatory payment date. The Act states that an amount is payable “in accordance with this Act” (s 4(1)), but does not specify when payment must be made after the triggering event. That leaves the timing of payment to administrative practice and financial procedures, again without statutory penalty for delay.
• Governor‑General’s exclusion power. The Act excludes payment on removal under s 72 of the Constitution unless the Governor‑General directs otherwise (s 7). There is no statutory test, criteria or procedure set out for the Governor‑General’s exercise of that power, and no avenue in the Act to challenge such a direction.

Implications for claimants and administrators

• Claimants seeking to enforce payment must rely on the statutory entitlement and on general remedies outside the Act: writs for mandamus, declaratory relief or other common law or equitable remedies may be the procedural avenues, but these are not provided for in this Act and must be inferred from the broader legal framework (not contained in the Act text).
• Administrative bodies will need to ensure internal compliance processes, because the Act does not create statutory enforcement steps. Departments should adopt documented procedures to determine eligibility, calculate amounts and effect payments to reduce the risk of dispute.
• Because the Act delegates certain distribution decisions to the Attorney‑General, decisions about distribution among multiple claimants could be subject to challenge on public law grounds if a claimant sought to contest the Attorney‑General’s exercise of power; the Act, however, contains no internal review mechanism.

In sum, enforcement of the rights created by the Act is procedural and practical rather than statutory: the Act creates entitlements but leaves enforcement reliant on executive action and the general legal system rather than on specific statutory penalty or enforcement provisions.

The Act expressly cross‑references and thereby interacts with other statutes and constitutional provisions. Those interactions influence eligibility, certification requirements and definitions, and they allocate certain determinations to other statutory regimes.

Close cross‑references in the Act

• Judges’ Pensions Act 1968, s 6. The Act instructs that “service as a Justice” is to be regarded as “service as a Judge for the purposes of section 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968” (s 4(3)). The Act also relies on a certification under s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 to trigger payment where retirement is due to permanent disability or infirmity (s 4(2B)). Those cross‑references mean administrators must apply definitions, counting rules and certification mechanisms from the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 when interpreting qualifying service and when determining whether a retirement due to disability triggers an entitlement. The Act therefore imports external substantive and procedural determinations from that pensions statute.
• Acts Interpretation Act 1901. For purposes of identifying a “surviving spouse or de facto partner” the Act relies on the meaning of de facto partnership within the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (s 5(5)). That means the statutory tests and legal definitions set out in the Acts Interpretation Act govern who qualifies as a de facto partner for distribution priority under s 5(2)(a).
• Constitution, s 72. The Act expressly interacts with s 72 of the Constitution: removal under s 72 normally disqualifies a Justice from receiving the payment unless the Governor‑General otherwise directs (s 7). The Act therefore depends on constitutional process for removal to produce a consequential bar to payment, subject to the Governor‑General’s discretion.
• Consolidated Revenue Fund. Section 6 allocates payments to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and appropriates the Fund accordingly. That links the Act to the Commonwealth’s fiscal framework and budgetary processes, and informs how payments will be made in practice under financial legislation and administrative funding procedures.

Operational and interpretative consequences

• Determination fora and certifying authorities. Because the Act relies on the Judges’ Pensions Act certification for disability retirements, the authority that certifies disability under that pensions statute becomes a gatekeeper for payment under this Act (s 4(2B)). Administrators will therefore coordinate with the pensions authorities to obtain the statutory certificate required to establish entitlement in disability cases.
• Definition and eligibility conformity. Use of external statutory meanings (service counting from the Judges’ Pensions Act and de facto definition from the Acts Interpretation Act) means differences in statutory definitions or subsequent amendments to those Acts will affect entitlements here. The Act itself contains no independent definition of “de facto partner” or of how to count service; it defers to those external regimes.
• Constitutional exception. Removal under s 72 of the Constitution is a specified exception to payment (s 7). The Act therefore interacts with constitutional mechanisms for removal, effectively turning removal into a disqualifying event for payment unless the Governor‑General chooses otherwise. The Governor‑General’s discretionary power is statutory and specific to the s 72 removal context.
• Absent procedural links. The Act does not cross‑reference administrative review statutes, record‑keeping obligations, or the Financial Management and Accountability framework. That means the Act leaves many procedural and administrative details to general government practice and to the rules that apply to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and public service administration, rather than prescribing them here.

Practical implication for advisers

• Practitioners must consult the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 when advising on eligibility and addressing disputes, because those statutes’ definitions and certification processes determine key elements of entitlement under this Act. The Act’s text deliberately ties calculation and certification functions to those other provisions.
• Budget officers and finance advisers must treat payments as funded from the Consolidated Revenue Fund and handled under the usual appropriation and payments processes (s 6). The Act’s appropriation clause supplies the legal basis for payment from that fund.

The Act therefore should not be read in isolation. Its entitlement structure, eligibility rules and certain determinative certifications rely on external statutory frameworks and constitutional provisions.

The text provided contains the Act as a self‑standing instrument with seven sections: short title (s 1), commencement (s 2), interpretation (s 3), payment rules (s 4), recipients and distribution powers (s 5), appropriation (s 6), and removal exclusion (s 7). The document does not include any schedules, amending provisions, transitional arrangements, or notes of repeal or variation. The Act as presented therefore appears in its consolidated form with those seven operative sections.

What the Act shows about amendments

• No amending instruments or amendment history are set out in the provided text. The Act itself contains no language that indicates it has been amended, consolidated, or otherwise varied within the document you supplied. There are no schedules listing earlier versions or amendment dates included in this copy.
• Cross‑references to other statutes are present (for instance to the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 and to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901), but the Act does not contain internal amendment provisions affecting those statutes, nor does it reference any amending Acts.

Consequences for practice

• Because the Act relies on external definitions and certification provisions, any amendments to the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 or to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 would potentially change how the High Court Justices (Long Leave Payments) Act 1979 operates, even if this Act itself remains textually unchanged. The Act’s effective operation therefore depends in part on the stability of those other statutory regimes.
• The absence of internal amendment notes or a schedule in the provided text means that practitioners should not infer any later amendments from this copy alone. If advice or litigation depends upon amendment history (for example to show how a provision has changed over time), the client or adviser must obtain formal legislative history and consolidation records outside the Act’s text as provided here.

What is not in the Act text

• No transitional arrangements. The Act contains no transitional provisions addressing Justices who retired or died before enactment, or any savings clauses. The commencement clause simply states the Act comes into operation on Royal Assent (s 2).
• No sunset or review clause. There is no provision for periodic review, repeal date, or sunset; the Act is drafted as a continuing entitlement until amended or repealed by subsequent legislation.

In summary, the Act as provided is a compact, stand‑alone statutory instrument with no internal amendment narrative. Any inquiry about legislative history, subsequent amendments, or repeal must be addressed by consulting parliamentary records, consolidation tables, or subsequent legislative instruments outside the provided text.

The Act text supplied contains no references to judicial decisions, litigation, or case law. It does not cite any authorities, nor does it include any annotations about judicial interpretation or disputes. Consequently, based on this instrument alone there is no litigation history recorded.

What the absence of litigation references means

• The Act’s text does not itself indicate whether its provisions have been the subject of challenge, interpretation, or judicial analysis. There is no mention of precedent or case law that would illuminate how courts have treated ambiguous terms such as “long leave”, the Attorney‑General’s discretion on distribution, or the calculation of “judicial salary” under changing remuneration regimes.
• Where questions of construction arise in practice,such as whether a particular period qualifies as “long leave” excluded under s 4(3), or how to treat overlapping claims from multiple surviving spouses or dependants,the Act provides no statutory guidance on dispute resolution or judicial remedies. Any litigation would therefore proceed by reference to the general law of statutory interpretation, trusts and estates, administrative law, and the external statutes expressly referenced in the Act (for example the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901), but these doctrines and cases are not reproduced in the Act text.

Practical consequence for advisers

• Because no litigation history is present in the Act, advisers should expect that contested questions,such as the exercise of the Attorney‑General’s discretion in distribution, the computation of qualifying service when periods of long leave intersect with active service, or the effect of a Governor‑General direction under s 7,are issues that may ultimately require judicial determination if administrative resolution fails. The Act itself does not preclude litigation, but does not create any special court or tribunal procedures either.
• In the absence of statutory judicial guidance, administrative decision‑makers should anticipate potential judicial review of their exercises of discretion and so document decisions and reasoning, especially where the Attorney‑General’s powers under s 5 or the Governor‑General’s power under s 7 are invoked.

Because the provided Act contains no litigation history, anyone advising on an actual claim should undertake a separate search of case law and administrative decisions for litigation that interprets this Act or resolves disputes arising under its provisions; that material is not contained in this text.

The Act is short and precise, but it contains several features and drafting choices that create practical traps for claimants, administrators and advisers. These are matters to check closely, because the Act prescribes few procedural safeguards or definitions and delegates several determinations to other statutes or to executive discretion.

1. The definition of judicial salary is tightly focused

• The Act defines “judicial salary” as one fifty‑second of the annual rate that was payable immediately before the Justice’s retirement or death (s 3). The Act does not state whether the annual rate includes allowances, special purpose payments, or other emoluments. Administrators must use the precise annual rate “that was payable immediately before” the event. Any change in the annual rate shortly before retirement or death will affect the weekly calculation. Practitioners should confirm what elements of pay are included in the annual rate used for the calculation.

2. Qualifying service excludes long leave and payment in lieu

• “Qualifying service” explicitly excludes any period of service for which the Justice has taken long leave or has been paid in lieu of such leave (s 4(3)). The Act does not define “long leave”. That undefined term will require administrators to adopt a consistent administrative meaning or to refer elsewhere for a definition. Where a Justice has taken extended leave periods, those periods may reduce the number of completed years for the 5.2 weeks per year calculation and therefore materially reduce the payment.

3. Different triggers, different thresholds, and differing caps

• Retirement after 10 or more years triggers the 52‑week maximum or the 5.2‑weeks‑per‑year lesser test (s 4(1)-(2)). Death triggers the same calculation irrespective of length of service (s 4(1)(b), s 4(2)). But the alternative routes in ss 4(2A)-(2C) require at least 6 years’ service and operate on the 5.2 weeks per year metric alone (s 4(2C)). Practitioners must determine which subsection applies, because the presence or absence of the 52‑week cap depends on it. For example, a Justice with more than 10 years who retires normally will be capped at 52 weeks, but a Justice who leaves office on attaining a particular age under s 4(2A) after 6+ years will receive only 5.2 weeks per year with no statutory cap; these differences can produce materially different outcomes.

4. Death cases are treated differently to retirement

• On death, the entitlement attaches regardless of years served (s 4(1)(b)), but recipients are ordered by priority. A surviving spouse or de facto partner has the first claim (s 5(2)(a)). If no spouse/partner exists, dependants are next (s 5(2)(b)), and only if none of those exist does the legal personal representative receive the payment (s 5(2)(c)). The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 definition of de facto partner applies (s 5(5)), so administrators must ensure that relationships are assessed under that statutory meaning.

5. Attorney‑General’s discretion is broad and under‑specified

• The Attorney‑General may direct distribution among multiple surviving spouses or de facto partners (s 5(2A)) or among dependants (s 5(3)), and may appoint trustees for persons under legal disability and direct the trusts (s 5(4)). The Act does not prescribe criteria, procedures, or evidentiary standards for those directions. That leaves scope for disputes over fairness and process, and for arguments that administrative law principles should govern the exercise of those powers. Practitioners should anticipate the Attorney‑General asking for documentation to support claims and should expect decisions to be recorded.

6. Removal under s 72 is an exclusion unless GG directs otherwise

• Where a Justice is removed under s 72 of the Constitution, the Act bars payment unless the Governor‑General otherwise directs (s 7). Removal therefore ordinarily disqualifies the person from payment; the Governor‑General’s direction is the only textual escape hatch. That creates a potential sharp edge where removal proceedings intersect with entitlement.

7. Funding is from the Consolidated Revenue Fund but no payment timetable

• Payments are appropriated from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s 6). The Act does not set timing, instalment, or process for making the payment. Administrators must fit payment into existing financial controls and appropriation processes, which can involve time lags. There is no statutory remedy in the Act for delay.

8. No procedural rules, evidence requirements, or appeal rights in the Act

• The Act supplies the entitlement and the categories of recipients but leaves the practical administrative mechanics unspecified. This absence creates uncertainty about filing claims, required proof of relationship or dependency, time limits, and dispute resolution procedures. Practitioners should prepare documentary evidence early and coordinate with the Attorney‑General’s office to ascertain procedural expectations.

9. Dependants undefined; multiple dependency claims possible

• The Act uses “dependant” without a statutory definition in the text. Administrators must either apply common law or other statutory criteria to identify dependants. When multiple dependants claim, the Attorney‑General’s power to direct distribution applies (s 5(3)), but again no criteria are set in the Act; this may lead to contested distributions.

10. Interaction with external statutory certification

• For disability retirements, payment requires certification under the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 (s 4(2B)). If certification is refused, entitlement under s 4(2B) will not arise; the Act therefore depends on the operation and criteria of that separate statute.

Practitioners should therefore pay careful attention to: precise timing of the “annual rate” used; the administrative meaning adopted by the government for “long leave”; whether the applicable subsection in s 4 is correctly identified; documentation proving spouse, de facto partnership, dependency or legal incapacity; and the need to engage with pensions administrators and the Attorney‑General’s office early to establish process and timing.

This section translates the Act’s requirements into practical steps for administrators, the Attorney‑General’s office, claimants and their advisers. The Act contains no prescribed procedural forms or deadlines, so compliance requires documenting entitlement, applying statutory definitions, and coordinating with related statutory bodies.

Steps for administrators (Attorney‑General’s Department, Department of Finance, pensions administrators)

1. Establish the triggering event

• Determine whether the event is retirement, death, cessation on attaining a specified age, certified disability retirement, or removal under s 72 of the Constitution. Apply the definitions in s 3 and the tests in s 4 to identify which subsection governs entitlement.

2. Confirm status and length of service

• Confirm that the individual is a Justice of the High Court (s 3).
• Determine “service as a Justice” by reference to s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968, since s 4(3) directs that service be regarded as service as a Judge for the purposes of that provision. Obtain records showing start and end dates of service and any periods of long leave.

3. Adjust for qualifying service exclusions

• Identify any periods where the Justice took long leave or was paid in lieu of long leave, and exclude those periods from qualifying service calculations (s 4(3)). Maintain clear records of leave periods and payments in lieu.

4. Calculate judicial salary and the payable amount

• Ascertain the annual rate “payable immediately before the Justice’s retirement or death” and compute the weekly “judicial salary” as one fifty‑second of that annual rate (s 3).
• Apply the appropriate formula:
  • For retirement with at least 10 years’ service or on death: compute both 52 weeks’ worth of judicial salary and the product of 5.2 weeks for each completed year of qualifying service; pay the amount that corresponds to the lesser of those two calculations (s 4(2)).
  • For cessations under ss 4(2A)-(2C): compute judicial salary times 5.2 weeks per completed year of qualifying service (s 4(2C)). Ensure the 6‑year service threshold is met where applicable.
• Document calculation steps and the data sources used: pay records, leave records, service registers.

5. Identify and verify recipients

• If payment arises on retirement, pay the Justice (s 5(1)).
• If payment arises on death, determine whether the Justice left a surviving spouse or de facto partner (use the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 for the definition of de facto partner per s 5(5)); if none, identify dependants; if none, pay to the legal personal representative (s 5(2)).
• Gather documentary evidence for relationship status, dependancy, and identification of the legal personal representative.

6. Apply Attorney‑General distribution powers where multiple claimants exist

• If multiple surviving spouses or de facto partners exist, the Attorney‑General must be asked to give a direction as to distribution between or among them (s 5(2A)).
• If multiple dependants are present, obtain a direction from the Attorney‑General on distribution (s 5(3)).
• If a recipient is under legal disability, seek the Attorney‑General’s authority to pay trustees and obtain directions on trust terms (s 5(4)).
• Prepare a recommendation for the Attorney‑General with supporting documentation and a proposed distribution if appropriate.

7. Implement payment and record‑keeping

• Once the amount and recipient(s) are confirmed, effect payment from the Consolidated Revenue Fund in accordance with financial procedures (s 6). Record all approvals, calculations and directions.
• Keep a clear audit trail: calculation sheets, certified documents, Attorney‑General directions, trustee appointment documentation where used.

8. Coordinate with pensions administrators for disability certifications

• For retirements due to permanent disability or infirmity, obtain the required certification under s 6 of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 before proceeding (s 4(2B)). Ensure the certification is appropriately evidenced and on file.

Steps for claimants and their advisers

1. Assemble documentary evidence early

• Justices preparing to retire should ensure records of salary and leave are up to date. Executors and surviving partners should have relationship and dependency evidence available to present to administrators.
• Where a claimant is a de facto partner, prepare to apply the statutory tests contained in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to establish status.

2. Provide clear proof of identity and relationship

• Provide marriage certificates, registration documents, cohabitation evidence, financial interdependence evidence, or other documentation required by the Attorney‑General’s office to prove status as spouse, de facto partner or dependant.

3. Anticipate the Attorney‑General’s involvement in distribution issues

• If multiple claimants exist, note that the Attorney‑General has the statutory power to direct distribution (s 5(2A)-(3)). Parties should be prepared to make submissions to the Attorney‑General, including proposed distribution models and evidence of dependency or contribution.

4. Where legal incapacity exists, anticipate trusteeship mechanics

• If a beneficiary is under legal disability, expect the Attorney‑General to appoint trustees and direct trust terms under s 5(4). Prepare to provide documentation about the person’s capacity and proposals for trustees if appropriate.

5. If removal under s 72 has occurred, investigate Governor‑General direction

• Where a Justice has been removed under s 72, confirm whether the Governor‑General has directed that payment be made (s 7); absent such direction, the statutory bar applies.

Administrative design recommendations (not mandated by the Act but necessary in practice)

• Develop a standard claims procedure, including application forms, evidence checklists, and timelines for decision and payment, to reduce uncertainty given the Act’s silence on process.
• Maintain a clear policy for what counts as “long leave” for the purpose of qualifying service or identify the statutory or industrial instrument that defines long leave if relevant.
• Establish a liaison process with the Judges’ Pensions Act administrators to ensure disability certifications and service counting are handled consistently.
• Record all Attorney‑General directions and trustee appointments in writing and publish internal guidance for departmental officers administering the Act to ensure consistent application.

By following these steps, administrators can operationalise the Act’s narrowly framed entitlement, and claimants can prepare the documentary materials likely to be required for payment. The Act itself provides the substantive entitlement and distribution powers; the detailed process and evidentiary rules must be managed by executive administration in line with the Act’s prescriptions.