The Act contains a number of textual features and drafting choices that create specific legal effects and potential practical traps for trustees, institutions and other stakeholders. The following are concrete points to be alert to, grounded in the statutory wording.
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the will" (s 3)
- The Schedule substitution in s 3 is statutory and overrides contrary testamentary provisions for the specific sums and beneficiaries identified. Trustees and potential claimants should not assume that the will governs those allocations in the usual way; the Act itself provides the authority for reallocation.
Two-trustee action suffices (s 2(1))
- The statutory definition of "trustees" includes "any 2 of those trustees acting together". Unless internal governance or the trust instrument requires otherwise, the Act allows any two trustees to act for the purposes of the Act. Practitioners should be alert that decisions under the Act do not require unanimity of all trustees.
Conclusive certificate (s 4(2))
- The Act makes the trustees’ certificate "for all purposes" conclusive evidence that an institution has ceased or will cease to exist and that proper inquiry was made. This is a powerful statutory finality device. It removes factual contestability and can preclude later challenge on those facts. Trustees should ensure contemporaneous records and the written certificate reflect adequate inquiry because the statutory conclusiveness makes the certificate the operative fact.
Broad immunity (s 5(2))
- The statutory wording that "no action, suit, or demand shall be brought or allowed" is expansive. It prevents claims "for or in respect of any alleged breach of trust or otherwise in relation to any act, matter, or thing done in pursuance of, or for the purpose of giving effect to, the provisions or objects of this Act." Affected parties should note that the immunity is not limited to narrow categories; it extends to acts done in pursuance of the Act and to broader acts intended to give effect to its provisions.
Attorney-General’s retrospective power (s 4(6))
- The Attorney-General may specify an approval date that is antecedent to the approval. This can retroactively validate earlier trustee payments or actions. Trustees and institutions should be aware that an approval given later may validate past acts and alter legal consequences retrospectively.
Deeming of past allocations (s 5(1))
- Section 5(1) resolves any doubt about past applications to the West Coast District Hospital by treating those sums as having been applied as if substitution for Strahan and Queenstown hospitals had occurred from the time of the last payment to those institutions. This is a specific, retrospective deeming provision and may resolve title or accounting ambiguities in the trust finances.
Investment power alteration (s 6)
- Section 6 requires subsection (1) of section 5 of the Trustee Act 1898 to be read as if a particular qualifying phrase were omitted. That alteration affects the scope of the trustees’ investment powers for these trusts. Trustees should not infer the precise operational effect of that change without checking the text of the Trustee Act subsection in force, but they must recognise that the Act intentionally modifies the statutory construction of trustee-investment law.
Limited scope of substitutions in s 3
- Section 3 authorises substitution "to the extent in each case of the sums appearing opposite each institution in [Part II] of the Schedule." The substitution is monetary and amount-limited; it does not necessarily alter any other non-monetary, administrative or conditional terms that might otherwise attach to funds absent additional authority. Trustees should apply sums only to the extent and in the amounts specified.
Absence of judicial review or appeal provisions
- The Act does not provide a mechanism for review of Attorney-General approvals or trustees’ certificates within the text. While that omission does not by itself preclude judicial review under general law, the presence of s 4(2) and s 5(2) creates statutory obstacles to litigation challenging factual determinations and to suing actors who implement the Act.
Potential conflicts with other statutory regimes
- The Act does not purport to override all other statutes. Parties should be cautious about assuming the Act displaces obligations under other legislative schemes entirely. The supplied text expressly amends the Trustee Act subsection reading (s 6) and references the Supreme Court substitution route (s 2(1)), but does not make express statements about other statutes.
Documentation risks
- Because s 4(2) makes trustees’ certificates conclusive and s 5(2) immunises actors from suit, poor documentation could result in irreversible allocations that are difficult to challenge. Trustees should ensure clear records of inquiry and written certification, and keep copies of any Attorney-General approvals and the terms attached.
Practical allocation mismatch risk
- The Schedule transfers are amount-specific. Trustees must take care when applying sums to ensure payments match the amounts in Part II. Section 3’s wording limits application to "the extent in each case of the sums appearing opposite each institution", creating a compliance trap if trustees attempt to pay different sums without appropriate authorisation.
No penalties for malicious acts under the Act
- The immunity provision is broad but framed only in relation to acts done in pursuance of or for the purpose of giving effect to the Act. It does not create a general licence for bad faith conduct unrelated to implementing the Act. However, within the text supplied there is no express penalty for persons who act outside the Act in other ways, and readers should avoid assuming wider statutory protections exist.
In sum, the statutory drafting centralises factual authority in trustees’ certificates and administrative authority in the Attorney-General, provides retrospective validation devices, alters trustee investment law in a specified way, and uses explicit statutory language to reduce exposure to civil claims. Those textual choices create concrete operational and legal risks when acting without careful documentary and procedural compliance.