Government Agencies (Campaign Advertising) Act 2009

The Act turns on a short set of definitional and conceptual building blocks. The key definitions appear in Part 2 and the dictionary and set the scope of the Act’s coverage and triggers.

• Government agency (s 7). The Act applies to an administrative unit, a territory instrumentality, a statutory office-holder and staff assisting the office-holder, and a territory-owned corporation. This is an inclusive definition that reaches a broad range of public-sector entities as ordinarily defined in ACT law, and it brings into scope entities that operate with differing governance and accountability models.

• Responsible person (s 8). For each covered agency the Act names a responsible person: for administrative units it is the responsible Minister; for territory instrumentalities it is the chief executive officer; for statutory office-holders it is the office-holder; and for territory-owned corporations it is the chief executive of the corporation. The responsible person holds the statutory duty to request review where the $40,000 threshold is likely to be exceeded (s 14), to certify compliance before conducting a campaign (s 15), and to prepare a statement of campaign costs after a campaign (s 16).

• Government campaign (s 9). A government campaign is defined as the dissemination by a government agency of information to the public about a program, policy or matter affecting entitlements, rights or obligations, and expressly includes information programmes and education campaigns. The definition contains express exclusions: public health or safety programmes (including road safety), job advertisements, tender advertising, and other routine advertising campaigns related to agency operational activities (s 9(c)). The Act gives examples to illustrate the exclusions and the kind of matters covered.

• Campaign costs (s 10). Campaign costs are the costs of the development, production and conduct of government campaigns, including media costs. The statutory text provides examples that concretely identify cost categories: market research, PR or advertising consultancy fees; production costs for press, radio, online or television; audio-visual material; pamphlets and booklets; and other production and distribution costs (s 10 and examples). The Act therefore sets a monetary trigger that depends on the agency’s reasonable forecast of the defined campaign costs.

• Party political (s 11). The Act defines “party political” by reference to intent and effect: material is party political if it is designed to promote the policies, past performance, achievements or intentions of a program or the government with a view to advancing or enhancing a political party’s reputation rather than informing the public. The definition is functional and focuses on promotional intent and effect rather than specific words or formats.

• General principles and object (ss 5-6). The Act’s object is to prevent the use of public funds for advertising or communications for party political purposes (s 5). The general principles (s 6) balance that object against an express recognition that the public has a right to information about government policies, and that governments may use public funds for information and education programmes, but that such programmes must not be party political in purpose.

• Threshold and review architecture (s 14). The Act sets a clear administrative trigger: if campaign costs are likely to exceed $40,000, the responsible person must ask the reviewer to review the proposed campaign and report on whether it complies with the Act (s 14(1)). The responsible person may also ask for review where costs are below $40,000 if the subject matter is sensitive or review is otherwise appropriate (s 14(2)). The reviewer must review and report in relation to compliance (s 14(3)).

• Reviewer role and constraints (ss 12-13, 19-20). The reviewer must have experience in media and advertising, legal or government administration (s 12(2)), must not be a public servant (s 12(3)), and must be approved by the Legislative Assembly by at least a 2/3 majority (s 12(4)). The appointment is for no more than three years (s 12(5)). The reviewer’s functions are to review proposed campaigns for compliance and to report to the responsible person and the Assembly (s 13). The reviewer must prepare periodic reports covering defined intervals and give them to the Assembly and Speaker under specified timing rules (ss 19-20), and the reviewer may omit sensitive information from public reports with a mechanism for special reports to relevant committees (s 21).

• Content and delivery constraints in guidelines (s 17). The Minister must make disallowable guidelines that implement the object and general principles. The guidelines must require information to be relevant to current government responsibilities, presented objectively and fairly, not include slogans or advertising techniques designed to promote parties, be accessible to diverse groups, not be directed at promoting government or party interests by content, source, timing or targeting (with illustrative examples), be produced and distributed efficiently with an audit trail and procurement compliance, be clearly identified as government campaigns, recognise community diversity, and comply with relevant ACT laws (s 17(3)(a)-(i)).

These main concepts combine a content-and-procurement rule set with an institutional oversight chain designed to create review, certification and public reporting before and after larger campaigns, and to restrict campaigns during pre-election periods.

The Act’s coverage reaches multiple groups and decision-makers; the statutory text identifies who is directly regulated and who will be implicated in complying with the regime.

• Government agencies. The primary regulated entities are the government agencies defined in s 7: administrative units, territory instrumentalities, statutory office-holders and staff assisting them, and territory-owned corporations. This grouping covers ministries, statutory bodies, government business enterprises and entities that provide services on behalf of the ACT government. Agencies of different legal forms and governance structures are therefore subject to the same definitional rules for campaign activity, but the responsible person differs according to the entity type (s 8).

• Responsible persons. The statutory duties fall on the “responsible person” for each agency (s 8). For administrative units the responsible person is the Minister, for territory instrumentalities it is the relevant chief executive officer, for statutory office-holders it is the office-holder, and for territory-owned corporations it is the chief executive of the corporation. These named actors must obtain review where the $40,000 threshold is breached (s 14), certify compliance (s 15), and prepare and publish statements of campaign costs (s 16). The responsible person is the legal actor in whom compliance obligations are vested.

• The campaign advertising reviewer. The Act establishes a discrete oversight role, the reviewer, who must be appointed by the Minister but only with Legislative Assembly approval by a two-thirds majority (s 12(1), (4)). The reviewer must not be a public servant (s 12(3)), must have relevant experience (s 12(2)), and carries the functions of reviewing proposed campaigns and reporting to the responsible person and the Assembly (s 13). Practically, the reviewer will be an external appointee who assesses compliance for higher-cost campaigns and prepares periodic reports covering referred campaigns (s 19).

• The Minister and Executive. The Minister is responsible for appointing the reviewer (s 12), making the mandatory guidelines (s 17), and for exercising the exemption power in emergencies or extraordinary circumstances (s 23). Exemptions are disallowable instruments and must be reported to the Assembly in writing with reasons as soon as practicable (s 23(3)-(4)). The Executive may make regulations under s 24.

• Legislative Assembly and committees. The Legislative Assembly plays an oversight role: it must approve the reviewer appointment, it receives and considers the reviewer’s reports (s 20), and can disallow the Minister’s guidelines and exemption instruments (ss 17(2), 23(4) as disallowable instruments). The reviewer may prepare special reports for relevant Assembly committees when information omitted from public reports is sensitive (s 21(3)-(6)), and those committees must consider any special reports.

• Contractors and media suppliers. The Act explicitly identifies typical cost items that will count toward the $40,000 threshold and that agencies should record: market research agencies, public relations or advertising consultants, production costs for media buys and audio-visual material, pamphlets and booklets (s 10 and examples). Suppliers of media space and creative services will therefore be engaged in circumstances where the reviewer must assess compliance, and procurement and contract records will form part of the audit trail envisaged in the guidelines (s 17(f)).

• The public and targeted groups. The Act’s substantive constraints and the guidelines’ accessibility and representation requirements (s 17(d), (h)) directly affect how agencies present information to particular groups, including young people, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and those whose first language is not English. The Act therefore shapes content design and targeting choices by agencies, restricting content-based and temporal targeting that could be construed as promoting party political interests (s 17(e)).

• The electoral administration. The Act excludes the electoral commissioner from the pre-election ban on government campaigns in the pre-election period (s 18(2)). It also cross-refers to Electoral Act definitions of “pre-election period” and “general election” in the dictionary and the definition of government campaign (s 9, dict) so electoral timing and the operation of electoral law intersect with campaign restrictions.

Who pays. Taxpayers ultimately fund the campaigns and any administrative compliance costs (internal staff time, paying the reviewer, procurement auditing). Who decides. The responsible person decides to run campaigns, subject to certification and review obligations; the Minister decides reviewer appointment and guidelines; the reviewer decides compliance and issues reports to the Assembly. What behaviour changes. Agencies will need to incorporate legal review and procurement documentation into campaign planning, allow lead time for reviewer reports, avoid content or targeting that might be regarded as promoting government or party interests, and be mindful of timing constraints during pre-election periods.

The Act embeds a set of concrete duties and limited rights across responsible persons, the reviewer, the Minister, the Legislative Assembly and the Executive. These are procedural, reporting and content-based rather than penal.

Duties of responsible persons

• Request review for high-cost campaigns. If campaign costs are likely to exceed $40,000 the responsible person must ask the reviewer to review the proposed campaign and report on compliance with the Act (s 14(1)). The $40,000 figure is the statutory threshold for mandatory review.
• Optional review for sensitive or otherwise appropriate campaigns. The responsible person may request review even if anticipated costs are below $40,000, where the subject matter is sensitive or review otherwise appropriate (s 14(2)).
• Certification before conducting a campaign. A responsible person may conduct a government campaign only if they certify that it complies with this Act, and, where campaign costs are likely to exceed $40,000, after the reviewer has reported on compliance (s 15).
• Prepare statement of total campaign costs. After undertaking a government campaign the responsible person must prepare a statement of the total campaign costs and itemise identifiable development and production costs (s 16(1)-(2)). This supports transparency and auditability.

Duties and powers of the reviewer

• Review and report on proposed campaigns. The reviewer must review proposed campaigns referred to them and report to the responsible person on whether the campaign complies with the Act (s 14(3), s 13(1)(a)-(b)).
• Periodic reporting to Legislative Assembly. The reviewer must prepare reports covering specified report periods (biannual in non-election years, split periods in election years) and must identify proposed campaigns referred during those periods, itemised campaign costs and the reviewer’s decision and reasons (s 19(1)-(2)). The reviewer must deliver reports within specified timeframes: 2 weeks before an election for the pre-election report period, and within 3 months after other report periods (s 19(3)).
• Respect public interest exceptions for sensitive information. The reviewer must not include material in reports that would be contrary to the public interest because of privacy, trade secrets, commercially valuable information, prejudice to investigations or fair trial, or diplomatic relations, but may provide special reports to a relevant Assembly committee containing omitted material (s 21(1)-(6)).

Duties of the Minister and Executive

• Appoint the reviewer. The Minister must appoint a reviewer who satisfies the experience requirements and is not a public servant; appointments require Assembly approval (s 12(1)-(5)).
• Make guidelines. The Minister must make guidelines consistent with the Act’s object and general principles; the guidelines are disallowable instruments (s 17(1)-(2)). The guidelines must include detailed content and procurement-related provisions (s 17(3)(a)-(i)).
• Exempt campaigns in narrow circumstances. The Minister may exempt a campaign from the Act only if appropriate because of an emergency, extreme urgency or other extraordinary circumstances (s 23(1)-(2)). The Minister must inform the Assembly in writing of an exemption and the reasons as soon as practicable; the exemption instrument is disallowable (s 23(3)-(4)).

Rights and procedural protections

• Assembly oversight of reviewer appointment. The appointment of the reviewer requires a Legislative Assembly resolution passed by at least two-thirds of members (s 12(4)). This provides an inter-branch check on the reviewer appointment.
• Reviewer’s discretion on sensitive information. The reviewer may omit sensitive information from public reports for reasons set out in s 21(1), but may provide that information in a special report to a relevant Assembly committee, where it will be considered in committee (s 21(3)-(6)). This both protects commercially or personally sensitive material and allows parliamentary scrutiny.
• Disallowable instruments. Ministerial guidelines and exemption decisions are disallowable instruments (ss 17(2), 23(4)). This gives the Legislative Assembly the formal right to disallow those instruments under the broader Legislation Act regime.

Scope constraints and practical obligations

• Pre-election restriction. Government agencies must not conduct government campaigns in the pre-election period, with the electoral commissioner as the sole exception (s 18(1)-(2)). That is a substantive timing constraint on agency communications during sensitive electoral windows.
• Compliance with other laws. Guidelines must require that government campaigns comply with relevant ACT laws in force, with an example reference to privacy laws (s 17(3)(i)). Responsible persons must therefore ensure campaigns adhere to statutory privacy, procurement and other applicable legal obligations.

Notably absent: explicit offences or monetary penalties in the Act’s operative provisions. The Act prescribes procedural, reporting and content duties but does not within the provided text set out express criminal or administrative penalty provisions tied to non-compliance with the core campaign rules. The republication front-matter notes the penalty unit amounts for offences against the law generally at that date, but the Act itself does not specify particular penalty provisions for contraventions of campaign rules.

The Government Agencies (Campaign Advertising) Act 2009 constructs enforcement through administrative processes, reporting, public accountability and parliamentary oversight, rather than by specifying express criminal sanctions or fines in the text of the operative provisions. The republication materials state the value of a penalty unit applicable to offences against the law as at the republication date, but the Act itself does not create specific penalty provisions for breaches of duties such as failing to consult the reviewer, failing to certify compliance, or conducting a campaign in the pre-election period.

Mechanisms of enforcement in the Act

• Certification plus reviewer report. The primary internal control is process driven. The responsible person may conduct a government campaign only after certifying compliance with the Act and, where campaign costs are likely to exceed $40,000, after receiving the reviewer’s report (s 15). This creates an administrative duty that places the onus on the responsible person to refuse to proceed without certification and reviewer input where required.
• Public reporting and parliamentary scrutiny. The reviewer must prepare periodic public reports and give them to the Legislative Assembly and Speaker under prescribed timing rules (ss 19-20). Reports will itemise referred campaigns, list campaign costs and set out the reviewer’s decisions and reasons. Publication and presentation of these reports are procedural levers for political and public accountability, allowing scrutiny by the Assembly, committees and the media.
• Disallowable instruments and Assembly powers. The Minister’s guidelines and any exemptions granted are disallowable instruments (ss 17(2), 23(4)). As disallowable instruments, they are subject to review and potential disallowance by the Legislative Assembly under the Legislation Act regime, creating an additional parliamentary check.
• Reviewer appointment process. The reviewer must be approved by the Legislative Assembly by a two-thirds majority (s 12(4)), which is a political and institutional check on the reviewer role. The reviewer must not be a public servant and must have specified experience (s 12(2)-(3)).
• Special reports for sensitive material. The reviewer may omit information from public reports for public interest reasons but can furnish the omitted material to a relevant Assembly committee via a special report (s 21(3)-(6)). That mechanism allows scrutiny of sensitive material in a parliamentary context.

What the Act does not specify

• No offence clauses. There are no specific offence or penalty provisions in the body of the Act that prescribe criminal or civil penalties for running an unlawful campaign, failing to consult the reviewer, or failing to prepare a statement of campaign costs. The publication front-matter gives the monetary value of a penalty unit for offences generally as at the republication date, but the Act does not create named offences to which those penalty units would be applied within the text provided.
• No direct administrative sanctions. The Act does not set out a statutory regime of administrative sanctions (for example, abatements, clawbacks of funds, injunctions, or civil pecuniary penalties) tied explicitly to non-compliance with the Act’s duties. Enforcement therefore relies on administrative process failures being escalated through internal governance frameworks, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary oversight and the political consequences of adverse reporting.

Practical enforcement consequences and channels

• Political and reputational enforcement. Because the Act emphasises public reporting and Assembly scrutiny, the most immediate consequences for non-compliance are likely to be political, reputational and administrative. Reviewer reports and Assembly consideration will create public records that can lead to ministerial accountability, committee inquiries or media exposure.
• Procurement and audit trails. The guidelines require an auditable procurement trail and regard to cost-benefit analysis and accountability (s 17(3)(f)). Non-compliance with procurement rules or financial management obligations might therefore be picked up in audits under other fiscal or governance statutes, or trigger internal audit and compliance responses.
• Potential overlap with other legal mechanisms. While the Act does not itself create express sanctions, affected parties remain subject to other laws referred to in the Act and guidelines, such as privacy laws and procurement regimes (s 17(3)(i), examples). Where those laws impose sanctions or remedies, non-compliant campaigns could attract enforcement under those separate statutes.

In short, enforcement under this Act is administrative and political, grounded in independent review, certification, transparent reporting and parliamentary oversight. The Act does not set out express criminal or pecuniary penalties for failure to comply in its operative provisions, so practical consequences will arise principally through supervisory and political processes and through potential enforcement under other applicable laws.

The Act explicitly cross-references and integrates with other statutory instruments and administrative frameworks. Those interactions are largely definitional, procedural and supervisory, and they channel certain aspects of the Act into the broader legal and governance architecture of the ACT.

Statutory reference points and definitions

• Electoral Act. The Act uses definitions from the Electoral Act 1992 for terms such as “general election” and “pre-election period” (see dictionary and s 9 referencing the Electoral Act 1992 dictionary). The ban on government campaigns in the pre-election period (s 18) therefore operates in conjunction with electoral-timing definitions in the Electoral Act. The electoral commissioner is expressly exempted from the pre-election restriction (s 18(2)).
• Legislation Act. The Act relies on the Legislation Act 2001 for multiple procedural and interpretative matters. For example, the appointment process references the Legislation Act (s 12 note), the dictionary and general interpretative rules are governed by the Legislation Act (s 3 and dict notes), and the meaning of “disallowable instrument” used in relation to guidelines and exemptions is a Legislation Act concept (s 17(2), s 23(4)).
• Remuneration Tribunal Act. The conditions of appointment of the reviewer are subject to any determination under the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1995 (s 12(6)), placing remuneration and conditions within an established tribunal regime for senior appointments.
• Financial Management Act. The dictionary cross-references the Financial Management Act 1996 in defining “directorate” (dict). While not elaborated in the operative text, this indicates the Act sits alongside and interacts with the ACT’s financial management framework, particularly through the guidelines’ procurement and accountability examples (s 17(3)(f)).
• Privacy and other ACT laws. The guidelines must require compliance with any relevant ACT laws in force, with an example citation to privacy laws (s 17(3)(i)). Campaign design, targeting and data collection activities will therefore need to be compliant with privacy statutes and any other applicable sectoral regulation.

Administrative and parliamentary interface

• Disallowable instruments and Assembly oversight. The Minister’s guidelines and ministerial exemptions are disallowable instruments (ss 17(2), 23(4)). That subjects them to Legislative Assembly review and potential disallowance under the Legislation Act regime. The Assembly also approves the reviewer appointment by special majority (s 12(4)) and receives and considers reviewer reports (ss 19-20), creating institutional checks.
• Assembly committees and sensitive information. Where the reviewer omits sensitive material from public reports for public interest reasons, the reviewer may prepare a special report for the relevant Assembly committee, and the committee must treat the special report as referred for inquiry (s 21(3)-(6)). That mechanism connects the Act to the Assembly’s committee inquiry powers.

Procurement, audit and fiscal frameworks

• Procurement compliance and auditable records. The guidelines expressly require production and distribution in an efficient and accountable way, with a clear audit trail and current procurement policies and procedures followed (s 17(3)(f)). That connects the Act operationally to procurement law and internal financial controls under the Financial Management Act and related procurement rules. Agencies will need to ensure procurement practices align with financial management laws and policies.
• Campaign costs and reporting. The Act’s required statement of total campaign costs and itemisation of development and production costs (s 16) creates reporting obligations that can be subject to audits or scrutiny under financial management and accountability mechanisms.

Limits and complements rather than contradictions

• Exclusions reduce overlap. The Act’s definition of “government campaign” expressly excludes job advertisements, tender advertising and routine operational advertising (s 9(c)), limiting overlap with other advertising obligations and procurement processes involved in recruitment, tendering and routine service notices.
• No direct criminal law overlap within the Act. The Act does not itself create criminal offences, but other laws may impose sanctions for procurement breaches, corruption, misuse of public funds, or privacy breaches. Those external enforcement pathways interact with the Act where non-compliance implicates those separate legal rules.

In practice, compliance with the Act will require agencies to work across administrative, financial, electoral and privacy regimes. Agencies must align campaign planning and procurement with financial management rules and privacy obligations, operate within electoral timing constraints, follow the Minister’s guidelines (which are disallowable by the Assembly), and be ready to provide detailed cost records and documentation for reviewer assessment and Assembly reporting.

The republished Act includes a recorded amendment history and legislative history in the endnotes. The core Act was originally notified in late 2009 and began operation in stages; subsequent amendments have updated aspects of the Act and its application.

Key legislative milestones and amendments recorded in the republished law

• Original enactment and commencement. Government Agencies (Campaign Advertising) Act 2009, A2009-55, was notified to the legislation register on 21 December 2009 (Legislation history, endnote 3). Sections 1 and 2 commenced on 21 December 2009; the remainder of the Act commenced on 1 July 2010 (endnote 3, Legislation history).
• Administrative (One ACT Public Service Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2011 (A2011-22). This amending Act, notified LR 30 June 2011 and with relevant parts commencing 1 July 2011, made amendments that included inserting “directorate” into the dictionary (amendment history, endnote 4). The 2011 amendments also affected s 21 (reporting sensitive information), with s 21 am A2011-22 amdt 1.221 listed in the amendment history (endnote 4).
• Legislation (Legislative Assembly Committees) Amendment Act 2022 (A2022-4). Notified LR 30 March 2022 and with the relevant part commencing 6 April 2022, this Act amended s 21 (reporting sensitive information) as reflected in the amendment history (s 21 am A2022-4 amdt 1.30, amdt 1.31). The legislation history records the amendment and commencement dates (endnote 3).
• Statute Law Amendment Act 2025 (A2025-29). Notified LR 6 November 2025. Sections 1 and 2 commenced on 6 November 2025, and sch 4 pt 4.87 of that amending Act commenced on 16 December 2025 (endnote 3). The 2025 amendments touched multiple provisions: s 17 (Minister must make guidelines) was amended by A2025-29 amdt 4.87; s 23 (exemptions) and s 24 (regulation-making power) were also amended by A2025-29 amdt 4.87; and s 2 (commencement) was omitted and updated (amendment history, endnote 4). The legislation history lists the 2025 amendments and their commencements.

What the amendment notes show concretely

• The treatment of sensitive reporting (s 21) has been adjusted over time by both 2011 and 2022 amending Acts, indicating a legislative focus on balancing transparency with protection of personal, commercial or investigatory material. The amendment history specifically records changes to s 21 across A2011-22 and A2022-4.
• The Minister’s guidelines provision (s 17) and the exemptions/regulation-making powers (ss 23-24) received amendment attention in the 2025 Statute Law Amendment Act, which is recorded as amending those provisions in the amendment history. The republication notes that s 17 was amended by the 2025 Act (endnote 4).
• The legislative history endnote records the specific statute names, instrument numbers and dates of notification and commencement for each amendment, allowing one to trace when changes took legal effect (endnote 3).

Practical reading points from the amendment history

• Check commencement dates. Several provisions had differing commencement dates at enactment and for subsequent amendments. The republished law’s endnotes provide those dates, which matter for determining when the amended text applied to agency practice.
• Legislative focus areas. The recorded amendments indicate that reporting sensitive information and the Minister’s guideline and exemption powers have been the subject of legislative adjustment, suggesting parliament has periodically refined the balance between transparency, confidentiality and ministerial discretion.

For a practitioner analysing a particular campaign or historical compliance event, the endnotes in the republication provide the authoritative legislative and amendment history to determine which version of the Act applied at the relevant time, including the notification and commencement dates for original enactment and each amendment.

The republished law itself does not catalogue judgments or litigation records. The text of the Act and the associated endnotes set out the legislative history, amendments, commencement dates and republication details, but they do not include any case law, judicial decisions or litigation references. The Act’s contents and endnotes therefore do not identify any court or tribunal determinations construing the Act or adjudicating disputes under it.

What the republished material shows

• No cases named. The Act and its endnotes do not refer to any judicial decisions, nor do they include a litigation history section. The statutory text, explanatory notes embedded in the republication, and endnotes document legislative changes and republications but remain silent as to judicial interpretation.
• Administrative and parliamentary remedies emphasised. The Act relies on administrative review, certification, reporting to the Legislative Assembly, and the Assembly’s instrument oversight powers as the primary compliance and accountability mechanisms (see ss 12-13, 15-20, 23). Where disputes arise in practice (for example, about whether particular material is “party political”), contested matters could in principle be subject to judicial review, freedom of information, or other legal proceedings, but the republished law does not record any such litigation.

Practical implications for research

• To identify judicial treatment, one must search case law databases and tribunal decisions outside the statute. The republished law is silent on litigation outcomes and provides no judicial interpretative material.
• Given the Act’s administrative architecture, litigation, if it occurs, would likely involve questions about administrative law principles (for example, whether the Minister’s exercise of the exemption power was lawful, or whether a reviewer’s decision was lawful or procedurally fair). Those potential avenues are not directly addressed in the statute text and require case law research.

In short, the republished Act contains no litigation history. Practitioners seeking judicial authority should consult court and tribunal databases for decisions post-dating the republished law or contemporaneous with the events under review.

The Act contains several practical traps, timing risks and interpretative friction points that agencies, responsible persons, and practitioners should note. These operational “gotchas” arise from definitional choices, the $40,000 threshold, timing rules around elections, the reviewer appointment process, and the nature of enforcement and reporting.

1. The $40,000 threshold is based on “campaign costs” as defined

• The statutory trigger for mandatory review is that campaign costs are “likely to exceed $40,000” (s 14(1)). Campaign costs are broadly defined to include development, production and media costs (s 10), with examples that include consultancy fees, production and media buys, audio-visual material, pamphlets and booklets. Agencies that underestimate or misclassify costs risk proceeding without required review. The “likely to exceed” formulation requires an ex ante forecast; agencies must capture expected media buys and agency fees at the planning stage.

2. Reasonable scope creep can convert a non-mandatory review into a mandatory one

• A campaign initially forecast at below threshold may, through added elements (market research, additional media channels, creative production), push costs above $40,000. The responsible person must be alert to changes in scope and seek review when the threshold is expected to be exceeded (s 14(1)). The Act allows optional review for sensitive campaigns below the threshold (s 14(2)), but the safe operational practice is to assume the reviewer should be engaged early in any substantial campaign.

3. The reviewer role is independent of the public service and requires Assembly approval

• The reviewer must not be a public servant (s 12(3)) and must be approved by a two-thirds Assembly majority (s 12(4)). Finding an appropriately experienced external reviewer who can be appointed on reasonable terms, and timing the appointment for approval, creates logistical and cost considerations. If the reviewer position is vacant or contested, agencies relying on the reviewer for timely clearance may face delays or legal uncertainty.

4. No express statutory penalties in the operative text

• The Act does not set out explicit penalties for breaches such as conducting a campaign in the pre-election period (s 18) or failing to obtain a reviewer report for campaigns above the threshold. Enforcement relies on certification duties, public reporting and parliamentary oversight. Agencies should not assume that absence of a penalty clause makes non-compliance inconsequential. Political, reputational and audit consequences can be material.

5. Pre-election period ban with narrow exemptions

• Agencies must not conduct a government campaign during the pre-election period (s 18(1)). The electoral commissioner is exempt (s 18(2)). The Minister may grant exemptions in emergencies or extraordinary circumstances (s 23), but exemptions are themselves disallowable by the Assembly and must be reported in writing to the Assembly with reasons (s 23(3)-(4)). Relying on a ministerial exemption in a politically-charged pre-election period risks parliamentary scrutiny and potential disallowance.

6. Content and targeting constraints have practical interpretation challenges

• The guidelines require information to be objective, non-promotional, and not designed to promote government or party political interests by content, source, reason, purpose, choice of media, timing, geographic or demographic targeting, or designed effect (s 17(3)(b)-(e)). Distinguishing an informational campaign from a promotional one can be fact-specific. For example, including case studies, positive framing of a program, or demographic-targeted outreach to particular constituencies may be attacked as promotional, even if intended to inform. Agencies should document decision rationales and evidence bases for presentation choices.

7. “Presentation and delivery must be clearly identified as part of a government campaign”

• The guidelines mandate that presentation and delivery must be clearly identified as part of a government campaign, for example by a statement at the end of a radio or TV announcement (s 17(3)(g)). Failure to include clear government identification can be interpreted as circumvention of the Act’s transparency aims.

8. Record-keeping and procurement expectations

• The guidelines demand efficient, effective and relevant production and distribution with an audit trail and adherence to procurement policies (s 17(3)(f)). Agencies must retain procurement documentation, contracts, invoices and evidence of decision-making. Poor record-keeping will undermine an agency’s ability to certify compliance and could create problems in Assembly inquiries or audits.

9. Sensitive information handling and committee routes

• The reviewer may omit sensitive information from public reports if disclosure would be contrary to the public interest for enumerated reasons (privacy, trade secrets, prejudice to investigations, etc.) and may prepare a special report for a relevant Assembly committee (s 21(1)-(6)). Agencies should identify sensitive material early and engage with the reviewer about how it will be handled, because the special report route may expose material to committee scrutiny under parliamentary processes.

10. Timelines for reviewer reports are not tightly prescribed for individual reviews

• While the reviewer must produce periodic reports to the Assembly on set timelines (s 19), the Act does not elaborate specific short-form statutory timeframes within which the reviewer must complete an individual campaign review after referral. That absence can create operational delay risk if a campaign must be certified before launch and the reviewer’s capacity or timeline is uncertain. Agencies should build review time into campaign schedules and maintain contingency plans.

11. Interplay with other obligations

• The guidelines require compliance with other relevant ACT laws, with an example given of privacy laws (s 17(3)(i)). Practitioners must consider data protection, procurement law and any sector-specific regulatory obligations. Non-compliance with those other laws could have enforcement consequences beyond the Act.

These “gotchas” recommend conservative planning and rigorous documentation, early engagement with the reviewer for any campaign close to the $40,000 threshold or that touches on sensitive subject matter, and careful attention to timing and procurement processes.

This section provides a stepwise compliance checklist grounded in the Act’s provisions, together with recommended administrative controls and record-keeping practices that follow directly from statutory obligations (citations in parentheses).

1. Determine whether the planned activity is a “government campaign”

• Apply the statutory definition in s 9. Confirm that the communication is dissemination of information to the public about a program, policy or matter affecting entitlements, rights or obligations. Check the explicit exclusions: public health or safety programmes, stated job advertisements, tender advertising, and routine operational advertising (s 9(c) and examples). Document the legal analysis that supports the classification.

2. Calculate “campaign costs” and compare to the $40,000 threshold

• Identify development, production and media costs as defined in s 10 and the examples. Include market research, PR or advertising agency fees, production costs for print, radio, TV, online, audio-visual materials, pamphlets and other production items. Prepare a forecast showing whether campaign costs are likely to exceed $40,000 (s 14(1)). Keep contemporaneous cost forecasts and assumptions to support the “likely to exceed” determination.

3. If likely to exceed $40,000, request a reviewer assessment early

• The responsible person must ask the campaign advertising reviewer to review the proposed campaign and report on compliance (s 14(1)). Engage the reviewer early in the planning process so review can inform campaign content and procurement choices. For campaigns below $40,000, consider requesting review where subject matter is sensitive or where political or reputational risk is elevated (s 14(2)).

4. Follow the reviewer’s report and certification process

• Do not conduct a government campaign without the required reviewer report for campaigns above $40,000 (s 15(b)). The responsible person must certify that the campaign complies with the Act (s 15(a)). Maintain written certification records, including the reviewer’s report and internal sign-off documents.

5. Follow the Minister’s guidelines for content, presentation and procurement

• The Minister’s guidelines are mandatory and disallowable (s 17(1)-(2)). Ensure campaign information is relevant to current government responsibilities, is objective and fair, does not include undisclosed opinion or statements promoting government performance, does not use slogans or advertising techniques designed to have the effect of promoting a political party, is accessible to groups with special communication needs, and is not targeted to promote government or party political interests by content, source, timing, media choice, geographic or demographic targeting, or designed effect (s 17(3)(a)-(e), (g)-(i)). Keep records documenting how each guideline requirement was met.

6. Build and retain procurement and audit trails

• The guidelines require efficiency, cost-effectiveness, justification by cost-benefit analysis, and a clear audit trail consistent with procurement policies (s 17(3)(f), examples). Use existing procurement frameworks, retain tender documents, contracts, invoices, campaign production briefs, approvals and communication with suppliers. These documents will support the statement of total campaign costs and any audit or Assembly inquiry.

7. Prepare a statement of total campaign costs after the campaign

• The responsible person must prepare a statement of total campaign costs and itemise separately identifiable development and production costs (s 16(1)-(2)). Maintain a reconciliation between forecast and actual costs and annotate reasons for any variances.

8. Avoid running campaigns in the pre-election period

• Do not conduct a government campaign during the pre-election period (s 18(1)), unless it is an activity by the electoral commissioner (s 18(2)) or the Minister has issued a timely exemption for an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance (s 23). Plan campaign timing to avoid the pre-election window or, if unavoidable, ensure an exemption is sought and documented in writing with reasons for the Assembly, bearing in mind that exemptions are disallowable instruments (s 23(3)-(4)).

9. Handle sensitive information appropriately in reviewer reporting

• If the campaign involves material that could be an unreasonable disclosure of personal information, trade secrets, commercially valuable information, prejudice to investigations or trials, or affect relations with other governments, identify this early and discuss with the reviewer. The reviewer may omit such details from public reports and furnish a special report to the relevant Assembly committee (s 21(1)-(6)). Prepare non-sensitive summaries for public reporting while securing sensitive material.

10. Ensure compliance with other applicable laws

• The guidelines require compliance with relevant ACT laws (s 17(3)(i)), for example privacy law and financial management obligations. Legal and compliance units should vet campaign design for privacy, data collection and procurement legality. Keep legal advice memos and compliance checklists to support certification.

11. Maintain timeline and scheduling buffers for review and reporting

• Anticipate reviewer lead time and the absence of tight statutory deadlines for individual reviews. Schedule campaigns with adequate lead time for reviewer assessment and possible iterations. Note the reviewer’s periodic reporting deadlines to the Assembly (s 19) and plan to provide requested materials in time.

12. Record decisions and rationale for future scrutiny

• Keep written records of all decisions that could be subject to Assembly inquiry, audit or media scrutiny, including cost forecasts, procurement rationale, creative briefs, reviewer communications and responsible person certifications. These records support compliance claims and facilitate timely responses to any Assembly committee requests or inquiries.

13. If in doubt, engage the reviewer

• For borderline or politically sensitive campaigns, or where content or targeting choices could be interpreted as promotional, asking the reviewer for an advisory opinion or review reduces litigation, reputational and parliamentary risk. The responsible person has the statutory discretion to request review even if the threshold is not met (s 14(2)).

14. Monitor guidelines and amendments

• The Minister’s guidelines and the Act itself may be amended (see amendment history). Treat guidelines as binding instruments subject to disallowance and monitor for changes to ensure ongoing compliance with the most recent version (s 17(2), endnotes).

This compliance pathway converts the statutory requirements into practical steps that protect the agency and the responsible person from procedural and reputational risk and provide auditable documentation for Assembly and public scrutiny.