Gas Services Information Act 2012

The statute deploys a small set of defined concepts that determine who must act, what information is subject to the regime, and how protective and enforcement measures operate.

• Gas bulletin board (GBB). The GBB is a website for short and near term information on supply, demand, and transmission and storage capacity in Western Australia (s 4(1)). It may host offers to buy and sell natural gas and transmission capacity and can include material on other fuels insofar as relevant to its primary purpose (s 4(2)(a), (c)).

• Gas statement of opportunities (GSOO). The GSOO is a periodic statement providing medium to long term information and assessments on supply, demand and transmission and storage capacity (s 5(1)-(2)). The GSOO complements the GBB by focusing on forward-looking system capability and investment signals.

• Gas market participant. The Act defines gas market participant broadly to capture service providers, users (with several sub-meanings), producers, storage providers and any person prescribed by regulation (s 3(1)). The "user" definition covers contractual counterparties to pipeline service providers, persons with rights under access determinations, and end users prescribed in regulations (s 3(1)). The definition determines who can be obliged to provide information and who may be affected by rules and penalties.

• Operator. The person or body on which functions are conferred under s 7(2)(a) is the "operator". The operator is the legal entity charged with collecting, collating and managing information for the GBB and GSOO, including deriving and publishing information (s 7(3)(a)-(d)). The Act permits delegation of those functions in writing (s 11).

• Protected information. Information given to the operator under obligation that is specified as confidential by the provider (unless specification is unreasonable), or by its nature confidential, or is classified confidential under regulations or rules becomes "protected information" (s 3(1)). The operator must take reasonable measures to protect such information and may only use it for functions under the Act subject to statutory controls (s 13(1), (3)).

• Rules and regulations. The Act bifurcates delegated detail into regulations and rules. Regulations are primary subordinate legislation, required to provide for establishment and publication of GBB/GSOO, and may create offences and civil penalties. Regulations must provide for rules that deal with form, content and operation of the GBB and the form and content of the GSOO (s 7(1), s 8(1)). The regulations may also authorise rules to confer functions, impose obligations, and set civil penalties up to defined maxima (s 7(2), s 8(2)).

• Liability, immunity and civil penalties. The Act grants immunity from civil monetary liability to the operator and to persons supplying required information unless acts are in bad faith or negligent; the regulations may cap civil monetary liability for negligence (s 14(1)-(4)). The regulations may prescribe civil penalties (rules may be made civil penalty provisions) with specific monetary ceilings (s 8(2), s 15(2)).

• Interaction with other laws. The Act incorporates by reference certain provisions of the National Gas Law for protection of information (s 13(4)), and ensures terms generally align with the National Gas Access (WA) Law (s 3(2)). The Act also amends the Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998 to permit Board review of decisions under this Act (s 16).

These concepts create a framework in which an authorised operator collects commercially significant data from a wide set of market participants, publishes and analyses material for market signalling, and operates under rules and regulations that can create compliance obligations, civil penalties and confidentiality controls.

The Act explicitly targets "gas market participants", a statutory class that includes service providers, users, producers, storage providers and any person prescribed by regulation (s 3(1)). That group will typically include: transmission pipeline owners/operators, gas producers and marketers, storage facility operators, large industrial users with contractual pipeline rights, and any retail or wholesale counterparties prescribed in regulations. The "user" sub-definition reaches both contractual counterparties to pipeline services and persons entitled to pipeline services under access determinations (s 3(1)). The Act intentionally excludes pipelines that form part of distribution systems from the Act’s definition of "pipeline" for these purposes while including meter stations and gate stations through which gas may flow into distribution systems (s 3(2)). Consequently, entities operating within distribution networks may fall outside the Act’s core scope unless otherwise captured by regulations or by regulatory prescriptions of "user" or "gas market participant".

Who pays: the Act contemplates recovery of costs through fees and charges (s 9). Regulations may authorise the operator or the rules to set fees for specified functions, allow cost-based calculation, and may also authorise the Board to allocate costs and expenses of Board hearings (s 9(1)-(4)). Market participants can therefore expect to bear some of the operating costs of the GBB and GSOO through statutory fees or charges once the regulations and rules are made.

Who decides: the Minister or an authorised person or body will be empowered to determine operational responsibilities under the regulations and rules (s 7(2)(a)-(b), s 8(2)(f)-(g)). The person designated as operator will determine how information is collected, collated and published, subject to rules (s 7(3)(a)-(d)). The operator may be an office-holder, a body established under a written law, or another person identified in regulations (s 7(5)). The Board is given a review role for decisions of designated persons (s 12(1)-(2)).

Behavioural change: gas market participants will likely have to adapt contracting and internal compliance processes to supply information to an operator on request or under regulatory obligation (s 7(2)(d)-(e)). They will need to identify and, where appropriate, designate information as confidential (subject to a reasonableness test) and implement protections for their own commercially sensitive information given the operator’s limited but statutory permissive disclosure rights (s 3(1), s 13). Suppliers of information are also protected from civil monetary liability for providing the information except in cases of bad faith or negligence (s 14(2)). Participants must also plan for potential civil penalty exposure where rules make contraventions civil penalty provisions with set maxima (s 8(2)).

Diffuse and concentrated impacts: compliance costs will be more readily absorbed by larger producers, pipeline owners and storage operators than by small users or smaller market entrants. The Act allows regulations to prescribe additional classes of participant, creating scope for regulation to expand obligations to other market participants. In sum, the Act affects the information flows of market incumbents and prospective investors, shifts some costs onto participants via fees, and imposes new compliance and disclosure obligations enforceable under rules and regulations.

The Act sets out duties to provide information to the operator, duties of protection and limited permissions to use protected information, and rights to review certain decisions.

Information-provision duties. The core mechanism for gathering data is through obligations that may be imposed by regulation or rules. The regulations may impose obligations on gas market participants to provide specified information to the operator and may authorise the operator to impose informational obligations (s 7(2)(d)-(e)). Where the regulations or rules require provision of information, a duty to provide will arise; in addition, the Act makes clear that a person cannot refuse to provide required information on the basis of an external duty of confidentiality (s 10). That means contractual confidentiality obligations, or other private duties, are not a statutory defence to a regulatory obligation to provide information.

Designating and protecting protected information. The Act defines "protected information" and sets an obligation on the operator to take all reasonable measures to protect it from unauthorised use or disclosure (s 3(1), s 13(1)). Protected information includes information specified as confidential by the provider, unless specification is unreasonable, or by its nature confidential, or classified confidential under regulations or rules (s 3(1)). The operator is authorised to use protected information for its statutory functions but only subject to any statutory requirements or limitations (s 13(3)). The Act imports by reference certain National Gas Law provisions for protected information from the National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008 Schedule, modified for this Act and subject to regulation (s 13(4)). While regulations controlling use and disclosure are to be made, s 13(5)-(6) imposes a consultation requirement: the Governor cannot make regulations controlling the use and disclosure of protected information unless the Minister is satisfied that gas market participants have been adequately consulted (s 13(6)). Until regulations are made, subsections (1)-(4) apply (s 13(5)).

Operator’s duties and delegations. The regulations must include functions for an operator to collect, collate and manage information for the GBB and GSOO, to derive information for inclusion, to include specified information on the GBB, and to prepare and publish the GSOO periodically (s 7(3)(a)-(d)). The Act allows the person on whom these functions are conferred to delegate them in writing (s 11(1)); a delegate is taken to perform in accordance with the delegation terms unless shown otherwise (s 11(2)).

Protection from civil monetary liability and limits. The operator and its officers/employees are immune from civil monetary liability for acts or omissions in performing functions under the Act unless those acts are in bad faith or through negligence (s 14(1)). Persons supplying information under a statutory obligation are likewise immune unless their act was in bad faith or negligent (s 14(2)). The Act allows the regulations to prescribe a maximum amount for civil monetary liability arising from negligence and to make nuanced caps by class of person, event or period (s 14(3)-(4)). The immunity does not affect an officer or employee’s liability to their body corporate (s 14(5)).

Rights of review and dispute resolution. The Act permits applications to the Board for review of decisions made by persons on whom functions were conferred under s 7(2)(a) or (b), with exceptions for classes of decision specified in regulations (s 12(1)). The regulations may provide for the Board’s powers in relation to such reviews (s 12(2)). The regulations may also authorise the rules to provide for resolution of disputes arising under the Act (s 7(2)(h)).

Rule-making and enforcement rights. Regulations must provide for rules that will set form, content and operational detail for the GBB and the GSOO (s 8(1)). The regulations may declare specified rule provisions to be civil penalty provisions, prescribe monetary limits for contraventions and continuing contraventions, provide for enforcement and for taking proceedings, and govern how penalties are applied and accounted (s 8(2)(a)-(e)). The regulations may also provide for initial rules, their amendment and parliamentary procedures for publication and laying (s 8(2)(f)-(h)). Notably, the Interpretation Act 1984 sections 42 and 43(6) do not apply to the rules (s 8(4)), removing certain default statutory constraints.

Fee-imposition rights. The regulations may provide for the imposition and recovery of fees and charges connected with the cost of performing functions under the Act and may authorise rules to set such fees (s 9(1)). Where appropriate, methods of calculating fees, including cost-based calculations, can be specified (s 9(3)). The regulations may authorise the Board to allocate costs and expenses of Board hearings and proceedings (s 9(4)).

Collectively, duties focus on data provision and operator protection duties, while rights allow regulated parties to seek Board review of operational decisions and set rules for civil penalties, fee recovery and controlled disclosure.

The Act provides for enforcement principally through delegated rule- and regulation-based mechanisms rather than by prescribing a detailed offence catalogue within the primary Act. The regulations may provide that provisions of the rules are civil penalty provisions and may prescribe maximum monetary amounts for contraventions (s 8(2)(a)-(b)). The Act sets statutory maxima that the regulations may prescribe for civil penalty provisions: up to $100,000 for a contravention and, for continuing contraventions, an additional daily amount not exceeding $20,000 for each day or part of a day during which the contravention continues (s 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii)). The regulations may also provide for demands for payment not exceeding $20,000 and their enforcement (s 8(2)(c)).

Process and remedies. The regulations may govern the taking of proceedings for alleged contraventions of rules, the orders and sanctions available in those proceedings, and their enforcement (s 8(2)(d)). They may also set how amounts received by way of civil penalties are to be applied (s 8(2)(e)). The Act anticipates rules will address the procedural specifics of how the GBB/GSOO operate and the compliance framework, while regulations will provide the high-level enforcement architecture, including initial rule-making and parliamentary oversight (s 8(2)(f)-(h)).

Offences under regulations. The Governor may make regulations and those regulations may make contraventions offences punishable on conviction by a penalty not exceeding $100,000 and, if continuing, by a daily penalty not exceeding $20,000 (s 15(1)-(2)). That mirrors the civil penalty ceilings available under the rules and gives the executive flexibility to create criminal offences where considered necessary.

Board review and dispute resolution. The Act expressly permits the Board to review decisions of persons exercising functions conferred under s 7(2)(a)-(b), except for classes of decision the regulations may exclude (s 12(1)-(2)). The regulations may also provide for dispute-resolution mechanisms in the rules (s 7(2)(h)). The Board’s role provides an administrative enforcement and review forum, supplemented by civil and potentially criminal sanctions in subordinate legislation.

Limits on defences and confidentiality. Section 10 removes reliance on duties of confidence as a ground to refuse to provide legally required information. This reduces a potential defence for market participants who receive confidential information under commercial contracts and are asked to provide it to the operator.

Liability caps and indemnities. The Act gives immunity from civil monetary liability to the operator and to information suppliers except for bad faith or negligence (s 14(1)-(2)). Regulations may cap civil monetary liability arising from negligence (s 14(3)-(4)). These provisions limit the damages exposure of public or designated private operators and of participants compelled to provide information, subject to the exception for bad faith or negligence and any caps set by regulation.

Taken together, enforcement under the Act is a delegated regime: the primary Act sets the structure and ceilings but relies on regulations and rules to specify offences, civil penalty provisions, procedural mechanisms, and allocation of costs. The operator and regulated parties face civil liability exposure only in limited circumstances and subject to regulatory caps; market participants cannot assert confidentiality duties to avoid disclosure obligations.

The Act interacts with several existing legal instruments by cross-reference, amendment and selective incorporation.

Alignment with National Gas Access (WA) Law. The Act provides that terms not otherwise given a contrary intention take the same meaning in this Act as they do in the National Gas Access (Western Australia) Law (s 3(2)). This keeps a consistent statutory vocabulary across WA gas regulation, while modifying the definition of "pipeline" specifically for the purposes of this Act to exclude distribution system pipelines as defined in the Energy Coordination Act 1994 s 3(1) and to include meter/gate stations that feed distribution (s 3(2)(a)-(b)). The effect is that the GBB and GSOO regime is focused on transmission and storage infrastructure rather than routine distribution mains, with meter/gate stations that connect into distribution systems brought into scope.

Incorporation of National Gas Law information-protection provisions. Section 13(4) applies Chapter 2 Part 6 Division 7 Subdivision 2 of the National Gas Law as set out in the Schedule to the National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008 (as in force at commencement), but with modifications: references to AEMO are to be read as references to the operator, and regulations may specify further modifications (s 13(4)(a)-(c)). The Act therefore borrows an existing framework for handling protected information and disclosure, but it does not reproduce that framework in the primary text; the specifics depend on the imported provisions and any modifications made by regulation.

Amendment to Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998. Section 16 amends the Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998 by extending the Acts in respect of which the Board may undertake reviews to include decisions under the Gas Services Information Act 2012 (amendment to s 50(2A)). This gives the Board formal jurisdiction to review certain administrative decisions under the Act, subject to any regulatory exclusions (s 12(1)-(2)).

Interaction with distribution regulation. The Act deliberately excludes pipelines that are part of a distribution system from the definition of "pipeline" for this Act (s 3(2)(a)). That exclusion interacts with the Energy Coordination Act 1994 definition of distribution system. The practical result is that regulatory obligations under this Act, including information-provision duties and GBB/GSOO coverage, are framed around transmission and storage capacity rather than local distribution networks, except where meter or gate stations that connect into those distribution networks are involved (s 3(2)(b)).

Regulatory primacy and inconsistency override. If conferring functions under s 7(2)(a) or (b), or making consequential subsidiary legislation under s 7(2)(c), would otherwise be inconsistent with a written law, the Act permits the function to be conferred despite that written law and the subsidiary legislation to be amended despite that written law (s 7(4)(a)-(b)). That gives the delegation and regulation machinery the capacity to operate even where there are inconsistent statutory provisions, subject to the formal exercise of regulation-making power.

Interpretation Act carve-out for rules. The Act states that the Interpretation Act 1984 sections 42 and 43(6) do not apply to the rules (s 8(4)). That modifies the normal interaction between rules made under this Act and the general interpretive and procedural rules that apply to subsidiary instruments in WA; the precise operational implication depends on the content of those Interpretation Act provisions but the Act is explicit that they do not apply.

Public access to adopted texts. The regulations may adopt external texts by reference but must ensure copies of adopted texts and amendments can be inspected or purchased by the public at reasonable times (s 15(3)-(6)). This condition imposes an administrative interface between the Act’s delegated instruments and any externally published standards or documents the regulations adopt.

Taken together, the Act is designed to sit alongside and in some cases incorporate or override aspects of existing federal and state gas law and administrative law, leaning on existing frameworks for information protection, and creating a route for judicial or administrative review via the Board.

The text provided is the original 2012 compilation of the Gas Services Information Act 2012 and contains the Act as enacted with its initial commencement details. The compilation table records:

• Short title: Gas Services Information Act 2012 (No. 5 of 2012).
• Assent: 10 April 2012.
• Commencement: ss 1 and 2 commenced on assent day (10 April 2012); the remainder of the Act commenced on 30 June 2012 as proclaimed (Gazette 29 Jun 2012 p. 2929) (Compilation table, s 2; notes).

The only consequential amendment recorded within this text is to the Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998 in s 16 of the Gas Services Information Act 2012. That amendment deletes a date reference in s 50(2A) of the Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998 and inserts reference to "under the Gas Services Information Act 2012", thereby placing the Gas Services Information Act within the scope of decisions reviewable by the Board (s 16(2)). No other legislative amendments to the Act itself are contained in the supplied text.

Regulatory and rule development is a principal intended vehicle for further specification under the Act. Sections 7, 8, 9, 13 and 15, for instance, authorise the Governor or Minister to make regulations and to provide for rules that will fill in operational detail. That means the substantive operational architecture of the GBB and GSOO as they will be experienced in practice is to be determined by subsequent subordinate instruments. The Act anticipates amendment by regulation and rules rather than frequent textual amendment to the primary Act. For protected information, s 13(6) requires the Minister to be satisfied that gas market participants have been adequately consulted before the Governor makes regulations controlling use and disclosure. This is a statutory gatekeeping step that channels how and when amendments relating to information protection can be made.

In short: as of the compilation provided, the Act itself contains no later textual amendments other than the s 16 consequential amendment to the Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998, and the operational specifics are intentionally deferred to regulations and rules, which are the expected vehicles for future amendment and detail.

The supplied legislative text does not include any case law, judicial decisions, or administrative determinations applying or interpreting the Gas Services Information Act 2012. The Act itself contemplates administrative review and dispute mechanisms rather than immediate judicial channels: it confers a statutory right to apply to the Board for review of decisions of persons on whom functions are conferred under s 7(2)(a) or (b), except for classes of decision specified in regulations (s 12(1)-(2)). The Act also permits the regulations to provide for dispute resolution in the rules (s 7(2)(h)). Section 16 amends the Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998 to include decisions under the Gas Services Information Act 2012 among those the Board may review (amendment to s 50(2A)), which provides a likely administrative avenue for contested decisions.

Potential litigation pathways not spelled out in the text. Although the Act establishes an administrative review forum via the Board, it does not remove or otherwise address common law remedies or judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Commonwealth) or state equivalents, nor does it specify privative clauses that would oust judicial review. The text is silent on other statutory remedies or privative effects. Also, civil penalty provisions and offences are to be specified by regulations and rules; any litigation relating to civil penalties or offences will depend on how those subordinate instruments are drafted. The Act’s immunity provisions (s 14) create potential litigation contours: the operator and information providers are protected from civil monetary liability except for bad faith or negligence, and regulations may cap negligence liability (s 14(1)-(4)); disputes over whether conduct amounts to bad faith or negligence, and over the application of any regulatory caps, are likely litigable once factual scenarios arise and penalties or damages are sought.

Absence of reported cases in source. Because no cases are included in the source, there is no litigation history to summarise from this text. Practitioners assessing litigation risk should therefore focus on the statutory review route (Board review per s 12 and the Energy Arbitration and Review Act amendment in s 16), the construction of future regulations and rules that will create and prescribe penalties and procedures, and general administrative law principles that will apply to executive decisions under the Act. In particular, contested issues likely to arise once the GBB/GSOO regime operates include: scope of information obligations, adequacy of operator protections for confidential material, the lawfulness of regulations and rules imposing penalties, the scope of delegation and the validity of delegated acts, interpretation of "bad faith" and "negligence" in immunity provisions, and the proper allocation of costs under fee-making provisions.

The Act creates several practical and legal traps or points of friction that practitioners, compliance officers and market participants should anticipate.

1. Confidentiality cannot be used to refuse disclosure. Section 10 explicitly bars reliance on any duty of confidence as a ground to refuse compliance with an obligation to provide information under the Act. That overrides contractual confidentiality provisions, subject only to the defined protections for "protected information" under s 13. Market participants who handle third-party confidential information need to plan contractual clauses and operational processes in light of this statutory override.

2. "Protected information" designation has a reasonableness qualifier. A provider may specify information as confidential to make it "protected information", but the Act qualifies that designation by reference to reasonableness: "unless it is not reasonable in the circumstances to so specify the information" (s 3(1) definition). That introduces a legal standard that could be contested if a regulator or operator declines a confidentiality claim; "reasonableness" will be a recurring point of contention in disputes and reviews.

3. Rules excluded from specified Interpretation Act provisions. Section 8(4) states that the Interpretation Act 1984 sections 42 and 43(6) do not apply to the rules. Practitioners must review what those Interpretation Act sections provide in WA; the Act expressly removes their application, producing potentially unusual procedural consequences for the making and review of rules. That departure may affect parliamentary oversight or disallowance mechanisms that otherwise would apply.

4. Regulations may confer broad functions and override other written laws. Section 7(2)(a)-(c) authorises the regulations to confer functions on persons and to make amendments to subsidiary legislation under other Acts consequential on those conferrals, and s 7(4) allows these conferrals and subsidiary amendments despite inconsistency with other written laws. This is a broad power to harmonise or displace certain statutory arrangements, but because the power is exercisable by regulation it may produce complexity in mapping applicable legal obligations across instruments.

5. Civil penalty and offence ceilings are high and flexible. The Act allows the regulations to prescribe civil penalty provisions with ceilings up to $100,000 and daily amounts up to $20,000 for continuing contraventions (s 8(2)(b)), and similarly allows regulations to create offences with the same penalty caps (s 15(2)). The delegated nature of these powers means market participants must watch the rules and regulations closely for newly created liabilities.

6. Limited liability for operator and information providers, but with exceptions. Section 14 gives the operator and those who provide information statutory immunity from civil monetary liability unless bad faith or negligence is shown. The Act also permits regulations to cap negligence liability and to segment caps by person, event or period (s 14(3)-(4)). While that reduces exposure, the exception for negligence and bad faith creates a litigation vector; moreover, regulatory caps are not yet fixed in the primary Act and will be prescribed later.

7. Consultation requirement for disclosure regulations. The Governor cannot make regulations controlling the use and disclosure of protected information unless the Minister is satisfied gas market participants have been adequately consulted (s 13(6)). This creates a procedural hurdle but also uncertainty about what counts as adequate consultation and the timing of such regulations.

8. Scope exclusions and inclusions. The Act excludes distribution pipelines from its pipeline definition for this Act (s 3(2)(a)) but includes meter and gate stations that feed distribution systems (s 3(2)(b)). Parties need to carefully map whether particular assets and contractual rights fall inside or outside the Act’s scope.

9. Delegation and accountability. Functions can be delegated in writing (s 11), which may create delegation chains and complicate accountability, particularly where the operator itself is a statutory body that subcontracts operational tasks. The delegate is taken to act in accordance with the delegation terms unless the contrary is shown (s 11(2)), shifting evidentiary burdens in disputes.

10. Rule-making still central. The Act leaves substantial operational matters to rules and regulations (ss 7-9, 15). Until those instruments are made, duties, penalties, fees and operational details are not finalised; market participants must therefore track subordinate instruments closely. The Act allows incorporation or adoption of external texts by regulation (s 15(3)-(6)), which can import standard-setting documents into the regulatory regime; however, any adopted text must be made available for inspection or purchase.

Each of these items is a mechanism-based source of compliance or litigation risk rather than an abstract critique. Practically, they translate into workstreams for affected entities: contract re-drafting to anticipate statutory disclosure obligations, internal classification of commercially sensitive information, regulatory monitoring, insurance/indemnity review to reflect remaining negligence exposure, and operational security measures to meet the "reasonable measures" obligation in s 13(1).

For market participants, operators, and advisers preparing to operate under the Gas Services Information Act 2012, compliance requires a mix of legal, contractual and operational actions. The Act delegates many specifics to regulations and rules, so early compliance work should assume those instruments will define precise reporting, confidentiality and penalty rules.

1. Monitor subordinate instruments. Immediately track the making of regulations and rules under ss 7-9 and s 15. These instruments will prescribe which persons are gas market participants, what information must be provided, the format and timing of reporting, civil penalty provisions, fee schedules and the initial rules for the GBB and GSOO (s 7(2)(d)-(e), s 8(2)(f)-(h), s 9(1)-(3)). Compliance programmes must be dynamic to incorporate changes as rules are made and amended.

2. Identify whether you are a gas market participant and map obligations. Use the Act’s definitions (s 3(1)) and the future regulations to determine whether your organisation is captured. For users, examine whether contractual positions or access determinations bring you within the "user" definition (s 3(1)). Map existing contracts and data flows to determine what data you will be required to produce once rules are in force.

3. Audit and classify data, and apply reasonableness tests to confidentiality claims. Establish an inventory of the types of information held that could be required under the Act. For each dataset, determine whether it is confidential in nature and whether it is "reasonable" to specify it as confidential, because s 3(1) makes confidentiality designation subject to a reasonableness test. Where confidentiality is claimed, document the legal and commercial basis for that claim to prepare for potential operator or Board scrutiny.

4. Implement information security and record-keeping systems. The operator must take "all reasonable measures" to protect protected information (s 13(1)). Market participants should therefore adopt at least equivalent standards for any information transferred to an operator: access controls, encryption, personnel vetting, incident response plans, and audit trails. Operators in particular should develop formal policies and technical arrangements consistent with "reasonable measures" and the National Gas Law provisions imported by s 13(4).

5. Revisit contract terms. Amend confidentiality, data-sharing and indemnity clauses in contracts (supply, transportation and storage agreements) to reflect the statutory position that confidentiality duties cannot be used to refuse legally required disclosure (s 10). Consider adding clauses providing for notification, cooperation when responding to operator requests, and allocation of costs arising from compliance with statutory data obligations. Where possible, negotiate indemnities or insurance coverage for any residual negligence exposure consistent with s 14.

6. Prepare to supply information and manage timing. Implement internal procedures for responding to operator requests and for recurring scheduled reporting once rules set forms and deadlines. Ensure proper delegation of authority for disclosures and maintain a register of disclosures made to the operator, including the legal basis and any protective markings.

7. Insurance and liability management. Review professional indemnity, public liability and cyber insurance to cover potential negligence claims or third-party losses relating to data disclosure or publication. The Act limits civil monetary liability except for bad faith or negligence and allows regulations to cap negligence liabilities (s 14(1)-(4)). But until regulatory caps are known, plan conservatively.

8. Engage in consultation on disclosure regulations. Section 13(6) requires the Minister to be satisfied that gas market participants have been adequately consulted before the Governor can make regulations controlling the use and disclosure of protected information. Participate in consultation processes to shape the regulatory approach to confidentiality and to secure protective measures. Record consultation inputs and responses.

9. Establish governance for operator functions. If you are, or will be, the operator, document your statutory functions as conferred under ss 7(2)(a) and 7(3), establish delegation protocols under s 11, create operational manuals for GBB/GSOO publication, and set procedures for dealing with Board reviews (s 12). Ensure facilities for public inspection of any adopted texts as required by s 15(6).

10. Plan for fees and costs. The regulations may authorise fees and charges to recover costs (s 9(1)-(3)). Budget for potential fee liabilities and include cost-recovery considerations in commercial forecasting. For entities participating in Board processes, note that the Board may be authorised to fix and allocate costs of hearings (s 9(4)).

11. Dispute and review readiness. Familiarise yourself with the Board’s review jurisdiction under s 12 and the amended Energy Arbitration and Review Act 1998 scope (s 16). Where the rules create dispute resolution mechanisms, integrate them into commercial dispute escalation procedures.

12. Compliance training and internal controls. Provide staff training on statutory obligations to supply information, data handling requirements, the limits of confidentiality defences (s 10), and the thresholds for negligence and bad faith. Maintain an escalation ladder for clearance of sensitive disclosures.

Compliance is pragmatic: until regulations and rules are made, actions are preparatory (surveillance, inventory, contract review, security upgrades). Once the subordinate instruments are in force, convert preparatory work into operational processes that meet prescribed formats, timelines and protective measures.