Forfeiture Act 1991

The central concept is the forfeiture rule, defined in the dictionary as “the rule of public policy that in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another person from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing.” This is the common law rule, not a statutory creation. The Act does not abolish it; it merely allows the Supreme Court to modify its effect in appropriate cases. The Act does not define what “certain circumstances” means, leaving that to the common law. The scope of unlawful killing is deliberately broad. The dictionary defines “unlawful killing” as including “aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an unlawful killing.” The definition of “person who has unlawfully killed another” likewise includes a person who has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death. This means accomplices and accessories before the fact fall within the Act, not only the primary actor. The term property is defined inclusively to include any thing in action or incorporeal moveable property. The note in the dictionary gives examples: debts, money held at a bank, shares, rights under a trust, copyright, and the right to sue for breach of contract. This is broad enough to cover almost any form of wealth, but it is not exhaustive. Real property is presumably included even though not explicitly mentioned, because “property” in its ordinary meaning includes land; the definition says “includes”, so it does not exclude other forms. The offender is the person who has unlawfully killed another. The deceased is the person killed. The justice of the case test in section 3(2) is the only substantive criterion for the court’s discretion. It requires the court to have regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased, and to any other circumstances that appear material. This gives the court a very wide discretion. The concept of conviction is important for the time limit in section 3(5). The Act does not define “conviction”. It refers to “an offence in which unlawful killing is an element.” That would include murder (though murderers are excluded by s4) and manslaughter. It would also include offences such as dangerous driving causing death if that involves unlawful killing, though the act of dangerous driving itself is not necessarily an intentional killing; the term “unlawful killing” at common law is a killing without lawful excuse, which includes manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act or by criminal negligence. The Act does not define the elements of unlawful killing; it relies on the criminal law. The concept of modification under section 3(3) is binary in mechanism: the court may exclude the application of the rule in respect of all or part of a property interest, or, if multiple interests are affected, in respect of all or any of them. The court cannot partially reduce the benefit; it can only exclude the rule entirely for a given interest. For example, if the offender would have inherited a house and a car, the court could exclude the rule for the house but not the car, or for the whole house, or for half the house? Section 3(3)(a) says “excluding the application of the rule in respect of all the property or any part of it.” This suggests the court can carve out a fractional interest. That gives flexibility. Retrospectivity is a key concept. Section 5(1) allows orders for killings before or after commencement. Section 3(4) provides that an order modifies the rule for all purposes including anything done before the order was made. That means an order can retrospectively validate property transfers that were void or voidable under the forfeiture rule. However, section 5(2) protects property that has already been acquired by a third party (other than the offender or a person claiming through the offender) before the Act’s commencement (7 November 1991). So the Act cannot disturb settled titles that vested before that date. The murder exclusion in section 4 is absolute: no order can be made affecting the forfeiture rule for a person convicted of murder. That is a categorical exception, regardless of the justice of the case. It derives from the seriousness of murder and the principle that no killer should benefit from his crime, but the Act goes further by precluding any judicial discretion even in cases of assisted suicide or mercy killing that results in a murder conviction (though such cases may be rare because murder requires intent). The interplay between conviction and the forfeiture rule is worth noting. The forfeiture rule applies where a person has “unlawfully killed” as a matter of fact, even without a criminal conviction. The Act allows applications under section 3(1) for any such person. The time limit in section 3(5) only applies “in relation to an offence in which unlawful killing is an element.” So if the offender is not convicted of such an offence (e.g., because of insanity, or because they died before trial, or because the killing was not criminal due to mental impairment), the time limit may not apply. But the offender would still need to establish the unlawful killing to the court’s satisfaction, likely on the balance of probabilities in civil proceedings. That creates an anomaly: a person convicted of manslaughter has only three months to apply; a person acquitted on insanity grounds may have no time limit at all, but must prove the killing in a civil context.

The Act directly affects offenders who have unlawfully killed another person, excluding those convicted of murder. These offenders are otherwise disqualified from inheriting or receiving any benefit from the deceased’s estate, life insurance policies, joint tenancy survivorship, superannuation death benefits, or any other property interest whether under a will, intestacy, or by operation of law. The Act gives them a limited right to apply to the Supreme Court for relief. The primary category is persons convicted of manslaughter or other unlawful killing offences (e.g., dangerous driving causing death) that do not amount to murder. But the Act also covers persons who have not been convicted but are nevertheless found to have unlawfully killed, such as those found not guilty by reason of mental impairment, or where the killing occurred but no prosecution was brought due to diplomatic immunity or other barriers. The Act also affects accomplices who aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death, even if they did not physically carry out the killing. That includes persons who were parties to a suicide pact that succeeded, or those who assisted a terminally ill person to die, if such assistance amounts to unlawful killing (which it does under current law, given that assisted suicide is not lawful in the ACT). The Act affects other beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate. If the forfeiture rule applies, the offender is treated as having died before the victim, so the property passes to other heirs or beneficiaries. If the court modifies the rule, those other beneficiaries lose all or part of their inheritance. They will be directly affected parties, though the Act does not give them a right to be heard in the application (though the court, as a matter of natural justice, would likely hear them). Section 5(2) protects persons who acquired property before 7 November 1991 as a consequence of the forfeiture rule. Those acquirers cannot have their property taken away by a later order under the Act. This protects settled expectations and property rights that vested before the Act commenced. The Act affects estate administrators and trustees. They must decide whether to distribute property to a suspected killer or hold it pending a court order. The Act gives them a mechanism to seek guidance, but they bear the risk of distributing to the wrong person if they act without an order. The Act also affects the deceased’s creditors, to the extent that the forfeiture rule may affect the quantum of the estate available for debts. If the offender is disqualified, the estate may pass to other beneficiaries who may be more or less able to pay debts. The Act’s modification orders could change the distribution. Life insurance companies and superannuation trustees are affected because the Act applies to any “interest in property”, which includes proceeds payable to a nominated beneficiary who kills the insured. The Act is not limited to inheritance; it covers any benefit acquired in consequence of the killing. For example, if a person kills their spouse and is the nominated beneficiary of a life insurance policy, the forfeiture rule would prevent them claiming the proceeds. The Act gives them a possible avenue to obtain relief. The state (ACT Government) may be affected in cases of intestacy where the deceased has no surviving kin other than the offender. If the forfeiture rule applies, the estate may escheat to the Crown. An order modifying the rule would redirect the estate to the offender, reducing state revenue. Family members of the offender may also be indirectly affected if they claim through the offender (e.g., if the offender would have inherited property that would then pass to their children under a will or intestacy). The dictionary definition of “person claiming through the offender” is not further defined, but likely includes heirs, assignees, and beneficiaries of the offender. Those claimants may lose their expectation if the forfeiture rule is not modified, or may gain if it is.

Right of the offender to apply: Section 3(1) gives any person who has unlawfully killed another and is precluded by the forfeiture rule from obtaining an interest in property the right to apply to the Supreme Court for an order modifying the rule. This right is not absolute; the court must exercise its discretion. The offender has the burden of satisfying the court that the justice of the case requires modification. Duty of the court: Under section 3(2), the court must consider the conduct of the offender and of the deceased, and any other material circumstances. It must then decide whether the justice of the case requires modification. The court has a duty to give reasons, though the Act does not require this explicitly; it is inherent in judicial decision making. The court also has a duty to respect the time limit in section 3(5) for cases involving a conviction for an offence where unlawful killing is an element. The court cannot make an order if the application is made more than three months after conviction, regardless of the merits. Duty to comply with the time limit: For the offender, there is an implied duty to apply within three months of conviction if the application relates to an offence where unlawful killing is an element. The Act does not provide for extensions of time. This is a strict cut off. If the offender misses the deadline, they lose the right to relief forever, unless the case does not involve such an offence (e.g., no conviction). Rights of third parties: The Act does not expressly give third parties a right to be heard, but as a matter of procedural fairness, the court would likely allow affected beneficiaries, executors, or insurers to appear. Section 5(2) gives a right to property already acquired before commencement not to be disturbed. That is a substantive right. Right of the offender to receive property: If the court makes an order, section 3(4) provides that the forfeiture rule has effect for all purposes subject to the modifications. This gives the offender the right to the property as if the rule did not apply to that interest. The order is retrospective to the date of death (or the time the interest would have accrued). The offender can then enforce that right against the estate, the executor, or the person currently holding the property, subject to any protections for purchasers. However, the Act does not override the rights of bona fide purchasers for value who acquired the property before the order; section 3(4) says “for all purposes (including purposes relating to anything done before the order was made)” which could include acts by third parties. But if a third party has already received the property and is not the offender or a person claiming through the offender, the Act does not expressly extinguish their title. The court’s order modifies the rule but does not automatically vest property. The offender would need to bring separate proceedings to recover the property. The Act gives the offender a right to apply, but not a direct right to seize property. No duty on the deceased: The deceased is obviously dead, but the court must consider the deceased’s conduct under section 3(2). That could include whether the deceased provoked the killing, had a history of domestic violence, or consented to euthanasia. The court can take that into account in the justice assessment. Right of the executor or administrator: The personal representative of the deceased may apply for directions or may themselves be the applicant? Section 3(1) says the application may be made by a person who is precluded by the forfeiture rule. That is the offender. The executor is not precluded; they are holding the property. So the executor cannot apply under this section, but they can be involved in the proceedings as a respondent or seek court guidance under general principles. No right to relief for murderers: Section 4 extinguishes any right under the Act for a person convicted of murder. They cannot apply, and even if they did, the court has no power to make an order. This is an absolute bar. Duty to act promptly: For those covered by the time limit, there is a strict duty to act within three months. This is unusually short for civil proceedings. It creates pressure on the offender to obtain legal advice immediately after conviction. Failure to act forfeits the right to seek modification under the Act, unless the application is solely for property interests unrelated to a conviction? For example, if the killing was not the subject of a criminal prosecution, the three month limit may not apply. But if there is a conviction for manslaughter, the three month limit is mandatory.

The Forfeiture Act 1991 does not create any criminal offences or civil penalties. It does not impose fines, imprisonment, or monetary sanctions. Its enforcement mechanisms are civil in nature. The primary enforcement tool is the court order made under section 3(2). Once the court makes an order, the forfeiture rule is modified, and the offender is entitled to the property interest as if the rule did not apply. If the person holding the property (e.g., the executor, a beneficiary, a trustee) refuses to hand over the property despite the order, the offender would need to enforce the order through ordinary civil process, such as a writ of delivery or an action for recovery of property. The Act does not provide any streamlined enforcement mechanism; it relies on the general law. There is no penalty for failing to comply with an order; that would be contempt of court, which is a separate regime not mentioned in the Act. The Act also does not create any offence for knowingly distributing property to a killer in disregard of the forfeiture rule, but the common law rule is that the property passes to others, and a personal representative who distributes to the wrong person may be liable for breach of trust or devastavit. That liability arises under general trust and estates law, not under the Act. The Act’s absence of penalties reflects its nature as a remedial measure: it modifies a harsh rule, it does not punish. However, the incentive effects of the Act are significant. The existence of the modification power reduces the deterrent effect of the forfeiture rule. A potential killer might reason that even if convicted of manslaughter, they could apply to the court and possibly keep the inheritance. The Act thus creates a moral hazard, albeit one tempered by the court’s discretion and the murder exclusion. The burden of proof is on the offender, and the court must consider conduct. But the mere possibility of relief may encourage a person to take a risk that they would not have taken if the forfeiture rule were absolute. The Act also has an enforcement cost: the offender must hire lawyers and pay court fees to apply. If the application is successful, the costs may come out of the estate, reducing the net benefit to the offender and other beneficiaries. If the application fails, the offender bears the costs, which could be substantial. This deterrence is economically efficient: it screens out unmeritorious claims. But the three month time limit is a blunt instrument: it may bar meritorious claims due to delay, especially if the offender is in custody or suffers from mental health issues after the killing. No extension is provided. That is a penalty in itself: losing the right to apply because of a missed deadline. The Act does not provide for waiver or extension even for good cause. The only possible relief is if the application is not “in relation to an offence in which unlawful killing is an element.” For example, if the killer was not convicted of any offence because they were found unfit to plead, the time limit may not apply. That creates a perverse incentive: a killer might argue they should not be convicted in order to preserve their ability to apply later. The court in the criminal proceeding could take that into account, but the Act does not address it.

The primary interaction is with the common law forfeiture rule. The Act explicitly modifies that rule by giving the court a power to exclude its application. It does not abolish the rule; it merely provides a statutory override. The rule continues to apply automatically in all cases of unlawful killing unless an order is made. The Act therefore does not codify the rule; it leaves the common law in place. This means that case law on the forfeiture rule from other jurisdictions may be relevant, but the ACT court must apply the Act. Criminal law: The Act depends on the criminal law to determine whether a person has “unlawfully killed” another. It does not create a civil definition; it relies on the existing law of homicide and the definitions of murder, manslaughter, and other unlawful killing offences. The Act also uses the criminal conviction as the trigger for the three month time limit. A conviction for murder is an absolute bar. A conviction for manslaughter triggers the time limit. The Act does not define what constitutes a conviction for an offence in which unlawful killing is an element. That is a matter of criminal law. Succession law: The Act interacts with the Administration and Probate Act 1929 (ACT) and the Wills Act 1968 (ACT) . The forfeiture rule affects the distribution of estates under wills and intestacy. An order under the Act can alter who inherits. The Act does not override the formal requirements of wills or the rules of intestate succession; it merely decides whether the forfeiture rule applies to disqualify a particular beneficiary. The personal representative must administer the estate in accordance with the order. Property law: The Act interacts with joint tenancy survivorship rules. At common law, the forfeiture rule prevents a joint tenant who kills the other from surviving and taking the whole property by right of survivorship. The Act allows the court to modify that rule, potentially returning the property to the killer. This could affect the interest of a person who was a joint tenant with the deceased. The Act defines property broadly, including things in action, so it applies to all property interests. It does not, however, override the Torrens system of land registration. An order under the Act does not automatically change the register; the offender would need to register the order as a court order affecting title. Insurance law: The forfeiture rule applies to life insurance policies. The Act would allow the court to modify the rule so that the killer can claim the proceeds. However, insurance contracts often have exclusion clauses for intentional acts, which may be independent of the forfeiture rule. The Act does not affect those contractual terms; it only modifies the public policy rule. The insurer could still refuse to pay on a contractual basis if the killing amounts to a breach of policy conditions. Family provision law: The ACT has laws allowing family members to seek provision from an estate (e.g., Family Provision Act 1969). If a killer is disqualified by the forfeiture rule, they cannot apply for family provision because they are treated as having predeceased the deceased. If the court modifies the rule, the killer may then be eligible to apply for family provision as a beneficiary. The interaction is indirect. Criminal injuries compensation: A victim of crime may seek compensation from the killer. The Act does not affect that. If the court modifies the forfeiture rule, the killer may receive property that could be used to satisfy a compensation order. That is incidental. Bankruptcy law: If the killer is bankrupt, any property they acquire under an order may vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. The Act does not provide any exemption. Legislation Act 2001: The Act’s dictionary and notes are made part of the Act by sections 2 and 2A. The definitions in the Legislation Act also apply, including definitions of terms such as “registrar of firearms”, “State”, and “the Territory”. The note in the dictionary references the Legislation Act. The republished version includes editorial changes authorised by the Legislation Act, part 11.3. Those changes do not alter the effect of the law but may affect the form of the Act.

The Forfeiture Act 1991 (A1991-68) was originally enacted on 7 November 1991 and commenced on that date. It comprised four sections: s1 (Name of Act), s2 (Definitions), s3 (Power of Supreme Court to modify forfeiture rule), s4 (Application of orders). It also had a schedule of dictionary definitions? Originally, s2 contained the definitions of “forfeiture rule”, “property”, and “will”. The dictionary was part of the Act as originally enacted? The republication shows the dictionary at the end. The original Act likely had the dictionary as a schedule or part. The only substantive amendment recorded is the Statute Law Amendment Act 2007 (A2007-3), which made minor structural changes. According to the amendment history: section 2 definitions were relocated to the dictionary by amendment 3.246; section 2 was substituted by amendment 3.247 (which inserted a new section 2 simply stating “Dictionary” and the note); section 2A (Notes) was inserted by amendment 3.247; the dictionary was inserted by amendment 3.248, which included the definitions of “forfeiture rule” (relocated from s2), “person who has unlawfully killed another” (inserted), “property” (relocated), “unlawful killing” (inserted), and “will” (relocated). So the 2007 amendment expanded the dictionary to include definitions for “person who has unlawfully killed another” and “unlawful killing” that had previously been part of the common law understanding but not explicitly in the Act? Actually, the original s2 did not define these terms; they were added in 2007. The original s2 defined only “forfeiture rule”, “property”, and “will”. The 2007 amendment therefore added new definitions that clarified the scope of who is covered and what unlawful killing means. This is a significant change: it explicitly includes aiders, abettors, counsellors, and procurers. Before 2007, the Act may have been interpreted to cover them through the common law meaning of “unlawful killing”, but the amendment made it explicit. The amendment also introduced s2A to note that notes are explanatory. No other amendments are recorded. The Act was republished in 2002 (R1) and 2007 (R2). The current version is R2 effective 12 April 2007. There have been no further amendments since. The Act remains in force as a short, focused statute. The sparse amendment history suggests that the Act has been largely uncontroversial and that the 2007 changes were housekeeping to align with modern drafting practice. The addition of the definitions for “person who has unlawfully killed another” and “unlawful killing” may have been intended to remove any ambiguity about the scope of the Act, but it also expanded the range of persons who can apply. The Act’s amendment history provides no indication of policy shifts in the operation of the forfeiture rule. The original Act allowed modification for “unlawful killing” without defining it. The amendment now includes aiding etc. That could have been an amendment to ensure that the Act covers all complicity scenarios equally. It also ensures the Act is consistent with the common law approach to the forfeiture rule, which has been extended to accessories. The amendment does not affect the murder exclusion or the time limit.

The source provided for the Forfeiture Act 1991 does not include any case law, judgments, or litigation history. The republished Act contains no references to judicial decisions. The endnotes on earlier republications do not list any cases. The Act’s short text and narrow scope mean that litigation under it is likely rare, but the absence of citation in the source does not mean no cases exist. However, as a deep dive grounded solely in the source, we cannot refer to any cases. We can note that the Act creates a judicial discretion, and the exercise of that discretion would be the subject of any litigation. The key legal issues that would likely arise in litigation are: (1) whether the applicant has “unlawfully killed” the deceased, especially in cases of aiding and abetting or where there is no criminal conviction; (2) whether the three month time limit applies and whether it can be extended (the Act says no extension); (3) whether the applicant is excluded as a murderer, including the meaning of “convicted of murder” (does it include a conviction for murder reduced on appeal? Does it include a conviction for murder that is later quashed?); (4) the weight to be given to the conduct of the deceased and the offender in the justice assessment; (5) whether an order can modify the rule in respect of property that has already been dealt with by executors or trustees; (6) the interaction with other legislation such as the Property Law Act or the Trustee Act. The Act does not provide for appeals, but standard appeal rights from the Supreme Court would apply. The source does not indicate any notable cases. Given that the Act has been in force since 1991, it is likely that some applications have been made, but none have reached a level of notoriety to be included in the republication. The ACT is a small jurisdiction, and such cases are fact sensitive and rarely reported. The three month time limit may deter many applications. The Act’s limitation to the ACT Supreme Court means that only a small number of judges have had the opportunity to interpret the Act. The 2007 amendment adding definitions may have resolved some interpretive issues before the courts. Without case law, the Act’s operation remains uncertain in many respects. For example, what standard of proof applies to the issue of unlawful killing in a civil application? The Act does not say; it is likely the civil standard (balance of probabilities), but that has not been confirmed by a reported decision from the ACT courts. Litigation history would be relevant for determining whether the courts take a generous or restrictive approach to the discretion. In the absence of source information, we cannot assess that. The Act may be rarely used because many killers do not have significant estates to claim, or because they accept the moral disincentive of benefiting from their crime. The practical significance of the Act may be overstated.

Absolute murder exclusion: Section 4 is ironclad. Even if the killing was a mercy killing or in self defence but the jury convicts of murder (e.g., if the jury finds no partial defence), no relief is available. This is harsh but clear. If a person is convicted of murder, the Act is useless; they must rely on executive pardon or other extra statutory remedies. Three month time limit: Section 3(5) applies only to “an offence in which unlawful killing is an element.” That includes manslaughter and murder, but murderers are excluded anyway. So in practice, the time limit applies to anyone convicted of manslaughter or other non murder unlawful killing offences. The three months runs from the day of conviction, not from the date of the killing, not from the date of the forfeiture rule’s application. If the offender is sentence later, the time has already started. If the offender dies within three months, no application can be made (the right is personal to the offender). There is no provision for extending the time. This is a trap for the unwary. If the offender is incarcerated, they may not get legal advice quickly. The time limit cannot be waived. No time limit if no conviction: For unlawful killings that do not result in a conviction (e.g., due to insanity, death of the offender, or statute barred prosecution), the three month limit does not apply. But the offender must still satisfy the court that they did unlawfully kill. That may be difficult to prove in a civil context years later. The Act gives the court no guidance on the standard of proof. The offender must also consider that the forfeiture rule may apply even without a conviction; the estate administrator may refuse to distribute. The lack of a time limit could encourage late applications, which could disrupt settled estates. Retrospectivity trap for pre 1991 acquirers: Section 5(2) protects property acquired before commencement (7 November 1991) by a person other than the offender or someone claiming through the offender. But what about property acquired after commencement but before the order? The Act does not protect that. If a third party acquires property from the estate in good faith before the order, they may be subject to the order’s retrospective effect. Section 3(4) says the order modifies the rule for all purposes including anything done before the order. So the order could defeat the title of a purchaser who bought property from the estate after 7 November 1991 but before the order. The Act has no provision protecting bona fide purchasers. That is a significant risk for anyone dealing with estate assets where there is a suspicion of unlawful killing. Broad definition of unlawful killing: The dictionary now includes aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring. This extends to persons who did not physically kill but encouraged or planned the death. For example, a friend who advises suicide and provides the means may be caught, even if they are not present at the death. If the deceased died in a suicide pact, the survivor may be guilty of an unlawful killing as a party to the pact. The Act covers that. It also covers persons who were not convicted of any crime but who participated in an unlawful killing. The lack of a conviction does not protect them. Broad definition of property: Property includes things in action, such as a cause of action. If the deceased had a right to sue for breach of contract, that is property that could pass under the will. The Act applies to that. Also, superannuation death benefits are property within the definition (being a right under trust or contract). The court’s broad discretion: The court may consider “any other circumstances that appear to the court to be material.” This is wide open. It could include the offender’s mental state, the deceased’s wealth, the needs of other beneficiaries, the offender’s financial situation, the public interest, the lapse of time, etc. This creates uncertainty for estate planning and litigation. No two cases are alike. No right to appeal from refusal: The Act does not mention appeals. The offender has a right of appeal under general law, but the court’s discretion is unlikely to be reversed unless it is plainly wrong. Costs risk: The offender bears the costs of the application. If the estate is small, the cost of applying may outweigh the benefit. The offender cannot recover costs from the estate unless the court orders otherwise. The court may order costs out of the estate, but that reduces the benefit to other beneficiaries. This can create a perverse incentive: the killer may apply even if the chance of success is low, hoping the estate will pay for the litigation. Interaction with family provision: If the court modifies the forfeiture rule, the offender may then be eligible to apply for further provision from the estate under family provision laws. This could lead to multiple proceedings. No requirement for the deceased’s wishes to be considered: The Act does not require the court to consider the deceased’s testamentary intention, except insofar as it is part of “the conduct of the deceased” (e.g., if the deceased provoked the killing). If the deceased left a will explicitly disinheriting the killer (had they known), that might not be relevant under the Act. That can override the deceased’s autonomy.

The Act does not impose compliance obligations on the general public. Instead, it provides a process for offenders to seek relief and for estate administrators to manage the distribution of property in cases of unlawful killing. For an offender who has unlawfully killed (other than murder), the key steps are: (1) Immediately after conviction (if convicted of an unlawful killing offence) obtain legal advice about applying to the Supreme Court within three months. (2) Prepare evidence regarding the conduct of both the offender and the deceased, and any other circumstances that might persuade the court that justice requires the forfeiture rule to be modified. This could include evidence of provocation, domestic violence, mental impairment, the deceased’s consent to euthanasia, the offender’s rehabilitation, the needs of dependents, etc. (3) Identify the property interests that would have been acquired but for the forfeiture rule. This may require a grant of probate or letters of administration, or evidence of joint tenancy, insurance policies, superannuation, etc. (4) File an application in the Supreme Court within three months of conviction (if applicable). The application should specify the property interests and the modification sought (exclusion of the rule as to all or part of each interest). (5) Serve the application on the executor or administrator of the deceased’s estate, and on any other persons who would be affected by the order (e.g., other beneficiaries). (6) Attend the hearing and present evidence. The court will decide whether to make an order. If the order is made, the offender should obtain a sealed copy and provide it to the personal representative. (7) The personal representative will then distribute the property in accordance with the order. If the order excludes the rule for part only of a property, the personal representative must distribute that part to the offender. For an estate administrator or executor: (1) As soon as you become aware that a beneficiary has unlawfully killed the deceased, do not distribute property to that beneficiary or to anyone claiming through them. (2) Determine whether the killing was murder (no relief possible) or some other unlawful killing. If murder, the forfeiture rule applies absolutely; treat the killer as predeceased and distribute accordingly. (3) If the killing appears to be manslaughter or other non murder unlawful killing, the killer may apply to the Supreme Court within three months of conviction. The executor should not distribute the killer’s share until the three months expire (if no application) or until the application is resolved. The executor may need to retain the property or place it in a separate account. (4) If the killer has not been convicted (e.g., died before trial, or acquitted on insanity grounds), the executor should still consider whether the forfeiture rule applies. The court may still entertain an application without a conviction. The executor may seek directions from the Supreme Court (under other legislation) or wait for the killer to apply. (5) If the killer applies, the executor should participate in the proceedings, providing the court with information about the estate and any relevant circumstances. The executor should not take sides; the executor’s duty is to the estate as a whole. (6) If the court makes an order, the executor must comply with it, distributing the property as directed. If no order is made (due to the killer not applying, missing the deadline, or refusing to apply), the executor can treat the killer as predeceased and distribute to the other beneficiaries or the residuary estate. (7) Be aware of the protection for property acquired before 7 November 1991. If the killing occurred before that date and property has already been distributed to a third party, that property cannot be recovered under the Act. For other beneficiaries: Be prepared to assert your rights if the killer applies. You may need to intervene in the proceedings to argue that the justice of the case does not require modification. You can present evidence of the killer’s conduct, the deceased’s wishes, or the hardship you would suffer if the killer receives the property. For insurers and superannuation trustees: If a claim is made by a person who has killed the insured, do not pay without ensuring the forfeiture rule is either applied or modified. If the killer has applied under the Act, await the outcome. If no application is made within three months of conviction (if any), you may pay to the alternative beneficiaries or the estate. The Act does not give immunity from double liability, so seek legal advice. For legal practitioners: Advise clients promptly. The three month limit is the biggest pitfall. If the client is in custody, arrange to meet them quickly. Prepare the application even before the criminal appeal is exhausted? The Act says “convicted”; an appeal is pending? The Act does not say the conviction must be final. The time limit runs from the day of conviction in the trial court, not from the finality of the appeal. If the conviction is later quashed, the killer may be able to argue that the order should be annulled, but the Act does not address that. To be safe, apply within three months of the trial conviction. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the application may become moot. The risk is that the application is granted based on a conviction that is later quashed; the order might remain valid because it was made under a power that existed at the time. The Act does not provide for revocation of orders. This is a significant uncertainty. Practitioners should also explore alternative remedies if the Act is unavailable, such as seeking an ex gratia payment from the government, or a deed of variation with other beneficiaries. The Act provides the exclusive statutory mechanism in the ACT for modifying the forfeiture rule; no other legislation provides relief. So careful timing and full evidence are critical.