The Determination rests on a small set of legal and administrative concepts set out in the instrument itself and by cross‑reference to other statutes and the Intergovernmental Agreement:

• Federal Financial Relations Act s 16 framework. The Determination is made under s 16 of the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (para 1). That section provides the statutory authority for the Commonwealth to determine amounts for National Partnership payments, and shapes how those amounts are credited and paid. The Determination repeatedly invokes the s 16 mechanics (paras 6, 12, 15).

• COAG Reform Fund and Special Account management. The COAG Reform Fund, established by the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008 (referenced at para 3), is the financial vehicle into which determined amounts are to be credited and from which payments are made (para 6). The COAG Reform Fund is expressed to be a Special Account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (para 6). The COAG Reform Fund Act also requires that the terms and conditions of grants provided through the Fund be set out in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the State (para 7). The combination of these references locates the transactions within the Commonwealth’s Special Account accounting and PGPA reporting and audit framework.

• Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) and Schedule D , Payment Arrangements. The Determination points to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations (that took effect on 1 January 2009) as the overarching framework for transfers and collaboration between Commonwealth and States, and specifically cites Schedule D, which provides how National Partnership payments are intended to be used (para 8). The Determination therefore operates as a Commonwealth Executive instrument within the broader IGA architecture; the content of each National Partnership and its payment profile is supplied by separate agreements under that IGA (para 9).

• National Partnership payment typology. The Determination defines three categories of purpose for National Partnership payments: supporting delivery of specified outputs or projects, facilitating reforms, or rewarding nationally significant reforms (para 5, para 12). It clarifies different triggering mechanisms for payments depending on whether payment is contingent on pre‑determined milestones or performance benchmarks (paras 10-11), and allocates decision authority to the “relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate” to determine whether conditions are met (para 10).

• Ministerial or delegated decision and independent assessment. For reward payments, the Minister or delegate will determine whether the incentive payment will be paid following receipt of an independent assessment as to whether a pre‑determined benchmark has been achieved (para 10(a)). For facilitation/project payments, the Minister or delegate will determine payment based on expenditure and performance reporting arrangements set out in the National Partnership (para 10(b)). The Determination therefore embeds the requirement for documented reporting or independent verification before funds are released in benchmarked cases.

• Parliamentary oversight exemption. The instrument asserts that s 42 (disallowance) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to this Determination despite its status as a legislative instrument under subsection 16(5) of the Act (para 4). That removes the statutory power of either House of Parliament to disallow the instrument under that provision, narrowing formal parliamentary oversight avenues.

• Fiscal constraint by debit limit. The Determination records the debit limit that applies under s 16(3) , a $25,000,000,000.00 cap on amounts credited to the COAG Reform Fund for National Partnership payments in the 2016-17 financial year (para 15). The instrument then places the current determination in context by giving cumulative totals in Table 2 and confirming the cap is not exceeded (paras 16-17).

These concepts combine to make the Determination a primarily administrative instrument that: (a) authorises and sets the accounting path for specified National Partnership payments; (b) links payment release to documentary or independent verification where applicable; (c) embeds those transactions in the COAG Reform Fund Special Account under PGPA; and (d) reduces one form of parliamentary oversight by disallowance.

This Determination directly affects several classes of actors, with effects cast in administrative rights and duties rather than new criminal or civil liabilities in the text of the instrument.

• The States (and Territories). The Determination is an instrument that grants financial assistance to “States”, expressly including the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory (para 3). States are the intended recipients of National Partnership payments set out in Table 1 and Schedule 1 (paras 12-14). States will be required to enter written agreements with the Commonwealth that set out terms and conditions for each grant, per the COAG Reform Fund Act requirement (para 7). Where payments are conditional on performance benchmarks or milestones, state performance, reporting, and compliance systems will be engaged (paras 10-11). States therefore carry administrative and compliance obligations in exchange for funding.

• Commonwealth Ministers and their delegates. The Determination repeatedly assigns decision‑making to “the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate” to determine whether payments linked to performance benchmarks or milestones should be made (para 10). That places practical authority in the executive branch and, where delegation occurs, in officials or agencies authorised to act under the delegation.

• The Departmental and Treasury administration of the COAG Reform Fund. The COAG Reform Fund (a Special Account under PGPA) must receive the credited amounts before funds are paid to States (para 6, para 13). Commonwealth officials administering the Fund must ensure credits and subsequent disbursements conform to the PGPA Special Account rules and the written National Partnership agreements.

• Independent assessors and performance verifiers. For incentive (reward) payments, the Determination requires payment decisions to follow receipt of an “independent assessment” as to whether a pre‑determined benchmark has been achieved (para 10(a)). Entities retained to perform those assessments are therefore part of the compliance chain. The Determination does not define “independent”, leaving its meaning to the National Partnership or procurement/contractual arrangements.

• State agencies and service providers. The underlying purpose of many National Partnerships is to fund delivery of specified outputs, projects, or reforms (para 5). Agencies that deliver those programs and third‑party providers engaged by States will be affected operationally, because funding flows and reporting requirements will determine cashflow, project timelines, and accountability arrangements.

• Auditors, accountants and legal advisers. The Determination invokes Special Account and PGPA frameworks (para 6), and requires written agreements and performance reporting (paras 7, 10). Auditors and accountants will therefore participate in verifying expenditure and compliance, and legal advisers will be engaged in drafting and negotiating National Partnership agreements and advising on ministerial delegation and interpretation issues.

• Parliament and the public. The Determination itself asserts that section 42 disallowance does not apply (para 4). That narrows one statutory parliamentary mechanism for review. Practically, however, parliamentary and public scrutiny can still arise through other avenues: estimates, Auditor‑General reviews under PGPA arrangements, ministerial statements, and transparency obligations in the National Partnership agreements and annual reports. The Determination shifts oversight from the disallowance mechanism to administrative and contractual controls.

The Determination sets out or implies a set of duties and rights, distributed between the Commonwealth and the States, anchored in statutory cross‑references and the Determination’s own paragraphs.

Commonwealth duties and administrative obligations

• Make the Determination under s 16 and ensure amounts are credited to the COAG Reform Fund. The instrument is made under subsection 16(1) and restates that amounts determined must be credited to the COAG Reform Fund (paras 1, 6, 12-13). Practically, the Commonwealth must effect accounting entries to credit the Special Account and then disburse payments on the scheduled date (para 13).

• Observe the debit limit. Under subsection 16(3), the total amount credited to the COAG Reform Fund in the 2016-17 financial year for National Partnerships must not exceed $25,000,000,000.00; the Determination records this cap and confirms cumulative amounts do not exceed it (paras 15-17).

• Make determinations about payment triggers. Where payments are contingent on pre‑determined benchmarks or milestones, the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate must determine whether the payment will be made: for reward payments after receipt of an independent assessment (para 10(a)); for facilitation/project payments based upon expenditure and performance reporting specified in the National Partnership (para 10(b)). Those determinations are administrative decisions and must be documented.

• Ensure written agreements set terms and conditions. The COAG Reform Fund Act requires terms and conditions of grants to be set out in a written agreement between Commonwealth and State (para 7). The Commonwealth must therefore negotiate and conclude these agreements before or contemporaneously with payments.

State duties and rights

• Right to receive payments subject to National Partnership terms. The Determination identifies the amounts and recipients in Table 1 and Schedule 1 and therefore confers an entitlement to receive those amounts if the National Partnership conditions are met (paras 12-14). The entitlement is conditional: where performance benchmarks apply, States must achieve those benchmarks or meet reporting/expenditure requirements to trigger payment (para 10).

• Duty to enter written agreements and provide reporting. States must accept the terms and conditions set out in written agreements required by the COAG Reform Fund Act (para 7). For payments tied to expenditure and performance reporting (para 10(b)), States must prepare and submit the specified reports. For reward payments, States must be prepared to engage with independent assessment processes (para 10(a)).

Ministerial/delegate authority and procedural rights

• Determining officer’s procedural discretion. The Determination places the authority to decide payment release in the hands of the Minister or delegated official (para 10). The procedural right to an “independent assessment” for reward payments is referenced; however, the Determination does not define the assessment’s content, standards, or procurement procedures (para 10(a)).

Accounting and audit rights and duties

• Compliance with Special Account and PGPA Act requirements. Amounts credited to the COAG Reform Fund are to be managed in accordance with the PGPA Act (para 6). This imposes duties on the Commonwealth and on State reporting where the Special Account or grant arrangements require audit or reporting under PGPA frameworks.

Rights of parliamentary scrutiny

• Explicit limitation on disallowance. The Determination declares that s 42 of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply (para 4), which removes one express Parliamentary mechanism to disallow the instrument. Rights of parliamentary review therefore operate through other channels (estimates, Auditor‑General, public reporting) rather than the s 42 disallowance pathway.

The instrument therefore creates a system of conditional entitlements for States and administrative duties for Commonwealth officials. It relies on written agreements and reporting, with payment release governed by ministerial/delagate determinations and, for certain payments, independent assessment.

The Determination itself does not create new criminal offences or civil penalties. Its enforcement mechanism is administrative and contractual rather than penal statutory enforcement. The instrument indicates the principal enforcement levers and limits as follows.

Administrative enforcement , withholding or conditional release of funds

• Payment conditions and ministerial determinations. The primary enforcement mechanism is the Commonwealth’s ability to withhold or release payments based on whether pre‑determined milestones or performance benchmarks have been met (paras 10-11). For reward payments, release follows the Minister or delegate’s determination after receiving an independent assessment (para 10(a)). For facilitation/project payments, release follows a Minister or delegate determination based on expenditure and performance reporting prescribed in the National Partnership (para 10(b)). In short, the Commonwealth enforces compliance by controlling payment triggers.

• Scheduling where benchmarks are not required. Where payments are not conditional on performance benchmarks, they are scheduled according to the National Partnership payment profile and will be paid per that profile (para 11). The enforcement here is procedural: failure to meet non‑specified standards will not delay payments unless the National Partnership provides otherwise.

Contractual enforcement , terms in written agreements

• Written agreements set terms and conditions. The COAG Reform Fund Act requires that the terms and conditions of grants delivered through the Fund be set out in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the State (para 7). Those agreements will typically include clauses on repayment, recoupment, audit, record‑keeping and other contractual remedies if the State fails to comply with its obligations. The Determination does not specify those contractual terms; enforcement therefore depends on the specifics of each National Partnership agreement.

Auditing and PGPA reporting

• Special Account and PGPA obligations. Because credited amounts are to be held in the COAG Reform Fund, a Special Account under PGPA (para 6), the Fund and associated transactions are subject to PGPA reporting and audit regimes. The Auditor‑General’s functions and PGPA reporting obligations provide a supervision mechanism and may lead to administrative findings or recommendations against officials or departments.

Absence of statutory penalties in the instrument

• No statutory sanctions contained. The Determination contains no express penalty provisions, statutory sanctions, or referral mechanisms to courts or tribunals. The instrument therefore does not itself create offence provisions; any penalties would derive from the contractual terms in National Partnership agreements or from other statutes that regulate financial management and public administration.

Practical enforcement risks and uncertainties

• Undefined standards for “independent assessment”. The Determination requires independent assessment to trigger reward payments (para 10(a)), but does not define required independence, scope, methodology, or dispute resolution procedures. That creates potential for disagreement about whether the assessment met contractual expectations and may result in administrative disputes. Resolution of such disputes would likely be contractual or administrative, possibly culminating in litigation if contractual remedies or administrative review are exhausted.

• Ministerial discretion and delegation. The determinations required under paragraph 10 are vested in the relevant Minister or delegate. The extent to which such determinations are reviewable (administrative law standards) and the evidence standard required are matters for legal analysis and depend on the facts and any express terms in the relevant National Partnership agreements. The Determination itself does not specify review rights or standards.

In sum, enforcement is implemented through administrative control over payments, contract remedies in written agreements, and PGPA/Auditor‑General oversight. The Determination creates governance and reporting obligations rather than imposing statutory criminal or civil penalties.

The Determination operates by reference to and within the architecture of several statutes and the Intergovernmental Agreement. Its legal effect and operational compliance therefore depend on interactions with those instruments.

Primary statutory references

• Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (s 16). The Determination is exercised under s 16 of the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (para 1, para 12). That Act authorises the Commonwealth to determine amounts for National Partnership payments, sets out the accounting pathway (crediting the COAG Reform Fund), and imposes the debit limit for the financial year (referenced at para 15). Compliance with s 16 is therefore the immediate enabling legal basis.

• COAG Reform Fund Act 2008 (s 5 and s 7(2)). The Determination repeatedly invokes the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008. The COAG Reform Fund Act established the COAG Reform Fund and requires terms and conditions of grants made through the Fund to be set out in a written agreement between Commonwealth and State (para 6-7). This creates a legal requirement that National Partnership grants be documented in bilateral written agreements.

• Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). The Determination identifies the COAG Reform Fund as a Special Account for the purposes of the PGPA Act (para 6). That places COAG Reform Fund transactions within the PGPA framework for appropriation law, financial management, annual reporting and audit. The PGPA Act therefore supplies governance, accountability, and audit obligations that apply to the credited amounts and disbursements.

• Legislation Act 2003 (s 42 disallowance). The Determination explicitly states that s 42 of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply (para 4), thereby limiting the operation of the disallowance regime that normally allows either House of Parliament to annul legislative instruments under s 42. The Determination thus narrows one parliamentary check on executive instruments.

Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations

• Schedule D , Payment Arrangements. The Determination refers to the Intergovernmental Agreement that took effect on 1 January 2009 and specifically to Schedule D as the instrument that provides the purpose and broad conditions for National Partnership payments (para 8). The IGA remains the architecture in which National Partnerships are negotiated and the Determination functions as the Commonwealth’s authorisation to credit and disburse funds under that architecture. National Partnership agreements sit under the IGA and will contain payment profiles and reporting/benchmark requirements (paras 9-11).

Interaction with procurement, audit and administrative law regimes

• Procurement and independent assessment. For payments requiring an independent assessment, the Determination does not set procurement rules for commissioning such an assessment; procurement will therefore default to applicable Commonwealth procurement rules, the terms of the National Partnership, or the State’s procurement regimes depending on contractual arrangements (para 10(a)). That may raise interaction points with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, PPV frameworks, and PGPA expectations for officials commissioning external assessments.

• Administrative law review. The Determination vests decision power in Ministers or delegates (para 10). The exercise of those powers can be subject to administrative law principles (judicial review) depending on statutory context and the nature of the decision. The Determination does not create or limit review rights in itself; reviewability will depend on whether an affected person has standing and whether the decision qualifies as a reviewable action under administrative law.

State law and contractual links

• Written agreements and state law obligations. The COAG Reform Fund Act requires written agreements with States (para 7). Those agreements will be governed by Commonwealth law for the Commonwealth’s obligations and by the terms negotiated for the States. States must ensure their own compliance with state/territory procurement, financial management, and legislative constraints when performing under a National Partnership.

Accounting and audit intersection

• PGPA audit and reporting obligations. Because the COAG Reform Fund is a Special Account under PGPA, the transactions are subject to the PGPA reporting regime and Auditor‑General oversight (para 6). Annual reports and financial statements will reflect credited and paid amounts, and the Auditor‑General may audit compliance with the terms of the Special Account and the grant agreements.

Net effect

The Determination is a connecting instrument. It sits at the intersection of the Federal Financial Relations Act s 16 mechanics, the COAG Reform Fund Act and PGPA accounting, the Intergovernmental Agreement’s National Partnership architecture, and the administrative/contractual practices that implement conditioned payments. Practitioners should therefore read the Determination together with the s 16 provisions, the COAG Reform Fund Act, the PGPA Act, the relevant National Partnership agreement and any relevant ministerial delegation instruments.

The document as provided records the following specific historical and formal facts about the instrument, and contains no textual amendments beyond those facts:

• Instrument identity and date. The Determination is titled Federal Financial Relations (National Partnership payments) Determination No. 119 (May 2017) and is signed by Michael Sven Sukkar, Assistant Minister to the Treasurer, dated 3 May 2017 (front matter and signature block).

• Commencement. The Determination states it commences on the day on which it is made (para 2). That makes it effective immediately on signature.

• No amendment trace shown. The text provided does not include any schedules of amendment or later variations to the Determination. There is no notation in the text provided of prior versions of the instrument, nor of subsequent amendments. The Determination reproduces its title and preliminary material multiple times in the provided file, but this appears to be duplication rather than formal amendment history.

• Numbering and incorporation. The Determination relies on other statutory instruments (s 16 of the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009, COAG Reform Fund Act 2008, PGPA Act 2013). Any amendments to those Acts subsequent to 3 May 2017 could affect how the Determination operates, but the Determination text itself records only its date and commencement.

• Schedule material. The Determination incorporates Table 1 and Schedule 1 which set out payments for 8 May 2017 (paras 12-14) and Table 2 which records cumulative payments and the debit limit status (paras 15-17). Those tables are embedded as images in the provided text. The source file here reproduces Schedule 1 and the tables as images; the Determination’s amendment history does not appear in the textual file.

For legal certainty a practitioner should verify the instrument’s currency and any subsequent amendments or instruments in the Federal Register of Legislation, the Commonwealth Gazette and Treasury records. The document as provided contains no record of amendments; therefore, absent checking those external sources, one must assume the version provided is the No. 119 instrument dated 3 May 2017 and commencing on the date of signature. Any later changes to the Federal Financial Relations Act, the COAG Reform Fund Act or the PGPA Act could alter operational parameters but are not reflected in this Determination.

The Determination as supplied contains no litigation history, and it names no cases. The instrument does not reference any judicial decisions, nor does the provided text record any challenges to its validity, review of ministerial determinations under paragraph 10, or contractual disputes arising from the National Partnership payments it implements.

Because the Determination is an executive administrative instrument that authorises payments and delegates determinations to the Minister or delegate, litigation arising from its operation would likely take one of the following forms, none of which appear in the provided text:

• Judicial review of ministerial or delegate determinations to pay or withhold funds (paragraph 10 determinations), if an affected State or interested party alleged jurisdictional error, failure to consider relevant material, or other administrative law error.

• Contractual disputes under the written National Partnership agreements required by the COAG Reform Fund Act (para 7), for example about whether a State met conditions for payment, or about interpretation of reporting obligations and independent assessment requirements.

• Review or challenge to procurement or independence of assessments used to justify reward payments (para 10(a)).

• Auditor‑General or PGPA‑related findings that lead to administrative action, and subsequent legal challenges if parties dispute audit recommendations or interpretation of PGPA obligations.

The Determination’s explicit statement that s 42 disallowance does not apply (para 4) narrows a particular parliamentary avenue for contesting the instrument; however that exclusion does not, by itself, preclude judicial review of administrative decisions taken under the Determination. Practitioners should search case law databases and the Federal Court and High Court records for post‑2017 litigation referencing this Determination, relevant National Partnership agreements or s 16 determinations, since the document provided contains no such references.

The Determination contains a number of features that create practical risks, uncertainty, or require specific attention; these are concrete, source‑grounded items practitioners should watch for.

1. Disallowance exemption narrows parliamentary oversight (para 4). The Determination states that s 42 of the Legislation Act 2003 (disallowance) does not apply despite the Determination being a legislative instrument under subsection 16(5). This removes the specific power for either House to disallow the instrument under s 42, and therefore reduces one formal parliamentary check. Do not assume parliamentary disallowance will be available; oversight will rely on other mechanisms (PGPA reporting, Auditor‑General, estimates committees, FOI and political processes). Check the Legislation Act and any related guidance for alternative oversight mechanisms.

2. “Independent assessment” is not defined (para 10(a)). Reward payments require an independent assessment before the Minister or delegate determines payment. The Determination does not specify the scope, standards, procurement mechanism, or who qualifies as “independent”. That creates room for disagreement about whether an assessment meets contractual expectations. Drafts of National Partnership agreements should explicitly define independence, scope, evidence requirements and dispute resolution.

3. Ministerial/discretionary determinations can create uncertainty (para 10). For both reward and facilitation/project payments, the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate decides whether to pay. The standard of proof, decision timelines, and the content of supporting material are left to the National Partnership or to ministerial practice. States should negotiate clear, objective reporting standards and timelines into written agreements to reduce administrative discretion.

4. Payment amounts and details are in images/schedules. The Determination incorporates Table 1 and Schedule 1 that list amounts and recipients (paras 12-14), but in the provided text those tables appear as images. Practitioners relying on reproduced text should obtain the official instrument (Federal Register/Gazette) to extract exact numeric figures and payment lines, rather than relying on a transcribed or truncated copy.

5. Debit limit is cumulative and year‑specific (para 15). The $25,000,000,000.00 debit limit applies to amounts credited to the COAG Reform Fund for National Partnership payments in the financial year starting 1 July 2016. The Determination shows cumulative totals (Table 2), and confirms the cap is not exceeded (para 17). Practitioners dealing with multi‑instrument planning should model how future determinations and intra‑year credits will affect the cap and potential prioritisation of payments.

6. Written agreements required under COAG Reform Fund Act (para 7). The Determination requires written agreements to set terms and conditions for grants through the COAG Reform Fund. Those agreements will be the operative documents for performance triggers, repayment clauses, audit rights, and recoupment. Ensure the National Partnership agreements are negotiated precisely and include dispute resolution and transparency provisions.

7. PGPA implications and Special Account handling (para 6). The COAG Reform Fund is a Special Account under PGPA. That subjects the credited amounts and payments to PGPA governance, reporting and audit obligations. Both Commonwealth administrators and State recipients should assume audit scrutiny and align financial reporting accordingly.

8. Delegation chains and documentation. The Determination repeatedly allows action by a Minister or “delegate” (para 10). Delegations must be properly authorised and recorded; otherwise decisions risk challenge for lack of proper authority. Request sight of delegation instruments if payment decisions are contested.

9. Practical cashflow mismatch. For payments contingent on meeting milestones or performance benchmarks (para 10), States often bear the initial delivery cost and then seek Commonwealth payments. If payments are withheld for administrative reasons, States face cashflow risk. National Partnership agreements should address timing, interim payments, and dispute mechanisms.

10. Duplication and drafting irregularities in the provided text. The supplied file repeats sections many times; this appears to be a formatting reproduction issue in the source provided rather than substantive law. Always consult the authoritative version on the Federal Register of Legislation for definitive text.

For parties affected by this Determination,Commonwealth officials, State treasuries, State agencies, independent assessors, and advisers,the following practical compliance roadmap is grounded in the Determination’s text and the statutory references it invokes.

For States (and their agencies)

1. Obtain and review the relevant National Partnership agreement(s). The Determination provides funds for objects specified in the National Partnerships (paras 8-9, 12-14). The written National Partnership agreement will define the payment profile, reporting requirements, milestones or benchmarks, evidence required, timing, and repayment/audit provisions. Do not rely on the Determination alone.

2. Confirm terms and conditions are set out in a written agreement per COAG Reform Fund Act s 7(2) (para 7). Ensure that the agreement contains clear, objective performance indicators, reporting timetables, definitions of independent assessment (if applicable), dispute resolution procedures, and audit/recoupment clauses. Seek to limit ambiguous ministerial discretion where possible by negotiating objective tests and documentary triggers.

3. Prepare internal accounting and reporting systems for PGPA‑compliant reporting. Because payments are routed via the COAG Reform Fund as a Special Account under PGPA (para 6), State agencies must prepare to provide the specific expenditure and performance reports required by the National Partnership agreements to satisfy the Minister or delegate for payments (para 10(b)).

4. Plan for cashflow. If payments are milestone contingent (para 10), expect to fund initial delivery costs. Negotiate interim facilitation payments, or agree a clear schedule of evidence and payment timing to minimise cashflow disruption.

5. Engage and set terms with independent assessors early. For reward payments contingent on independent assessment (para 10(a)), negotiate in the National Partnership the scope, standards, procurement and acceptance criteria for any independent assessment. Document independence criteria (conflicts, qualifications, methodology) to reduce dispute risk.

6. Request access to delegation and decision procedures. Ask the Commonwealth for the relevant delegation instruments and expected timelines for determinations so you can align reporting submissions and follow up if determinations are delayed.

For the Commonwealth (departments and Ministers)

1. Ensure s 16 processes are followed. Make the necessary determinations under s 16 and ensure amounts are credited to the COAG Reform Fund before disbursing payments (para 6, para 13). Maintain records of crediting and disbursement steps for PGPA audit purposes.

2. Maintain cumulative debit accounting against the $25bn cap for 2016-17 (para 15). Keep a live tally of credits across all s 16 determinations (as Table 2 purports to do) and ensure the cap is not exceeded.

3. Draft National Partnership agreements with precise triggering mechanisms. Where payments are conditional, the National Partnership should set precise benchmarks, evidence required, reporting formats, acceptable independent assessor specifications, and clear timelines for the Minister or delegate to make determinations (paras 9-11).

4. Define independent assessment procurement and acceptance criteria. For reward payments requiring an independent assessment, publish or provide to the State the criteria for selecting assessors, the required content and methodology of the assessment, and how independence will be tested (para 10(a)).

5. Ensure delegations are documented and lawful. Where determinations are to be made by delegates, ensure delegation instruments are in place, comply with statutory delegation processes, and are published or accessible to States and their advisers to avoid procedural challenges (para 10).

6. Comply with PGPA and audit obligations. The COAG Reform Fund Special Account is subject to PGPA reporting and the Auditor‑General’s oversight (para 6). Maintain audit trails, retain documentary evidence of determinations, and record independent assessment reports and expenditure reporting used to trigger payments.

For advisers, auditors and assessors

1. Read the National Partnership, Schedule 1 and the Determination together. The Determination provides the legal authority for credit and payment; the National Partnership contains operative terms. Where payment amounts are embedded as images in the Determination instrument, obtain the official instruments or original schedule to read exact figures and line items (paras 12-14).

2. For auditors and accountants: align reporting to PGPA and the expressed reporting requirements in the National Partnership. Verify that funds credited and disbursed are reflected in COAG Reform Fund Special Account records and in annual reports and audit statements (para 6).

3. For independent assessors: obtain clear terms of engagement from the party commissioning the assessment, confirm independence criteria, produce a methodology statement, and retain working papers and evidence justifying conclusions. The Determination requires independent assessment for reward payments but does not provide standards (para 10(a)); those standards will usually be set in the National Partnership or the commissioning contract.

General compliance checklist

• Obtain the authoritative legislative instrument from the Federal Register of Legislation or Commonwealth Gazette, particularly to read Table 1 and Schedule 1 amounts and details (paras 12-14).

• Review the relevant National Partnership written agreement required by the COAG Reform Fund Act and ensure it contains precise, objective triggers for payment and clear reporting and dispute resolution mechanisms (para 7).

• Prepare for PGPA Special Account handling, audit and reporting obligations, and maintain full records of credits, disbursements and all determinations (para 6, para 13).

• For payments tied to independent assessments, ensure procurement and independence standards are documented and defensible (para 10(a)).

• Document delegation instruments and decision timelines to reduce procedural challenge risk where Ministerial determinations are delegated (para 10).

Following this practical roadmap will align parties with the Determination’s administrative and contractual requirements, reduce the risk of disputed payments, and facilitate audit and reporting compliance within the PGPA and COAG Reform Fund frameworks.