The Determination organises three core legal and administrative concepts: National Partnership payments, the COAG Reform Fund as the conduit Special Account, and the ministerial decision-making/assessment regime for performance‑conditioned payments.

National Partnership payments: The instrument repeatedly ties itself to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations (the Intergovernmental Agreement), in particular Schedule D , Payment Arrangements (para 8). It states the purpose of National Partnership payments is to support delivery of specified outputs or projects, to facilitate State reforms, or to reward States for nationally significant reforms (para 5). Payment profiles and reporting/expenditure arrangements are to be set out in National Partnership agreements (paras 9 and 10(b)).

COAG Reform Fund and Special Account mechanics: The Determination explicitly requires amounts determined under s 16(1) of the Federal Financial Relations Act to be credited to the COAG Reform Fund (para 6). It cites the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008, which establishes the COAG Reform Fund as a Special Account for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (para 6). The COAG Reform Fund Act further requires that terms and conditions for financial assistance provided through the Fund be recorded in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the State (para 7). The Determination therefore pairs the ministerial authorisation to credit and pay amounts with the statutory requirement of a written agreement to govern the use of those funds.

Ministerial determinations, independent assessment and reporting: Where payment is conditional on achievement of pre‑determined milestones or performance benchmarks, the Determination distinguishes two decision pathways. For reward payments (for nationally significant reforms) an incentive payment will be made “following receipt of an independent assessment as to whether a pre-determined performance benchmark has been achieved,” with the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate making the determination (para 10(a)). For facilitation and project payments, the relevant Minister or delegate will determine payment “based upon expenditure and performance reporting arrangements set out in the National Partnership” (para 10(b)). Where no performance benchmark is required before payment, the payment schedule set out in the National Partnership will apply (para 11).

Debit limit and fiscal control: The Determination records the statutory debit limit on total amounts credited to the COAG Reform Fund for National Partnership payments in the 2015-16 financial year ($25,000,000,000) as fixed by subsection 16(3) of the Act (para 15), and affirms that cumulative determinations to date do not exceed that limit (paras 16-17). Table 2, which the Determination includes, is the operative record of cumulative determinations for the year.

Legislative instrument and parliamentary oversight: The instrument notes that subsection 16(5) of the Act renders it a legislative instrument but that disallowance under s 42 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 does not apply (para 4). That creates a formal classification while excluding one particular form of parliamentary review.

Schedule structure: The Determination incorporates a Schedule 1 which, according to the instrument, provides further information on the payments to be made on the stated date (para 14) and contains the detailed amounts in tabular form (Schedule 1 header). Table 1 lists the specific payments and recipient States for 9 May 2016 (para 12), while Table 2 summarises cumulative payments for the financial year (para 16).

Primary affected parties

• Commonwealth executive and ministers: The Treasurer made the Determination (instrument heading), and the Determination repeatedly assigns decision-making roles to the “relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate” for determining whether payments will be paid when they depend on pre‑determined milestones, performance benchmarks or on expenditure and performance reporting (paras 10(a)-(b)). The instrument therefore affects executive officials who administer National Partnerships, allocate funds from the COAG Reform Fund and exercise delegated determination powers.
• States and Territories: The Determination explicitly targets payments “to a State” as defined (which includes the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory) (definitions at para 3; para 12). States are the recipients of the financial assistance and the parties required to enter written agreements setting out terms and conditions (para 7). States are also the actors required to deliver specified outputs, meet reforms and satisfy performance benchmarks to obtain conditional payments (para 5 and paras 10-11).
• COAG Reform Fund administrators: The COAG Reform Fund, established by the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008 and defined here, is the account into which amounts are credited before payments are made to States (paras 6, 13). Administrators of that Special Account under the PGPA Act will be required to record receipts and payments in line with the Special Account rules.
• Independent assessors and reporting entities: For incentive payments tied to nationally significant reforms, the Determination requires receipt of an independent assessment before the Minister or delegate determines whether payment should be made (para 10(a)). That creates a role for independent evaluators engaged to assess whether a pre‑determined benchmark has been achieved, and for officers preparing the expenditure and performance reports required under National Partnerships (para 10(b)).

Secondary and indirect affected parties

• State agencies and service providers: Although not named in the Determination, State agencies that deliver the specified outputs or projects will be operationally affected because they must meet the terms of the written agreement and provide the expenditure and performance reporting that the Commonwealth will use to make payment decisions (para 7 and para 10(b)).
• Auditors and accountability bodies: Because the COAG Reform Fund is a Special Account under the PGPA Act (para 6), auditors, internal control officers and parliamentary departments with responsibility for special account oversight will be affected when reviewing compliance with account and reporting requirements.
• Parliamentarians and parliamentary committees: The instrument expressly removes the instrument from the s 42 disallowance mechanism (para 4), which affects the set of parliamentary tools available to review or invalidate the Determination.

Who pays and who decides

• Who pays: The Determination authorises amounts to be credited to the COAG Reform Fund and paid to States. The source of Commonwealth funding is the COAG Reform Fund as the conduit; the Act’s requirement to credit amounts there means that the Commonwealth, via that Fund, supplies the monies (para 6, para 13).
• Who decides: The Treasurer made the instrument; the Determination delegates operational decisions about conditional payments to the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate (para 10). The interlocking written agreements between Commonwealth and States (para 7) are the contractual instruments by which terms and conditions are set and enforced.

What behaviour changes

• States will be incentivised to negotiate National Partnerships that set out payment profiles and, if interested in rewards, meet pre‑determined performance benchmarks and submit to independent assessment (paras 9-11).
• The Commonwealth will exercise discretion through ministerial determinations and use reporting and independent assessments as gatekeeping mechanisms for payments (paras 10-11).
• Administrators will need to monitor the cumulative debit against the statutory cap and ensure proper Special Account accounting (paras 15-17, para 6).

Duties imposed by the Determination and referenced Acts

• Credit to COAG Reform Fund: The Determination enforces the statutory duty that amounts determined under s 16(1) must be credited to the COAG Reform Fund (para 6). This is a mechanical duty on the Commonwealth finance administration to flow monies through the Special Account.
• Written agreement requirement: Under the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008, subsection 7(2) requires that the terms and conditions under which financial assistance is granted through the COAG Reform Fund must be set out in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the State (para 7). That creates a contractual duty on both parties to record responsibilities, reporting requirements and conditions for payment.
• Performance reporting and expenditure reporting: The Determination requires that payments for facilitation and project activity be determined “based upon expenditure and performance reporting arrangements set out in the National Partnership” (para 10(b)). This imposes a duty on States to provide the specified reports in the form and timing required by the National Partnership.
• Independent assessment for reward payments: For payments to reward nationally significant reforms, an incentive payment will be paid only after receipt of an independent assessment as to whether a pre‑determined performance benchmark has been achieved (para 10(a)). The duty to obtain and provide that independent assessment rests with the parties (most likely the State) as a precondition to payment.
• Reporting of cumulative determinations relative to debit limit: The Determination records cumulative amounts and confirms they do not exceed the statutory debit limit for 2015-16 (paras 15-17). Administratively, the Commonwealth must ensure total credits for the financial year do not exceed the limit in subsection 16(3) of the Act (para 15).

Rights and authorities

• Ministerial determination power: The relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate has the authority to make the decision to pay conditional amounts once the assessment or reporting requirements are satisfied (paras 10(a)-(b)). This is an executive right to determine payment after evaluating evidence.
• Recipient States’ contractual rights: Where a written agreement (a National Partnership) prescribes the payment profile and terms, States acquire contractual entitlements to payments subject to the specified conditions (para 7; paras 9-11). The Determination makes clear that the payment profile in a National Partnership is the basis for unscheduled payments (para 11).
• Special Account accounting rights: The COAG Reform Fund, as a Special Account under the PGPA Act, has statutory accounting and appropriation characteristics that create rights to access credited funds in accordance with Special Account rules (para 6).

Procedural protections and limits

• Independent assessment requirement introduces an evidentiary gate: For reward payments, the Determination does not permit payment until an independent assessment is provided (para 10(a)). This is a procedural limit on ministerial discretion in practice, since the Minister’s determination follows receipt of the assessment.
• Debit limit as a fiscal constraint: The statutory $25,000,000,000 debit limit for the 2015-16 financial year constrains the aggregate amount the Commonwealth may credit to the COAG Reform Fund for National Partnership payments (para 15). The Determination records that cumulative amounts to date do not exceed that limit (para 17).

What is not provided as a duty or right

• The Determination does not itself set out detailed performance benchmarks, precise payment profiles or the operational content of the written agreements , it defers those specifics to National Partnerships and Schedule 1 (paras 9, 11, 14). The instrument is thus a high‑level authorisation and record rather than a detailed contract or regulation of State activity.

Direct penalties in the instrument

• The Determination contains no express offences, penalties or sanctions. It is a fiscal and administrative instrument that authorises payments and records process requirements; it does not itself create criminal or civil penalties for non‑compliance.

Enforcement pathways implicit in the instrument and referenced Acts

• Conditionality and payment withholding: The primary enforcement mechanism is the Commonwealth’s ability to withhold payment where pre‑determined milestones or performance benchmarks have not been achieved. The Determination requires the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate to make a determination on whether an incentive or facilitation/project payment will be paid, based on independent assessment or expenditure and performance reporting as set out in the National Partnership (paras 10(a)-(b)). The practical effect is administrative enforcement via non‑payment.
• Contractual enforcement: The COAG Reform Fund Act 2008 requires terms and conditions to be set out in a written agreement between Commonwealth and State (para 7). That written agreement (a National Partnership) will be the contractual vehicle that can specify remedies, recoupment, clawbacks, audit rights and dispute resolution. The Determination signals that compliance and enforcement of detailed obligations will depend on those written agreement terms (para 7).
• Special Account accounting and audit oversight: Because the COAG Reform Fund is a Special Account for PGPA Act purposes (para 6), standard PGPA Act governance, financial management and audit arrangements will apply to the special account, enabling audit scrutiny of credited amounts, payments and compliance with Special Account rules. Enforcement through audit findings and public reporting is an available accountability mechanism.
• Ministerial determinations and independence of assessors: Where payments for rewards require independent assessment (para 10(a)), the Determination embeds an evidentiary control , the Minister will only determine to pay after receipt of an assessment. The independence requirement functions as a quality‑control enforcement mechanism and may reduce disputes about factual achievement of benchmarks.

Limits on parliamentary enforcement

• Removal of s 42 disallowance: The Determination states that subsection 16(5) renders it a legislative instrument but that s 42 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (disallowance) does not apply (para 4). That removes a specific parliamentary tool for disallowing the instrument under the Legislative Instruments Act, narrowing the scope of parliamentary oversight available via that mechanism for this Determination.

Practical enforcement consequences for States

• Non‑payment as sanction: The immediate practical sanction for a State that does not meet reporting or milestone conditions is non‑receipt of the agreed payment, as the Commonwealth’s determination power is the mechanism to effect that sanction (para 10(b)).
• Contractual remedies will be engaged through National Partnerships: Any formal recovery, remediation or requirements to repay will generally flow from the written agreements referred to in para 7 rather than from this Determination itself.

Federal Financial Relations Act 2009

• Primary enabling provision: The Determination is made under section 16 of the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (instrument header and multiple references). That section authorises the Treasurer to determine amounts to be credited to the COAG Reform Fund for National Partnership payments; the Determination explicitly relies on that authority (para 12).
• Subsection cross‑references: The Determination cites subsection 16(2) (requirement to credit amounts to the COAG Reform Fund), subsection 16(3) (annual debit limit), and subsection 16(5) (classification as a legislative instrument and disallowance exemption), thereby operating as an exercise of the powers and subject to the limits in s 16 of the Act (paras 4, 6, 15).

COAG Reform Fund Act 2008

• Special Account and written agreement requirement: The Determination depends on the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008 for the structural role of the Fund. It notes that the Fund is established by s 5 of the COAG Reform Fund Act (definition para 3 and para 6) and that subsection 7(2) of that Act requires the terms and conditions of financial assistance provided through the Fund to be set out in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the State (para 7). Thus the Determination interfaces with that statute to ensure funds are paid only where contractual arrangements are in place.

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act)

• Special Account treatment: The Determination records that the COAG Reform Fund is a Special Account for the purposes of the PGPA Act (para 6). This means the crediting and payment of amounts are subject to the PGPA Act’s financial management, governance and reporting frameworks as they apply to Special Accounts. The Determination itself does not restate PGPA obligations, but those rules will govern the COAG Fund’s accounting, audit and stewardship.

Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations

• Payment architecture: The Determination references the Intergovernmental Agreement and specifically Schedule D , Payment Arrangements, as the framework that provides the Commonwealth will make National Partnership payments to States to support outputs, facilitate reforms or reward reforms (para 8). It defers to National Partnership agreements (which sit under the Intergovernmental Agreement) for payment profiles and reporting arrangements (paras 9-11). The Determination thus functions within the federal financial relations architecture created by that Intergovernmental Agreement.

Legislative Instruments Act 2003

• Disallowance exemption: While the Determination is a legislative instrument under subsection 16(5) of the Act, the Determination asserts that section 42 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (the Parliamentary disallowance mechanism) does not apply (para 4). That affects the interface between this instrument and Parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms established by the Legislative Instruments Act.

Other potential interactions

• Contract and administrative law: The Determination contemplates written agreements and ministerial determinations based on assessments and reporting (paras 7, 10). Those agreements and determinations will be subject to contract law principles and, for administrative actions, could attract judicial review principles if a party sought to challenge a ministerial determination (the Determination itself does not describe judicial review procedures, but those remedies remain part of the broader legal environment).
• Audit and public accountability mechanisms: The Special Account status ties the Determination to the PGPA Act and associated Auditor‑General and parliamentary committee scrutiny. The Determination’s exemption from the disallowance process narrows one parliamentary mechanism but does not remove audit or FOI obligations that otherwise apply under relevant laws.

Operational deference

• The Determination delegates granular operational content , payment profiles, reporting templates, performance benchmarks, and dispute resolution , to National Partnership agreements and Schedule 1 (paras 9, 11, 14). Practitioners should therefore consult the specific National Partnership documents and Schedule 1 for operational interaction with these other regimes.

Formal dating and signature

• The Determination is dated 2 May 2016 and bears the signature of Scott John Morrison as Treasurer (instrument heading and signature block). The instrument commences on the day it is made (commencement clause).

No amendments recorded in the text provided

• The text included contains no express amendment clauses, no marginal notes indicating prior instruments, and no consolidation notes within the provided material. The Determination repeats its title and clauses in multiple places in the document provided, but that repetition appears to be duplication rather than recording of amendments.

Relationship to other determinations

• The Determination is made under s 16 of the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 and references cumulative amounts determined in the 2015-16 financial year (paras 15-17), implying there are other determinations made under s 16 in that financial year. Table 2 purports to list total cumulative payments determined in 2015-16, including this Determination (para 16). The Determination therefore sits in a sequence of s 16 determinations but does not in itself amend prior determinations.

How to identify changes over time (practical note for researchers)

• Because this Determination is an individual instrument authorising payments at a point in time, amendment history will typically be traceable through successive s 16 determinations and through records held by the Department of Finance or Treasury. The instrument itself does not include a chronological amendment trail. Researchers seeking changes should consult: (a) the Federal Register of Legislation for subsequent or earlier s 16 determinations; (b) Treasury/Finance records about credits to the COAG Reform Fund; and (c) consultation minutes or press releases describing changes to National Partnership payments across financial years.

No archival or repeal information supplied

• The Determination contains no clause specifying repeal, expiry or sunset. Its operation is event‑driven (payments specified for 9 May 2016 and cumulative totals recorded for 2015-16). If this Determination were to be superseded or amended, the subsequent instrument would need to be located on the Federal Register of Legislation or in departmental records.

No cases or litigation referenced in the instrument

• The Determination itself contains no reference to litigation, no citation of judicial decisions, and no record of any judicial or administrative proceedings concerning this instrument.

What this implies for searchers

• To identify litigation that touches on National Partnership payments, the COAG Reform Fund, or the exercise of s 16 powers more generally, one must search case law databases and records of administrative decisions concerning those topics. The Determination does not identify or summarise any proceedings.

Potential avenues for dispute, indicated by instrument mechanics

• Although no litigation is recorded here, the Determination creates potential factual and legal triggers for dispute: ministerial determinations to pay or withhold funds based on independent assessments or reporting (paras 10(a)-(b)); the content of written agreements under the COAG Reform Fund Act (para 7); and the adequacy or independence of assessments. Any dispute about whether a performance benchmark has been achieved or whether reporting suffices could, in principle, generate administrative law or contractual litigation. The Determination does not supply dispute resolution mechanics; those will be found in the National Partnership agreements referenced.

No named cases in source material

• The Determination names no judicial authorities. The developer instruction requires not to invent cases; therefore this section records no litigation history contained within the source.

Exemption from s 42 disallowance reduces one parliamentary check

• Para 4 states that although the Determination is a legislative instrument under subsection 16(5) of the Act, section 42 (disallowance) of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 does not apply. Practitioners should note that this removes one avenue of parliamentary disallowance for this instrument. This is not the same as removing all parliamentary or legal oversight, but it narrows a specific parliamentary review mechanism.

Material details are external to the Determination

• The Determination sets payment authority and refers readers to Table 1, Table 2 and Schedule 1 for amounts and recipient breakdowns (paras 12-14, 16). The core operational content , payment profiles, performance benchmarks, expenditure and performance reporting arrangements, and the terms of the written agreements , is not in the body of the Determination and instead is placed in the National Partnership agreements and Schedule 1 (paras 7, 9-11, 14). Practitioners should therefore not assume that reading the Determination alone gives the full compliance picture; the National Partnership documents and Schedule 1 are essential.

Independent assessment requirement is narrowly described

• For reward payments, the Determination requires receipt of an independent assessment as to whether a pre‑determined performance benchmark has been achieved, after which “the relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate will make a determination as to whether the incentive payment will be paid” (para 10(a)). The Determination does not define “independent assessment”, the standard of independence, the qualifications of assessors, or dispute resolution if parties disagree with the assessment. Those definitions and processes will be located in the National Partnership or the written agreement (para 7).

Debit limit is annual and cumulative

• The instrument refers to subsection 16(3) which fixes a total annual debit limit for credits to the COAG Reform Fund for National Partnership payments in 2015-16 ($25,000,000,000) (para 15). Table 2 is intended to keep a running total for the financial year (para 16). Practitioners must not treat the limit as per-determination; it is an aggregate cap across the financial year. Failure to monitor cumulative credits could result in a breach of the statutory limit.

Administrative discretion and delegation are leveraged

• The Determination repeatedly allows the “relevant Commonwealth Minister or delegate” to decide whether a payment will be made when benchmarks or reporting are required (para 10). This concentrates decision authority in Ministers and their delegates rather than in an automatic, mechanistic flow of funds. That creates a governance pivot around ministerial discretion.

Schedule 1 and tables may not be machine‑readable or accessible

• In the copy provided, the actual monetary figures and recipient lines are embedded in images (image.001.png, image.002.png, image.003.png, image.004.png). Those images require retrieval from the official source where they will be rendered as machine-readable tables or scanned images. Relying on an excerpt that lacks accessible tables can lead to errors in financial summary work.

No statutory penalties in instrument

• The Determination does not itself create offences, fines or express recovery schemes. Remedies, recoupment or sanctions will be contractual or administrative (paras 7 and 10). Practitioners should consult the specific National Partnership agreement for clawback clauses and repayment mechanics.

Timing specificity: single payment date recorded

• The Determination states these amounts will be credited to the COAG Reform Fund and paid to the States on 9 May 2016 (para 13). That fixes the operative payment date for this instrument; questions about timing after that date will require looking into subsequent determinations or National Partnership schedules.

Repetition in the document may indicate drafting consolidation issues

• The material provided contains repeated sections and duplicated headings. Practitioners should rely on the authoritative, consolidated text on the Federal Register of Legislation to avoid confusion from copy errors in distributed PDFs.

Checklist for Commonwealth administrators

• Ensure proper authorisation: Confirm the Determination is in force (dated 2 May 2016) and that amounts to be credited are those set out in Table 1 and Schedule 1 (paras 12-14).
• Credit process through COAG Reform Fund: Credit the authorised amounts to the COAG Reform Fund as required by subsection 16(2) (para 6). All payments must flow through the Special Account mechanism under the PGPA Act.
• Monitor the debit limit: Maintain a running total of all s 16 determinations credited in the financial year to ensure the aggregate does not exceed the debit limit in subsection 16(3) (para 15). Use Table 2 or an internal ledger to track cumulative credits (para 16).
• Manage Special Account governance: Apply PGPA Act accounting, control and reporting requirements for the COAG Reform Fund following Special Account rules (para 6). Document all credits and payments and ensure audit trails are maintained.
• Exercise ministerial determinations with evidentiary support: For payments tied to milestones or performance benchmarks, ensure the required independent assessment (for reward payments) is obtained and is fit for purpose before making the Minister’s or delegate’s determination (para 10(a)). For facilitation or project payments, ensure expenditure and performance reporting satisfies the National Partnership criteria before making a determination (para 10(b)).
• Record and publish payment profiles: Ensure National Partnership documents and Schedule 1 properly set out payment profiles and reporting obligations (paras 9-11, para 14). Where reporting templates or performance metrics are specified, make them accessible to recipient States.

Checklist for States and recipients

• Enter a written agreement: Ensure the terms and conditions for the financial assistance are set out in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the State, as required by subsection 7(2) of the COAG Reform Fund Act 2008 (para 7). The agreement should specify payment profiles, deliverables, reporting schedules, and dispute resolution.
• Prepare for independent assessment where relevant: If the payment is a reward for nationally significant reform, prepare documentation and invite or commission an independent assessment that meets the criteria set out in the National Partnership or agreement (para 10(a)). Clarify the scope, independence criteria and timing of assessments in the written agreement.
• Comply with expenditure and performance reporting: For facilitation or project payments, implement systems to capture expenditure data and performance metrics in the form required by the National Partnership so that the Commonwealth can make a determination based on those reports (para 10(b)).
• Coordinate operational deliverables: Align State agency project plans and delivery schedules with the payment profile in the National Partnership so funding corresponds with deliverable milestones (paras 9 and 11).
• Keep audit-ready records: Because funds pass through a Special Account and the PGPA Act applies (para 6), ensure financial records, supporting documentation and performance evidence are audit-ready to withstand Auditor‑General review.
• Monitor fiscal calendar and payment date: Note the scheduled payment date (9 May 2016 for the sums in this Determination) and ensure contractual and operational readiness for receipt on that date (para 13).

Recommended drafting and negotiation practices for written agreements

• Define “independent assessment”: Make explicit in the National Partnership or written agreement who may perform the independent assessment, what standards they must meet, the evidence required, the process for recruitment, costs allocation and how disputes over findings are resolved (para 10(a)).
• Specify reporting templates and timing: To avoid ambiguity, include precise templates, thresholds, and reporting frequencies for the expenditure and performance reporting that will trigger facilitation or project payments (para 10(b)).
• Include remedies and clawback clauses: Because the Determination does not create penalties, specify in the written agreement the contractual remedies, repayment triggers and interest or administrative recovery processes if funds are misapplied or conditions are not met (para 7).
• Clarify delegation and decision timeframe: Where the Minister or delegate will make determinations, set procedural timelines for decision-making after receipt of assessments or reports so parties know when to expect payment and can plan cashflow.

Record‑keeping and audit readiness

• States should retain documentation demonstrating achievement of milestones and the basis for any claim to payment. The Commonwealth should retain ministerial determination records and copies of independent assessments and reporting upon which payments were made or withheld (paras 10(a)-(b)).
• Both sides should record communications and approvals to defend against disputes or audit findings later.

Practical liaison points

• Treasury/Finance (COAG Reform Fund administrators) for account crediting and payment scheduling (paras 6, 13).
• The relevant Commonwealth Minister’s office for procedural matters about ministerial determinations and delegation (para 10).
• State Treasury or central agency for negotiating the written agreement and ensuring compliance with reporting obligations (para 7).
• Independent assessor(s) for scope, method and timing of performance assessments where reward payments are sought (para 10(a)).

By following the Determination’s structural prescriptions , crediting to the COAG Reform Fund, embedding terms in a written agreement, obtaining the required assessments or reports and observing the annual debit limit , Commonwealth and State parties align with the instrument’s procedural and fiscal requirements (paras 6-7, 10, 15).