Competition and Consumer (Prices Surveillance—Aeronautical Services to NSW Regional Airlines) Direction 2023

This Direction brings together a small number of legal and economic concepts and applies them narrowly to the Sydney (Kingsford‑Smith) Airport context. The instrument defines the key operational terms and links them to existing statutory and regulatory frameworks. The core concepts are:

• Prices surveillance under Part VIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The instrument applies to "an exercise of power and performance of functions under Part VIIA" by the ACCC where those powers and functions relate to specified instruments (s 7). The instrument therefore operates through the ACCC's Part VIIA surveillance and monitoring remit rather than by directly regulating market participants.

• "Give special consideration". The direction does not impose an absolute cap or amend Part VIIA; rather it directs the ACCC to give "special consideration" to a government policy in the exercise of its Part VIIA powers (s 8). The wording signals that the ACCC's decision‑making must take that policy into account as a material factor when relevant surveillance, monitoring, notification or investigatory powers are deployed.

• Scope by instrument linkage. The Direction's application is limited to matters that relate to either the Competition and Consumer (Price Notifications,Aeronautical Services to NSW Regional Airlines) Declaration 2023, or the Monitoring of Prices, Costs and Profits instrument listed (s 7). This makes the Direction instrument‑specific: it does not purport to instruct ACCC conduct in all Part VIIA matters, only those tied to the two named instruments.

• Targeted actors and payments. The policy that the ACCC must give special consideration to concerns price increases "that are paid by operators of regular public transport air services operating wholly within the State of New South Wales" and that are paid to "Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (ABN 62 082 578 809)" (s 8(b)-(c)). The Direction thus identifies the payer group (NSW‑only RPT operators) and the payee (Sydney Airport Corporation Limited) as the relevant commercial relationship for the policy.

• Revenue‑weighted percentage increase. The metric the Direction uses is "the total revenue-weighted percentage increase in prices (including new or restricted prices)" for the relevant services in each financial year (s 8). The instrument requires the ACCC to give special consideration to a government policy that this revenue-weighted percentage increase should not exceed the CPI‑derived percentage.

• CPI‑based benchmark. The inflationary benchmark is defined by reference to sums of "index numbers" for defined quarters. "Index number" means the All Groups Consumer Price Index number (weighted average of the eight capital cities) for a quarter (s 5). The percentage increase is computed as the increase between the sum of the index numbers for the quarters of the 12 months of the "reference year" (ending 31 March immediately before the start of the financial year) and the sum for the 12 months ending 31 March in the year immediately before the reference year (s 8(c) and s 5). The instrument itself notes that this percentage represents the inflation rate for the relevant year (s 8 Note).

• Temporal limits. The Direction applies to the three specified financial years commencing 1 July 2023, 1 July 2024 and 1 July 2025 (s 9), and has a specific cessation and repeal date (s 10 and Schedule 1). The instrument replaces the prior 2022 Direction (Schedule 1 repeals the 2022 instrument).

The combined effect of these concepts is procedural: the instrument channels a government price‑inflation policy through the ACCC’s Part VIIA surveillance powers for a narrow class of aeronautical services at Sydney Airport involving NSW‑only regional public transport operators and the airport corporation as recipient of payments. The instrument does not itself set prices, create a private right, or prescribe enforcement measures in its text. Its operative instruction is to "give special consideration" to a specified numerical policy benchmark in relevant ACCC activity (s 8).

The instrument names and delimits the groups to which it is relevant. The statutory text itself identifies four primary categories of affected parties:

• The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The Direction is addressed to the ACCC and instructs it to give special consideration to a specified government policy when exercising its Part VIIA powers and functions (s 8 and s 7). The ACCC is the decision-maker directed by the instrument.

• Sydney Airport Corporation Limited. The Direction specifically refers to prices "that are paid to Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (ABN 62 082 578 809)" (s 8(c)). That identifies the airport operator as the payee whose aeronautical charges are the subject of the government's CPI‑based concern.

• Operators of regular public transport (RPT) air services operating wholly within the State of New South Wales. The Direction concerns prices "that are paid by operators of regular public transport air services operating wholly within the State of New South Wales" (s 8(b)). The instrument therefore targets the relationship between the airport and NSW‑only regional airline operators that provide scheduled services entirely within NSW.

• Declared notified aeronautical services. The Direction applies only to "aeronautical services and facilities that are declared to be notified services by the Competition and Consumer (Price Notifications,Aeronautical Services to NSW Regional Airlines) Declaration 2023" (s 8(a) and s 7(a)). The implication is that only those services that the separate Declaration has specified as notified services come within the Direction’s concern.

Other affected parties flow from these primary categories:

• The ACCC's use of its monitoring and information gathering powers under the monitoring instrument referenced in s 7(b) is implicated because the Direction applies to ACCC conduct "in relation to the pricing of aeronautical services and facilities at the airport known as the Sydney (Kingsford‑Smith) Airport" insofar as the activity relates to the monitoring instrument. While the Direction does not itself create new obligations on third parties to provide information, the practical effect is to focus ACCC attention on this subset of transactions, with potential effects on information requests or investigatory activity under Part VIIA and the monitoring instrument.

• Other airport users and airlines. The Direction applies narrowly to NSW‑only RPT operators and to services declared by the separate Price Notifications Declaration. The text therefore excludes interstate services, international services, and non-RPT operators from the specified CPI bench‑marking focus in s 8, unless those services fall within the declared notified services or within the monitoring instrument’s scope. The instrument does not purport to regulate other airport charges paid by other classes of users.

• The Commonwealth executive. The Direction is a ministerial instrument made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s 3) and thus is an act of the executive shaping statutory agency priorities. The instrument names the Assistant Minister for Competition, Charities and Treasury as the issuer (instrument header and signature).

In short, the instrument is targeted at ACCC behaviour with respect to aeronautical service charges at Sydney Airport when those charges are paid by NSW‑only RPT operators and are part of the services declared in the linked Price Notifications Declaration. The airport operator (Sydney Airport Corporation Limited) is the direct payee named in the instrument, and the ACCC is the actor whose Part VIIA actions are to reflect the policy the Direction describes.

This Direction creates an ACCC duty of consideration rather than a direct duty on private parties. The operative legal effect imposes an instruction on the ACCC and sets the scope of that instruction. The key duties and rights framed by the instrument are:

Duty on the ACCC to give special consideration. Under section 95ZH of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the ACCC is "directed to give special consideration, in exercising its powers and performing its functions, to the Government’s policy" set out in s 8 (see the opening words of s 8). That is the primary duty: the ACCC must treat the specified CPI-based price outcome as a matter of special consideration when its Part VIIA activity relates to the named instruments and subject matter (s 7 and s 8).

Scope limitation duty. The ACCC’s duty is limited to exercises of power and performance of functions under Part VIIA that concern "the pricing of aeronautical services and facilities at the airport known as the Sydney (Kingsford‑Smith) Airport" insofar as they relate to the two named instruments,the Price Notifications Declaration 2023 and the Monitoring instrument (s 7). The ACCC therefore does not have a generalised new duty across all Part VIIA matters; the duty is confined to the relationship between its Part VIIA activities and the specified instruments.

No direct pricing power or statutory right created for third parties in the Direction. The instrument contains no express private right of action, offence, or direct statutory cap imposed on Sydney Airport or airlines. The Direction instructs the ACCC about how to prioritise or weigh its Part VIIA powers; it does not itself amend Part VIIA or create new civil or criminal liabilities in its text. Any rights or obligations that arise for private parties would therefore flow from ACCC action under Part VIIA or under the linked monitoring/notification instruments, not from the Direction directly.

Method of measurement duty. The instrument specifies the metric that the ACCC must give special consideration to: the "total revenue-weighted percentage increase in prices (including new or restricted prices)" for the declared notified aeronautical services paid by NSW‑only RPT operators to Sydney Airport (s 8). The ACCC’s consideration therefore has a quantitative focus; the instrument details how to compute the comparative inflation rate using defined CPI index numbers and quarters (s 5 and s 8(c)).

Temporal duty. The ACCC’s duty applies only during the instrument’s application period: financial years commencing 1 July 2023, 1 July 2024 and 1 July 2025 (s 9), and ceases on 30 June 2026 (s 10). The ACCC’s duty to give special consideration thus has a fixed duration.

Duty of instrument‑specificity. The ACCC must apply the special consideration in relation to the two named instruments (s 7). That creates a duty to align its Part VIIA surveillance approach with the government policy where the surveillance work intersects the declared notified services or the monitoring instrument; it does not automatically alter ACCC priorities outside those intersections.

In practical terms, the Direction creates a decision‑making duty for the ACCC to treat a particular CPI‑based price outcome as a material consideration in relevant surveillance work, but it does not itself impose statutory obligations on Sydney Airport or the airlines, nor does it amend enforcement powers in the Act. Any downstream duties for private parties will arise through ACCC action under the Part VIIA regime and the linked monitoring and notification instruments.

The Direction itself does not create penalties, criminal offences, or express enforcement mechanisms directed at private parties within its text. The instrument is a ministerial direction to the ACCC concerning how the ACCC should exercise its Part VIIA powers and functions (s 8). Consequently, enforcement in the usual sense falls into two categories as reflected by the instrument’s form:

1. ACCC compliance with the Direction. The instrument is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s 3) and cites s 95ZH as the statutory basis for directing the ACCC (s 8 begins "Under section 95ZH of the Act..."). That statutory route gives the Commonwealth executive the capacity to direct the ACCC about certain matters of policy or prioritisation. The instrument therefore imposes an administrative obligation on the ACCC to give special consideration to the specified policy in relevant Part VIIA matters; any internal or external challenge to the ACCC’s compliance with the Direction would engage administrative law principles or the statutory mechanics of s 95ZH, but the instrument itself does not set out a penalty for breach.

2. Part VIIA enforcement powers remain with the ACCC. The Direction operates in relation to the ACCC's exercise of its Part VIIA powers and functions (s 7). Part VIIA contains surveillance, monitoring, notification and investigation powers (the instrument presumes the ACCC’s Part VIIA toolkit by reference). The Direction does not expand or curtail, in its text, the ACCC’s pre‑existing enforcement powers under Part VIIA. If the ACCC exercises Part VIIA powers (for example, monitoring or reporting, or taking enforcement action under the Act), any penalties or enforcement measures that might flow are those provided for in the Act and related instruments, not in the Direction itself.

No specified sanctioning mechanism against Sydney Airport or airlines. The Direction does not prescribe that Sydney Airport or the relevant airlines be penalised if the revenue-weighted price increases exceed the CPI benchmark. The text instructs the ACCC to give special consideration to a government policy that such increases "should not exceed" the CPI-based percentage (s 8), but that language is directional rather than punitive. Any regulatory response to observed non‑compliance with the policy would arise from ACCC exercise of its statutory powers under Part VIIA and related instruments, which the Direction references but does not modify.

Practical enforcement implication. Because the Direction is an instrument about ACCC priority and consideration, actual enforcement or remedial outcomes for price increases will depend on subsequent ACCC action,monitoring, reporting, or any formal regulatory steps the ACCC elects to take under the Part VIIA regime and the linked monitoring/notification instruments. The Direction itself imposes no civil or criminal penalties and does not directly alter private parties’ statutory liability in its text.

The Direction is explicitly integrated with and limited by other statutory instruments and legislative provisions. The instrument formally sits within the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 regime and operates through Part VIIA functions and two named instruments. The principal interactions are:

Statutory foundation under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The Direction is made under the Act (s 3). It invokes section 95ZH of the Act as the statutory authority directing the ACCC to "give special consideration" to the described government policy (s 8). The instrument therefore relies on the Act’s scheme for ministerial directions to the ACCC and the ACCC’s Part VIIA powers.

Part VIIA monitoring and surveillance powers. The Direction applies to "an exercise of power and performance of functions under Part VIIA" by the ACCC "in relation to the pricing of aeronautical services and facilities at the airport known as the Sydney (Kingsford‑Smith) Airport" insofar as this activity relates to specified instruments (s 7). It is thus an instruction about the ACCC’s use of its Part VIIA powers, not a direct amendment of those powers. Any enforcement, information collection or other action will be undertaken using the Part VIIA apparatus.

Integration with the Price Notifications Declaration 2023. The Direction is limited in part to matters related to "the Competition and Consumer (Price Notifications,Aeronautical Services to NSW Regional Airlines) Declaration 2023" (s 7(a); s 8(a)). That Declaration will list the aeronautical services that are declared to be notified services. The Direction's substantive metric (the revenue-weighted percentage increase) applies only to the declared notified services, so the scope of application hinges on the content of that separate instrument.

Reference to the existing monitoring instrument. The Direction also applies insofar as ACCC action "relates to" the instrument described as "Competition and Consumer Act 2010 - Monitoring of the Prices, Costs and Profits Relating to the Supply of Aeronautical Services and Facilities at Specified Airports in Australia" (s 7(b)). The Direction notes the monitoring instrument can be found on the Federal Register of Legislation with Register ID F2012L01271 and limits its application to ACCC action that intersects with that monitoring framework. The Direction therefore operates in tandem with the ACCC’s existing price, cost and profit monitoring regime for specified airports.

Definitions anchored in other legislation. The instrument states that expressions have the same meaning as in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 as in force from time to time, referring to paragraph 13(1)(b) of the Legislation Act 2003 (s 5 Note). It also imports the definition of "aeronautical services and facilities" from Part 7 of the Airports Regulations 1997 (s 5). These cross‑references mean interpreting key terms in the Direction requires looking to the Act, the Legislation Act 2003 rule on expression meanings, and the Airports Regulations 1997.

No amendment to Part VIIA or to the monitoring instrument in the text. The Direction does not itself amend the Act, Part VIIA, or the monitoring instrument; it is an administrative direction addressing the manner in which the ACCC should give weight to a particular policy consideration in relevant Part VIIA activity (s 3 and s 8). The Direction does, however, repeal the 2022 Direction in Schedule 1, thereby clearing the previous ministerial direction from the statute book for the period specified.

Temporal interaction with the legislative calendar. The Direction specifies reference years and quarters for CPI calculations and sets application years for when the ACCC must give special consideration (s 5, s 8(c), s 9, s 10). The calculation method uses published CPI figures for quarters ending 31 March and requires applying the specified arithmetic to determine the benchmark inflation percentage for the relevant financial year.

In short, the Direction is an instrument that interacts with the Act by directing ACCC behaviour under Part VIIA and by referencing, but not altering, the Price Notifications Declaration and the monitoring instrument. Interpreting and operationalising the Direction requires concurrent reference to those linked instruments and to definitions contained in the Act and the Airports Regulations 1997.

This Direction contains express temporal and repeal provisions and also expressly repeals a predecessor instrument. The amendment history and lifecycle details in the text are:

Commencement. The instrument's commencement clause states that "The whole of this instrument" commences on 1 July 2023 (s 2 table: "The whole of this instrument 1 July 2023"). The instrument also contains the signature and date of the Assistant Minister, 19 June 2023, which is the date of signing, while the operative commencement is 1 July 2023 as specified.

Time‑limited application and cessation. The Direction applies to the financial years commencing on 1 July 2023, 1 July 2024 and 1 July 2025 (s 9). It "ceases to apply on 30 June 2026, and is repealed on 1 July 2026" (s 10). Those provisions make the Direction explicitly temporary and tied to three consecutive financial years.

Repeal of the previous Direction. Schedule 1 of the instrument contains a single item that repeals the Competition and Consumer (Prices Surveillance,Aeronautical Services to NSW Regional Airlines) Direction 2022 in its entirety (Schedule 1). The Schedule says "Repeal the instrument" and identifies the 2022 Direction. Thus the 2023 Direction replaces the 2022 Direction for the timeframe it covers.

No other in‑text amendments. The instrument does not itself amend the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Part VIIA, nor the monitoring instrument or the Price Notifications Declaration. It is an independent direction instrument made under the Act and can be treated as a standalone ministerial direction for the stated period.

Notes on definitions and external references. The instrument’s note to the definitions refers to paragraph 13(1)(b) of the Legislation Act 2003, indicating that expressions have the same meaning as in the Competition and Consumer Act as in force from time to time (s 5 Note). It also imports the meaning of "aeronautical services and facilities" from Part 7 of the Airports Regulations 1997 (s 5). Those references mean that, where definitions in the Act or the Regulations change over time, the terms in this Direction will operate with those contemporaneous meanings.

No further amendments recorded in the instrument. The text contains no schedule adding new amendments to other instruments besides the stated repeal of the 2022 Direction. Any future amendment to extend, shorten, alter or reconfigure this Direction would require a further instrument made under the Act.

The instrument itself contains no litigation history, case citations, or references to judicial decisions. The text does not record any judicial challenges or proceedings concerning the 2023 Direction. The schedule repeals the 2022 Direction, but the instrument does not indicate any litigation connected to that repeal or to the 2022 instrument (Schedule 1).

Because this Direction is an administrative instrument made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s 3) and is addressed to the ACCC, any litigation that might arise in relation to it would typically concern administrative law issues: whether the ACCC complied with the Direction in exercising its statutory powers, or whether the Direction itself was validly made under the Act. The instrument contains no express rights of private challenge or procedural mechanisms; accordingly, any judicial review or litigation would rely on the general availability of administrative review remedies under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 and related judicial review principles, where applicable. The Direction does not itself reference those remedies.

Because the instrument applies to the ACCC’s exercise of Part VIIA powers and refers to the Price Notifications Declaration 2023 and the monitoring instrument, litigation could, in principle, involve the interaction of those instruments and the ACCC's conduct under Part VIIA. But the Direction text contains no factual or legal history of litigation and cites no cases. The instrument’s language is procedural and directional rather than normative for private parties; therefore, the instrument itself does not create an immediate enforcement context that would necessarily yield litigation detailed in the instrument.

In summary, the instrument contains no litigation history in its text. Any real‑world litigation arising from this Direction would be external to the instrument and would need to be identified from judicial records or proceedings, which are not contained in the document provided.

The Direction contains a number of narrow drafting features and cross-references that create potential practical pitfalls for practitioners and affected parties. These "gotchas" arise from the instrument’s limited scope, the measurement mechanics, and the nature of the instruction to the ACCC. The main items to note, with section references, are:

Narrow scope tied to declared notified services. The Direction applies only to "aeronautical services and facilities that are declared to be notified services by the Competition and Consumer (Price Notifications,Aeronautical Services to NSW Regional Airlines) Declaration 2023" (s 8(a) and s 7(a)). If a particular service is not included in that separate Declaration, it falls outside the Direction’s CPI focus. Practitioners should check the content of the Price Notifications Declaration to determine whether a given charge is within scope.

Payer and payee specificity. The Direction concerns price increases "that are paid by operators of regular public transport air services operating wholly within the State of New South Wales" and paid to "Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (ABN 62 082 578 809)" (s 8(b)-(c)). Flights that are interstate, international, not RPT, or services where the payee is not Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (for example, third‑party ground handlers) are not within the instrument’s stated focus. Do not assume broad application to all airport charges.

"Revenue-weighted percentage increase" metric. The Direction uses a revenue-weighted percentage increase measure and expressly includes "new or restricted prices" (s 8). Practitioners should note that the aggregation method is revenue‑weighted rather than simple average, which requires accurate revenue data and a consistent base period treatment to compute the weighted average change. The instrument does not set out a data‑reporting mechanism within its text; data operations will likely interact with the monitoring instrument referenced in s 7(b), but the Direction itself does not provide reporting rules or templates.

CPI calculation specifics and the reference year. The CPI benchmark is computed using the sum of index numbers for the quarters of the 12 months (the reference year) ending on 31 March immediately before the start of the relevant financial year, compared with the 12 months ending 31 March in the year before the reference year (s 8(c) and s 5). The definition of "index number" is the All Groups CPI (weighted average of the eight capital cities) published for each quarter (s 5). Practitioners must use the specified quarters and the Australian Statistician’s published series; using an annual CPI rate or a different quarterly‑aggregation would not match the instrument’s formula.

"Give special consideration" is not an absolute cap. The Direction directs the ACCC to give "special consideration" to the policy that price increases "should not exceed" the CPI‑derived percentage (s 8). The phraseology does not itself impose a legally binding cap or automatic sanction. The ACCC retains statutory discretion in how it exercises Part VIIA powers; the practical effect of the Direction will therefore depend on how the ACCC translates "special consideration" into monitoring, reporting or enforcement activity.

Reliance on linked instruments. The Direction’s effect depends on the content of the Price Notifications Declaration and the monitoring instrument referenced in s 7. Those instruments determine which services are "declared" and what monitoring powers exist; the Direction cannot be interpreted alone without checking those linked documents.

Temporal limits and transition points. The Direction applies only to the three specified financial years and ceases on 30 June 2026 (s 9-10). Practitioners should be alert to transitional pricing arrangements, contract renewal dates, and the reference year computation (which looks to quarters ending 31 March) when assessing which financial year and reference year apply to a price change.

Repeal of the 2022 Direction. The Direction repeals the 2022 instrument in full (Schedule 1). Parties who relied on the 2022 Direction should not assume continuity of wording, scope or operational detail without comparing the two instruments.

Absence of obligations on private parties in the Direction text. Because the Direction addresses ACCC conduct rather than prescribing direct obligations on Sydney Airport or airlines, do not assume that the Direction itself imposes statutory duties, reporting obligations, or penalties on private parties. Any such obligations will arise from ACCC action under Part VIIA or from other instruments referenced by the Direction.

These features mean that careful cross‑checking of the Price Notifications Declaration, the monitoring instrument, the CPI series and the Part VIIA powers is required before concluding how the Direction will operate in any given factual scenario.

Compliance considerations bifurcate into actions for the ACCC (the addressee) and practical steps for private parties affected by the Direction,principally Sydney Airport Corporation Limited and operators of RPT air services operating wholly within NSW. The Direction itself contains no new reporting or penalty provisions, so compliance is about aligning behaviour with the policy the ACCC is instructed to consider and preparing for ACCC monitoring or inquiries that may flow from it. Steps to consider, grounded in the instrument text, are:

For the ACCC (institutional duty)

• Treat the Direction as an explicit material consideration when exercising Part VIIA powers and functions that relate to the Price Notifications Declaration 2023 or the monitoring instrument (s 7 and s 8). ACCC decision‑makers should document how the Direction was considered in relevant surveillance, notification or monitoring work.
• Apply the specified measurement method when assessing whether the total revenue-weighted percentage increase for declared services paid by NSW‑only RPT operators to Sydney Airport exceeds the CPI-based percentage. That requires using the All Groups CPI (8 capital cities) quarterly index numbers as defined in s 5 and the reference year computation described in s 8(c).
• Coordinate any monitoring under the instrument referenced in s 7(b) with the Price Notifications Declaration’s list of notified services so that data requested or analysed relates to the declared services the Direction targets.

For Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (price-setting and record-keeping)

• Identify which aeronautical services at Sydney Airport are "declared to be notified services" under the Price Notifications Declaration 2023. Only those declared services fall within the Direction’s CPI benchmark (s 8(a)).
• Maintain revenue and pricing records by service and by customer group (notably operators of RPT services operating wholly within NSW). The Direction’s metric is revenue-weighted; accurate revenue attribution to the NSW‑only RPT operators is necessary to compute the numerator and denominator of any revenue-weighted price change assessment (s 8).
• Before applying price changes for the declared services charged to NSW‑only RPT operators, model the effect on the "total revenue-weighted percentage increase" for the relevant financial year and compare it to the CPI benchmark calculated using the specified quarters and index numbers (s 5 and s 8).
• Consider engaging early with the ACCC if proposed increases may push the revenue-weighted percentage above the CPI benchmark. While the Direction does not itself create a cap, it instructs the ACCC to give special consideration to the CPI outcome, which may influence monitoring or regulatory responses (s 8).

For NSW‑only RPT operators (airlines)

• Track charges billed to you by Sydney Airport that are for declared notified aeronautical services. Maintain your own records of quantities and prices paid, so that you can verify any revenue-weighted calculations the airport or the ACCC may produce in the course of monitoring (s 8).
• If you consider proposed price changes to be inconsistent with the CPI benchmark, prepare a record of impacts and consider making that information available to the ACCC in response to monitoring inquiries under the monitoring instrument referenced in s 7(b).

Common practical steps for all parties

• Use the exact CPI series and quarterly aggregation specified by the Direction: the All Groups CPI index numbers for each quarter (s 5). The "reference year" for computing the benchmark is the 12 months ending 31 March immediately before the start of the financial year (s 8(c)).
• Anticipate ACCC information requests under the monitoring framework cited in s 7(b). While the Direction does not itself create reporting obligations, the monitoring instrument likely contains data collection arrangements that will be used to assess the metric in question.
• Be aware of the instrument’s temporal scope: it applies to the three financial years commencing 1 July 2023, 1 July 2024 and 1 July 2025 (s 9), ceases on 30 June 2026 and is repealed on 1 July 2026 (s 10). Contractual or pricing strategies should be developed with those dates in mind.

Record-keeping details to facilitate calculation

• Maintain the revenue streams by service and by customer segment (NSW‑only RPT operators).
• Maintain base period pricing and volumes to compute revenue-weighted change correctly in the financial year.
• Maintain documentation of any "new or restricted prices" introduced during the financial year, as the Direction explicitly includes those in the revenue-weighted measure (s 8).

Because the Direction instructs the ACCC rather than directly imposing obligations on private parties, the principal compliance aim for airport operators and airlines is to prepare accurate, auditable data and to engage constructively with ACCC monitoring activities so that price changes and their revenue impact can be assessed against the CPI benchmark specified in the Direction.