Extradition (Norway) Regulations

The Treaty in the Schedule organises extradition around a set of core concepts that define when extradition may be granted, when it may be refused, what documentation is required, and how practical aspects such as detention, surrender and costs are handled. The principal concepts in the Treaty are:

• Obligation to extradite and limits (Article 1). Each Contracting Party undertakes to extradite persons present in its territory who are charged with, or convicted of, an extraditable offence, subject to Treaty provisions. The Treaty also provides that extradition may be refused on several enumerated grounds and that, where extradition is refused for territoriality reasons, the requested State should consider prosecuting the person domestically and inform the requesting State of results (Article 1(2) and (3)).

• Territorial scope and special locations (Articles 2 and 3). Territory is defined broadly to include land, airspace, waters under criminal jurisdiction, and certain vessels and aircraft (Article 2(1)). The Treaty treats offences on the continental shelf installations as if committed in the requesting State (Article 3).

• Extraditable offences and dual criminality (Article 4). Extraditable offences are those punishable under both parties’ laws by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for more than one year. For convicted persons wanted to serve sentences, extradition requires at least four months remaining to serve. The Treaty instructs that differences in legal classification or terminology do not prevent extradition, and it directs that the totality of acts alleged should be considered rather than the requesting State’s statutory elements (Article 4(2) and (3)). Persons convicted in absentia are treated as charged, not convicted, for treaty purposes (Article 4(4)).

• Nationals and related discretion (Article 5). A Contracting Party is not obliged to extradite its own nationals. The Treaty includes a specific provision dealing with Norwegian permanent residents who are nationals of certain Nordic countries, permitting Norway in its discretion to refuse or grant extradition (Article 5(2)) and requiring the requested State to consider domestic proceedings if extradition is refused (Article 5(3)).

• Grounds to refuse extradition (Articles 6 and 7). The Treaty lists political offences, persecution based on race, religion or political opinions, humanitarian considerations, military-only offences, concurrent domestic proceedings or prior acquittal/conviction, expiry of limitation periods under domestic law, and other grounds permissible under the requested State’s law as bases for refusal.

• Evidentiary sufficiency and documentary requirements (Articles 8, 12 and 13). In the case of persons charged but not convicted, Norway may refuse extradition if the authorities consider the evidence insufficient (Article 8). Requests must be in writing through diplomatic channels, authenticated and accompanied by specified documents: warrants, statements of offences and acts, conviction documents, laws creating offences, nationality and identity evidence (Article 12). Documents must be authenticated by appropriate authorities and sealed (Article 13).

• Provisional arrest and transit (Articles 15 and 22). Provisional arrest requests may be made urgently through diplomatic channels or Interpol with specified contents, and transit of extradited persons through Contracting Parties is permitted subject to domestic law and possible refusal grounds.

• Rule of speciality and subsequent prosecution (Article 10). The Treaty applies the speciality principle: the extradited person must not be detained or tried for offences other than those for which extradition was granted except in narrow circumstances or with consent. There is a 45-day rule permitting exceptions where the person has had the opportunity to depart and has not done so.

• Surrender, time limits and release (Article 18 and Article 14). Surrender logistics are to be arranged from a convenient place of embarkation agreed by the Parties. If removal does not occur within a time prescribed by the requested State, the person may be set at liberty and further extradition on the same offence may be refused. If additional information requested under Article 14 is not supplied, the detained person may be released and a fresh request may follow.

• Costs and expenses (Article 21). The requested State represents the requesting State’s interests in extradition proceedings and generally cannot claim pecuniary compensation from the requesting State for costs of arrest, detention, examination and extradition, but the requesting State must pay transportation costs for removal.

These concepts establish a framework that distributes decision-making discretion to the requested State on certain refusal grounds, while prescribing detailed documentary and procedural expectations for the requesting State.

The Regulations and Treaty produce obligations and rights for several distinct groups and institutions. The parties who bear the principal operational effects are:

• Federal government and executive agencies. By declaring Norway an extradition country and applying the Treaty (Regs 3 and 4), the Regulations determine the international legal framework within which Australian executive agencies handle requests involving Norway. Diplomatic channels, Interpol, and central authorities responsible for transmitting and receiving requests will be operationally engaged under Articles 12 and 15.

• Australian courts, magistrates and other judicial authorities. Although the Treaty sets procedural and substantive expectations, Article 23 expressly provides that extradition proceedings and provisional arrest are governed solely by the law of the requested State. For Australia as requested State, that means Australian extradition law and court procedures will govern domestic proceedings and determinations on refusal grounds that the Treaty lists.

• The person sought for extradition. The individual whose surrender is sought is directly affected by numerous Treaty protections and constraints. They gain the protections of refusal grounds such as political offence exemption, non-extradition of nationals, humanitarian considerations, evidentiary sufficiency, and the rule of speciality on subsequent prosecutions (Articles 5, 6, 8 and 10). The Treaty also creates procedural rights in relation to the documentation and authenticity of the request (Articles 12 and 13), translation (Article 20), and limits on custody and surrender timing (Articles 14 and 18).

• The requesting State and its prosecuting authorities. When Australia is the requesting State seeking extradition from Norway, Australian authorities must comply with the specific documentary and certification standards in Articles 12 and 13 and may be required to provide translations and further information on demand (Article 20; Article 14). Conversely, when Norway requests extradition from Australia, Australian authorities must assess the request against the bilateral Treaty and their own extradition law.

• Third States and transit authorities. Article 22 impacts any Contracting Party through which a person is to be transported. The transit State must apply its domestic law to authorise or refuse transit and may be liable for expenses incurred, subject to reimbursement from the receiving State.

• Costs bearers and administrative budgets. Article 21(2) and (3) allocate expenses: the requested State generally bears costs for arrest, detention and examination but the requesting State pays transportation costs. This allocation affects the budgetary positions of law enforcement and foreign affairs departments in the Parties.

• Persons with property interests. Article 19 contemplates delivery of material evidence or property acquired as a result of the offence and their potential return after trial, while protecting third party rights. This affects victims, private owners and evidence custodians.

The instrument thereby touches executive, judicial, law enforcement, diplomatic and administrative actors, as well as individual persons who are the subject of extradition proceedings. The Regulations impose documentary, timing and procedural expectations on requesting States and preserve domestic decision-making discretion for requested States on several substantive grounds.

The Treaty and Regulations allocate duties and rights between the Contracting Parties, domestic authorities and individuals. The central duties and rights are as follows, cited to Treaty Articles and Regulations where appropriate.

Duties of the requesting State

• Provide a written request communicated through the diplomatic channel and authenticate all supporting documents (Article 12(1), Article 13). Requests must include specific documents depending on whether the person is charged or convicted, including warrants, statement of offences and acts, conviction and sentencing records, statements of the relevant law and punishment, nationality/residence evidence and identity documents (Article 12(2)(a)-(e)). Translations certified under the requesting State’s law must accompany documents (Article 20).

• If urgency requires, seek provisional arrest with a description of the person, a statement that extradition will be requested, warrant or judgment information, punishment details and, if required, the alleged acts or omissions (Article 15(2)). Provisional arrest requests may go through diplomatic channels or Interpol (Article 15(3)).

• Pay transportation costs for removal of the person from the place of embarkation (Article 21(3)). The requesting State must reimburse the other State for expenses connected with transit if transit is used (Article 22(4)).

Rights of the requesting State

• To seek extradition of persons charged with or convicted of extraditable offences (Article 1). Where extradition is refused on territorial grounds, to request that the requested State prosecute domestically and to be informed of the results (Article 1(3) and Article 5(3)).

• To request consent for detention or trial on offences not included in the original extradition submitted under the rule of speciality (Article 10(1)(a)(ii)) and to be informed of decisions and reasons for refusal through diplomatic channels (Article 17).

Duties of the requested State

• To consider extradition requests and apply the Treaty’s grounds for grant or refusal while governing procedure according to its own law (Article 1, Article 23). The requested State must notify decisions, giving reasons for any complete or partial refusal (Article 17).

• To represent the requesting State in legal proceedings relating to the extradition and to otherwise represent its interests (Article 21(1)). Generally, the requested State will not make pecuniary claims against the requesting State for arrest, detention, examination and extradition expenses (Article 21(2)).

Rights of the requested State and discretion

• To refuse extradition on enumerated grounds, including political offence exceptions, persecution concerns, humanitarian considerations, military-only offences, pending domestic proceedings, prior acquittal or punishment, expiry of limitation periods under either domestic law, and other grounds permitted by the requested State’s law (Articles 6 and 7). Article 8 specifically permits Norway to refuse extradition where evidence is considered insufficient.

Rights and protections for the person sought

• Protection from extradition for political offences and persecution on prohibited grounds, as well as protection where extradition would conflict with fundamental humanitarian considerations (Article 6). Protection when charged but lacking sufficient evidence under the law of the requested State (Article 8).

• The rule of speciality protects the extradited person from being detained or tried for offences other than those for which extradition was granted, except with consent or after certain post-sentence conditions (Article 10). The person also benefits from specified documentary and translation standards and the possibility of release if the requested State’s demands for additional information are unmet (Article 14).

Procedural duties and standards

• Authentication requirements for documents (Article 13). The requested State may request additional information if domestic law requires it (Article 14(1)). If detained persons are released because additional information is not provided, fresh requests can be made (Articles 14(2) and (5)).

These duties and rights create a bilateral architecture where the requesting State must meet documentary, translation and certification standards and bear transport costs, while the requested State retains discretionary refusal grounds, procedural governance, and an obligation to notify and explain refusals back through diplomatic channels.

The Regulations themselves are declaratory as to the bilateral relationship and do not prescribe criminal penalties. Enforcement in the extradition context is effected through domestic law and practice, which the Treaty expressly acknowledges when it provides procedural obligations and rights. The Treaty provisions that bear on enforcement and consequential outcomes are as follows.

Domestic enforcement through requested State law

• Article 23 states that proceedings for provisional arrest and extradition shall be governed solely by the law of the requested State. That clause places responsibility for enforcement of the Treaty’s procedural obligations into domestic legal and institutional mechanisms. For Australia, that means enforcement occurs through the Extradition Act 1988 and associated domestic procedures and courts, though the Regulations here simply specify that the Treaty governs the bilateral aspects (Reg 4).

Surrender and custody consequences

• Article 18 sets practical conditions for surrender. Once an extradition order is made, removal must occur from a place of embarkation agreed by the Parties (Article 18(1)). If the person is not removed within a period prescribed by the laws of the requested State, the person may be set at liberty and the requested State may refuse further extradition for the same offence (Article 18(2)). The requested State must notify the requesting State of custody periods (Article 18(3)). These rules constrain the effectiveness of an extradition order where transport or diplomatic arrangements are unduly delayed and create an enforcement incentive to coordinate removal promptly.

Limits on post-extradition prosecution

• The rule of speciality in Article 10 imposes a legal constraint on the requesting State’s prosecutory actions after surrender, limiting the offences for which the extradited person may be tried. Exceptions require either consent by the requested State or the particular 45-day departure opportunity condition. This operates as an enforceable restriction: if contravened, the requested State could object and refuses further cooperation or seek remedies through diplomatic channels.

Refusal grounds and remedies

• The Treaty enumerates grounds for refusal that operate as protective enforcement constraints on the requesting State’s power to obtain surrender. Where extradition is refused because the requested State chooses to prosecute domestically under Article 1(3) or Article 5(3), the requested State bears the prosecution expense and must inform the requesting State of the outcome. Such domestic prosecutions are an alternative enforcement measure.

Documentation, authentication and evidentiary requirements

• Article 12 and Article 13 impose documentary obligations which, if unmet, may be a basis for refusal or release, particularly where the requested State considers information insufficient (Article 14). Article 8 grants Norway discretion to refuse extradition for lack of presumptive evidence in charged-but-not-convicted cases. These provisions create practical enforcement levers: failure to comply with documentary standards impedes extradition.

Costs and financial enforcement

• Article 21(3) requires the requesting State to pay transport expenses. Article 21(2) prevents pecuniary claims by the requested State against the requesting State for costs related to arrest, detention and extradition except where otherwise agreed. In practice this allocates the majority of the financial burden of detention to the requested State but forces the requesting State to fund removal. Those allocations can influence the practical enforceability of extradi­tion if the requesting State cannot or will not pay transport costs.

There are no criminal sanctions in the Regulations themselves for breach of Treaty obligations. Enforcement of the Treaty’s terms will be implemented through domestic legal mechanisms, diplomatic notifications, and practical measures such as refusal to extradite or domestic prosecution in lieu of surrender. The Treaty’s articles create formal refusal rights and procedural constraints which function as the primary enforcement architecture between the Parties.

The Regulations and the Treaty interact with domestic and prior international law in multiple specific ways identified in their text.

Relationship with the Extradition Act 1988 and Acts Interpretation Act 1901

• The Regulations were made under the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (preamble) and expressly operate in relation to the Extradition Act 1988. Regulation 2 defines “the Act” as the Extradition Act 1988. Regulation 4 declares that the Act applies in relation to Norway subject to the Treaty which is set out in the Schedule. This means Australian extradition law applies but the bilateral Treaty’s provisions are the governing international agreement between Australia and Norway; where the Act requires recognition of bilateral treaties, this Regulation supplies that recognition.

Procedural law versus treaty obligations

• Article 23 in the Treaty specifies that extradition proceedings and provisional arrest are governed solely by the law of the requested State. For an Australian requested State scenario, this makes the Extradition Act and Australian procedural and constitutional protections directly applicable. The Treaty therefore operates alongside domestic law: the Treaty sets substantive bilateral obligations, while the requested State’s domestic law governs how those obligations are proceduralised.

Supersession of earlier bilateral instruments

• Article 24(2) states that on entry into force of the 1985 Treaty the Mutual Surrender Treaty of 1873 as supplemented by 1907 agreements ceases to have effect between Australia and Norway. The Regulations therefore bring into effect the 1985 Treaty in place of those earlier instruments as between the two Parties.

Interaction with domestic criminal law

• The definition of extraditable offences in Article 4 requires dual criminality by reference to offences punishable by deprivation of liberty of more than one year under the laws of both Parties. Article 4(2) and (3) expressly state that categorisation of offences or terminology differences do not prevent extradition and that the totality of acts should be considered rather than the requesting State’s statutory elements. This interacts with domestic statutory offence definitions: Australian courts and authorities must assess whether the alleged acts would constitute an offence under Australian law as required by Article 4(3) and the Extradition Act.

Nationality and domestic constitutional constraints

• Article 5 permits a Contracting Party to refuse to extradite its own nationals. That treaty entitlement interacts with domestic law that prescribes whether and how nationals can be surrendered under the Extradition Act. The Regulations do not alter domestic law; they simply set the bilateral treaty standard that Australian authorities must observe when Norway is the requesting or requested State.

Death penalty and human-rights-related constraints

• Article 9 allows the requested State to refuse extradition where the person is liable to the death penalty unless the requesting State gives an undertaking that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out. This interacts with any domestic law or policy that conditions extradition on assurance against capital punishment. While the Regulations do not set domestic standards for accepting or demanding particular assurances, the Treaty requires the requesting State to undertake non‑implementation of the death penalty as a precondition in capital cases.

Procedural documentary and translation obligations

• Articles 12, 13 and 20 require particular documents, authentication and certified translations. These obligations interact with administrative practice under the Extradition Act by imposing specific evidentiary and diplomatic transmission requirements in Australia-Norway matters.

Transit and third State law

• Article 22 delegates transit permitting and procedures to the law of the Contracting Party through whose territory transit occurs. That means requests involving transit interact with the domestic transit law of any intermediary State, not directly with the Australia-Norway bilateral Treaty beyond reimbursement obligations.

In short, the Regulations import a Treaty that sets bilateral substantive and documentary obligations while leaving domestic procedural governance to the requested State’s law. The main legal interaction points are the Extradition Act 1988 as the domestic procedural vehicle, the supersession of earlier treaties, dual criminality assessments against domestic criminal statutes, nationality-based surrender policy, and human-rights-related restraints such as death penalty assurances.

The Regulations as supplied include the following historical and formal markers in the instrument itself.

• Treaty negotiation and signing. The Treaty between Australia and Norway concerning Extradition was concluded at Oslo on 9 September 1985 and signed by the Australian and Norwegian representatives identified in the Schedule.

• Entry into force of the Treaty. Regulation 4 identifies the Treaty as “the Treaty between Australia and Norway concerning Extradition that came into force on 2 March 1987” and the Schedule carries Article 24(1) stating that the Treaty shall come into force ninety days after exchange of Notes notifying compliance with constitutional and other requirements. The Regulations therefore record the Treaty’s entry into force as 2 March 1987.

• Making of the Regulations and publication. The Regulations were made by the Governor-General on 24 November 1988 (preamble and signature block) as Statutory Rules 1988 No. 2941. The Schedule notes notification in the Commonwealth Gazette on 30 November 1988 (Note).

• Supersession of prior treaties. Article 24(2) declares that on entry into force the 1873 Mutual Surrender Treaty between the Parties as supplemented in 1907 ceased to have effect as between Australia and Norway.

The text provided contains no subsequent amendments, variations or replacement instruments. The Regulations as presented are a single Statutory Rule enacted in 1988 incorporating the 1985 Treaty. If any amendments, later instruments, orders in council, or legislative changes modifying either the Extradition Act, the Regulations, or Australia’s position under the Treaty have occurred after the documents supplied here, they are not recorded in the material provided. The Schedule itself contains transitional and termination provisions: the Treaty may be terminated by either Party by notice in writing and will cease 180 days after receipt of that notice (Article 24(4).)

Therefore, in the source material the amendment history is limited to the original treaty signing in 1985, treaty entry into force 2 March 1987, the making of the Regulations on 24 November 1988, and notification in the Gazette on 30 November 1988. No later amendment or revocation is recorded in the supplied text.

The Regulations and the Treaty text as supplied contain no references to litigation, judicial decisions, or any case law. The Schedule does not cite judicial interpretation or precedent, nor does the Regulations’ text include any judicial rulings or litigation outcomes.

The Treaty itself contemplates that proceedings shall be governed by the law of the requested State (Article 23). That means any litigation challenges to how the Treaty is applied in Australia would be conducted under Australian domestic law, principally under the Extradition Act 1988 and relevant judicial review or criminal procedure rules. However, the supplied materials do not record any such litigation, nor do they name cases or refer to judicial interpretations.

Accordingly, based solely on the text provided, there is no litigation history to summarise in relation to the Extradition (Norway) Regulations 1988 or the incorporated Treaty. Users seeking reported decisions or judicial interpretation of how Australian courts have applied these Regulations or the Treaty to particular facts will need to consult case law databases or court records outside the present instrument.

The Treaty contains a number of technical features and procedural traps that can cause operational friction or unexpected outcomes if not anticipated when preparing or responding to extradition requests. These are not policy judgments but specific mechanisms in the text that practitioners should note.

Documentary strictness with discretionary fall-back

• Article 12 prescribes detailed documents that must accompany a request, including warrant copies, statements of acts, conviction and sentence records, statutory provisions or statements of law, and identity evidence. Article 13 prescribes authentication requirements. Failure to satisfy these documentary standards can result in delay, a request for additional information (Article 14) or refusal, though Article 12(3) permits surrender where the person consents despite non-compliance. Practically, obtaining authenticated and sealed documents and certified translations can be time-consuming and is often decisive.

Provisional arrest versus full request timing

• Article 15 allows provisional arrest in urgent cases via diplomatic channel or Interpol. The requesting State must submit the full extradition request “as soon as possible” but the Treaty also allows the requested State to release the detained person at any time in accordance with its law (Article 15(4)). This means provisional arrest will not necessarily secure continued detention if the supporting full request is delayed or deficient.

Release for insufficient information but subsequent risk

• Article 14(2) provides that where detained persons are released because additional information is not furnished within the time specified, that release does not preclude making a fresh extradition request. Thus, a requesting State that fails to meet the requested State’s documentary standard risks immediate release but is not prevented from trying again.

Timing for removal and potential loss of extradition

• Article 18(2) states that if the person is not removed from the requested State within the time prescribed by that State’s laws, the person may be set at liberty and the requested State may later refuse extradition for the same offence. This introduces a strictly domestic timetable element that can be triggered by logistical or diplomatic delays, potentially resulting in loss of the extradition opportunity.

Dual criminality assessed on totality of acts and differences in classification

• Article 4(2) and (3) direct that differences in offence categories or terminology do not prevent extradition and instruct authorities to consider the totality of alleged acts without reference to the requesting State’s statutory elements. This may complicate legal analysis where statutory elements differ, requiring careful mapping between alleged conduct and domestic offence provisions.

Rule of speciality exceptions and the 45-day rule

• Article 10 protects the extradited person from prosecution for offences other than those for which surrender occurred, but Article 10(3) carves out an exception where the person had an opportunity during a 45-day period after completion of proceedings and serving any sentence to leave the requesting State without hindrance but failed to do so, or if they voluntarily returned. Practitioners must pay attention to the timing of departure windows and consent mechanics.

Nationality and third-country nationality complications

• Article 5(1) permits refusal to surrender nationals. Article 5(2) contains a unique provision for persons resident in Norway who are nationals of Denmark, Finland, Iceland or Sweden; it permits Norway to refuse extradition and yet to proceed in its discretion. This can create unexpected jurisdictional permutations where nationality is complex or where the person has multiple national allegiances.

Evidentiary sufficiency standard for charged but not convicted persons

• Article 8 explicitly allows Norway to refuse extradition where Norwegian authorities consider the evidence insufficient to establish a presumption of guilt. That is an explicit discretionary evidentiary gate for charged but not convicted persons, potentially stricter than other standards in practice.

Transport and cost allocation timing

• Article 21(3) assigns responsibility for transport costs to the requesting State. In practice, this may delay removal if funding or logistical responsibility is unclear. Article 22(4) also requires reimbursement for transit-related expenses. Counsel should ensure budgetary approvals and logistical plans are in place before surrender orders are made.

Property and evidence handling constraints

• Article 19 permits the requesting State to request delivery of property that is material evidence or acquired through the offence, but requires return after trial if requested and protects third party rights. Delivering original evidence across borders can raise chain-of-custody and rights issues that complicate prosecutions.

Authentication, translation and formality exceptions

• While Article 13 sets authentication standards, Article 12(3) allows extradition where the person consents despite non-compliance with Article 12’s formal requirements. Reliance on a person’s consent can be strategically risky if consent is later contested. Article 20 requires translations certified in accordance with the requesting State’s law, which may be a formality in some cases but a practical hurdle in multilingual or technical evidence cases.

Concurrent requests

• Article 11 requires the requested State to decide between competing requests from different States and to consider factors such as relative seriousness, time and place of commission, dates of requests, nationality and residence and the possibility of subsequent extradition. Competing requests can produce delay and diplomatic sensitivities that need early identification.

Practitioners should not treat these clauses as merely advisory; in practice each creates a procedural step or decision node where failure to anticipate documentary standards, timing constraints, translation needs, transport costs, or nationality complications may result in release, refusal or logistical collapse of extradition plans.

For a requesting State (for example Australian authorities seeking extradition from Norway), the Treaty and Regulations prescribe a clear compliance checklist and practical steps. The following is a practical compliance roadmap derived from the Treaty provisions.

1. Initiate through diplomatic channel and plan for authentication

• Submit the request in writing through diplomatic channels as required by Article 12(1). Ensure documents furnished in support are authenticated per Article 13: warrants signed or certified by a Judge, Magistrate or competent authority, and sealed with the official seal of a Minister of State or a Ministry.

2. Assemble and certify required documents

• For an accused person: include a warrant for arrest or copy, a statement of each offence for which extradition is sought and a statement of the acts or omissions alleged (Article 12(2)(a)).

• For a convicted person: provide documents proving conviction and sentence, the fact that the sentence is enforceable immediately and the extent to which it remains to be served (Article 12(2)(b) and (c)). Remember that for convicted persons, extradition shall be granted only if at least four months of penalty remains (Article 4(1)).

• Always include a copy of the relevant statute or a statement of law relating to the offence and the punishment available under that law (Article 12(2)(d)).

• Include information or documentation regarding nationality, residence and proof of identity (Article 12(2)(e)).

3. Provide translations and certified copies

• Accompany documents with certified translations as required by Article 20. Ensure translations are certified in accordance with the law of the requesting State.

4. Consider provisional arrest for urgent cases

• Where urgent detention is necessary, lodge a provisional arrest request via diplomatic channel or Interpol with the particulars specified in Article 15(2). Be prepared to follow up with the full extradition request promptly, as the requested State may release the person if the full request or required information is delayed (Article 15(4)).

5. Anticipate requests for additional information

• Article 14 permits the requested State to request further information within a specified time. Prepare to respond rapidly to avoid release under Article 14(2) and to prevent delays that lead to logistical complications under Article 18.

6. Budget for transport and reimbursement obligations

• Secure funding and logistical arrangements to pay for transportation of the person from the place of embarkation, as Article 21(3) requires the requesting State to pay those costs. For transit arrangements involving third States, be prepared to reimburse expenses incurred by the transit State under Article 22(4).

7. Obtain required assurances where relevant

• In cases involving potential capital punishment, obtain an undertaking that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out, as Article 9 makes such an assurance a precondition to extradition where the requesting State’s law exposes the person to death penalty.

8. Address dual criminality issues using the Treaty standard

• Map the alleged acts to domestic offences in line with Article 4(3) which requires considering the totality of acts without strict reference to the requesting State’s statutory elements. Prepare legal arguments or summaries that show the alleged conduct would constitute an offence under the requested State’s law punishable by more than one year.

9. Be ready to seek consent for post-extradition prosecution

• If there is a need to detain or try an extradited person for additional offences not included in the original request, secure the requested State’s consent per Article 10(1)(a)(ii) before proceeding unless one of the specified departure exceptions applies.

10. Maintain diplomatic and interagency coordination

• Ensure clear communication between justice, law enforcement and foreign affairs departments for the diplomatic transmission of requests, provisional arrest communications and logistics for surrender and transit. Article 17 requires notification of decisions and reasons through diplomatic channels.

11. Prepare for contested nationality or political/humanitarian defences

• Anticipate Article 5 nationality issues and Article 6 political, race, religion, nationality or humanitarian considerations. Prepare legal and factual materials to address arguments that a request is politically motivated, that extradition would subject the person to persecution, or that humanitarian factors make extradition inappropriate.

12. Respect requested State’s procedural law

• Remember Article 23’s mandate that proceedings are governed solely by the law of the requested State. Ensure the request complies not only with Treaty wording but also with the specific procedural and evidentiary rules of the requested State, including timing for surrender and custody requirements under domestic law.

13. Document chain-of-custody and third-party property rights

• If seeking delivery of property or evidence under Article 19, document chain-of-custody, third-party rights, and the legal basis for transfer. Be prepared to return evidence as required.

14. Prepare for competing requests

• If there are concurrent requests from other States, be prepared to justify priority considerations and to address factors listed in Article 11 such as seriousness, timing, place of commission, nationality and residence.

Finally, where the requesting State is Australia, practitioners should coordinate with the central authority designated under the Extradition Act to ensure conformity with domestic requirements that implement these Treaty obligations. The Treaty provides formal structure, but compliance assessment will occur under the law of the requested State, so early legal and diplomatic coordination is essential to avoid procedural rejection or release.