Extradition (Kingdom of Belgium) Regulations

The instrument is founded on a few interlocking legal concepts that will drive how practitioners and agencies act.

• Extradition country declaration: Regulation 3 performs the formal domestic act of declaring Belgium an extradition country. That declaration imports the bilateral Treaty framework into the operation of the Extradition Act 1988 as it applies to Belgium (Regulation 4).

• Dual criminality and minimum‑penalty threshold: Article 2 requires that an offence sought be punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by imprisonment for a maximum period of at least one year (Article 2(1)). For convicted persons sought for sentence enforcement the Treaty requires that a penalty of at least one year has been imposed and at least three months remain to be served (Article 2(1)).

• Formula for determining equivalence: The Treaty expressly disavows rigid formalism. Article 2(2)-(3) say it “shall not matter” if the offences are not categorised the same way or if the constituent elements differ; the totality of acts alleged and the substance of the conduct are to be considered.

• Exceptions and discretionary bars: Article 3 lists mandatory bars (political offences, risk of persecution for race/religion/nationality/political opinion, military law offences not criminal under ordinary law, final judgement elsewhere, immunity by lapse of time) and discretionary refusals (nationality of the person, prosecution refrained by Requested State, death penalty unless assurance is given, acts regarded as committed in Requested State, pending prosecution in Requested State, humanitarian considerations such as age or health). Article 3(3) preserves multilateral obligations.

• Documentary, authentication and translation requirements: Article 5 specifies the form and content of requests and the documents to accompany them (warrants, statements of offences and acts, judgments and evidence of conviction/sentence, text of the relevant legal provision; for Australia, a statement of common law applicable to the offence where relevant). Article 6 prescribes authentication criteria (signature/certification by judge, magistrate or officer and an official seal) and permits admission in evidence in extradition proceedings.

• Provisional arrest and time limits: Article 8 creates a provisional arrest mechanism using INTERPOL or other means for urgency, prescribes the contents of the provisional request and sets a 45‑day limit after which a person so arrested may be released if the full diplomatic request and supporting documents have not been received (Article 8(4)).

• Rule of speciality and third‑State surrender: Article 12 imposes the specialty rule,an extradited person may only be detained or tried for the offences for which extradition was granted or for other extraditable offences with the Requested State’s consent,subject to exceptions including voluntary return or failure to leave within a specified period after final discharge (Article 12(3)). Article 13 governs surrender to third States.

• Costs and logistics: Article 15 allocates costs: the Requested State shall make arrangements and meet the costs of proceedings arising from a request and shall bear costs incurred in arrest and maintenance of the person until surrender. Article 14(4) provides for reimbursement by the Requesting State of expenses caused by transit through the territory of the Requested State.

• Termination and succession of treaties: Article 16 provides entry into force and termination mechanics; Article 17 terminates prior bilateral extradition instruments between Australia and Belgium on this Treaty’s entry into force.

These concepts determine who acts, when and with what documentary and substantive thresholds. The Treaty delegates significant discretionary assessment to the Requested State and depends on domestic law for several key determinations (for example, whether the Requested State’s law punishes extraterritorial conduct or whether an individual is a national).

Primary actors identified in the text are the Contracting Parties (Australia and the Kingdom of Belgium), national authorities responsible for extradition requests and responses, persons the subject of extradition requests, and third States in limited circumstances.

• National authorities and officials: The Treaty repeatedly requires action “through the diplomatic channel” (Article 5(1), Article 10(1)) and identifies judges, magistrates and authorised officers as the signatories or certifying authorities for documents to be authenticated (Article 6(2)). Those roles map to executive and judicial actors in each State: central authorities tasked with receiving and sending requests, prosecutors, courts dealing with arrest and extradition hearings, and foreign affairs/diplomatic posts responsible for transmission. The Regulations themselves are made by the Governor‑General on the advice of the Federal Executive Council and the Attorney‑General is identified in the preamble; the instrument thus connects ministerial executive power to treaty operation domestically.

• Persons sought for extradition: Any person “wanted for prosecution or the imposition or enforcement of a sentence” for an extraditable offence may be the subject of a request (Article 1). The Treaty explicitly covers accused persons and convicted persons, including those convicted in absentia (Article 5(2)(a)-(b), (c)-(d)). The text provides protections (refusal grounds, rule of speciality, possibility of postponement under Article 4).

• Requesting State’s agents and litigators: Prosecutors and foreign affairs officials who prepare requests are directly affected by documentary and authentication rules (Article 5), by translation requirements (Article 5(4)), and by the asymmetric substantive tests that apply depending on the direction of the request (Article 2(5)).

• Detention facilities and custodial authorities: The Requested State is responsible for arrest and maintenance of custody until surrender (Article 15(2)), and its domestic prison administrations will be engaged in temporary detention and possibly in decisions to postpone extradition in order to proceed with domestic prosecutions or to have the person serve a domestic sentence first (Article 4).

• Property holders and third parties: Article 11 may affect owners of property found in the Requested State if that property is alleged to have been acquired through the offence or may be required as evidence. The Requested State’s domestic law and third‑party rights are preserved under Article 11(3).

• Transit States and carriers: Article 14 contemplates transit through a Contracting Party’s territory; the transit State’s law determines detention in transit and the State may claim reimbursement for expenses (Article 14(4)). Transport providers will be involved in removal logistics under Article 10.

• National legal systems: Although not named as actors, domestic courts and administrative mechanisms implementing the Extradition Act 1988 will be directly engaged via Regulation 4, which makes the Act apply in relation to Belgium subject to the Treaty. The Treaty therefore shapes domestic extradition processes between the two States.

Who pays and who decides: the Treaty places decision‑making discretion with the Requested State on many core questions (for example, whether to refuse on nationality grounds, humanitarian considerations, pending domestic prosecutions, or whether extradition is “compatible” with humanitarian considerations , Article 3(2)(a), (f)). The Treaty also allocates certain costs to the Requested State (Article 15) and obliges Requesting States to reimburse for transit expenses (Article 14(4)), shifting where financial burdens fall in practice.

The Treaty imposes a set of reciprocal duties on the Contracting Parties and confers rights on the person sought for extradition through refusal grounds and procedural safeguards.

Duties of the Contracting Parties (selected and cited):

• To extradite persons wanted for prosecution or enforcement of sentence in accordance with the Treaty (Article 1). This is a primary mutual obligation subject to the treaty’s conditions.

• To respect the dual‑criminality threshold and sentence minimums: extraditable offences are those punishable in both States by imprisonment for a maximum of at least one year; for sentence enforcement, the sentence must be at least one year and at least three months of it must remain (Article 2(1)).

• To follow documentary and transmission rules: requests must be in writing, communicated through diplomatic channels, accompanied by specified documents (warrant of arrest, statement of offences and acts, judgment/certificates of conviction and sentence evidence, text of relevant laws, identifying information) and be authenticated (Article 5(1)-(2); Article 6).

• To translate supporting documents into one of the languages of the Requested State (Article 5(4)).

• To accept provisional arrest requests and respond promptly to such requests (Article 8(1)-(3)).

• To honour the rule of speciality: a person extradited shall not be tried or detained for offences other than those for which extradition was granted, except with the Requested State’s consent or under the specified exceptions (Article 12).

• To consider and, if necessary, refuse extradition on specified mandatory grounds (political offence, risk of persecution, final judgement, immunity by lapse of time, military‑only offences) (Article 3(1)) and discretionary grounds (nationality, pending or decided domestic prosecution or other humanitarian considerations) (Article 3(2)).

• To make arrangements for and meet the costs of proceedings arising from a request and to bear expenses for arrest and maintenance in custody in their territory (Article 15).

Rights and protective provisions for persons sought for extradition (selected):

• Political‑offence exception: extradition “shall not be granted” for political offences (Article 3(1)(a)), with a specific carve‑out that attempts on the life of a Head of State or family member are excluded from the political offence exception.

• Non‑refoulement‑like protections: refusal where there are substantial grounds for believing the request is for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing on account of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or where the person’s position may be prejudiced for those reasons (Article 3(1)(b)).

• Death penalty safeguard: if the offence carries the death penalty in the Requesting State, extradition may be refused unless the Requesting State gives an assurance sufficient to the Requested State that the death penalty will not be carried out (Article 3(2)(c)).

• Humanitarian discretion: the Requested State may refuse extradition if it considers it incompatible with humanitarian considerations such as age or health (Article 3(2)(f)).

• Procedural protections: where the Requested State considers documentary information insufficient, it may request further information and, failing receipt, may release the person without prejudice to a fresh request (Article 7).

• Rule of speciality protections against subsequent prosecution for unrelated prior offences except in limited circumstances (Article 12).

Administrative and operational duties:

• Authentication: documents must be authenticated as per Article 6 and will be admitted in evidence in the Requested State (Article 6(1)-(2)).

• Competing requests: the Requested State has the duty to determine between competing requests and must consider listed factors such as seriousness, time and place of commissions, dates of requests, nationality and ordinary residence (Article 9).

• Transfer logistics: where extradition is granted, the Requested State must remove the person from its territory from a departure point convenient to the Requesting State and specify a reasonable period within which the Requesting State must remove the person (Article 10).

These duties are operationalised through domestic law: Regulation 4 makes the Extradition Act 1988 apply in relation to Belgium subject to the Treaty. The Treaty prescribes the bilateral content of duties and rights; domestic implementing legislation governs how courts and executive agencies carry out arrest, review and surrender processes.

The Regulations and the incorporated Treaty do not create new criminal offences or specify penalties that apply to individuals for non‑compliance. Instead the instrument supplies procedural and inter‑State enforcement mechanisms intended to enable one State to secure custody and transfer of persons wanted for prosecution or sentence enforcement by the other State.

Enforcement mechanisms in the text:

• Arrest and detention: the Treaty authorises the Requested State to arrest persons under requests made through diplomatic channels (Article 5) and to take necessary steps on provisional arrest requests, including arrest pursuant to an INTERPOL notice or other written application (Article 8). The enforcement activity of arrest and detention is to be carried out under the domestic law of the Requested State.

• Judicial admissibility of foreign documents: Article 6(1) provides that authenticated documents accompanying a request shall be admitted in evidence in extradition proceedings in the territory of the Requested State. The authentication standard is a signature/certification plus an official/public seal (Article 6(2)). This eases evidentiary hurdles for Requesting States but leaves courts to assess sufficiency under domestic procedure.

• Surrender and removal: once extradition has been granted, the Treaty requires prompt communication of the decision and physical removal from the Requested State (Article 10). If the Requesting State fails to remove the person within the reasonable period specified, the Requested State may refuse extradition for the same offence (Article 10(3)). This is a practical enforcement mechanism: the Requested State controls the physical custody and can revoke surrender where the Requesting State does not act.

• Provisional arrest time limit: the Treaty imposes a 45‑day limit after provisional arrest for receipt of the formal request and supporting documents; failure to provide these supports release from custody (Article 8(4)). This limits indefinite pre‑trial detention on a provisional basis.

• Property surrender: Article 11 empowers the Requested State to surrender property acquired as a result of the offence or required as evidence, subject to the Requested State’s law and third‑party rights. The ability to secure and transfer evidence or tainted assets is part of enforceability of criminal justice.

• Costs and administrative obligations: Article 15 requires the Requested State to make necessary arrangements for and meet costs of proceedings in its territory and to bear expenses for arrest and maintenance in custody until surrender; Article 14(4) requires reimbursement by the Requesting State for transit expenses. These financial allocations affect how the practical enforcement is resourced.

Limits on enforcement (grounds for refusing extradition):

• Mandatory bars include political offences and risk of persecution on proscribed grounds (Article 3(1)(a)-(b)), military offences not criminal under ordinary law (Article 3(1)(c)), final judgment elsewhere (Article 3(1)(d)), and immunity by lapse of time under either Contracting Party’s law (Article 3(1)(e)).

• Discretionary bars include nationality of the person, autonomous decisions to refrain from prosecuting, death penalty concerns without sufficient assurance, the conduct being treated as committed in the Requested State, pending prosecution, and humanitarian considerations (Article 3(2)).

Operational enforcement therefore depends on the Requested State’s domestic implementation of the Treaty and the Extradition Act 1988. The Treaty sets standards and procedures for cross‑border enforcement actions but leaves policing of human rights, nationality, prosecution policy and humanitarian considerations to the Requested State’s discretion and law.

The Regulations explicitly invoke and interact with other legal instruments and domestic law in multiple ways.

• Extradition Act 1988: Regulation 2 defines “the Act” as the Extradition Act 1988 and Regulation 4 states the Act “applies in relation to the Kingdom of Belgium subject to” the bilateral Treaty. That means Australia’s Extradition Act 1988 provides the domestic statutory procedures and powers (arrest warrants, committal, magistrates’ and ministerial decisions, appeals, and judicial review mechanisms contained in that Act), while the Treaty modifies or supplements the operation of the Act as between Australia and Belgium. Practitioners must therefore interpret the Treaty provisions alongside the Extradition Act 1988 when preparing or responding to requests between the two States.

• Acts Interpretation Act 1901: the Regulations are made pursuant to section 4 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (preamble). This provides the executive with power to make regulations under an Act, indicating the Regulations are an exercise of statutory subordinate legislation consistent with enabling instruments.

• Domestic criminal law of the Requested State: Article 2(4) requires extradition where the law of the Requested State provides for punishment of extraterritorial offences in similar circumstances. Thus whether an offence committed outside the Requesting State’s territory is extraditable depends on domestic legislation in the Requested State that criminalises extraterritorial conduct.

• Domestic limitations and immunities: Article 3(1)(e) refers to immunity from prosecution or punishment by lapse of time “according to the law of either Contracting Party.” That indicates limitation periods and amnesty-like rules under domestic law inform a treaty‑based refusal ground.

• Multilateral Conventions: Article 3(3) expressly states that the Treaty shall not affect obligations under multilateral Conventions. Practically, that means if Australia or Belgium has assumed obligations under a multilateral treaty that affects extradition (for example, United Nations instruments), those obligations retain their force and may displace or supplement the bilateral terms.

• Termination of prior bilateral instruments: Article 17 terminates earlier bilateral extradition instruments (the 1901 Treaty and subsequent supplements) between Australia and Belgium on entry into force of this Treaty. This affects the legal landscape by replacing earlier treaty obligations with the 1985 Treaty text.

• Procedural law on evidence and authentication: Article 6 sets authentication standards for documents. How domestic rules of evidence and the operation of courts treat foreign documentary proof will interact with this authentication clause, which says authenticated documents “shall be admitted in evidence” in extradition proceedings in the Requested State.

• Transit and transport law: Article 14(2) and (3) subject permission for transit and custody during transit to the law of the Requested State. That means domestic aviation, immigration, and detention laws influence how transit is executed.

• Human Rights and constitutional law: while not mentioned in the Treaty, the discretionary grounds (Article 3(2)(f) on humanitarian considerations) and death‑penalty assurances (Article 3(2)(c)) will interact with domestic human‑rights jurisprudence and constitutional protections in each State; Article 3(3) indicates multilateral obligations also retain force.

In short, the Regulations and Treaty overlay a bilateral treaty framework on the domestic Extradition Act 1988 and interact with domestic criminal law, evidence rules, immigration and transit law, human‑rights obligations and any multilateral conventions to which either Contracting Party is a party. Practitioners must always read Treaty terms alongside domestic statutory procedures and case law under the Extradition Act and related statutory regimes.

The instrument itself provides a concise administrative history in the text and the Note appended to the Schedule.

• Making and notification dates: The Regulations were made by the Governor‑General dated 24 November 1988 (preamble). The Note to the Treaty indicates the instrument was notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 30 November 1988. The Treaty was signed at Brussels on 4 September 1985 by representatives for Australia and the Kingdom of Belgium and is described in Regulation 4 as having “came into force on 19 November 1986” (Regulation 4 and Schedule header referencing “came into force on 19 November 1986”).

• Statutory Rule citation: The Regulations are Statutory Rules 1988 No. 288, and the Treaty is referenced as S.R. 317/88 in the Schedule header notation (the Schedule contains the parenthetical reference “S.R. 317/88,Cat. No. 14/16.11.1988”).

• Treaty operation and supersession: Article 16 gives the Treaty its own entry into force mechanics (30 days after written notice of compliance with domestic requirements), and Article 17 expressly terminates the earlier bilateral extradition arrangements (Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitive Criminals, Brussels 1901, and two Supplementary Conventions of 1907 and 1911) on entry into force of the 1985 Treaty. Those provisions record internal succession of treaty instruments.

• Later amendments: The Regulations as provided contain no text indicating any subsequent amendments. The Schedule does not include amending protocols. The instrument’s own text is in the form of the original 1988 Regulations accompanying the 1985 Treaty. The Note at the end only reports Gazette notification; it does not report subsequent variation.

• Practical consequence: absent any amendment text in the instrument, practitioners should treat the Regulations and the Schedule as reflecting the original 1988 declaration and the 1985 Treaty terms. Any later changes to the Extradition Act 1988, separate protocols amending the Treaty, or subsequent orders altering the list of extradition countries would be contained in other instruments or legislation and are not reflected in this document.

For compliance and research, the final paragraph printed in the Schedule indicates the Treaty was “Done in duplicate at Brussels, on 4 September 1985, in English, French and Dutch, each text being equally authentic,” and provides the signatures. Those canonical facts support treaty authenticity and the dates that determine when earlier treaties ceased between the Parties. If a practitioner needs the amendment record beyond the instrument, the appropriate next steps are to consult later statutory instruments, legislative amendment records to the Extradition Act 1988, Treaty registers and the Commonwealth Gazette beyond the 30 November 1988 notification cited in the Note.

The instrument itself contains no case law, judicial commentary or litigation history. The Regulations set out the treaty text and administrative details; they do not report decisions applying the Treaty, nor do they reference judicial interpretation. Consequently, the Schedule provides no litigation citations or judicial exposition.

Implications for practitioners and researchers:

• Primary source status: because the Treaty text and Regulations do not include litigation history, any judicial interpretation of the Treaty’s provisions will be found in subsequent domestic cases or in Belgian jurisprudence, not in the instrument. For questions of domestic procedure and judicial application, counsel must consult case law under the Extradition Act 1988 and any reported decisions where Australian courts have applied or interpreted the Belgium Treaty provisionally or substantively.

• Points likely to generate litigation: the Treaty’s text identifies subjects that commonly produce contested litigation in extradition matters , interpretation of dual criminality and the “totality” of acts (Article 2(3)); the political offence exception and persecution concerns (Article 3(1)(a)-(b)); the application of the death penalty assurance principle (Article 3(2)(c)); the adequacy of documentary evidence and authentication (Articles 5-6); the operation of the rule of speciality and its exceptions (Article 12); and the effect of provisional arrest deadlines (Article 8). These are standard points of judicial scrutiny in extradition litigation, and they are the areas in which one should expect legal argument and precedent to exist.

• Recommended next steps to locate litigation: practitioners should search Australian federal and state court databases and the High Court for decisions interpreting the Extradition Act 1988 in cases involving Belgium (or treaties broadly) and consult the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade treaty database and the Commonwealth Gazette for any notes or later instruments. Belgium’s domestic jurisprudence and decisions of Belgian courts on treaty interpretation may also be relevant for cross‑border questions. Because Article 3(3) preserves multilateral obligations, litigation involving multilateral instruments that Australia or Belgium has signed may also bear on interpretation.

• No litigation record in text: conclude that the Regulations and Schedule as promulgated do not themselves supply litigation history; practitioners must look to external jurisprudence and administrative practice records for interpretive guidance and enforcement precedents.

The text contains discrete drafting features and procedural traps that practitioners should note; they produce risks in practice that are concrete and testable against the text.

• Documentary and translation exactness: Article 5 prescribes specific documents and, in the case of Australia, requires “a statement of the law applicable to the offence” for common law offences (Article 5(2)(e)). Failure to provide the documents or to translate them into one of the Requested State’s languages (Article 5(4)) can trigger a request for additional information under Article 7 and may lead to the person’s release if additional information is not supplied within the time specified (Article 7(2)-(3)). Practitioners preparing requests must ensure completeness and accurate translations; gaps create procedural risk.

• Authentication standard and admissibility: Article 6 sets a defined standard for authentication: signature or certification by a Judge, Magistrate or officer of the Requesting State plus an official/public seal (Article 6(2)(a)-(b)). While Article 6(1) says such a document “shall be admitted in evidence,” domestic courts still have procedural rules governing evidence and admissibility; parties should be aware that the Treaty’s authentication standard may be necessary but not always sufficient for satisfying domestic evidentiary standards.

• Provisional arrest time limit: Article 8(4) requires the full request and supporting documents to be received within 45 days of provisional arrest or the person may be released. This is a hard operational deadline: failure to meet it will usually produce release without prejudice to a later request, but it may cost the Requesting State the custody advantage and complicate evidence preservation.

• Asymmetry in temporal test for offences (Article 2(5)): the Treaty applies a different temporal test depending on whether the request originates from Belgium or Australia. For requests from Belgium, the Treaty requires: (i) that it was an offence under Belgian law at the time of the acts; and (ii) that the acts would have constituted an offence in Australia at the time of making the request (Article 2(5)(a)(i)-(ii)). For requests from Australia, the test is that it was an offence under both Contracting Parties at the time of the acts (Article 2(5)(b)). This asymmetry can affect the viability of particular requests and is a detail that must be checked case‑by‑case.

• Typographical inconsistencies: the text uses “forty five days” in several places but Article 12(3) contains a typographical rendering “forty live days.” While courts usually treat typographical errors in context, practitioners should be alert to such inconsistencies and verify the operative timelines in domestic legislation (Extradition Act 1988) and in authoritative treaty text recorded by government treaty repositories.

• Rule of speciality exceptions and voluntary return windows: Article 12(3) exempts the Rule of Speciality where the person had “an opportunity to leave the Requesting State and has not done so within forty five days of final discharge” or has “returned voluntarily to the territory of the Requesting State after leaving it.” That window and the factual question of whether the person had an “opportunity to leave” often generate factual disputes which can determine whether the Requested State’s consent is necessary for additional prosecutions.

• Nationality refusal with optional domestic prosecution: Article 3(2)(a) permits a Requested State to refuse extradition of its nationals. It also sets an obligation, where the Requested State refuses extradition of its nationals, to submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution if the other party so requests and its laws allow. This creates a potential enforcement gap if the Requested State’s domestic law does not permit prosecution or chooses not to pursue it.

• Costs allocation: Article 15(1) imposes on the Requested State the duty to “make all necessary arrangements for and meet the cost of any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition and shall otherwise represent the interest of the Requesting State.” This allocation may be surprising for Requesting States used to paying for some stages of the process and can influence strategic decisions about where to seek arrest and how to resource proceedings. Article 14(4) requires the Requesting State to reimburse the Requested State for transit expenses, so practitioners should budget for cross‑border logistics accordingly.

• Property surrender complexity: Article 11 allows surrender of property “to the extent permitted under the law of the Requested State,” while preserving third‑party rights and allowing requested temporary retention for domestic proceedings. Competing civil claims and third‑party rights can thus delay or complicate the transfer of assets.

• Multilateral obligations preserved: Article 3(3) states that the Article 3 exceptions do not affect obligations assumed under multilateral Conventions. Practitioners must ensure that multilateral treaty obligations are considered and do not inadvertently rely on bilateral terms to override wider international commitments.

These “gotchas” are concrete procedural and substantive points that can determine the success or failure of an extradition request or the permissibility of extradition in any given case. They should be specifically addressed in any operational checklists or legal submissions.

This section provides a practical compliance checklist split between the Requesting State (the authority seeking extradition), the Requested State (the authority receiving and deciding on the request), and operational actors (courts, custodial authorities, transport agencies).

For the Requesting State (when Australia seeks a person in Belgium, or Belgium seeks a person in Australia):

1. Verify dual criminality and penalty thresholds:

   • Confirm the alleged conduct meets Article 2’s dual‑criminality test: punishable under laws of both Parties by imprisonment for a maximum of at least one year (Article 2(1)).
   • For enforcement of sentence cases, ensure a sentence of at least one year was imposed and at least three months remain to be served (Article 2(1)).

2. Prepare required documentation (Article 5):

   • For accused persons: warrant for arrest or copy of warrant; statement of each offence and statement of acts/omissions alleged (Article 5(2)(a)).
   • For persons convicted in absence: judgment authorising apprehension plus statements of offences and acts (Article 5(2)(b)).
   • For persons convicted: documents evidencing conviction and sentence, enforceability of the sentence and extent of sentence not carried out (Article 5(2)(c)-(d)).
   • In all cases: text of the provision of law creating the offence (or where Australian common law offence, a statement of applicable law) including limitation rules and statement of punishment (Article 5(2)(e)); and as accurate a description as possible of the person claimed and identity/nationality information (Article 5(2)(f)).

3. Authenticate documents per Article 6:

   • Ensure documents are certified/signed by a Judge, Magistrate or relevant officer and bear an official/public seal or ministerial/department seal recognised under Article 6(2).

4. Translate into one of the languages of the Requested State (Article 5(4)):

   • Obtain accurate translations of all supporting documents into an official language of the Requested State.

5. Use diplomatic channels (Article 5(1)):

   • Send the written request and supporting documents through the diplomatic channel; for urgency consider Article 8 provisional arrest via INTERPOL or other written means.

6. Provisional arrest (Article 8):

   • If provisional arrest is sought, include description of person, statement that full request will be made, confirmation of existence of one of Article 5 documents authorising apprehension, statement of the punishment, and if requested, statement of the acts or omissions alleged (Article 8(2)).
   • Be prepared to supply the full diplomatic request within 45 days of provisional arrest to avoid release under Article 8(4).

7. Death penalty and assurances (Article 3(2)(c)):

   • If the offence carries capital punishment under Requesting State law, be prepared to provide assurances acceptable to the Requested State that the death penalty will not be carried out.

8. Prepare for property and transit arrangements (Articles 11 and 14):

   • If property restitution/evidence seizing is relevant, coordinate with the Requested State under Article 11, recognising the Requested State’s domestic law and third‑party rights.
   • For transit, secure permission and be ready to reimburse transit expenses (Article 14(4)).

For the Requested State (e.g. domestic Australian authorities receiving a request from Belgium, or Belgian authorities receiving from Australia):

1. Check documentary sufficiency and request additional information if needed (Article 7):

   • Use Article 7(1) to request additional information where documentary support is insufficient, specifying a time limit for receipt.
   • If the person is under arrest and additional information is not forthcoming or not sufficient, consider release but note Article 7(2) preserves the right to receive a fresh request.

2. Apply mandatory and discretionary refusal grounds (Article 3):

   • Evaluate political offence exception, risk of persecution on enumerated grounds, immunity by lapse of time, final judgments, military‑only offences, nationality, pending domestic prosecutions, death penalty concerns, and humanitarian considerations such as age or health.
   • Document reasons for refusal or for requesting assurances where appropriate.

3. Authentication and admissibility:

   • Accept documents authenticated per Article 6 as admissible in extradition proceedings, subject to domestic procedural standards. Where authentication is contested, follow domestic evidence rules consistent with Article 6.

4. Provisional arrest and timelines:

   • On receipt of provisional arrest requests, arrange for arrest and notify the Requesting State promptly, and monitor the 45‑day deadline to receive the formal request (Article 8(3)-(4)).

5. Competing requests (Article 9):

   • When multiple States request extradition of the same person, determine which State should receive the person, taking into account the factors in Article 9(2), and promptly notify all Requesting States of the decision.

6. Surrender logistics (Article 10):

   • When granting extradition, communicate the decision through diplomatic channels and coordinate the removal from a point of departure convenient to the Requesting State. Specify a reasonable period for removal and be prepared to refuse if the Requesting State does not remove the person within that period (Article 10(2)-(3)).

7. Uphold rule of speciality (Article 12) and consent for third‑State surrender (Article 13):

   • Ensure prosecutions post‑extradition are limited to offences for which extradition was granted or to extraditable offences with consent; for surrender to third States obtain Requested State consent or clear proof the specialty exceptions apply.

Operational and custodial compliance:

• Custody and maintenance funding: the Requested State bears arrest and custody costs in its territory (Article 15(2)); budget for these costs and liaise with the Requesting State on transit reimbursements.

• Property and evidence handling: where property is to be surrendered, consider temporary retention for domestic proceedings (Article 11(4)) and preserve rights of third parties; arrange return without charge when appropriate (Article 11(3)).

• Records and diplomatic liaison: retain thorough records of communications through diplomatic channels, translations, authentication certificates and any assurances accepted (for example, death‑penalty undertakings).

Practical drafting tips:

• For Australian requests: prepare a clear statement of law where common law offences are charged, including precedent citations where appropriate, to satisfy Article 5(2)(e).

• For death‑penalty cases: frame proposed assurances in language likely to satisfy the Requested State, and be prepared to negotiate form and scope.

• Timeframes: design operational plans that respect the 45‑day provisional arrest rule and the “reasonable period” for removal in Article 10(3); delays risk loss of custody and the need to re‑initiate steps.

• Review of domestic law: because the Treaty expressly defers to the law of the Requested State on certain points (extraterritorial jurisdiction, transit custody, property laws), confirm domestic statutes and case law before acting.

This checklist is not exhaustive but highlights the treaty‑specified procedural steps and the practical actions necessary to comply with the Regulations and the Treaty in cross‑border extradition matters.