Relevant network: The Bill defines "relevant network" to mean any transmission system that is part of the South West interconnected system regulated under Part 8 and any other transmission system prescribed by regulations, but only if that system is regulated under Part 8 (s 129V(1)(a)-(b), s 129V(3)). The definition therefore links the scope of the regime to the Part 8 regulatory perimeter and allows the regulations to extend coverage to other Part 8 regulated transmission systems.

Capital charge: The statutory concept of a capital charge is introduced as a payment a person is required to pay to a network service provider in specified circumstances (s 129W(2)). The Bill does not itself define a numerical or formulaic meaning for "capital charge"; rather, s 129W(3) expressly permits regulations to prescribe the amount, a calculation method, and indexation.

Person liable and related entity: Section 129W(1) defines "related entity" in two parts: it expressly adopts the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) definition of related body corporate (s 129W(1)(a)) and allows regulations to prescribe additional classes of related entities (s 129W(1)(b)). Liability to pay a capital charge arises where a person enters into or modifies an access agreement in the circumstances prescribed by regulations (s 129W(2)(a)), or where an additional circumstance specified in the Code/rules exists (s 129W(2)(b)). Subsection 129W(4) clarifies that such additional circumstances may include making an application to enter into or modify an access agreement, or having access under another contract or an arbitration determination.

Regulations and Code/rules split: The Bill deliberately allocates matters between regulations and the Code/rules. Regulations are to prescribe who pays and the charge amounts, indexation, eligibility criteria and differing amounts by network/provider/transfer rate (s 129W(3)). The Code/rules may address the mechanics of payment (instalments, interest, guarantees), record keeping of revenue from capital charges, implementation or facilitation of the adjustment mechanism, requirements for relevant instruments to facilitate compliance, and any other matter prescribed by regulations (s 129Z(2)). The Bill allows the Code/rules to modify regulations to adapt them to additional circumstances specified in the Code/rules (s 129Y).

Adjustment mechanism: Regulations that create capital charge circumstances must also provide for an "adjustment mechanism" designed to ensure a network service provider does not earn more revenue than would have been permitted under Part 8 if Part 9C had not been in place (s 129X(1)). Regulations may specify how the adjustment must be implemented or facilitated, the period for which it applies, and may authorise the Authority to determine or implement it (s 129X(2)).

Ministerial recommendation: Regulations under the Part may only be made on the recommendation of the Minister, who may recommend only if satisfied the regulations are consistent with the Part’s objective and the State electricity objective (s 129ZB(1)-(2)).

Coordinator oversight and information sharing: The Coordinator must conduct a report on the scheme’s consistency with the Part objective and the State electricity objective as soon as practicable after the 5th anniversary of the Part’s operation and thereafter at intervals not exceeding five years, and provide the report to the Minister (s 129ZC). The Authority must disclose information requested by the Coordinator necessary for that function, and such disclosures are protected from civil or criminal liability and are not breaches of confidentiality duties or professional standards (s 129ZD).

Transitional powers: The Bill adds Part 12 to provide for transitional regulations which may be retrospective to commencement day in limited ways, but not so as to prejudice private rights existing before publication day or impose liabilities for actions before publication day (ss 147-148). The Minister may be authorised by transitional regulations to make orders determining how matters in progress are treated and to amend existing instruments to facilitate transition, subject to publication requirements (s 149).

Amendment of references to the Code: Part 3 of the Bill (commencing with a provision of a different Act) replaces references to "Code" with "electricity system and market rules" in multiple sections (ss 7-11) and deletes the provision that made regulations prevail over the Code (s 129ZA deleted by s 10 of this Bill). The effect is a change in the subordinate instrument referenced by the primary Act to implement many operational details; Part 3’s timing is linked to the commencement of section 53 of the Electricity Industry Amendment (Distributed Energy Resources) Act 2024 (s 2(b)).

Network service providers operating relevant networks: The primary operational burden and subject matter of the Bill is revenue earned by network service providers who operate transmission systems classified as relevant networks. The Part’s objective explicitly concerns "network service providers who operate the systems" and aims to ensure over a certain period those providers "do not earn more revenue than would have been permitted under Part 8" absent this Part (s 129U(2)(b)). The Bill requires these providers to accept capital charge payments from persons accessing services and to keep records of revenue as the Code/rules may require (s 129Z(2)(b)).

Persons entering into or modifying access agreements: The immediate targets of the new payment obligation are persons who enter into or modify access agreements in circumstances prescribed by regulations, and those who obtain access by other contracts or arbitration where the Code/rules specify such circumstances (s 129W(2)(a)-(b), s 129W(4)). The regulations may create eligibility criteria to determine which persons or classes of persons are required to pay (s 129W(3)(b)).

Related entities: A person’s related entities can be made liable. "Related entity" is defined to include related bodies corporate as in the Corporations Act and any other persons the regulations prescribe (s 129W(1)). This expands potential liability beyond the immediate contracting counterparty where the regulations choose to do so.

Market participants with arbitration or other contractual access: The Bill explicitly contemplates that access obtained under other contracts, agreements or arbitration determinations can be subject to capital charges (s 129W(4)(b)). Therefore parties who secure access outside the formalised access agreement route can be drawn into the scheme if the Code/rules specify so.

The Authority and Coordinator: The Authority may be authorised to determine or implement adjustment mechanisms (s 129X(2)(c)) and must disclose information to the Coordinator when requested (s 129ZD(1)). The Coordinator is required to review the scheme periodically and report to the Minister (s 129ZC). Thus the regulator and the Coordinator are organisationally affected, with new functions and interagency information sharing obligations.

The Minister and the executive: Regulations under the Part can be made only on the Minister’s recommendation, and the Minister must be satisfied of consistency with the Part objective and the State electricity objective (s 129ZB). Transitional regulations and orders under s 149 may authorise the Minister to treat matters in progress and amend existing instruments, imposing executive-level discretion in the transitional phase.

Contracting counterparties and holders of existing access instruments: Transitional provisions permit the Minister or the Code/rules to provide for how existing instruments and things in progress are to be treated (s 149(2)-(3)). The Bill therefore affects rights and obligations under existing access instruments, to the extent transitional regulations and orders are made.

Regulated transmission systems outside SWIS: The regulations may prescribe other transmission systems as relevant networks, but only if those systems are regulated under Part 8 (s 129V(3)). Operators and users of such Part 8 regulated systems outside the South West interconnected system may therefore be brought within scope by regulation.

Legal advisers, contract drafters and compliance teams: Parties who draft or review access agreements will need to track regulatory development because the statutory payment obligation is tightly linked to regulatory prescriptions and Code/rules specification (s 129W(3)-(4), s 129Z(2)).

Notably absent: The Bill does not itself create criminal or civil penalties for failure to pay a capital charge, nor does it set administrative enforcement provisions within the text inserted (no penalty or enforcement sections appear in Part 9C as presented). Where enforcement, sanctions or registration consequences may arise will depend on the content of the regulations, the Code/rules, or other parts of the Act (see ss 129W-129ZD for scope and delegation).

Duty to pay capital charge where prescribed: The central statutory duty is that a person is required to pay a capital charge to a network service provider where the person enters into or modifies an access agreement in the circumstances prescribed by regulations, or an additional circumstance specified in the Code/rules exists (s 129W(2)). The regulations may make provision for the amount, methods of calculation, indexation, and differing amounts by network, provider or transfer rate (s 129W(3)(a), (c)).

Regulatory-design duty to include an adjustment mechanism: If regulations prescribe circumstances in which capital charges apply, they must also include an adjustment mechanism designed to ensure that, over a certain period, the network service provider does not earn more revenue than would have been permitted under Part 8 had this Part not applied (s 129X(1)). The regulations may further set implementation details for that mechanism, the applicable period and may authorise the Authority to determine or implement it (s 129X(2)).

Right of the Code/rules to specify enabling circumstances and mechanics: The Code/rules may specify "additional circumstances" that bring a person within the capital charge regime (s 129W(2)(b)). The Code/rules are given explicit power to make provision for payment mechanics, record keeping, implementation or facilitation of adjustment mechanisms, and to require relevant instruments to provide for requirements under the Part (s 129Z(2)(a)-(d)).

Ministerial recommendation constraint: Regulations under the Part can only be made on the recommendation of the Minister, and the Minister may recommend them only if satisfied of consistency with the Part objective and the State electricity objective (s 129ZB(1)-(2)). This imposes a gatekeeper role on the Minister for all regulations implementing the scheme.

Coordinator review and Authority disclosure duties: The Coordinator must review and report on scheme consistency at five‑year intervals and provide the report to the Minister (s 129ZC). The Authority must disclose information requested by the Coordinator to enable this review (s 129ZD(1)). Section 129ZD(2) protects the Authority and individuals from liability for such disclosure, and states the disclosure is not a breach of duties of confidentiality, secrecy or professional standards.

Transitional ministerial powers: Transitional regulations may authorise the Minister to determine how matters in progress are to be treated and to amend existing instruments to facilitate transition (s 149(2)). The Code/rules may also provide how things done under an existing instrument in relation to transitional matters should be treated from a day not earlier than commencement day (s 149(3)).

Limits on backward effect of transitional regulations: Transitional regulations may take effect earlier than publication day but not earlier than commencement day and may not operate so as to prejudice rights of private persons existing before publication day or impose liabilities on them in respect of actions done before publication day (s 148(2)-(3)).

Delegation and authorisation powers: Regulations may authorise the Authority to determine or implement adjustment mechanisms (s 129X(2)(c)), and the Code/rules can make provision for matters that would otherwise be within regulations, including payment methods and record-keeping (s 129Z(2)). These provisions create potential duties on the Authority and procedural obligations in subordinate instruments.

Rights not set out in the Bill: The Bill does not set out specific dispute resolution, enforcement, penalties, or administrative review mechanisms for capital charges within the inserted Part 9C text. Any enforcement or remedial regime will need to be read from the regulations, the Code/rules, or other parts of the Act.

The inserted Part 9C, as drafted in the Bill, does not itself prescribe civil or criminal penalties, infringement provisions, or administrative enforcement mechanisms for failure to pay a capital charge. The statutory text focuses on creating the legal basis for imposing capital charges, delegating the amount, timing, payment methods and supporting mechanics to regulations and the Code/rules (s 129W(3), s 129Z(2)). Because the Bill leaves these implementation details to subordinate instruments, enforcement mechanisms (for example, interest, debt recovery, suspension or termination of access, administrative fines) would have to be specified in those instruments or elsewhere in the Act.

Regulatory design constraint: The Bill requires an adjustment mechanism to prevent network service providers from earning more revenue than would have been allowed under Part 8 (s 129X(1)). That adjustment mechanism may include enforcement‑type features (for instance, revenue clawbacks, offsets, accounting adjustments), but the Bill does not prescribe the remedies. The regulations may authorise the Authority to determine or implement such mechanisms (s 129X(2)(c)), which implies an institutional role for the Authority in implementation and potentially enforcement, subject to whatever powers the regulations or the Act otherwise confer.

Payment mechanics and securities: The Code/rules may make provision for the way in which a capital charge is payable, including instalments, charging of interest and the use of guarantees as security (s 129Z(2)(a)). Those provisions could create contractual and security rights enforceable under general law and the Code/rules. The Bill therefore contemplates typical commercial enforcement methods being available via the subordinate instruments rather than by primary legislation in Part 9C.

Information disclosure with legal protections: Where the Coordinator requests information from the Authority to perform the Coordinator’s review, the Authority must disclose the information (s 129ZD(1)). Section 129ZD(2) provides statutory protection against civil or criminal liability and treats that disclosure as not constituting breaches of confidentiality duties or professional standards. Those protections lower the legal risk for the Authority in sharing information but do not themselves create enforcement mechanisms for non‑compliance with disclosure requests; the Bill does not specify penalties for failure to disclose.

Transitional orders and amendments to instruments: Transitional regulations may authorise the Minister to amend existing instruments to facilitate transitional matters (s 149(2)(b)). The Bill enables modification of contractual or regulatory instruments by order to provide for transition in limited circumstances, but again does not specify penalty regimes for non‑compliance with such orders; any compulsory amendment mechanism’s enforceability will be a function of the Minister’s statutory power under transitional regulations and the procedural safeguards included therein.

Implications of absence: Practitioners should note that the Bill delegates enforcement content to the regulations and the Code/rules. The presence or absence of explicit penalties, dispute processes, administrative review rights and enforcement powers will matter materially to affected parties, but the Bill itself does not contain that content. Consequently, the regulatory instruments that follow will determine the legal risks and enforcement pathways.

Relationship with Part 8 revenue framework: The Bill’s adjustment mechanism is expressly designed to ensure that, over a specified period, network service providers "do not earn more revenue than would have been permitted under Part 8 if this Part had not come into operation" (s 129X(1); see also s 129U(2)(b)). The design and measurement of that comparison necessarily depend on the existing Part 8 regulatory revenue framework. The Bill does not itself define the technical accounting or timing rules for that comparison; instead it mandates an adjustment mechanism to achieve the outcome (s 129X(1)-(2)).

Linkage to Corporations Act definition of related body corporate: The Bill references the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for the meaning of "related body corporate" when defining "related entity" (s 129W(1)(a)). That cross‑reference draws private company law definitions into the capital charges regime and therefore connects corporate group structures governed by Commonwealth law to liability under the State Act.

Interaction between regulations and Code/rules: The Bill assigns complementary roles to regulations and the Code/rules. Regulations prescribe who pays and the amounts; the Code/rules may set payment mechanics, record keeping and facilitate adjustment mechanisms (s 129W(3), s 129Z(2)). Initially the Bill included an express provision that, in the event of inconsistency, regulations prevail over the Code (s 129ZA). However, Part 3 of the Bill deletes s 129ZA (s 10) and replaces references to the Code with "electricity system and market rules" (ss 7-11). The deletion of s 129ZA removes the express legislative prioritisation between regulations and the Code/rules at the textual level; consequential interpretative questions will depend on the broader Act and common statutory construction principles.

Subordinate instrument hierarchy and Ministerial recommendation: Regulations under the Part may be made only on the recommendation of the Minister and subject to satisfaction of consistency with the Part’s objective and the State electricity objective (s 129ZB). This introduces an executive-control interaction between the primary Act, regulations and the State electricity objective, which itself is a statutory objective elsewhere in the Act. The Minister’s role affects how delegated instruments interact with the Act’s policy goals.

Authority and Coordinator functions under the Act: The Authority may be authorised by regulations to determine or implement the adjustment mechanism (s 129X(2)(c)), and must disclose information to the Coordinator on request for review purposes (s 129ZD(1)). These provisions interact with the Authority’s existing statutory functions and information sharing regimes under the Act. The statutory protection from liability for disclosures to the Coordinator (s 129ZD(2)) intersects with confidentiality obligations in other statutory or contractual regimes and modifies legal risk for the Authority when cooperating with the Coordinator’s review.

Transitional instruments and existing instruments: Transitional regulations and Ministerial orders can amend existing relevant instruments and determine how matters in progress are to be treated (s 149(2)). The Code/rules may also provide how existing instruments’ obligations are treated from a specified day (s 149(3)). This creates an interaction between the new Part, transitional regulations and pre‑existing access agreements and published/approved instruments under the Code/rules, potentially affecting contractual rights and regulatory commitments.

State electricity objective: The Bill repeatedly conditions the Minister’s recommendation and the Coordinator’s review on consistency with the State electricity objective (s 129ZB(2), s 129ZC). The State electricity objective therefore functions as a statutory constraint and benchmark against which the capital charges scheme must be tested, linking Part 9C to the broader statutory objectives governing electricity policy in the Act.

Absence of explicit enforcement provisions in Part 9C: Because Part 9C is silent on penalties and enforcement, interaction with other enforcement provisions elsewhere in the Act will be important. Recovery of unpaid charges, regulatory sanctions and dispute resolution may have to rely on other parts of the Act, the regulations, or the Code/rules.

Electoral and administrative law interfaces: The Bill creates substantial delegated rule‑making via regulation and Code/rules with a Ministerial recommendation gate. Administrative law principles (procedural fairness, reasonableness) will apply to decisions made under those instruments, and any authorisation to the Authority to implement adjustment mechanisms will be exercised within the broader administrative law framework.

The Bill itself records a two‑stage amendment structure across Parts 2 and 3.

• Part 2 (Amendments commencing on the day after Royal Assent): This Part amends the Electricity Industry Act 2004 by inserting Part 9C , the Capital Charges Scheme , comprising ss 129U through 129ZD. It also inserts a new Part 12 (ss 147-149) providing transitional provisions. The new sections set out the Part’s objective (s 129U), terms used (s 129V), capital charge mechanism (s 129W), mandatory adjustment mechanism (s 129X), powers for the Code to modify regulations (s 129Y), matters the Code may deal with (s 129Z), the relationship between regulations and the Code (s 129ZA), Minister’s recommendation requirement (s 129ZB), Coordinator’s review (s 129ZC) and disclosure obligations (s 129ZD). The transitional Part 12 defines terms (s 147), confers power to make transitional regulations (s 148), and enables Ministerial orders and Code/rules treatment of existing instruments and matters in progress (s 149).

• Part 3 (Amendments commencing with Electricity Industry Amendment (Distributed Energy Resources) Act 2024 Part 3): Part 3 updates references from the "Code" to "electricity system and market rules" in ss 129W(2)(b), 129Y(1), 129Z(1) and 129Z(2). It deletes s 129ZA (the provision giving precedence to regulations over the Code) (s 10). It also adjusts the definition of "relevant instrument" in s 149(1) to include instruments that were relevant instruments immediately before the day on which the Distributed Energy Resources Act provision came into operation (s 11(1)). The timing of Part 3 is linked to the separate Act’s s 53: Part 3 commences the day after assent if that other Act’s s 53 has already commenced, or otherwise immediately after that section commences (s 2(b)).

Commencement sequencing: Section 2 of the Bill sets out that Part 1 commences on assent day, the rest of the Act commences the day after assent day (s 2(c)), but Part 3 is treated specially and ties to the other Act as noted above (s 2(b)). This sequencing means that, depending on the operational fact of the other Act’s commencement, the transitional and substantive wording of the new Part may differ in time: Part 9C may first operate referring to the "Code" with s 129ZA in place, and later be altered by Part 3 to refer to "electricity system and market rules" and to delete s 129ZA. The Bill therefore carries a staged amendment history built into its own commencement clauses.

No recorded past legislative history or decisions: The Bill text contains no legislative history beyond its own internal structure and no cited cases, prior decisions, or amendment chronology beyond the two-part amendment described above. It does not, for example, list previous amendments to Part 8 or the State electricity objective; those remain to be read in the Act itself.

The Bill is a legislative instrument in progress and, as presented, does not contain any litigation history. There are no cases cited in the Bill text, nor are there references to judicial determinations, disputes, or prior litigation that have shaped the provisions. The inserted Part 9C and the transitional Part 12 are new statutory provisions; as such there is no case law arising from them at the time of the Bill text. Any litigation history in future will depend on the content of the regulations and the Code/rules made under the Part, and on how courts interpret the adjustment mechanism, Ministerial recommendation requirement, the interaction between regulations and the Code/rules (particularly after deletion of s 129ZA), and the transitional powers.

Because the Bill delegates substantive design to subordinate instruments, disputes that would generate litigation are likely to concern:

• the validity of regulations made on the Minister’s recommendation (s 129ZB);
• the content and operation of adjustment mechanisms and their compliance with the Part’s objective and the State electricity objective (s 129X, s 129U);
• whether a person is within a prescribed eligibility criterion or an "additional circumstance" in the Code/rules that triggers a capital charge (s 129W(2)-(4));
• the lawfulness of Ministerial orders or transitional amendments to existing instruments under s 149; and
• disclosure and confidentiality disputes arising from coordinator requests and Authority disclosures (s 129ZD).

At present the Bill contains no litigation record to cite.

Regulatory gap between principle and detail: The Bill sets an outline for capital charges but delegates almost all substantive details to regulations and the Code/rules (ss 129W(3), 129Z(2)). That means the legal effect and practical operation of the scheme will be determined by subordinate instruments which are not yet before Parliament. Practitioners must not assume details (amounts, instalments, enforcement) exist in the Bill; they will be in regulations and the Code/rules.

Ministerial gate on regulations: Regulations can only be made on the Minister’s recommendation and only if the Minister is satisfied of consistency with the Part objective and the State electricity objective (s 129ZB). This is not a mere formality. Parties should track the Minister’s public satisfaction and any accompanying statements or explanatory instruments, because they condition the validity of regulations.

Timing and staged substitution of "Code" and s 129ZA deletion: Part 3 changes multiple references from "Code" to "electricity system and market rules" and deletes the provision initially giving regulations priority over the Code (s 129ZA, deleted by s 10). Because Part 3 may commence at a different time (s 2(b)), there is potential for a period in which the Part refers to the Code and contains s 129ZA, and a later period in which the Code references are replaced by "electricity system and market rules" and s 129ZA removed. That staged change could create interpretative uncertainty for instruments made in the interregnum and for parties relying on the initial text.

Adjustment mechanism measurement: The adjustment mechanism must ensure that "over a certain period" network service providers do not earn more revenue than would have been permitted under Part 8 if Part 9C had not applied (s 129X(1)). The Bill does not define the measurement methodology, accounting conventions, or the temporal alignment between allowed revenue under Part 8 and capital charge receipts. How regulators implement this comparative measurement will be critical and possibly complex, involving vintage asset treatment, forecasting, and retrospective adjustments. The regulations and Code/rules will need to set clear accounting rules; until they do, uncertainty remains.

Scope of "relevant network" and extension by regulation: The primary definitional anchor is the South West interconnected system and other transmission systems if prescribed and regulated under Part 8 (s 129V(1)-(3)). That allows broad regulatory discretion to expand scope, but only within Part 8 regulated systems. Parties with assets or access rights outside SWIS should not assume immunity: regulations could add other Part 8 regulated systems.

Application to related entities: The definition of "related entity" imports Corporations Act concepts and permits further expansion by regulation (s 129W(1)). This can pull in corporate groups and affiliates, so whether a capital charge is payable may hinge on corporate structure. Be alert to group-level billing and allocation consequences.

Transitional ministerial amendment of existing instruments: Transitional regulations may authorise the Minister to amend existing instruments and determine how matters in progress are treated (s 149(2)). This power can alter rights and obligations under existing access agreements and other instruments, but the Bill also provides that transitional regulations cannot operate so as to prejudice private rights existing before publication day or impose liabilities for prior actions (s 148(3)). The precise way those constraints are applied will matter.

No penalties in the Bill: There are no express penalty clauses in the inserted Part 9C. Enforcement, remedies, and dispute resolution for non‑payment will depend on what the regulations and Code/rules provide or on other parts of the Act. Parties should not assume the existence of enforcement pathways until subordinate instruments are available.

Information disclosure protections versus confidentiality obligations: Section 129ZD(2) states that disclosure by the Authority to the Coordinator is not a breach of confidentiality duties, and the Authority incurs no civil or criminal liability for such disclosure. However, that statutory protection does not create an express right for third parties to access the disclosed information; it only protects the Authority when complying with Coordinator requests. Parties with commercially sensitive information supplied to the Authority should be aware their information may be shared with the Coordinator without creating liability for the Authority.

Potential for conflicting subordinate instruments: The Bill contemplates modifications of regulations by the Code/rules (s 129Y) to adapt regulations to additional circumstances specified in the Code/rules. That cross‑instrument modification regime creates complexity: tracking how a regulation has been modified by the Code/rules will be necessary to determine current legal obligations. After deletion of s 129ZA, the hierarchy between regulations and the Code/rules in cases of inconsistency is no longer expressly stated in Part 9C, leaving interpretative questions.

Broad delegation to the Authority: Regulations may authorise the Authority to determine or implement adjustment mechanisms (s 129X(2)(c)). Parties should monitor whether regulations choose to delegate substantive operational decisions to the Authority and, if so, what decision‑making processes, consultation and review mechanisms the Authority will be required to adopt.

Scan and map instruments and corporate structures: Immediately identify whether any transmission system you use or operate is a "relevant network" as defined (s 129V) or is likely to be prescribed as such by regulations. Map corporate relationships to determine whether you or related entities fall within the "related entity" concept (s 129W(1)), remembering that the Corporations Act related body corporate definition is expressly incorporated.

Review access agreements and pending applications: For entities that enter into or modify access agreements, review contract terms to determine whether new capital charge clauses may be triggered by contractual variation, novation, or application. Where the Code/rules may specify additional circumstances (s 129W(2)(b); s 129Y), check whether your existing form agreements or standard contracts could be interpreted as giving rise to a capital charge when read against the forthcoming regulations and rules.

Monitor and engage with subordinate instruments: The Bill delegates the crucial substantive matters , calculation methods, indexation, eligibility, instalments, interest, guarantees and records , to regulations and the Code/rules (s 129W(3), s 129Z(2)). Compliance requires actively tracking the drafting and promulgation of these instruments and participating in any consultation processes the Authority, Minister or rule maker conducts. The Minister’s recommendation is required before regulations can be made (s 129ZB), so monitoring Ministerial announcements and explanatory materials will be important.

Prepare accounting systems and record-keeping: The Code/rules may require maintenance of records of revenue earned from capital charges and set the method of maintaining those records (s 129Z(2)(b)). Operators and users should prepare accounting processes that can separately track capital charge receipts and interface with any adjustment mechanism accounting that seeks to compare actual revenues with Part 8 allowed revenue (s 129X(1)).

Negotiate security and payment terms in agreements: Because the Code/rules can deal with payment mechanics including instalments, interest and guarantees (s 129Z(2)(a)), contracting parties should consider incorporating clauses that address these matters, or reserving rights to negotiate payment security, instalment schedules, and tax treatment, subject to applicable regulation. If the Code/rules impose specific formats or requirements, contracts will need to be adjusted to reflect those mandated forms.

Be ready for adjustment mechanics: The adjustment mechanism required by the regulations must ensure no over‑recovery relative to Part 8 permitted revenue (s 129X(1)). Prepare systems to manage possible revenue offsets, clawbacks, accounting credits or reconciliations. Legal and accounting teams should model scenarios where capital charge receipts are adjusted against regulated revenue profiles, and identify potential timing mismatches.

Track transitional regulation and orders: Transitional regulations can be retrospective to commencement day but cannot prejudice private rights existing before publication day nor impose retrospective liabilities for actions done before publication day (s 148(2)-(3)). Nevertheless, transitional regulations may authorise the Minister to amend existing instruments and determine treatment of matters in progress (s 149(2)). Parties with current negotiations, in-flight projects, or pending applications should monitor transitional instruments closely and seek timely advice on how a Ministerial order could affect ongoing rights.

Respond to requests for information: The Authority must disclose information to the Coordinator on request to enable the Coordinator’s review (s 129ZD(1)), and that disclosure is protected from liability (s 129ZD(2)). Parties supplying information to the Authority should plan for potential onward disclosure to the Coordinator and take steps to manage commercially sensitive information, including marking confidential information and seeking protective arrangements where appropriate.

Legal and compliance checklist items:

• Confirm whether your activities are in a relevant network and whether your contracts will attract capital charges once regulations/rules are in force (s 129V, s 129W).
• Map all related entities and group arrangements that could trigger related entity liability (s 129W(1)).
• Implement accounting and record systems for capital charge receipts and for reconciling with Part 8 revenue (anticipate s 129X).
• Review and, if necessary, renegotiate access agreements to allocate capital charge responsibilities, payment terms, guarantees and dispute processes consistent with forthcoming regulations and rules (s 129Z(2)(a)).
• Monitor Ministerial recommendations and regulatory drafting timelines (s 129ZB).
• Prepare submissions for consultation processes on the regulations and the Code/rules to influence calculation methodology, indexing, eligibility criteria and adjustment mechanisms.
• Seek early advice on the possible impact of transitional regulations and Ministerial orders on existing contractual rights (ss 148-149).

Limitations and next steps: Because the Bill leaves core substantive matters to subordinate instruments, the most important compliance action is to monitor and engage in the development of regulations and the Code/rules. Organisations should allocate legal and regulatory resources to participate in the rule‑making processes and to prepare operational changes once the instruments are finalised.