Electoral and Referendum Regulations 2026

The instrument uses a compact set of legal concepts that determine access to information, how certain voters can vote by telephone/telephony assisted means, and how enrolment identity evidence operates. Several core concepts recur and drive the mechanics.

Prescribed authority and permitted purpose. The instrument specifies “prescribed authorities” for the definition in subsection 4(1) of the Act by listing Commonwealth agencies and authorities in the table in clause 1 of Schedule 1 (Reg 8; Schedule 1). For each listed agency the Schedule sets out permitted purposes, which Reg 11 makes into the statutory permitted purposes for paragraph 91A(2AA)(b) of the Act. The Act’s s90B mechanism (information sharing under the Act) is engaged by Reg 10 which authorises provision of information to those prescribed authorities “for the purposes” listed in the relevant Schedule item. The instrument therefore pairs named recipients with enumerated lawful uses of Roll information.

Electoral roll forms and marking. Reg 9 prescribes the manner to indicate that a person is not enrolled as a Commonwealth elector when working with State arrangements under paragraph 84(2)(a) of the Act: place a circle before the person’s name on the Roll. The instrument also prescribes permitted uses of Roll information for specific non‑standard users, such as a Commonwealth‑funded blood service (Reg 12), the Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Incorporated for the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (Reg 13), and other persons or organisations conducting medical research or population‑based health screening (Reg 14), subject to stated conditions including cross‑reference to Privacy Act guidelines (Reg 14(a)).

Additional identity evidence and unsigned enrolment claims. Reg 16 prescribes additional evidence types for the purposes of paragraph 98AA(2)(d) of the Act: a citizenship evidence number from a notice under s37 Australian Citizenship Act 2007, and the Medicare number where the person is covered by a Medicare card. Reg 18 relaxes signature formalities under subsection 382(7) of the Act by specifying that a claim or notice need only include date of birth and one of a set of specified identifiers (driver’s licence number, passport number, citizenship evidence number, Medicare number).

Electronically assisted voting. Part 4 creates a targeted, operationally detailed regime for “electronically assisted voting” by two defined classes: sight‑impaired persons (as defined by s202AA of the Act) and Antarctic electors (Reg 6 definitions; Reg 19 simplified outline). Core mechanics are:

• Electoral Commissioner must establish one or more authorised call centres and determine days/times/procedures for registration and voting (Regs 21-23).
• Registration is through the authorised call centre; the Commissioner must register compliant applicants and keep a register (Reg 22).
• Voting is by phone-assisted procedures: call centre operators (who must be pre‑poll voting officers within the meaning of the Act or the Referendum Act, Reg 6 definition) follow Commissioner‑determined procedures to confirm identity, record whether the person has already voted, assist the voter to indicate preferences, initial and mark ballot papers on behalf of the voter, read back preferences, envelope the papers and place the envelope, sealed, into a ballot‑box at the authorised call centre (Reg 24-25).
• Scrutineers may be appointed to attend authorised call centres, but attendance is regulated: appointments in writing to the Returning Officer, undertakings must be signed and submitted (Reg 27); scrutineers may not interfere or communicate except where reasonably necessary (Reg 28).
• Chain‑of‑custody rules for ballot boxes, sorting and forwarding envelopes, scrutiny by Divisional Returning Officer and strict liability prohibitions on unauthorised persons interfering with these tasks (Regs 26, 29-31).
• Criminal prohibitions extend to interfering with electronic systems used in connection with electronically assisted voting (Reg 33).

Registers and marking of voters. The instrument requires the Electoral Commissioner to record every registered electronically assisted voter who casts an electronically assisted vote (Reg 29). The record may be either a mark on an approved or certified list of voters or a separate document that states the voter’s name and Division; if a separate document is used, it must be forwarded to the Divisional Returning Officer who will place a mark beside the voter on the list (Reg 29(2)-(3)).

Transitional mechanics. The instrument contains transitional rules preserving the effect of certain provisions of the 2016 regulations for applications and writs made before commencement (Regs 34-35), and providing temporary continuity for agencies that lose specification or whose permitted purposes change, for a six‑month transition time (Reg 36).

Decision and operational control. The Electoral Commissioner is the central decision maker for the entire electronically assisted voting framework: establishing call centres, approving forms, determining days and procedures, giving directions to officers and maintaining registers (Regs 21-25). That centralisation places operational discretion with the Commissioner for both registration and voting mechanics.

Offences, strict liability and evidential burdens. The instrument creates a spectrum of penal consequences: from strict liability offences with relatively modest penalties for unauthorised handling of ballot materials and scrutiny (Regs 30(3), 31(4): 5 penalty units) to higher penalties for scrutineers who interfere or improperly communicate (Reg 28: 30 penalty units), interfering with voters or discovering how a voter voted (Reg 32: 10 penalty units), to 50 penalty units for destroying or interfering with electronic voting hardware or software used for electronically assisted voting (Reg 33). Two defences carry evidential burdens under the Criminal Code references in the instrument (Regs 32(2) note; Reg 33(2) note).

These concepts operate together to produce a framework that prescribes who may see Roll data and why, relaxes certain enrolment formalities while specifying acceptable evidence, and creates a controlled mechanism for telephony‑assisted voting with statutory chain‑of‑custody and criminal protections for systems and process integrity.

The instrument affects a defined set of actors across three spheres: the Electoral Commission and electoral staff, specified Commonwealth agencies and authorities, certain non‑government entities and persons, and two groups of electors.

Electoral Commission and electoral staff. The Electoral Commissioner is the primary decision‑maker under the instrument. The Commissioner must make arrangements for authorised call centres, determine written procedures and days/times for registration and voting, approve forms and documents for call centre operators, give directions to officers and maintain registers of registered electronically assisted voters (Regs 21-25, 29). Assistant Returning Officers and Divisional Returning Officers are specifically tasked with opening ballot‑boxes used at authorised call centres, sorting envelopes into division bundles and conducting the formal scrutiny (Regs 30-31). Call centre operators are defined as pre‑poll voting officers (Reg 6 definition) and therefore fall within the Act’s electoral officer framework. Electoral staff and officers who perform duties under the instrument are subject to the procedural and record‑keeping obligations described.

Prescribed Commonwealth agencies and authorities. Schedule 1 lists named Agencies and authorities that are specified as prescribed authorities for the definition in subsection 4(1) of the Act (Reg 8; Schedule 1 clause 1). These organisations are explicitly authorised to receive certain Roll information and to use it for enumerated “permitted purposes” (Reg 11). Those bodies include, among others, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (item 1), Australian Communications and Media Authority (item 2), Australian Federal Police (item 5), Australian Taxation Office (item 9), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (item 8), AUSTRAC (item 10), Services Australia (item 21) and a range of other Commonwealth departments and statutory agencies (Schedule 1 items 1-22). Each agency’s permitted purposes vary; they range from statistical collection and dissemination (ABS) to law enforcement functions, security vetting, fraud detection, locating individuals, verifying identities and administering particular Acts (Schedule 1 table).

Non‑government entities and researchers. The instrument prescribes permitted purposes for two named non‑government recipients and a broader category. Reg 13 prescribes that the Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Incorporated may use Roll information for the purpose of inviting persons to participate in the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes. Reg 12 prescribes specific permitted uses for a Commonwealth‑funded blood service (contacting donors and transfusion recipients in specified blood‑borne infection or adverse reaction circumstances). Reg 14 prescribes permitted purposes for “a person or organisation that conducts medical research or provides a health screening program” but conditions the conduct of medical research on compliance with guidelines issued under s95 of the Privacy Act 1988, and confines population‑based screening to programs funded in whole or in part by the Commonwealth. These provisions create pathways for certain non‑government actors to receive electoral data for narrowly defined health and research purposes.

Registered electronically assisted voters. The instrument defines “registered electronically assisted voter” to mean a sight‑impaired person or an Antarctic elector who is registered by the Electoral Commissioner under subsection 22(3) for this purpose (Reg 6 definition; Part 4). That limits the new electronically assisted voting procedure to two discrete elector classes: people with sight impairment as defined by section 202AA of the Act, and electors whose enrolment is in the Antarctic context. The instrument therefore does not authorise telephone‑assisted voting for other disabilities or remote electors outside these two classes.

Persons involved in provisional enrolment and enrolment processes. Reg 16, Reg 17 and Schedule 2 affect people seeking to enrol or provisionally enrol. Reg 16 prescribes additional evidence types that an applicant can provide, which will affect applicants for enrolment or provisional enrolment who hold Medicare cards or receive citizenship notices. Reg 17 and Schedule 2 list prescribed classes of electors who can make provisional enrolment applications as persons about to become Australian citizens (such as family counsellors, managers of community centres, certain staff members, prison officers, and persons before whom statutory declarations may be made).

Candidates, referendum appointers and scrutineers. Candidates in elections and persons who may appoint scrutineers at referendums are affected by the scrutineer rules in Reg 27. They may appoint scrutineers to monitor authorised call centres, but appointments must be in writing to the Returning Officer, the scrutineers must sign and submit undertakings in approved form under the Act or the Referendum Act and their attendance is limited (Reg 27). Scrutineers are also subject to criminal prohibitions on interference and on communications that are not reasonably necessary for their functions (Reg 28).

Data subjects and privacy. All electors whose Roll records are shared under the Act will be affected in practice by the expanded list of organisations permitted to receive Roll information and the enumerated permitted purposes. The instrument also creates a formal authorisation mechanism for providing Roll information to prescribed authorities (Reg 10). The instrument includes transitional arrangements that allow agencies previously specified in the 2016 regulations to continue certain uses for a transition period (Reg 36).

Third parties and potential contractors. The instrument defines “authorised call centre” and “call centre operator” but does not explicitly restrict the Electoral Commissioner’s arrangements to public servants or internal staff. The Commissioner “must make arrangements” and “may approve forms and other documents” (Regs 21-22), and consequently private contractors could be engaged in practice to operate call centres and provide technology, subject to the requisite approvals and that call centre operators be pre‑poll voting officers as defined (Reg 6). The instrument does not itself prescribe procurement or contracting modalities; it reserves operational details to the Electoral Commissioner.

Legal and compliance practitioners. Lawyers, compliance officers and advisers will be involved in advising agencies on permitted uses of Roll information (Schedule 1), drafting and reviewing undertakings and appointment notices for scrutineers (Reg 27), advising on evidentiary sufficiency for enrolment (Reg 16 and Reg 18) and in handling the criminal exposure and strict liability risks that the instrument creates for unauthorised handling of ballot‑box materials, interference and destruction of electoral hardware or software (Regs 28, 30(3), 31(4), 32-33).

In summary, the instrument directly affects electoral officials and staff, the Electoral Commissioner’s operational control of call centre voting, specified Commonwealth agencies and certain non‑government entities through Roll data access permissions, the small class of sight‑impaired and Antarctic electors who may use electronically assisted voting, candidates and scrutineers who participate in monitoring those call centres, and applicants for enrolment or provisional enrolment through altered identity evidence rules.

This instrument places procedural duties on the Electoral Commissioner and electoral officers, prescribes rights for certain electors to use electronically assisted voting, and defines obligations and limits on agencies permitted to receive Roll information. The duties and rights are tightly specified in the text of the Regulations.

Duties of the Electoral Commissioner. The Commissioner has multiple mandatory duties:

• Establishment and arrangements for authorised call centres: “must make arrangements for the establishment of one or more call centres” for registration and voting by sight‑impaired or Antarctic electors (Reg 21(1)). The Commissioner may also approve forms and documents to be used by call centre operators (Reg 21(2)).
• Registration procedures: must determine in writing the days and times on which people may apply to be registered as registered electronically assisted voters and procedures for assessing applications (Reg 22(1)). The Commissioner must register applicants who comply and keep a register (Reg 22(3)).
• Operational scheduling and procedural determinations: must determine, in writing, days and times when electronically assisted voting is to be available for a particular election or referendum and must determine procedures for call centre operators to use in assessing whether a person is a registered electronically assisted voter (Reg 23(a)-(b)). The Commissioner may give directions to officers in relation to requests for electronically assisted voting (Reg 23(c)).
• Record keeping: must make a record of registered electronically assisted voters who cast electronically assisted votes and ensure those records are made on an approved list/certified list or an alternative document forwarded to the Divisional Returning Officer for marking (Reg 29).
• Ballot handling instructions: the Commissioner’s arrangements interact with requirements taken from the Act for ballot‑box use; Regulations 26, 30 and 31 put duties on Assistant and Divisional Returning Officers to open authorised call centre ballot boxes, sort unopened envelopes into division bundles and forward them to the Divisional Returning Officer for scrutiny, and to conduct the scrutiny with modifications set out in the Regulations.

Duties of call centre operators and electoral officers. Call centre operators, as defined, are pre‑poll voting officers who must:

• Follow Commissioner‑determined procedures for registration (Reg 22(2)); for assessment of entitlement to vote by electronically assisted vote (Reg 24(2)(c)); and for enabling a registered electronically assisted voter to vote (Reg 25(1)-(2)). Those procedures may require the operator to ensure the voter receives the same information and voting options as on the ballot paper and to permit marking that will satisfy sections 239 or 240 of the Act (Reg 25(1) example).
• Ask whether the voter has already voted and record that information (Reg 25(3)).
• If the voter instructs how the ballot is to be marked, initial the ballot paper on the top front, mark it in accordance with instructions, read back preferences, envelope the paper with Division identified and place envelope in the authorised call centre ballot box (Reg 25(5)(a)-(e)).

Rights of registered electronically assisted voters. Registered electronically assisted voters have the right to:

• Be registered by the Electoral Commissioner if they comply with the procedures (Reg 22(3)).
• Vote by an electronically assisted vote at general elections, Senate elections, by‑elections and referendums in which they are otherwise entitled to vote (Reg 24(1)), subject to the procedural conditions in Reg 24(2) and ineligible categories in Reg 24(3).
• Receive assistance from call centre operators in accordance with Commissioner‑determined procedures, including being able to tell the operator how to mark the ballot (Reg 25(2), (4)-(5)) and to have their choices read back to them (Reg 25(5)(c)).

Rights and obligations of scrutineers and appointing parties. Candidates and persons who may appoint scrutineers for referendums have the right to appoint scrutineers for authorised call centres (Reg 27(1)-(3)). Scrutineers may attend authorised call centres for the limited purpose of monitoring the performance of call centre operators (Reg 27(4)). However:

• The appointment must be made by notice, in writing, signed and addressed to the Returning Officer, setting out the scrutineer’s name and address (Reg 27(3)).
• Scrutineers must sign an undertaking in the approved form under subsection 202A(3) of the Act or subsection 16A(3) of the Referendum Act and submit it to the Electoral Commission before attending (Reg 27(6)-(7)).
• Scrutineers are prohibited from interfering with the duties of call centre operators or communicating with persons in the call centre except where reasonably necessary for discharge of their functions; such conduct attracts a penalty of 30 penalty units (Reg 28).

Duties and permitted uses for prescribed authorities. Schedule 1 identifies the agencies specified as “prescribed authorities” and enumerates permitted purposes (Reg 8; Reg 11). Agencies that receive Roll information under the Act must limit their use to the permitted purposes set out in Scheduler 1 items or as otherwise prescribed (Reg 11). Reg 10 authorises provision of the relevant information to a prescribed authority under the Act’s s90B(4) mechanism.

Transitional duties. For agencies that were specified under the 2016 regulations but are not specified under the 2026 instrument, or whose permitted purposes change, Reg 36 provides transitional permissions for continued use of information for previously permitted purposes during a defined transition time (six months from commencement) and covers information provided before commencement.

Criminal duties by omission and conduct prohibitions. The instrument establishes criminal responsibility for certain behaviours:

• Scrutineers interfering or unlawfully communicating are liable to 30 penalty units (Reg 28).
• Interfering with a registered electronically assisted voter while the voter votes, communicating with them about the vote while voting, or trying to find out how they voted, attracts 10 penalty units, with a limited defence if the voter requests and consents (Reg 32; note on evidential burden).
• Strict liability offences: unauthorised persons who do sorting or forwarding tasks relating to authorised call centre ballot boxes or who conduct scrutiny attract penalties of 5 penalty units (Regs 30(3), 31(4)).
• Destruction or interference with computer programs, data files or electronic devices used for electronically assisted voting attracts 50 penalty units, except for officers acting in the course of their duties (Reg 33(1)-(2)).

Duties to record and forward. The Electoral Commissioner must ensure records of electronically assisted votes and proper forwarding to Divisional Returning Officers (Reg 29), assistant returning officers have duties to open authorised call centre ballot boxes and sort unopened envelopes into bundles by Division (Reg 30), and Divisional Returning Officers must conduct scrutiny with specified modifications (Reg 31).

In short, the instrument distributes duties from high‑level policy to operational obligations: the Electoral Commissioner has centralised decision rights, call centre operators have strict procedural obligations when interacting with voters and marking ballot papers, and a range of agencies have tightly defined permitted uses for Roll information. The instrument creates both procedural rights for registered electronically assisted voters to be assisted in voting and legal constraints on observers and third parties to protect process integrity.

The instrument creates several criminal and strict liability offences with specified penalty units, allocates responsibility for enforcement to electoral officers, and links evidential burdens to existing Criminal Code provisions. The penal architecture distinguishes interference with electoral processes, unauthorised handling of ballot materials, improper communications, and destruction of electronic systems.

Penalties by provision:

• Scrutineers: It is an offence for a scrutineer who attends an authorised call centre to interfere with the performance of duties of a call centre operator or Assistant Returning Officer (Reg 28(1)); and an offence to communicate with a person in the authorised call centre where the communication is not reasonably necessary for the discharge of the scrutineer’s functions (Reg 28(2)). Each of these offences attracts a penalty of 30 penalty units.
• Interference with electronically assisted voters: A person who interferes with a registered electronically assisted voter while the voter votes, communicates with such a voter about the voter’s vote while the voter is voting, or does anything to find out how a voter voted is liable to 10 penalty units (Reg 32(1)). There is a statutory defence where the voter requests assistance and consents, but a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to that matter (Reg 32(2) note referencing subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code).
• Strict liability offences for unauthorised handling: Two strict liability offences apply to unauthorised persons performing tasks that are reserved to Assistant Returning Officers or Divisional Returning Officers:
  • A person who is not an Assistant Returning Officer or person performing tasks under the direction of an Assistant Returning Officer who opens ballot boxes at an authorised call centre or forwards bundles (Reg 30(3)) faces a strict liability offence with a penalty of 5 penalty units.
  • A person who is not the Divisional Returning Officer, or a person performing tasks under their direction, who conducts the scrutiny (Reg 31(4)) faces a strict liability offence with a penalty of 5 penalty units.
• Destruction or interference with electronic voting hardware or software: Destroying or interfering with a computer program, data file, or electronic device that is used or intended to be used for or in connection with electronically assisted voting is an offence attracting 50 penalty units (Reg 33(1)). The section excludes officers acting in the course of their duties (Reg 33(2)); a defendant bears an evidential burden for that matter (note cross‑reference to Criminal Code).
• Additional offences: Reg 24(3) and Reg 25 impose procedural conditions and grounds of ineligibility (for example, having already voted, refusing to answer identity questions, being provisionally enrolled); while these are framed as conditions for eligibility, contravention or attempts to vote when ineligible would give rise to Act‑based offences beyond the Regulations where relevant.

Enforcement architecture and agents. The instrument places operational enforcement in the hands of electoral officers:

• Assistant Returning Officers and Divisional Returning Officers have duties in handling, sorting, forwarding and conducting scrutiny of ballots from authorised call centres (Regs 30-31).
• Call centre operators are required to follow Commissioner‑determined procedures and may be subject to supervisory directions from the Electoral Commissioner (Regs 22-25). Their compliance is operationally enforced by the Electoral Commission’s control mechanisms and by statutory prohibitions on interference and unauthorised communications by scrutineers and third parties (Regs 28, 32).
• Criminal enforcement of offences created by the Regulations will follow usual Commonwealth criminal procedures; the instrument references the Criminal Code for evidential burdens where applicable (Reg 32 note; Reg 33 note).

Strict liability and evidential burdens. The instrument creates strict liability offences in two narrow operational contexts (unauthorised opening and sorting of authorised call centre ballot‑boxes; unauthorised scrutiny) with relatively modest penalties of 5 penalty units (Regs 30(3), 31(4)). Strict liability reduces the prosecution’s burden to prove mens rea, increasing the legal risk for third parties who might inadvertently perform prohibited tasks. For some defences (Reg 32(2) consenting assistance; Reg 33(2) officers acting in the course of duties), the instrument notes that defendants bear evidential burdens pursuant to subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code, meaning they must raise enough evidence to show a reasonable possibility of the defence.

Record‑keeping and audit trails supporting enforcement. The Regulations require the Electoral Commissioner to maintain registers of registered electronically assisted voters and records of electronically assisted votes cast (Reg 22(3); Reg 29). The record must be either a mark on an approved list or a separate document stating name and Division that is forwarded to the Divisional Returning Officer (Reg 29(2)-(3)). The sorting and forwarding obligations (Reg 30) and the defined chain for scrutiny (Reg 31) create auditable steps and demarcated responsibilities for enforcement and post‑poll review.

Sanction scale and intent signals. Penalties scale from 5 penalty units for procedural unauthorised actions, to 10 units for improper influence of voters, to 30 units for scrutineer misconduct, to 50 units for destruction or interference with electronic systems. The highest penalty targets deliberate attacks on election technology infrastructure. The instrument’s explicit distinctions,between unauthorised persons performing reserved functions (strict liability), and persons who interfere with voting or communications (standard offences with more serious penalty units),structure enforcement towards protecting process integrity, the secrecy of the ballot, and system availability.

Transitional enforcement and continuity. Transitional provisions allow agencies that were specified under the 2016 regulations to continue certain uses during a six‑month transition period if they were previously authorised, while agencies with changed permitted purposes for information provided before commencement retain previously permitted uses for that prior data (Reg 36). This preserves enforcement expectations and authorised uses during transition.

In practice, enforcement will be carried out by the Electoral Commission and Commonwealth prosecutorial authorities where criminal contraventions are implicated. The Regulations create a framework of obligations, designate responsible officials for operational enforcement, and prescribe substantive and procedural offences with distinct penalties and, in some cases, evidential burdens for defences.

The instrument operates as subordinate legislation made under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (Reg 3). It expressly ties a range of its provisions to specific powers, definitions and paragraphs in those Acts and interacts with other Commonwealth statutes by cross‑reference, by conditioning the use of Roll information on other regimes, and by deferring operational standards to the Electoral Commissioner.

Primary statutory anchors. The Regulations are made under two Acts:

• Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918: multiple references throughout the instrument invoke the Act’s definitions and mechanisms (Reg 6 notes that a number of expressions are defined in the Act; Regs 8, 9, 10, 11 explicitly rely on provisions of the Act such as paragraph 84(2)(a), subsection 90B(4) and paragraph 91A(2AA)(b)). Part 4 explicitly provides electronically assisted voting methods “for the purposes of: (a) Part XVB of the Act; and (b) Part IVB of the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act” (Reg 20). The instrument adapts requirements and procedures in the Act to the authorised call centre context (Regs 26, 31).
• Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984: the Regulations parallel many provisions for referendums, cross‑referencing preliminary scrutiny, appointing scrutineers, and the entitlement to vote provisions (see Regs 20, 24 note 1, 27(2), 31(3)).

Roll information sharing and the Privacy Act. The Regulations create permitted uses of electoral Roll information by named agencies (Schedule 1) and authorise provision of information under subsection 90B(4) of the Act (Reg 10). Reg 14(a) conditions permitted purposes for medical research on “guidelines issued under section 95 of the Privacy Act 1988,” thereby explicitly linking permitted uses to Privacy Act guidance. This makes the Privacy Act a touchstone for certain research uses of Roll data, and requires agencies and researchers to be conscious of Privacy Act guidelines when conducting research using Roll data. The instrument does not itself amend the Privacy Act but requires compliance with applicable privacy guidelines where specified.

Other statutory intersections. Several Schedule 1 permitted purposes refer to the exercise of functions under other Commonwealth Acts, thereby creating practical intersections:

• Australian Taxation Office permitted purposes reference the administration of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Act 2015 (Schedule 1 item 9(b)(c)), linking Roll data use to those statutory schemes.
• AUSTRAC (Schedule 1 item 10) permitted purposes are tied to the Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (the AML/CTF Act): detecting money laundering, compiling AUSTRAC information, and advising reporting entities under that Act.
• The Federal Court related item (Schedule 1 item 17) links use of Roll data to jury selection and Division 1A of Part III of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976.
• National Anti‑Corruption Commission items (Schedule 1 item 18) link permitted uses to investigations under the NACC Act and associated consequential/transitional provisions.

Criminal Code evidential burdens. The Regulations’ notes for Reg 32(2) and Reg 33(2) explicitly state that the defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to certain matters under subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code. This links the Regulations to the provisions of the Criminal Code on evidential burdens and means that defences such as a voter’s consent or an officer acting in the course of duties require the defendant to raise evidence.

Interplay with State arrangements on Roll form. Reg 9 prescribes how to indicate on a Roll that a person is not enrolled as a Commonwealth elector for the purposes of paragraph 84(2)(a) of the Act: put a circle before the name. That provision therefore harmonises Commonwealth instructions for interaction with State electoral arrangements.

Transitional interaction with prior subordinate legislation. The instrument repeals the 2016 Regulations (Schedule 3) and contains transitional provisions preserving the effect of certain 2016‑era provisions for applications, writs and agencies that rely on previously authorised uses of Roll data for a limited period (Regs 34-36). Reg 36 is specifically tailored to avoid a cliff‑edge for agencies that were previously specified and had data provided under s90B(4) of the Act; during the “transition time” of six months they can continue to use that data for previously permitted purposes or, where permitted purposes have changed, the older permitted purposes remain included in relation to information provided before commencement.

Limitations and delegation. While the Regulations confer operational discretion on the Electoral Commissioner to determine procedures, days and times, and to approve forms, they do not displace the statutory duties of the Electoral Commissioner under the Acts. The Regulations therefore operate within the Acts’ delegation framework. The instrument also creates criminal offences and strict liability offences under Commonwealth law; enforcement and prosecutorial actions will proceed under Commonwealth criminal procedure and related statutes.

No change to voter entitlement standards beyond Acts. The Regulations do not expand or contract the substantive entitlement to vote; they provide mechanisms for voting and enrolment processes that operate within the entitlement framework of the Commonwealth Electoral Act and the Referendum Act. For example, Reg 24(1) confirms that electronically assisted voting is available to registered electronically assisted voters “at any [election or referendum] in which the voter is otherwise entitled to vote”, affirming that entitlement remains governed by the Acts.

In short, the Regulations operate as subordinate instruments that implement operational detail and data‑sharing permissions under the Electoral Act and the Referendum Act, interlock with the Privacy Act for research uses, reference other Commonwealth statutes for specific agency functions, and preserve transitional continuity with the repealed 2016 Regulations.

The instrument itself contains its commencement and repeal mechanics and records the repeal of the Electoral and Referendum Regulation 2016. The text supplies a clear record of what it replaces and the dates for commencement.

Commencement. The instrument’s commencement clause (Reg 2) sets a single commencement rule: the whole instrument commences the day after it is registered, which the instrument documents as 21 March 2026 (Reg 2(1) and the commencement table). Reg 2(2) clarifies that information in the table’s Column 3 is not part of the instrument.

Repeal of the 2016 instrument. Schedule 3 contains the repeal provision: it repeals “The whole of the instrument” being the Electoral and Referendum Regulation 2016 (Schedule 3). The Schedule therefore performs a full repeal of that subordinate instrument.

Transitional provisions preserving certain earlier arrangements. Part 5 contains transitional provisions that preserve legal effect for certain acts and permissions arising under the repealed instrument where necessary to avoid disruption:

• Applications made before commencement: Reg 34 ensures that s12 and Schedule 2 of the Electoral and Referendum Regulation 2016, as in force immediately before commencement, continue to apply in relation to applications for provisional enrolment (under s99B(1) of the Act or s38(1) of the Referendum Act) if those applications were made before commencement and not finally determined before commencement.
• Electronically assisted voting: Reg 35 preserves application of Division 1 of Part 4 of the 2016 regulations for any election whose writs were issued before commencement even if the election occurs after commencement.
• Transitional arrangements for agencies and permitted purposes: Reg 36 sets out a six‑month “transition time” to allow agencies previously specified by the 2016 Regulations to continue using information for previously authorised permitted purposes even if they are not specified under the new Schedule 1 or their permitted purposes change. Reg 36(1)-(4) distinguish between agencies that have been removed from the Schedule and agencies whose permitted purposes have changed, permitting continued use of previously provided information in each case for the transition period.

Schedule insertions and replacements. The instrument replaces the Schedule that previously listed agencies and permitted purposes. The Schedule 1 in the instrument sets out items 1-22 with specific agencies and their permitted purposes. Where those differed from the 2016 Schedule, Reg 36 provides the transitional bridge described.

No later amendment history is recorded in the instrument. The instrument’s opening note to the commencement table states that the table and the instrument relate only to the instrument as originally made and that it will not be amended in the text to reflect later amendment. Future amendments would be recorded in the Commonwealth legislation register and any subsequent amending instruments.

Key timestamped events and legal effects that practitioners should note:

• 21 March 2026: the date on which the entire instrument is taken to have commenced under Reg 2(1).
• Immediate repeal of the 2016 instrument via Schedule 3 on commencement, subject to transitional provisions in Regs 34-36 which preserve certain actions and authorisations made before commencement for specified durations or until final determination.
• A six‑month transition period from commencement for agencies affected by Schedule changes (Reg 36(5)).

For any compliance and advisory work, the 2026 Regulations are the operative subordinate instrument from the day after registration with the specified transitional continuities. The Regulations explicitly foreclose reliance on the 2016 instrument from that point forward except where Regs 34-36 preserve application for existing applications, writs or previously provided data.

The instrument itself contains no litigation history. It is subordinate legislation made under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (Reg 3), and the text does not name or summarise any judicial or tribunal decisions. There are no cases, appeals, or judicial determinations referenced in the instrument.

Practical implications for litigation risk and possible challenges:

• The Regulations create new operational regimes, especially for electronically assisted voting and expanded permitted uses for Roll information. Those changes could in principle give rise to administrative law challenges or privacy‑related litigation under the Privacy Act or judicial review of the Electoral Commissioner’s procedural determinations, but the instrument itself includes no record of existing litigation as of its text.
• The instrument refers to evidential burdens in the Criminal Code for certain defences (Reg 32 note; Reg 33 note). That cross‑reference clarifies evidential allocation in prosecutions under the Regulations and ties prosecutorial strategy to the Criminal Code framework, which has an existing litigation and jurisprudential history beyond this instrument but is not discussed in the text.
• Because the instrument repeals the 2016 Regulations and sets transitional rules for applications and writs made before commencement (Regs 34-35 and Reg 36 for agency permissions), litigation relating to transitional entitlements may arise where parties claim rights under earlier authorisations. The transitional provisions attempt to reduce that risk but the instrument does not provide prior litigation examples to indicate how courts might resolve disputes that arise from its application.

For practitioners advising clients on potential legal challenges (judicial review, administrative or privacy litigation), the immediate tasks are:

• Map the new statutory text to the operative provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act to determine where agency discretion is delegated and where reviewable decisions , such as the Commissioner’s procedural determinations on days and times, approval of forms, registration decisions for electronically assisted voters , could be subject to judicial review for reasonableness, procedural fairness or failure to comply with statutory duty. The instrument itself centralises those decisions with the Commissioner, which may attract administrative law scrutiny in appropriate cases.
• Monitor prosecutions and enforcement actions under the new offences created by the Regulations. The instrument’s creation of strict liability offences and the allocation of evidential burdens under the Criminal Code alters the litigation posture in prosecutions arising from these electoral processes.

Because the text contains no litigation history, one must rely on standard principles of administrative and criminal law to anticipate how disputes might be litigated. The absence of recorded litigation in the instrument means there are no source‑grounded precedents or adjudicated interpretations to cite from within the instrument itself.

This section highlights operational, legal and compliance pitfalls that arise directly from the text. Each “gotcha” is tied to a clause or schedule in the instrument and describes possible practical consequences or compliance traps to watch for.

1. Limited scope of electronically assisted voting. The instrument restricts “registered electronically assisted voter” to sight‑impaired persons and Antarctic electors (Reg 6 definition; Reg 19). The mechanism does not authorise telephone‑assisted voting for other disabilities or remote voters. Practitioners should not assume broader coverage for other accessibility needs.

2. Centralised discretion with limited statutory constraints. The Electoral Commissioner must determine, in writing, the times/days and procedures for registration and voting (Regs 22(1) and 23(a)-(b)). The instrument vests high operational discretion with the Commissioner; legal challenges could arise about the content or exercise of that discretion, but the Regulations themselves do not specify objective standards or minimum availability requirements. This creates an operational risk: if the Commissioner sets narrow windows for registration/voting, eligible voters may be unable to use the method.

3. Call centre operator definitions and staffing qualifications. A “call centre operator” must be a person who works in an authorised call centre and is a pre‑poll voting officer under the Act or Referendum Act (Reg 6 definition). The elector’s assistance depends on these operators following detailed procedures (Reg 25). If operators are not properly authorised, marked ballots could be legally vulnerable. Ensure that staffing and credentialing processes are robust and auditable.

4. Ballot secrecy and identifiable voting. The Regulations explicitly say that it is “irrelevant that the vote can be identified as being cast by a sight‑impaired person or Antarctic elector” during scrutiny (Reg 31(2)(d) and (3)(d)). While this removes one basis for contesting scrutiny, the ability to identify such votes may raise practical concerns about vote secrecy and the appearance of differentiated treatment. Practitioners should account for potential public scrutiny and explain how the procedure preserves secrecy even when identification is possible.

5. Operator marking of ballot papers. The procedure permits call centre operators to initial, mark, read back and envelope ballot papers (Reg 25(5)). This concentrates significant trust in call centre staff. While safeguards are specified (initialling, read‑back, envelope labelling), the method makes third‑party marking routine. Documented procedures, training and audit logs are essential because contested ballots may be susceptible to challenge based on procedural irregularities.

6. Strict liability offences for operational tasks. Unauthorised persons who open ballot boxes, sort/forward bundles, or conduct scrutiny face strict liability offences (Regs 30(3) and 31(4)), each with a penalty of 5 penalty units. An inexperienced temporary worker or contractor who mistakenly performs these tasks could incur strict liability criminal exposure. Practical effect: positional clarity and role segregation are necessary; employers and operators must ensure clear instructions and supervision to prevent accidental breaches.

7. High penalty for attacking electronic systems. The destruction or interference with computer programs, data files or devices used in connection with electronically assisted voting attracts 50 penalty units (Reg 33(1)). That is the highest penalty in the Regulations and underscores the statutory protection for electoral technology. However, the instrument allows an officer acting in the course of duties to avoid liability (Reg 33(2)). Employers and operators must clearly define and record authorised maintenance and administrative access to avoid liability and misinterpretation.

8. Scrutineer limitations and appointment formalities. Scrutineers must be appointed by written notice to the Returning Officer, signed by the appointer, and must sign undertakings in the approved form and submit them to the Electoral Commission before attending (Reg 27(3), (6)-(7)). Candidates or appointing parties who fail to follow those formalities may find their scrutineers excluded from authorised call centres. Furthermore, only one scrutineer per candidate/appointer may attend at any one time (Reg 27(5)). These formalities can be missed in fast‑moving campaigns.

9. Data sharing complexity and privacy cross‑references. Schedule 1 enumerates recipients and permitted purposes. Reg 14(a) requires medical research uses to comply with guidelines under s95 of the Privacy Act 1988. The instrument therefore creates a cross‑compliance requirement with privacy law for certain uses. Agencies and researchers must align their use with both the Regulations and the Privacy Act guidelines or risk non‑compliance.

10. Transition period nuances. Reg 36 provides a six‑month transition time for agencies removed from the Schedule or whose permitted purposes have changed. But that transitional authorisation applies only to uses of information provided before commencement (Reg 36(2)-(4)). Agencies must carefully distinguish between older datasets obtained under the 2016 instrument and new requests after commencement. Misclassification could lead to unlawful uses post‑commencement.

11. Eligibility trap for provisionally enrolled persons. Reg 24(3)(e) disqualifies provisionally enrolled persons from voting by electronically assisted vote. That creates a situation where a person who is in the process of provisional enrolment cannot use the facility; call centre procedures must therefore check enrolment status carefully. Because Reg 25(3) requires operators to ask whether the voter has already voted, operators must also verify enrolment status to ensure eligibility.

12. Identity evidence changes may alter fraud vectors and privacy exposure. Reg 16 accepts the citizenship evidence number from a notice under s37 Australian Citizenship Act 2007 and Medicare numbers as evidence of identity. While these broaden accessible identity evidence, they also change the set of identifiers stored or shared. Agencies and operators must ensure secure handling and justification for using such identifiers, in particular when forwarded as part of records (Reg 29).

13. Narrow permitted non‑government uses. Reg 13 permits the Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Incorporated to use Roll data for invitations to the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, and Reg 14 allows certain medical research or screening programmes contingent on Privacy Act compliance and Commonwealth funding. Practitioners should not assume general statutory permission for commercial or otherwise unlisted non‑government uses.

14. Documentation and approval forms are necessary but unspecified. The Commissioner “may approve forms and other documents” for use in call centres (Reg 21(2)), but the Regulations do not prescribe the content. That leaves form content, and thus the exact evidence/certification captured, to administrative practice. Practitioners should ensure that forms address the statutory requirements for identity checks, consent and chain‑of‑custody.

In sum, the principal operational “gotchas” are about role clarity, evidentiary formalities, the limited classes eligible for electronically assisted voting, strict liability exposure for operational errors, privacy cross‑compliance, and the concentration of operational discretion in the Electoral Commissioner. Each requires careful administrative implementation and clear audit trails to mitigate legal and public‑confidence risks.

This section provides a practical checklist and steps for the principal actors named in the instrument to implement and comply with its requirements, grounded in the Regulations’ text. It separates obligations by actor: Electoral Commissioner/electoral officers, prescribed agencies and researchers, candidates and scrutineers, and individual voters or applicants.

Electoral Commissioner and Australian Electoral Commission (operational implementation)

• Establish authorised call centres and formal arrangements (Reg 21(1)):
  • Create documented contractual or administrative arrangements for one or more authorised call centres with defined hours, staffing and security arrangements.
  • Ensure call centre operators are properly appointed pre‑poll voting officers as required (Reg 6 definition).
• Approve and publish forms and documents to be used by call centre operators and officers (Reg 21(2)):
  • Draft and approve registration forms, identity affirmation scripts, consent scripts, and vote‑recording templates that reflect the Commissioner‑determined procedures.
• Determine in writing days/times and procedures for registration and voting (Regs 22(1), 23(a)-(b)):
  • Publish a written schedule for each election or referendum including availability windows for registration and voting by electronically assisted vote.
  • Produce written procedures for assessing eligibility, identity verification and vote assistance, including sample questions to be used where the operator is not satisfied (Reg 23 note).
• Maintain a register of registered electronically assisted voters (Reg 22(3)):
  • Securely record names and Division information and protect access consistent with privacy obligations.
• Prescribe and document procedures for enabling a registered electronically assisted voter to vote (Reg 25(1)):
  • Implement checklists and scenario guidance: initialling, marking, reading back votes, envelope labelling, and placement in authorised call centre ballot‑box.
  • Train operators to ask whether the voter has already voted (Reg 25(3)) and to refuse if voter is ineligible (Reg 24(3)).
• Ballot‑box and chain‑of‑custody protocols (Regs 26, 30-31):
  • Ensure ballot‑boxes at call centres meet subdivision requirements taken from Part XVA of the Act (Reg 26); document any necessary variations noted in Reg 26(1)(a)-(b).
  • Designate Assistant Returning Officers to open call centre ballot boxes and sort unopened envelopes into Division bundles immediately after poll close (Reg 30(1)).
  • Implement forwarding procedures to Divisional Returning Officers and ensure compliance with strict liability constraints preventing unauthorised persons from performing reserved tasks (Reg 30(3)).
• Record and forward electronically assisted voter records (Reg 29):
  • Decide whether marks will be made on approved/certified lists or on separate documents; where separate documents are used, ensure timely forwarding to the Divisional Returning Officer and consistent marking protocols.
• Technology and security:
  • Implement technical controls and disaster recovery plans to prevent destruction or interference with computer programs, data files or electronic devices used for electronically assisted voting (Reg 33).
  • Keep audit logs of operator actions, identity checks and ballots marked to support later scrutiny and investigations. Note the 50 penalty unit offence for destruction or interference (Reg 33(1)).
• Transitional compliance:
  • Apply Reg 36 transitional arrangements carefully, coordinating with agencies that had prior access under the 2016 Regulations to identify previously provided data and the permitted purposes that continue for transition time.

Prescribed agencies, researchers and non‑government recipients of Roll data

• Check Schedule 1 and specific permitted purposes (Reg 8; Reg 11; Schedule 1 table):
  • Confirm your agency or body is listed and identify the exact permitted purposes authorised for your entity in Schedule 1.
  • If you are the Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Incorporated or a Commonwealth‑funded blood service, adhere to the distinct purposes in Reg 12 and Reg 13.
• Privacy Act compliance for research and medical uses (Reg 14(a)):
  • For medical research purposes, ensure compliance with guidelines issued under s95 of the Privacy Act 1988 before using Roll information.
  • For population‑based health screening, validate that the program is funded in whole or part by the Commonwealth (Reg 14(b)).
• Use data only for permitted purposes:
  • Implement internal policies, audit trails and use logs to demonstrate that data was used solely for the permitted purposes listed in Schedule 1 or as otherwise preserved under Reg 36 for prior data.
• Transitioned or former Schedule recipients:
  • If you were listed in the 2016 Regulations but are not listed in Schedule 1, identify whether data provided before commencement falls within the Reg 36 transitional permissions and for how long.
• Record retention and security:
  • Securely store Roll data and any derivatives, segregate functions to limit exposure, and maintain records required to demonstrate permitted use if audited.

Candidates, appointers and scrutineers

• Formal appointment and undertakings:
  • Candidates or persons who may appoint scrutineers must provide written notice to the Returning Officer, signed and stating scrutineer details (Reg 27(3)). Ensure the scrutineer signs and submits the required undertaking in approved form to the Electoral Commission before attending (Reg 27(6)-(7)).
• Understand attendance limitations:
  • Only one scrutineer per candidate/appointer may attend at any given time (Reg 27(5)). Scrutineers must only monitor operator duties and may not interfere or make unnecessary communications (Reg 27(4); Reg 28).
• Avoid prohibited conduct:
  • Inform scrutineers of the offence provisions: interference or unnecessary communication attracts 30 penalty units (Reg 28). Ensure scrutineers receive training on appropriate conduct in call centre environments.

Individual voters and enrolment applicants

• Evidence of identity and signature exceptions:
  • If making an enrolment‑related claim or notice that need not be signed under subsection 382(7) of the Act, include date of birth and one of the specified identifiers: driver’s licence number, passport number, citizenship evidence number from a s37 notice, or Medicare number if covered (Reg 18).
  • For additional evidence of identity under paragraph 98AA(2)(d) of the Act, a citizenship evidence number or Medicare number is prescribed (Reg 16).
• Provisional enrolment for applicants for citizenship:
  • If you are a person about to become an Australian citizen and you fall into one of the prescribed classes in Schedule 2 (family counsellor, manager of a community centre, prison officer, staff of a member of Parliament or electoral authority, etc.), review Schedule 2 to confirm eligibility for provisional enrolment applications (Reg 17; Schedule 2).
• Electronically assisted voting eligibility:
  • Only persons who are sight‑impaired or Antarctic electors and who have registered by contacting an authorised call centre on a designated day/time and complied with registration procedures may vote using the electronically assisted method (Reg 22(2)-(3); Reg 24(2)). Do not attempt to use the facility if provisionally enrolled or otherwise ineligible under Reg 24(3).

Operational compliance checklist (summary)

• For Electoral Commission: document written procedures (Regs 22-25), appoint and credential call centre operators as pre‑poll voting officers, set publicised days/times, train staff on identity checks and vote marking, maintain registers and record votes per Reg 29, segregate duties and audit chain‑of‑custody, and ensure technical protections for systems per Reg 33.
• For agencies: confirm Schedule 1 listing and permitted purpose, ensure Privacy Act guideline compliance where required, use data only for authorised purposes, and track transitional permissions under Reg 36.
• For candidates and scrutineers: comply with written appointment format, submit undertakings, observe attendance limits, and avoid prohibited communications or interference.
• For voters and applicants: provide prescribed evidence numbers where applicable, check eligibility for electronically assisted voting, and follow call centre registration steps.

Recordkeeping, training and audit recommendations

• Keep auditable logs of every registration, identity verification, ballot marking event, operator action and the forwarding of bundles to Divisional Returning Officers (Regs 22, 25, 29-31).
• Operate role‑based access control for systems and documents; strictly limit anyone not appointed as an Assistant Returning Officer or performing tasks under their direction from opening or sorting authorised call centre ballot boxes or conducting scrutinies (Regs 30(3), 31(4)).
• Train scrutineers, call centre operators and electoral staff on the precise statutory prohibitions and defences (Regs 28, 32-33). Document training attendance.
• For agencies using Roll information, create use‑case logs mapping each dataset to the Schedule 1 permitted purpose and retain approvals and privacy assessments, particularly where Reg 14(a) requires compliance with Privacy Act guidelines.

Following these steps will align operational practice with the instrument’s specific textual requirements. The central practical risk is operational: ensuring that Commissioner‑determined procedures are documented, staff are properly authorised and trained, and data sharing and usage strictly conforms to the Schedule 1 permitted purposes and transitional rules.