DUE PROCESS OF LAW ACT 1354 28 EDW 3 C 3

The Act rests on four condensed legal concepts, expressed in the single operative sentence. Each concept is compact and must be read together with the historical and republication material in the endnotes to understand how it sits in the ACT statute book.

1. "No person of what estate or condition" , universality of protection within the scope of the instrument. The phrase expresses that the rule applies without class limitation in its text; it is framed to cover persons irrespective of their estate or social condition. The Act itself uses no further definitional language to limit "person" or "estate" (the quoted text is the entire substantive clause).

2. Categories of deprivation , the five listed acts the rule addresses are: being "put out of land or tenement", being "taken", being "imprisoned", being "disinherited", and being "put to death". The instrument expressly requires "being brought in answer by due process of the law" before any of those five acts may lawfully occur under the terms of the provision. The list is specific and categorical; the Act does not add other categories or subcategories.

3. "Due process of the law" , the central normative and legal standard invoked. The Act commands that the enumerated deprivations not occur "without being brought in answer by due process of the law". The republication does not define "due process", set out minimum procedures, or prescribe institutional mechanisms. The phrase functions as a directive that some lawful process must occur, but the content of that process is not spelled out in this instrument.

4. Declaratory, not procedural, form , the Act is a single declarative sentence and contains no operational provisions (for example, it contains no procedures for notice, hearing, warrant, indictment, jury trial, appeal, remedies, or enforcement) and no penalties within the operative clause. The republication materials do record penalty unit values "for an offence against this republished law" at the republication date (individual $100, corporation $500), but the operative clause itself does not create or define an offence, nor does it prescribe administrative or judicial remedies.

Other republication concepts that affect how the text is to be read include editorial amendments authorised under the Legislation Act 2001 part 11.3, which may have been applied to bring the text into line with modern drafting practice (the republication notes that such editorial changes do not change the effect of the law but have effect as if made by an Act commencing on the republication date; see Legislation Act 2001, ss 115 and 117 as cited in the republication). The legislation history entries show the instrument’s movement from a UK statute to an ACT enactment through several transitional Commonwealth Acts; this history indicates the clause is part of the ACT statute book by operation of those historical conversion provisions.

In short, the main legal concept is a broadly framed prohibition on certain forms of state-inflicted deprivation without lawful process, expressed as a single declaratory sentence that does not supply procedural content or enforcement detail within the text of the Act itself.

The text of the Act is broadly framed and, insofar as it stands on the ACT statute book, is addressed to state action within the Territory. The operative sentence applies to "No person of what estate or condition", indicating the substantive protection is worded to cover persons without class limitation. The republished endnotes set out the pathway by which the historic UK provision became an ACT enactment, so the legal effect in the ACT arises through that conversion history.

Specifically, the republished material records these jurisdictional facts:

• The provision originated in a UK statute of 1354 and was in force in New South Wales immediately before 1 January 1911. It was continued in force by the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cwlth), s 6. That history matters because it is the route by which the provision came to apply in the Territory (see "Legislation history" endnote).
• Under the Seat of Government (Administration) Act 1910 (Cwlth), s 4, the Act had effect in the ACT as if it were an ACT law, subject to ordinances made under that Act.
• The Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cwlth), s 34(4) converted most former UK laws in force in the ACT into ACT enactments, and the republication records that this Act was converted into an ACT enactment on 11 May 1989 (self-government day).
• The Interpretation Act 1967 (repealed), s 65, completed the transition by treating former UK Acts in force in the ACT as laws made by the ACT Legislative Assembly, so the provision operates as an ACT law.

Who pays or bears the practical burdens under this provision is not set out in the Act itself. The words constrain how persons may be "put out of land... taken... imprisoned... disinherited... put to death" without "due process of the law". That constraint is directed at whoever exercises the power to carry out those deprivations , in practice that means public authorities exercising dispossessory, custodial, testamentary-administrative or criminal-sanctioning powers. The Act’s text does not itself list particular offices or agencies; the natural reading is that the rule operates against the organs of government and anyone acting under colour of authority.

Affected private parties include those whose possessions or liberties are at risk: land-holders or occupants (in relation to dispossession), individuals subject to arrest or detention, persons facing disinheritance, and persons subject to capital punishment. The Act does not create a private right of action in its text nor define remedies; whether and how an affected person may enforce the rule therefore depends on other statutory and common-law mechanisms and on judicial interpretation.

Finally, the republication notes that editorial amendments may have been made under the Legislation Act 2001 part 11.3; these are formal in nature but have legal effect as if made by an Act commencing on the republication date. For practical purposes, anyone who exercises or challenges the powers listed in the operative sentence does so in a legal framework where this historic declaratory provision forms part of the ACT statute book.

The Act is phrased as a declaratory prohibition rather than a code of duties and rights expressed in modern legislative form. Nonetheless, it establishes a terse set of rights and corresponding constraints on those who would deprive rights. The central legal right is the right not to be subjected to specified deprivations except following "due process of the law"; corresponding duties fall on decision-makers and actors who would undertake those deprivations.

Rights (as stated by the Act)

• Right not to be displaced from "land or tenement" without due process. The phrase is broad and covers dispossession or eviction-style deprivations.
• Right not to be "taken" without due process. The Act uses the single word "taken", which is not defined in the text; the term sits alongside "imprisoned" and is therefore read as covering seizure or apprehension.
• Right not to be "imprisoned" without due process, that is, to be deprived of liberty only following lawful process.
• Right not to be "disinherited" without due process, addressing the removal of inheritance rights or familial property claims.
• Right not to be "put to death" without due process, addressing capital punishment or state-sanctioned killing.

Duties (as implied by the Act)

• Duty to bring a person "in answer by due process of the law" before effecting any of the listed deprivations. The Act requires that persons be "brought in answer" , that is, presented to or confronted with legal process , but the Act does not define the shape of that process.
• Duty on public authorities and anyone acting under colour of law to ensure that any dispossession, seizure, imprisonment, disinheritance or capital sanction is preceded by lawful process. The Act's text does not enumerate what constitutes lawful process, so the duty is to abide by the applicable process as supplied by other statutes, rules of procedure, or judicially declared standards.

What the Act does not do (important limitations)

• It does not define "due process" or set minimum procedural requirements in the text. The content of the required process is therefore left for other laws or judicial construction.
• It does not itself create detailed administrative duties, timeframes, remedies, or enforcement mechanisms. There is no separate section providing a private right of action, remedy, or administrative process.
• The Act does not specify which tribunals or courts must be used, nor whether the requirement for "due process" involves a particular form of hearing (for example, jury trial) or particular procedural guarantees.

Consequences and interactions relevant to duties and rights

• The republication references editorial changes made under the Legislation Act 2001 part 11.3 and notes that such changes are made to bring the law into line with current drafting practice (the explanatory material cites Legislation Act 2001, ss 115 and 117). Those editorial changes do not alter the substantive content but may change form or wording.
• Penalty unit values for any offence "against this republished law" are stated on the republication inside front cover ($100 individual, $500 corporation), but the operative sentence contains no declared offence or statutory penalty within its text.

In practical terms, the Act sets a statutory floor: the enumerated deprivations should not be imposed absent legal process. The precise duties and remedies must be located in contemporaneous procedural statutes, rules of criminal and civil procedure, administrative law, or judicial determinations.

The republished materials make two relevant but distinct points on penalties and enforcement: first, the operative act does not itself spell out a statutory offence or sanctions in its text; second, the republication includes the penalty unit values that would apply to any offence "against this republished law" at the republication date.

Absence of textually prescribed penalties

• The single-sentence substantive provision does not include a penalty clause, an enforcement mechanism, or a specified remedy. There is no section that says an officer who deprives a person without due process commits an offence, or that sets out a fine, imprisonment term, or civil remedy within the Act’s operative text.

Penalty unit values on republication

• The republication notes, on the inside front cover material, that the value of a penalty unit for an offence against this republished law at the republication date is $100 if the person charged is an individual and $500 if the person charged is a corporation. That is the only express statement in the republication about penalty quantum. The republication does not identify particular offences or how they are to be prosecuted under ACT law, and it does not create a separate mechanism by which the Territory prosecutes contraventions of this one-sentence rule.

Enforcement pathways (by implication from republication history and the statutory form)

• Enforcement in practice must therefore rely on other instruments: criminal and civil law, administrative law remedies, or constitutional and common-law actions. The Act itself provides no procedural enforcement text; its role is to sit as a statutory standard within the body of ACT law.
• The republished history indicates the provision became an ACT enactment through a sequence of Commonwealth Acts and republishing steps (Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 s 6; Seat of Government (Administration) Act 1910 s 4; Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 s 34(4); Interpretation Act 1967 s 65). The practical enforcement vehicle for breaches of the normative statement therefore depends on contemporaneous ACT legal frameworks, including judicial remedies (injunction, damages, habeas corpus, writs) or statutory sanctions in other legislation.

Who enforces and who decides

• The Act does not name enforcement agencies or decision-makers. In practical terms, judges and administrative decision-makers in the ACT identify and apply applicable procedural rules, and executive agencies and their officers must comply with the procedural frameworks that give effect to deprivations of property or liberty. The Act places a textual constraint on deprivations without process but leaves the definition, enforcement, and remedies to other statutory or judicially developed law.

Risk of uncertainty and enforcement gaps

• Because the Act provides no procedural content, there is a risk of uncertainty about whether particular procedural steps meet the Act’s requirement. The republication does not provide interpretative guidelines, and the historical nature of the text means modern courts and legislators must supply content and enforcement by reference to current procedural law or judicial interpretation.

In summary, the republished Act itself sets a normative prohibition but does not include an enforcement regime; the only explicit penalty-related material is the statement of penalty unit values on the republication front matter, which presupposes that some other instrument or legal mechanism identifies an offence to which those values might apply.

The republished text and endnotes make clear that the Due Process of Law Act 1354 does not operate in isolation; its place on the ACT statute book and the practical effect of its one-sentence standard depend on and interact with a chain of historical conversion statutes and contemporary legislative processes. The republication identifies the key legal instruments that determine how the provision is applied in the Territory.

Transitional and conversion instruments

• Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cwlth), s 6: The republished history records the Act was in force in New South Wales immediately before 1 January 1911 and was continued in force by that 1909 Act. That continuity was the starting point for its operation in the Territory.
• Seat of Government (Administration) Act 1910 (Cwlth), s 4: Under this Act the provision had effect in the ACT as if it were an ACT law (subject to ordinances under the 1910 Act). That statute gave the historic UK Act operative force in the Territory and subject to local administrative rules.
• Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cwlth), s 34(4): This provision converted most former UK laws in force in the ACT into ACT enactments, enabling the ACT Legislative Assembly to amend or repeal them. The republished material records that the Due Process of Law Act 1354 was converted into an ACT enactment on 11 May 1989 (self-government day). That conversion is the mechanism by which the clause became part of the ACT legislative corpus.
• Interpretation Act 1967, s 65 (repealed): The republished history notes that under this provision all former UK Acts in force in the ACT immediately before 10 November 1999 became, for all purposes, laws made by the ACT Legislative Assembly. That step completed the process of assimilating former UK Acts into local law.

Amendment and editorial framework

• Imperial Acts Application Act 1986: The republished text was set out in an amended form by that Act (A1986-93 s 5 and sch 3 pt 4). The 1986 Act provided the amended text to apply as the text of the Act in the ACT (see amendment history).
• Legislation Act 2001, part 11.3: The republication materials cite this part as authorising the Parliamentary Counsel to make editorial amendments and other formal changes when republishing laws. The republication explains that editorial changes do not change the effect of the law, but have effect as if made by an Act commencing on the republication date (Legislation Act 2001, ss 115 and 117 are referenced). This means wording may be modernised or formatting adjusted while preserving substantive effect.

Practical interaction with procedural and substantive laws

• Because the Act contains no procedural content, its effect is to sit as a statement of principle which must be given effect through other statutes, rules, and judicial process. That creates an interactional relationship where criminal procedure legislation, civil procedure rules, administrative law principles, and statutes that authorise deprivation of land or liberty supply the operative process that will be judged against the Act’s standard.
• The republished material does not specify which statutes or common-law remedies will give effect to breaches; the natural statutory or common-law mechanisms include writs, injunctions, habeas corpus, statutory appeal processes, and remedies for unlawful dispossession. The Act’s text imposes a constraint on deprivations but leaves the operational detail to other instruments.

Penalties and offences interaction

• The republication lists penalty unit values for offences "against this republished law" at the republication date. That indicates a technical interaction with the ACT statutory system of penalty units, but the Act itself does not create a catalogue of offences. Therefore, where an offence is defined in other ACT instruments as contrary to the principle in this Act, the penalty unit values stated on republication apply to quantum calculations.

Editorial and modification flags

• The republication notes that provisions affected by current modifications bear an M marker and uncommenced provisions bear a U marker. The republished text as presented contains no marked U or M flags on the operative provision, but the endnotes contain the legislation and amendment history. Those procedural flags are part of the republication regime and determine whether later variations affect the Act's current legal operation.

In sum, the Act interacts with other laws as a declaratory standard that must be operationalised through the network of statutes and judicial doctrines that govern the taking of land, arrests and imprisonment, inheritance and testamentary disposition, and capital sentencing. The conversion and republication history identify the legal path by which the Act sits in ACT law, and editorial mechanisms under the Legislation Act 2001 shape its presentation without changing substantive effect.

The republication includes an explicit amendment history and legislative history that identify how the historic UK statute was imported and adjusted to sit as an ACT enactment. The endnotes record the following amendment and republication steps.

Imperial Acts Application Act 1986

• The text of this historic statute was set out in an amended form by the Imperial Acts Application Act 1986 (A1986-93 s 5 and sch 3 pt 4), which was notified 12 January 1987 (Cwlth Gaz 1986 No S1). Section 5 and schedule 3 part 4 of that 1986 Act commenced on 12 January 1987. The amendment history entry records that the 1986 Act "set out the text of this Act in an amended form and provided for the amended form to apply as the text of the Act in force in the ACT" (see endnote 4).

Subsequent change status

• The republication asserts the Act has not been amended since the enactment of the 1986 Act except under the Legislation Act 2001. That indicates there have been no substantive amendments beyond the 1986 textual amendments and editorial changes effected during republication.

Legislation Act 2001 editorial amendments

• The republication materials explain that the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office is authorised under the Legislation Act 2001 part 11.3 to make editorial amendments and other formal changes when preparing a law for republication. These editorial amendments do not change the legal effect of the law, but they operate as if made by an Act commencing on the republication date (see Legislation Act 2001, ss 115 and 117 cited in the republication). The endnotes state that this republication includes amendments made under part 11.3.

Name change on republication

• The Act was renamed as the Due Process of Law Act 1354 when it was first republished under the Legislation Act 2001. That is recorded in the legislation history as part of the republication administrative measures.

No later substantive amendments recorded

• The amendment history notes that the Act "has not been amended since the enactment of the 1986 Act, except under the Legislation Act 2001." That implies there are no additional substantive legislative changes or policy amendments to the operative clause beyond the historic 1986 restatement and editorial republication work under the Legislation Act.

Notes on modifications and commencements

• The republication explains the symbols U and M that would appear if any provision were uncommenced or modified. In this republication none of the substantive text displays U or M markers in the main body; modifications are to be read in the endnotes where applicable. The legislative history and amendment history are set out in the endnotes 3 and 4.

Practical effect

• For users seeking the legislative lineage, the endnotes trace the clause from a 14th-century UK statute through the 1909 and 1910 transitional Commonwealth Acts into ACT enactment via the 1988 Self-Government Act, with textual adjustment effected by the 1986 Imperial Acts Application Act and editorial adjustments under the Legislation Act 2001. The republication confirms no further content amendments were made after 1986, apart from editorial republication changes.

In sum, amendment history is limited: the key substantive textual form is that produced by the Imperial Acts Application Act 1986, with only editorial republication alterations under the Legislation Act 2001 recorded thereafter.

The republished law as provided contains no reported litigation history, and the endnotes do not cite any cases or judicial decisions construing this specific republished clause. The document includes a "Legislation history" and "Amendment history" but no "Litigation history" entries. Consequently, the republication records legislative provenance and editorial treatment but does not supply examples of judicial interpretation or court decisions that apply, limit, or define the operative phrase "due process of the law" within the ACT context.

What the republication records about litigation-related absence

• The endnotes and main republication text do not list any judicial authorities, reported cases, or decisions. The sections titled "Legislation history" and "Amendment history" document how the provision was carried into ACT law and how it has (or has not) been amended. There is no analogous "Cases" or "Judicial consideration" entry.

Implication for practitioners

• Because no litigation history is supplied in the republication, practitioners cannot rely on the document alone to identify settled judicial tests or standards derived from appellate decisions within the Territory that clarify what "due process of the law" requires in the contexts listed (property dispossession, arrest, imprisonment, disinheritance, capital punishment).
• Any authoritative guidance on the procedural content of "due process" therefore must be sought from other statutory instruments, rules of procedure, administrative law doctrine, and the general body of judicial decisions in the ACT, in the Commonwealth, or in other jurisdictions where relevant , none of which are included or referenced in the republication.

Caveat in the republication

• The republication is an authorised textual statement of the statute and its legislative history. It is not presented as a legal commentary and therefore does not include an annotated case list. The "About this republication" material makes clear that editorial changes may have been made under the Legislation Act 2001 and that the republication includes the amendment history; it does not purport to summarise litigation.

Conclusion on litigation history

• The republished text supplies no litigation history. For any analysis that relies on judicial construction of the clause, readers must search case law databases or court reports external to the republication for relevant authorities; the republication itself does not provide such materials.

The compactness and antiquity of the republished provision generate several practical risks and interpretative traps for practitioners who treat the text as a standalone source. The following are concrete, source-grounded issues to note, each stated with the underlying mechanism that creates the risk.

1. No definition of "due process of the law"

• The Act invokes "due process of the law" but the clause contains no definition or procedural minimum. The provision therefore leaves content and standards to be supplied elsewhere. The result is legal indeterminacy: whether particular procedural steps satisfy the Act cannot be assessed solely from the text.

2. Declaratory form without remedies or enforcement language

• The statute is a single declarative sentence and does not provide remedies, enforcement mechanisms or specific offences. The republication does note penalty unit values at the republication date, but the operative clause does not itself create an offence or articulate a remedy. Practitioners must therefore look to other statutes and common-law remedies, and cannot assume the Act itself prescribes a private cause of action or criminal sanction.

3. Archaic language and scope ambiguity

• Terms such as "land or tenement", "taken", "disinherited", and "brought in answer" are historical usages not explicated in the text. The lack of modern statutory definitions means there may be disputes about coverage, for example whether "taken" includes seizure of property other than persons, or whether "disinherited" reaches modern estate administration practices. The republication does not resolve these ambiguities.

4. Reliance on external statutory frameworks for application

• The Act’s practical effect depends on how other procedural and substantive statutes are interpreted and enforced in the ACT. The legislative history shows how the clause was converted into ACT law (Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 s 6; Seat of Government (Administration) Act 1910 s 4; Self-Government Act 1988 s 34(4)), but none of those conversion instruments define procedural content. Users should not assume the clause operates independently of contemporaneous procedural law.

5. Penalty unit statement without offence specification

• The republication provides penalty unit values for offences against the republished law but does not specify offences in the Act. That can mislead if readers assume there are specified statutory sanctions attached to the clause; the source merely lists the penalty unit rates that apply if an offence is specified elsewhere.

6. Editorial changes have effect as if enacted on the republication date

• The Legislation Act 2001 allows editorial amendments in republication (Legislation Act 2001, ss 115 and 117). Although editorial changes are said not to change the effect of the law, they operate as if made by an Act commencing on the republication date. Users should therefore note that the form of the text in the republication may differ in wording or presentation from older printed texts even where substantive effect is preserved.

7. Historical provenance but contemporary applicability

• The clause’s origin in 14th-century UK statute law and its conversion into the ACT statute book through a chain of transitional Acts means the text may be read in light of historical context, but that historical provenance is not itself determinative of modern procedural content. Practitioners must not conflate antiquity with modern scope.

8. No litigious precedents recorded in the republication

• The republication contains no litigation history; consequently the text provides no guide to settled judicial standards. That increases litigation risk where the clause is invoked without further statutory or case-law support.

9. Potential mismatch between expressed universality and statutory exceptions

• The clause is universal in language ("No person of what estate or condition"), but other statutes may lawfully authorise specified deprivations under defined procedures. The Act does not enumerate exceptions; therefore legal actors must check applicable statutory authorisations and procedural compliance rather than assume absolute immunity.

Each of these "gotchas" flows directly from the republication text and its endnotes. They produce implementation risks: uncertainty about compliance thresholds, reliance on other statutes for enforcement, and interpretative disputes about the clause’s temporal and substantive reach. Addressing these risks requires cross-referencing contemporary procedural law and searching for judicial construction outside the republication.

Compliance with the Due Process of Law Act 1354, as republished, cannot be achieved by following a checklist contained in the Act itself, because the instrument does not set out procedural rules. Compliance therefore requires aligning the processes that lead to dispossession, seizure, imprisonment, disinheritance, or capital sanction with the contemporaneous statutory and procedural law that constitutes "due process" for the purposes of ACT law. The following practical steps derive from the text and the republication material; each is a necessary stage in translating the Act’s declaratory requirement into operational practice.

1. Identify the statutory authorisation for the deprivation

• Before carrying out any act that could be described by the Act (putting someone out of land or tenement, taking or imprisoning someone, disinheriting someone, or imposing death), confirm the specific statute, ordinance, regulation, or judicial order that authorises the act. The Act operates as a constraint on deprivation without process; compliance requires there to be a lawful source of power to do the act.

2. Establish the applicable procedural rules

• Because the phrase "due process of the law" is not defined in the text, determine the procedural rules that govern the authorised deprivation: criminal procedure statutes for arrest and trial, civil procedure rules for eviction or property claims, succession and estates laws for disinheritance processes, and sentencing statutes for capital sanction where applicable. Ensure the steps taken match the procedural prerequisites stipulated in those instruments.

3. Document and evidence lawful process

• Maintain documentary proof that the person has been "brought in answer by due process" as the Act requires. That means retaining warrants, orders, service certificates, hearing schedules, transcripts, judgments, or other records that demonstrate lawful process was observed. The Act’s operative sentence places the onus on process being undertaken; contemporaneous documentary evidence reduces dispute risk.

4. Use authorised forums and observe jurisdictional limits

• Ensure that the action is taken by a competent decision-maker and in a forum with proper jurisdiction. The Act does not specify which courts or tribunals must be used; compliance requires adherence to the jurisdictional limits set out in other statutes and rules of court.

5. Check for statutory exceptions or emergency powers

• Some statutes authorise emergency measures or temporary derogations; confirm whether the statute permitting the deprivation includes any express exceptions and ensure any exceptional process conforms to the statutory scheme. The Act’s universal wording does not negate legislated exceptions; compliance requires observing those other statutory controls.

6. Audit institutional procedures and training

• Public authorities and private actors operating under delegated powers should audit their internal procedures to ensure they implement the procedural requirements applicable to dispossession, arrest, imprisonment, testamentary administration and similar actions. Because the Act provides no procedure itself, compliance will depend on implementing the correct procedural steps under other law.

7. Seek judicial guidance where uncertainty exists

• Where there is doubt whether the procedural steps to be taken amount to "due process of the law" for the purposes of the Act, obtain pre-action judicial advice or declaratory relief where appropriate. The republication includes no litigation history; judicial clarification may be necessary to determine whether particular procedures satisfy the Act.

8. Consider remedies and enforcement mechanisms

• If an action has already been taken that arguably contravenes the Act, consider remedies available under other law (injunction, declaratory relief, habeas corpus, judicial review, damages). The Act does not itself provide remedies; compliance and enforcement rely on the wider legal system.

9. Account for editorial republication effects

• When citing or relying on the republished text, be mindful that editorial amendments under the Legislation Act 2001 may have affected wording or presentation; ensure references and citations match the current republication document as authorised.

10. Confirm penalty exposure where appropriate

• Although the republication lists penalty unit values on the front matter, the Act does not define offences. If undertaking enforcement or prosecution based on other instruments that mirror the Act’s standard, calculate penalties using the penalty unit rates shown ($100 per unit for an individual, $500 for a corporation at the republication date), but confirm current penalty unit values and offence definitions in the operative ACT legislation before proceeding.

In short, compliance with the Act requires process-first practice: identify the legal authority, follow the procedural steps required by that authority, record and document the steps taken, and seek judicial confirmation where the adequacy of process is unclear. Because the Act sets a principle rather than a procedure, successful compliance is achieved by ensuring that other procedural statutes and rules are applied correctly and that the evidence shows an individual was "brought in answer by due process of the law" before deprivation occurred.