The central concept is the Digital Restart Fund, established as a separate account within the Special Deposits Account (s 5). It is not a separate legal entity; it is a notional fund within the existing state banking arrangements. The Minister controls and manages the Fund (s 7) and has the power to invest money in the Fund in accordance with the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 if the Minister is a GSF agency, or otherwise in a way approved by the Treasurer (s 11). The Secretary of the Department of Customer Service occupies a gatekeeping role: no project funding may be paid from the Fund without the Secretary’s recommendation to the Minister (s 9(a)). The Minister must also obtain and have regard to advice from the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner before approving a project payment (s 10). However, the Act does not require the Minister to follow that advice, only to have regard to it. The definition of government agency is wide (s 3(1)), covering government sector agencies under the Government Sector Employment Act 2013, statutory bodies representing the Crown, State owned corporations under the State Owned Corporations Act 1989, any other public authority constituted by an Act, and any person or body declared by regulation to be a government agency. This includes entities such as universities established by statute, local councils (if declared), and various boards and commissions. The object of the Act (s 4) is framed in terms of improving service delivery, facilitating whole-of-government digital transformation, and improving operational and cost efficiencies. The more detailed purpose of the Fund (s 6) lists four categories of projects: (a) developing digital products or services that help individuals navigate significant life events, record interactions with government and related entities, and identify and solve service impediments; (b) developing products or services usable by multiple agencies in a cost-effective manner; (c) optimising existing technologies to improve functionality and operational life; and (d) providing ICT education and training to government employees. Project payments must be for all or part of the cost of a project that “promotes the purpose of the Fund” (s 9(a)). The term “project” is not defined, leaving significant discretion. The Act also contemplates voluntary contributions from government agencies or other persons or bodies (s 8(1)(e), s 8(4)), which could include private sector entities or non-government organisations making payments into the Fund for specific purposes, potentially blurring the line between public appropriations and private donations to fund government digital activities. The annual report must include details of payments into and out of the Fund, project names, responsible entities, total costs, amounts funded, completion dates, objectives and whether they are likely to be achieved, and any other information determined by the Treasurer (s 14(2)). The Auditor-General must audit the Fund and report on whether payments were made in accordance with the Act (s 14(3)). The report must be made publicly available within six months after the end of the financial year (s 14(4)). The Act provides for regulations (s 16) that may contain savings or transitional provisions, and a statutory review after five years (s 17) to assess whether policy objectives remain valid and the terms remain appropriate.

The Act directly affects the Minister (currently the Minister for Customer Service), who controls and manages the Fund, approves project payments, obtains advice, invests money, delegates functions, and produces annual reports. The Secretary of the Department of Customer Service must recommend projects before the Minister can approve funding (s 9(a)), giving that departmental head substantial influence over which digital initiatives receive money. The Information Commissioner and Privacy Commissioner are obliged to provide advice when requested under s 10; their input must be obtained but need not be followed. The Treasurer is involved in approving investments if the Minister is not a GSF agency (s 11(1)(b)), and determines the form of the annual report and any additional information to be included (s 14(2),(c)). The Auditor-General must audit the Fund each year and produce a report on compliance (s 14(3)). Government agencies as defined broadly (s 3(1)) are the primary intended recipients of Fund money; they may be responsible for delivering projects, and they are authorised to make voluntary contributions to the Fund (s 8(4)). Within each agency, the head of the agency and employees may be affected by project requirements, training obligations, or standardisation of systems. The Act does not impose obligations on private citizens directly, but citizens will be affected as users of government digital services that are redesigned, consolidated, or replaced using Fund money. The vague purpose category (s 6(a) concerning “significant events during the individual’s life”) suggests the Fund will finance systems that track life events such as births, deaths, marriages, and changes of address, directly affecting how individuals interact with government. Private sector entities may be affected indirectly: they could become contractors or suppliers for Fund projects, or they could make voluntary contributions (s 8(1)(e)) - though the Act gives no guidance on what consideration, if any, a contributor receives. The public generally has a right to see the annual report, which must be publicly available (s 14(4)), and to assess how money is being spent. Non-government entities and other bodies connected with service delivery (mentioned in s 6(a)(ii)), such as private hospitals or aged care providers, may be included in the interaction recording systems, potentially becoming data-sharing partners or points of service integration, without any statutory privacy protections beyond what the Minister’s mandatory advice process considers. The Act binds the Crown (s 15), meaning the state government is subject to its provisions. Employees of Public Service agencies may have functions delegated to them (s 13), affecting internal decision-making authority.

The Act establishes duties primarily on the Minister and the public sector, with few explicit rights for private parties. The Minister has a duty to control and manage the Fund (s 7). Before approving a project payment under s 9(a), the Minister must: (1) obtain a recommendation from the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service; and (2) obtain and have regard to advice from the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner about the project’s effect on access to government information and protection of personal or health information (s 10). The duty is one of procedural consultation, not compliance: the Minister may still approve a project the commissioners warn against, so long as the advice was obtained and considered. The Minister may obtain additional advice, recommendations or information from any relevant person or body (s 12). The Minister may delegate functions (except the delegation power itself) to the head of a Public Service agency or any other person employed in a Public Service agency (s 13(1)). A delegate may subdelegate the function to another person employed in a Public Service agency (s 13(2)). This allows broad downstream decision-making, but delegation does not relieve the Minister of ultimate responsibility. The Minister must produce an annual report within six months of the end of each financial year, in a form determined by the Treasurer, containing the details listed in s 14(2) and including the Auditor-General’s audit (s 14(3)). The report must be made publicly available (s 14(4)). The Minister also must undertake a review of the Act after five years and table a report in Parliament within six months of that period (s 17). The Auditor-General has a duty to audit the Fund and report on whether payments have been made in accordance with the Act (s 14(3)). This creates a compliance check but does not specify consequences for non-compliance. Government agencies have the right to make voluntary contributions to the Fund (s 8(4)), but no obligation. They may also be the recipients of Fund money for delivering projects. The Act does not give agencies a right to demand funding; project approval is at the Minister’s discretion. The Information Commissioner and Privacy Commissioner have a duty to provide advice when requested under s 10, but the Act does not specify the form or detail of that advice. The Treasurer has the right to determine the annual report form and additional content (s 14(2),(c)) and to approve investments if the Minister is not a GSF agency (s 11(1)(b)). The public has a right to access the annual report once it is made publicly available, but the Act does not create any right to access other Fund documents or to challenge funding decisions. Persons or bodies may make voluntary contributions to the Fund (s 8(1)(e)), but the Act does not confer any voting rights, steering committee membership, or guarantee of influence over how contributed money is spent. The Act creates no private right of action for breach of its provisions; enforcement is through the audit process and ultimately political accountability.

The Digital Restart Fund Act 2020 contains no penalty provisions, no civil or criminal sanctions for non-compliance, and no offence sections. This is typical for an Act that establishes a fund and governs its management, rather than imposing obligations directly on private persons or creating regulatory prohibitions. Enforcement relies on a combination of accountability mechanisms built into the Act and external governance frameworks. The primary internal enforcement mechanism is the Auditor-General’s annual audit of the Fund, which must include a report on whether payments from the Fund have been made in accordance with the Act (s 14(3)). If the Auditor-General identifies payments that were not authorised under s 9, or that were made without the mandatory recommendation from the Secretary (s 9(a)) or without the Minister having obtained the required advice under s 10, that finding would be included in the audit report. The report is tabled by the Minister as part of the annual report (s 14) and is publicly available. This transparency creates political and public accountability, but it does not automatically trigger any remedy or penalty. If money is misapplied, the state would have to rely on general law remedies (e.g., recovery of money paid ultra vires, or action against the Minister or delegates for breach of statutory duty) or on the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (NSW) and Government Sector Finance Act 2018, which contain broader financial governance and misconduct provisions. The Act itself does not provide for surcharge, disallowance of expenditure, or personal liability of the Minister or officers. The delegation provision (s 13) may diffuse accountability; a subdelegate who makes an improper payment is not personally penalised under this Act. The Minister’s duty to produce an annual report and obtain a review after five years (s 17) are also enforcement-weak: there is no penalty for late reporting, nor any mechanism for a court to compel the report. The requirement that the report be made publicly available within six months (s 14(4)) is a statutory obligation, but breach would be remedied, if at all, through external pressure or perhaps an order for mandamus in extreme cases. The regulations (s 16) could potentially prescribe offences, but nothing has been enacted to date. In practice, the Act’s enforcement relies almost entirely on the public sector’s internal financial control systems, the Auditor-General’s scrutiny, and the political consequences of adverse audit findings. There is no independent regulator for the Fund; the Minister controls the Fund and is also the person required to comply with its procedural duties. This creates a potential conflict of interest, mitigated only by the mandatory advice from the Information and Privacy Commissioners and the audit requirement.

The Act explicitly references and interacts with several other NSW statutes. Most importantly, section 10 mandates that before approving a project payment, the Minister must obtain and have regard to advice from the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner about the project’s effect on: (a) access to government information under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act); (b) protection of personal information under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998; and (c) protection of health information under the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002. This creates a formal link between Fund spending and the state’s information access and privacy regimes, but only at the approval stage. It does not impose ongoing privacy obligations on projects funded from the Fund; those obligations flow from the substantive Acts themselves when agencies handle information. The Act also defines government agency by cross-referencing the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (for government sector agencies), the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (for State owned corporations), and “any other public authority constituted by or under an Act” (s 3(1)). This means the Fund can finance projects across a very broad range of public bodies, potentially including agencies with different governance structures. The Government Sector Finance Act 2018 is relevant for investment of Fund money: section 11 allows the Minister to invest money in the Fund as a GSF agency under Part 6 of that Act, or otherwise with Treasurer approval. That Act also governs the Special Deposits Account in which the Fund is established (s 5). The Interpretation Act 1987 is noted as containing definitions and provisions affecting interpretation (s 3(1) note). The Auditor-General performs the audit under section 14(3), which would draw on powers in the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 or equivalent. The Act does not interact with any specific federal legislation, although funded projects may need to comply with Commonwealth privacy or telecommunications law independently. The Act’s binding of the Crown (s 15) means it prevails over Crown immunity but does not interact with intergovernmental immunity. If regulations are made under s 16, they may interact with other Acts by prescribing extended definitions of government agency or transitional provisions. The review clause (s 17) sets a process that may lead to amendment or repeal, but does not itself interact with other laws. There is no mention of interaction with procurement legislation (e.g., the Public Works and Procurement Act 1912 or the Procurement Board directions), meaning Fund payments must still comply with general government procurement rules. Similarly, the Act does not override the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 provisions on appropriation and expenditure. Fund money is paid into and out of the Special Deposits Account, so it must comply with the rules governing that account under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018. The voluntary contribution provision (s 8(4)) authorises agencies to make contributions, but this may interact with the State Owned Corporations Act if a State owned corporation wishes to contribute, requiring consideration of its commercial objectives.

The Digital Restart Fund Act 2020 (Act No 15 of 2020) commenced on assent (s 2). As of the version provided to the user (current as at the date of the source text, which is undated but the Act appears unamended), there have been no amendments. The Act is a stand-alone statute not amending any other legislation. No subsequent amending acts are listed in the source. The Act itself does not contain any amendment schedules or provisions repealing other legislation. The review clause (s 17) requires the Minister to review the Act after five years, meaning a review would be due by 2025, with a report tabled within six months of that period. If any amendments are made as a result of that review, they would appear in future amending legislation. The Act also contains a regulation-making power (s 16) that permits the Governor to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act, which could include provisions of a savings or transitional nature consequent on future amendments. As at the date of the source text, no such regulations are incorporated in the Act. The Act has a simple history: enacted in 2020, unamended, awaiting its first statutory review.

There is no litigation history associated with the Digital Restart Fund Act 2020 in the source text. No cases are cited, and the Act does not create any private right of action or civil penalty that would typically generate litigation. Because the Act is primarily a machinery statute establishing a fund and imposing procedural duties on the Minister, the most likely form of litigation would be judicial review of a decision to approve a payment or of a failure to follow mandatory procedures (such as obtaining the Secretary’s recommendation or the commissioners’ advice). However, the broad discretion given to the Minister and the fact that the advice requirement is only procedural (need only be “obtained and had regard to”) makes successful challenges difficult. The requirement that the Minister must “obtain and have regard to” advice under s 10 is justiciable but the threshold for unreasonableness is high. There has been no reported litigation to date. The binding of the Crown (s 15) could theoretically allow the Crown to sue or be sued under the Act, but no proceedings have been recorded. The annual audit by the Auditor-General (s 14) may identify non-compliance, but that finding is not a court judgment and does not by itself create a cause of action. If the Auditor-General found that a payment was not made “in accordance with this Act”, that finding could be used in subsequent proceedings to recover money, but such proceedings have not occurred. The delegation provisions (s 13) could give rise to disputes about who validly exercised a function, but again there is no record. The review clause (s 17) is not litigable; it imposes a duty on the Minister but with no enforcement mechanism other than political.

Several features of the Act are less protective of taxpayer interests and less constraining on executive power than they may first appear. First, the definition of government agency (s 3(1)) is extremely broad. The regulations can declare any person or body to be a government agency, meaning the Fund could potentially finance digital projects for entities not traditionally considered part of government, such as private contractors delivering public services, or even non-profit organisations, without any further legislative change. Second, the mandatory advice requirement (s 10) is weaker than it sounds. The Minister must obtain and have regard to advice from the Privacy and Information Commissioners, but need not follow it. There is no requirement to publish the advice, nor to explain why it was rejected. The advice is also confined to information access and privacy impacts; the Minister need not consider cost-effectiveness, value for money, or whether a project duplicates existing systems. Third, project approval (s 9(a)) requires only the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service. There is no requirement for a business case, cost-benefit analysis, competitive tender, or independent review. The Minister can approve funding for projects that do not meet the purpose (s 6) as long as the Secretary recommends them - but the Secretary’s recommendation is not statutorily required to confirm that the project promotes the purpose. Fourth, voluntary contributions (s 8(1)(e) and s 8(4)) allow government agencies or any other person or body to pay money into the Fund. This creates a risk of private entities making contributions to influence government digital priorities, with no statutory safeguards against conflicts of interest, no transparency about who contributes what, and no requirement that contributions be disclosed in the annual report beyond aggregate “payments into the Fund”. The annual report (s 14) lists “details of payments into the Fund” but does not require itemisation by contributor. Fifth, the absence of any statutory project selection criteria beyond promoting the purpose means the Minister could choose projects based on political expediency rather than merit. The Act does not require the Minister to have regard to any efficiency criteria, interoperability standards, or whole-of-government priorities (beyond the object in s 4). Sixth, the delegation power (s 13) is very broad. The Minister can delegate any function to a head of a Public Service agency or any employee, and that delegate can subdelegate further. This could lead to senior officials approving multi-million dollar projects without ministerial involvement, and with limited accountability. Seventh, there is no sunset clause or automatic expiry. Once established, the Fund continues indefinitely unless repealed, and the five-year review (s 17) is not binding - the Minister may simply report that the policy objectives remain valid without any recommendation for change. Eighth, the investment power (s 11) allows the Minister to invest Fund money, but the returns flow back into the Fund. There is no requirement to consider liquidity needs for project payments, potentially creating a mismatch between investment holding periods and project expenditure timing. Ninth, the annual report must include whether the project has achieved or is likely to achieve its objectives (s 14(2)(b)(vii)), but there is no requirement for post-completion evaluation or independent verification of those claims. The reports are self-assessments by the Minister, albeit audited by the Auditor-General on compliance only, not on value for money. Tenth, the Act does not require the Minister to consult with other ministers whose portfolios may be affected by a digital project. A project could standardise systems across agencies without the consent of the agencies affected, because the Fund is controlled by the Minister alone. This centralising feature concentrates power and may override agency autonomy.

Compliance with the Digital Restart Fund Act 2020 falls primarily on the Minister, the Department of Customer Service (via its Secretary), and agencies seeking or administering Fund money. Because the Act creates few obligations on private parties, compliance guidance is focused on government actors. For the Minister: before approving any payment from the Fund to finance a project, ensure you have received a written recommendation from the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service (s 9(a)). That recommendation should satisfy you that the project “promotes the purpose of the Fund” as defined in s 6. Also, before approving, you must request and receive advice from the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner about the project’s likely effect on access to government information (GIPA Act) and protection of personal or health information (PPIP Act and HRIP Act) (s 10). Document that you have obtained and considered that advice; if you decide to proceed contrary to the advice, record your reasons to demonstrate you have “had regard to” it. The advice need not be sought again for each individual payment within a single project if the project scope is unchanged, but it is safest to obtain advice at the point of initial approval for the total project cost referred to in s 9(a). For ongoing project payments within a previously approved project, no new recommendation or advice is strictly required, but the Minister should satisfy themselves that the payment furthers the approved project. All payments from the Fund must fall within the categories listed in s 9: (a) project costs approved under the s 9(a) process; (b) administrative expenses related to the Fund; or (c) money directed or authorised by any Act or law. Keep meticulous records of each payment, linking it to the approved project. For investment of Fund money (s 11), check whether the Minister is a GSF agency under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018; if so, invest under Part 6 of that Act; if not, seek Treasurer approval for each investment. Ensure any delegation of functions (s 13) is in writing, specifies the extent of delegation, and is given only to a head of a Public Service agency or an employee of such an agency. Subdelegations must also be in writing and further limited to persons employed in a Public Service agency. The annual report (s 14) must be produced each year within six months of 30 June. It must contain the prescribed details for all payments into and out of the Fund, including project-specific detail listed in s 14(2)(b)(i)-(vii). Obtain the Auditor-General’s audit report on whether payments were made in accordance with the Act, and include that report. Make the combined report publicly available within the six-month window. For the five-year review (s 17), the Minister should commence the review process before the fifth anniversary of commencement to allow time for a report to be tabled within six months after the fifth anniversary. For government agencies: if you wish to receive Fund money, work with the Department of Customer Service to have your project recommended. If you make voluntary contributions to the Fund (s 8(4)), ensure you have internal authority to do so, and record the contribution separately for transparency. Ensure any project you deliver with Fund money complies with all other applicable laws, including procurement, privacy, and information access laws, which are not overridden by this Act. Neither the Act nor source provides any penalty for non-compliance, but the reputational consequences of an adverse Auditor-General finding or an invalid payment should be sufficient incentive.