Defence (Afghanistan Inquiry Compensation Scheme) Regulations 2024

Eligible recipient: defined by reference to s 5(1)(a). It means the person or class of persons to whom a claim relates, as referred by the Chief of the Defence Force. The Chief must be satisfied that each person is (i) reasonably likely to be the victim of an assault or property damage, or a family member of a victim of unlawful killing; (ii) not reasonably likely to be a member of a terrorist organisation; and (iii) not a sanctioned person nor likely to act for a sanctioned entity. These are gatekeeping criteria, not findings of fact on the merits. The Chief does not determine actual victimhood; the Brereton Inquiry findings are treated as substantiating the underlying wrong. The scheme does not require the Chief to make independent findings of fact about the incident.

Sanctioned person or entity: defined broadly by reference to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (designated persons) and Part 4 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (proscribed persons or entities). This captures individuals and entities subject to Australian autonomous sanctions or UN sanctions regimes. The Advocate must consult the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on sanctions implications before recommending actions (s 6(2)(a)), and must consider the probability that any recommended action would make funds available to or otherwise benefit a sanctioned person, entity, or terrorist organisation (s 6(3)(c)).

Afghanistan Inquiry Compensation Advocate: a statutory office holder appointed by the Minister on a part-time basis, with functions limited to considering referred claims, making recommendations to the Chief of the Defence Force, assisting in implementation on request, and providing advice (s 11(1)). The Advocate cannot undertake inquiries or investigations into whether an offence or wrong occurred (s 11(2)(a)), cannot direct public servants or Defence members except those made available (s 11(2)(d)), and cannot enter contracts on behalf of the Commonwealth (s 11(2)(e)). The Advocate operates with limited independence: staff come from the Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force (s 13), and the Chief of the Defence Force may engage consultants to assist the Advocate (s 14).

Cultural expectations: a mandatory consideration for the Advocate in determining recommended actions. The Advocate must take into account cultural expectations within Afghanistan of what would be appropriate action in response to the claim (s 6(3)(b)). This is a discretionary factor with no guidance on how to ascertain or weigh such expectations, raising evidentiary and practical implementation issues. The Advocate must also consider cultural, gender, societal, economic, and geopolitical factors the Advocate considers relevant (s 6(3)(e)).

No solicitation of claims: a key limitation. The Advocate cannot solicit claims for consideration (s 11(2)(c)). This means only claims referred by the Chief of the Defence Force can enter the scheme. Potential recipients have no avenue to apply or to compel referral. The Government presumably expects the Chief of the Defence Force to identify eligible recipients from the Brereton Inquiry findings, but the instrument provides no obligation to identify, notify, or seek out potential recipients.

Directly affected: Persons who are (or are within a class of) victims of assault or property damage substantiated by the Brereton Inquiry, and family members of persons unlawfully killed as found by that Inquiry. These are almost certainly Afghan nationals, given the Inquiry’s scope covering alleged misconduct by Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016. The instrument does not limit eligible recipients to Afghan nationals, but in practice the Inquiry concerned incidents in Afghanistan involving Afghan victims. Recipients may be in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The scheme also affects the family members of deceased victims, who may have dependency relationships to consider (s 6(3)(d)(ii)). Because the scheme is entirely discretionary, these persons have no right to initiate a claim, no right to be informed of decisions unless the Chief of the Defence Force considers it appropriate (s 8(5)), and no right to external review other than an internal review by the Chief personally if the original decision was made by a delegate (s 18(1)). Persons who are not informed of a decision have no notice of the process at all.

Indirectly affected: The Commonwealth of Australia, which bears the financial cost of any compensation payments or other actions. The Chief of the Defence Force may make, vary, administer, and give effect to contracts or arrangements for payments (s 9). The Commonwealth also incurs administrative costs for the Advocate’s office, staff, and consultants. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is drawn into the process for sanctions and foreign policy advice (s 6(2)(a)). The Minister for Defence is involved if the Chief intends to depart from the Advocate’s recommendation (s 8(4)). The Australian public, as funders, ultimately bear the cost, with no cap on compensation amounts or aggregate scheme expenditure specified in the instrument.

Affected institutional actors: The Chief of the Defence Force, who bears the decision-making burden and must personally review delegate decisions (s 18). Senior military officers and SES Band 2 employees in the Department of Defence may exercise delegated functions (ss 16-17). The Afghanistan Inquiry Compensation Advocate, who must navigate complex sanctions and foreign policy considerations, cultural expectations, and security sensitivities. Consultants engaged by the Chief may assist the Advocate (s 14). The scheme may also affect Australian foreign relations, as payments or apologies to persons in Afghanistan could have geopolitical consequences. The explicit consideration of whether actions could endanger the eligible recipient (s 6(3)(d)(iii)) suggests awareness that providing compensation could put recipients at risk, particularly if they are in areas controlled by the Taliban or other groups.

Not affected: Persons who were not the subject of Brereton Inquiry substantiated findings have no avenue for compensation under this scheme. The Advocate cannot expand the scope. Victims of other alleged misconduct not covered by the Inquiry are outside the scheme entirely.

Duties of the Chief of the Defence Force: Under s 5(1), the Chief may (not must) refer a claim if satisfied of the eligibility criteria. There is no duty to refer claims; the power is discretionary. If a claim is referred, the Chief must include specified information in the referral (s 5(2)). Upon receiving the Advocate’s report, the Chief must consider the recommendation taking into account the report, the DFAT consultation matters, and any other relevant information (s 8(1)). The Chief must then make a decision (s 8(3)). If intending to take a different action from the recommendation, the Chief must inform the Minister in writing at least 15 days before the decision, with reasons (s 8(4)). After decision, the Chief must inform each eligible recipient of the decision, except where the Chief reasonably believes it is not appropriate, necessary, or practicable (s 8(5)). Where not informing, the Chief must tell the Advocate and give the basis, unless doing so would prejudice security, defence, or international relations (s 8(6)). The Chief may inform any other person whose interests are affected (s 8(7)). Under s 18, if a delegate made the original decision, the Chief must personally review the decision upon written request, and confirm, vary, or revoke it within 60 days (s 18(4)). If varying or revoking a decision that followed the Advocate’s recommendation, the Chief must again inform the Minister 15 days before (s 18(3)).

Duties of the Advocate: Upon receiving a referral, the Advocate must consider the claim (s 6(1)). The Advocate must consult DFAT regarding sanctions and foreign policy implications (s 6(2)(a)). The Advocate may engage with eligible recipients or their representative, and may consult experts (s 6(2)(b)). The Advocate must then determine what actions to recommend, taking into account DFAT advice, cultural expectations within Afghanistan, risks of benefiting sanctioned or terrorist entities, and various factors about each eligible recipient (s 6(3)). After consideration, the Advocate must give a report to the Chief with recommendations, information considered, and any information relevant to informing recipients or other persons (s 7(1)). The Advocate may recommend monetary or other compensation, letters of apology, or no action (s 7(2)). The Advocate also has a duty to assist the Chief upon request to implement decisions, where practicable (s 11(1)(c)).

Rights of eligible recipients: The instrument confers no rights in the ordinary sense. Eligible recipients have no right to apply for compensation; only the Chief can refer a claim. They have no right to be heard by the Advocate; engagement is at the Advocate’s discretion (s 6(2)(b)(i)). They have a right to be informed of the Chief’s decision only where the Chief considers it appropriate, necessary, and practicable (s 8(5)). They have a right to request internal review only if the original decision was made by a delegate (s 18(1)); decisions made personally by the Chief are not reviewable under this instrument. The section 18 review does not provide for a hearing, reasons beyond the notice, or any merits review standard. There is no provision for judicial review in the regulations, though the general law (Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977) may apply. Eligible recipients may nominate a representative (s 6(2)(b)(i)), but the Advocate is not obliged to accept that representative. The instrument does not grant a right to legal representation or to be provided with reasons beyond the notification.

Minister’s role: The Minister appoints the Advocate and determines the Advocate’s terms and conditions (s 10(2), (4)). The Minister must be informed at least 15 days before the Chief deviates from the Advocate’s recommendation, and before the Chief revokes or varies a delegate’s decision that followed the recommendation (ss 8(4), 18(3)). The Minister may delegate his or her function under s 10(4) to senior officers or SES Band 2 employees (s 16). The Minister has no power under the instrument to direct the Chief’s decision, but the notification requirement suggests a political check.

The instrument itself creates no criminal offences and no civil penalty provisions. The scheme is administrative and voluntary. Non-compliance by the Chief of the Defence Force, the Advocate, or a delegate does not attract penalties under these regulations. However, the instrument must be read in the context of underlying laws. For example:

• If the Chief of the Defence Force or the Advocate improperly disclosed information collected under s 15 (which permits collection, use, and disclosure for scheme purposes), that could breach the Privacy Act 1988. The s 15 permission is broad - it allows collection, use, or disclosure of information about a person (whether sensitive or not) for the performance of a function or exercise of a power under Part 2. It does not provide immunity from other laws, but it gives a specific purpose authorisation. Unauthorised disclosure outside that purpose could attract enforcement under the Privacy Act or possibly the Criminal Code (e.g., unauthorised access or disclosure of personal information under s 478.1 of the Criminal Code if accessed via a computer).

• Payments made under the scheme could potentially contravene sanctions laws if not properly structured. The Advocate and Chief must avoid making funds available to sanctioned persons or entities (s 6(3)(c)). Deliberately doing so could breach the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 or the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945, which carry criminal penalties including imprisonment. The instrument attempts to mitigate this risk through DFAT consultation and explicit consideration factors.

• If the Chief of the Defence Force or delegate made a false statement in relation to a referral or decision, general criminal law could apply, but there is no specific offence in the regulations.

• The chief enforcement mechanism is internal: the review process under s 18 for delegate decisions. If the Chief fails to comply with the 15-day Ministerial notification requirement (ss 8(4), 18(3)), there is no penalty specified. The Minister could possibly issue directions if powers are delegated, but s 16(2) only requires that delegates comply with written directions of the Minister; it does not bind the Chief.

• The scheme is funded from consolidated revenue via s 9 contracts. There is no statutory cap, so expenditure could be significant, but there is no enforcement mechanism for financial accountability within these regulations. The Auditor-General would have oversight under the Auditor-General Act 1997.

• The Advocate’s failure to perform functions has no penalty attached, but the Minister could remove or not reappoint the Advocate. The advocate holds office on terms determined by the Minister (s 10(4)), so performance conditions could be imposed.

In summary, the instrument relies on bureaucratic compliance and political accountability rather than enforceability through penalties. The only person with a statutory right to trigger a review is someone whose interests are affected by a delegate’s decision (s 18(1)). Failure to conduct that review within 60 days (s 18(4)) appears to be a breach of duty, but the regulation does not specify consequences.

Defence Act 1903: The instrument is made under paragraph 63(1)(f) of the Defence Act, which authorises the Governor-General to make regulations for matters required or permitted to be prescribed, or necessary or convenient for carrying out or giving effect to the Act. The regulations create a scheme that does not alter the Defence Act itself; they operate as subordinate legislation within the Defence portfolio. The Chief of the Defence Force already had general administrative powers under the Defence Act; these regulations create specific duties and powers for the compensation scheme.

Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 and Charter of the United Nations Act 1945: These are central to the scheme’s operation. Section 6(2)(a) requires the Advocate to consult DFAT regarding implications of these Acts on options for action. Section 6(3)(c) requires the Advocate to consider the probability that a recommended action would make funds available to or otherwise benefit a sanctioned person or entity. The scheme is designed to avoid contravening these Acts. A payment to a person in Afghanistan might breach sanctions if the recipient is a designated person or acts on behalf of a designated entity. The definition of “sanctioned” in s 4 incorporates those Acts. The scheme does not override sanctions laws; it attempts to navigate them through consultation and risk assessment.

Criminal Code: The definition of “terrorist organisation” is taken from s 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The Chief must be satisfied the eligible recipient is not reasonably likely to be a member of a terrorist organisation (s 5(1)(a)(ii)). The Advocate must consider whether action may benefit a terrorist organisation (s 6(3)(c)(ii)) or an organisation for which providing material support is an offence under s 390.4 (supporting a criminal organisation). This links the compensation scheme to counter-terrorism and criminal organisation laws.

Privacy Act 1988: Section 15 allows collection, use, and disclosure of information about a person (including sensitive information) for the purposes of performing functions or exercising powers under Part 2. This overrides the normal restrictions in the Privacy Act, but only for those purposes. The provision does not authorise use for unrelated purposes. It is a specific authorisation that interacts with APP 6 (use or disclosure) by providing a basis for permitted use.

Acts Interpretation Act 1901: Sections 33AA to 34A are referenced in the delegation provisions (notes to ss 16, 17). These deal with the effect of delegations, including sub-delegation and revocations.

Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973: Section 10(3) provides that the office of the advocate is not a public office for the purposes of that Act, meaning the Tribunal does not set the Advocate’s remuneration. The Minister determines terms and conditions under s 10(4), likely including remuneration, without Tribunal oversight.

Foreign policy: Section 6(2)(a)(iii) requires the Advocate to consult DFAT regarding Australia’s foreign policy interests. This is not a legislative interaction but a directive to consider non-statutory foreign policy. It may also engage the Migration Act 1957 (if recipients are outside Australia) and the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 if payments are made through charitable organisations.

Contract law: Section 9 authorises the Chief of the Defence Force to make, vary, administer, and give effect to contracts, agreements, or arrangements for payments on behalf of the Commonwealth. This interacts with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) which governs Commonwealth contracts. The Chief would need to comply with PGPA requirements, including value for money, proper use, and appropriate approvals. The section does not exempt the Chief from the PGPA Act.

No interaction with tort law: The instrument does not affect any private law rights. It does not create a statutory cause of action. Payments are ex gratia. Recipients receiving compensation do not thereby waive rights to sue the Commonwealth, unless a separate deed of release is entered into. The instrument does not require such a deed.

The Defence (Afghanistan Inquiry Compensation Scheme) Regulations 2024 were made on 18 July 2024 by the Governor-General on the advice of the Federal Executive Council. They were registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on that date and commenced on 19 July 2024 (the day after registration), as per the table in s 2. As of the date of this analysis, there have been no amendments. The instrument is in its original form. There is no indication of sunsetting or review provisions in the instrument itself; however, as regulations made under the Defence Act, they may be amended or repealed at any time by the Executive. Given the subject matter - responding to the Brereton Inquiry (final report released 2020) - the scheme may be intended to operate for a defined period to process claims. The instrument does not include an expiry date. Amendment history will accumulate as the scheme operates; but as of writing, the only legislative history is the initial making. Users should check the Federal Register of Legislation for any subsequent amendments, such as updates to the Advocate’s appointment or modifications to the criteria, perhaps in response to operational experience or sanctions regime changes.

The instrument came into force in July 2024. As of the time of writing, there is no litigation history under this specific instrument. There has been no judicial consideration of its provisions. However, we can anticipate potential legal challenges based on its structure:

• Judicial review: Persons affected by decisions who were not informed (or who were informed but denied review) may seek judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act) or under s 75(v) of the Constitution for jurisdictional error. The ADJR Act applies to decisions under an enactment; the Chief’s decision under s 8(3) is likely a decision under an enactment. Grounds might include unreasonableness, failure to take into account relevant considerations (e.g., the Chief failing to consider cultural expectations or sanctions risk), or taking into account irrelevant considerations. However, the broad discretion and the lack of a statutory right to compensation may limit success. The exclusion of inform rights under s 8(5) where the Chief believes it is not appropriate etc. is a threshold issue; a recipient could challenge that belief as unreasonable.

• No merits review: The only internal review is for delegate decisions, and only the Chief can review. The Minister does not have a review power. The instrument does not provide for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal) or any external body. The exclusion of external merits review may be a deliberate policy choice, but it limits accountability.

• Constitutional challenges: A person could argue that the scheme is an impermissible exercise of the defence power under s 51(vi) of the Constitution, but compensation for past misconduct likely falls within that power as a matter of defence administration. Alternatively, a challenge based on a right to equality before the law (if some victims are included and others excluded arbitrarily) might be argued, but the High Court has not recognised such a right.

• Common law claims: Recipients may still pursue tort claims for assault, battery, wrongful death, or breach of statutory duty directly against the Commonwealth. The scheme does not extinguish those claims. If a recipient accepts compensation, the Commonwealth may require a release. Any litigation over such releases would be under general contract law.

• International law arguments: The instrument does not reference international humanitarian law, but the Brereton Inquiry found breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict. There is no private right of action under international law in Australia without legislation.

• Potential test case: If a claim is not referred, or if compensation is deemed inadequate, a disaffected person could challenge the process. The instrument’s structure makes it difficult for an unrepresented Afghan civilian to access Australian courts. Practical obstacles include jurisdiction, service, representation, and the cost of litigation. No litigation history exists yet, but lawyers for human rights organisations may test the scheme if it operates opaquely.

No right to initiate a claim: Perhaps the most significant hitch. The Chief of the Defence Force must refer a claim; the Advocate cannot solicit claims. This means potential recipients who are not identified by the Defence organisation cannot participate. There is no obligation on the Chief to search for eligible persons. If the Brereton Inquiry identified victims by name, the Chief may refer, but there is no transparency requirement. A victim who has no contact with Australian authorities may never know the scheme exists.

No right to be informed: Even after a decision, the Chief only informs eligible recipients if the Chief believes it is appropriate, necessary, and practicable (s 8(5)). The Chief may decide it is not appropriate due to security concerns, not necessary because the person is not interested, or not practicable because the person cannot be located. If the recipient is not informed, they are also not told the reasons for non-information (unless it does not prejudice security, defence, or international relations - s 8(6)(b)). A recipient could be the subject of a decision but never know.

Internal review only for delegate decisions: If the Chief of the Defence Force makes the decision personally, there is no right to request review under s 18. Only if a delegate (e.g., a Rear Admiral or SES Band 2 officer) made the decision can the affected person seek review. This incentivises the Chief to personally make decisions to avoid review. And if the Chief personally confirms a delegate’s decision after review, that is apparently the end of the line.

No merits review or external appeal: There is no provision for review by the Administrative Review Tribunal or any independent arbiter. The only review is by the same Defence organisation that made the decision.

Advocate cannot enter contracts: The Advocate may recommend payments, but the Advocate has no power to enter into contracts or arrangements to give effect to payments (s 11(2)(e)). The Chief of the Defence Force must do that (s 9). If the Chief disagrees with the recommendation, the Advocate cannot ensure the payment is made.

Vague cultural expectations factor: The Advocate must take into account “cultural expectations, within Afghanistan, of what would be an appropriate action” (s 6(3)(b)). This is an open-ended, arguably indeterminate criterion. What are “cultural expectations”? How are they ascertained? Who determines them? This gives enormous discretion, which may lead to inconsistency across claims and could be used to justify very different remedies for similar situations. It may also create tension with sanctions and foreign policy considerations; the Advocate must balance these.

Potential conflict between cultural expectations and sanctions: A culturally appropriate action in Afghanistan might involve a ceremony or payment that benefits local leaders, some of whom could be sanctioned or associated with terrorist organisations. The Advocate must consider both cultural appropriateness and the risk of benefiting proscribed entities (s 6(3)(c)). This may lead to no action being recommended, with cultural expectations cited as one factor but overridden by sanctions risk. The scheme may therefore result in very few payments to persons inside Afghanistan.

No guidance on amounts: The instrument provides no formula, limit, or criteria for determining quantum of compensation. There is no reference to common law damages, no schedule of injury, and no provision for economic loss or pain and suffering. This creates uncertainty for recipients and exposes the Commonwealth to arbitrary outcomes or political negotiation. The only constraint is that the Chief must act within the Defence Act’s appropriation and the PGPA Act.

Privacy override: Section 15 allows collection, use, and disclosure of information about a person for scheme purposes, even sensitive information. This could be used to share information between Defence, DFAT, and the Advocate without the person’s consent. While necessary for sanctions checks, it may conflict with reasonable expectations of privacy.

Ministerial involvement is limited: The Minister is only informed if the Chief intends to depart from the Advocate’s recommendation, or to vary or revoke a decision that followed the recommendation. If the Chief follows the recommendation, the Minister has no role. This limits political accountability.

No provision for legal representation: The Advocate may engage with the eligible recipient or their nominated representative (s 6(2)(b)(i)), but there is no right to legal representation, and the Advocate is not obliged to accept a representative. A recipient without access to legal advice may be at a disadvantage.

Advocate appointment terms: The office is part-time, not public office under the Remuneration Tribunal. The Minister sets terms and conditions (s 10(4)). This raises independence concerns: the Advocate serves at the Minister’s pleasure on terms the Minister controls. There is no fixed term or removal protection specified.

Potential for delay: There is no time limit for the Advocate’s consideration or the Chief’s decision at first instance. The only statutory time limit is 60 days for the Chief to respond to a review request (s 18(4)). Claims could languish indefinitely.

For the Chief of the Defence Force:

• Identify potential eligible recipients from the Brereton Inquiry findings. This is not mandatory but necessary to initiate the scheme. Use the Inquiry’s substantiated findings as the factual basis for assault, property damage, or unlawful killing.
• Before referring a claim, be satisfied that each person in the claim is reasonably likely to be a victim (or family member) and not reasonably likely to be a terrorist organisation member or sanctioned person. This requires reasonable investigation. Rely on advice from Defence intelligence or DFAT.
• Prepare a referral that includes each eligible recipient’s name, the information you took into account, and any other information relevant to the Advocate’s consideration (s 5(2)).
• After receiving the Advocate’s report, consider the recommendation. You must take into account the report, the DFAT consultation matters (which DFAT should have provided to the Advocate), and any other relevant information (s 8(1)). You may request further information from the Advocate or others (s 8(2)).
• Make a decision: either follow the recommendation or take a different action (s 8(3)). If you intend to take a different action, notify the Minister in writing at least 15 days before making the decision, with reasons (s 8(4)). Keep a record of compliance.
• After decision, inform each eligible recipient unless you reasonably believe it is not appropriate, necessary, or practicable. Document that belief in writing. If you do not inform someone, tell the Advocate and give the basis, unless disclosing the basis would prejudice security, defence, or international relations (s 8(6)). If you decide not to give the basis, document that decision.
• If payment is part of the decision, make or administer contracts under s 9. This must comply with the PGPA Act, including procurement rules and proper use of Commonwealth resources. Involve Defence’s commercial legal team.
• If a delegate made the original decision and a person requests review, you must personally conduct the review (s 18(2)). Confirm, vary, or revoke the decision. If varying or revoking a decision that followed the Advocate’s recommendation, notify the Minister 15 days beforehand (s 18(3)). Provide written notice of the review decision within 60 days (s 18(4)).
• Manage delegations: Only delegate under s 17(1) to Rear Admirals or higher, or SES Band 2 or higher. Give written directions under s 17(2). Do not delegate the power to delegate (s 17 itself) or the review power under s 18.
• Ensure all information collected, used, or disclosed under Part 2 is for Part 2 purposes only. Avoid using information for unrelated Defence purposes.

For the Advocate:

• Upon receiving a referral, immediately consider the claim (s 6(1)).
• Must consult DFAT on the implications of sanctions laws, the Charter of the UN Act, and foreign policy interests. Seek written advice. Document the consultation.
• May engage with eligible recipients or their representative. Consider cultural factors and the recipient’s personal circumstances. If engaging, be sensitive to security and trauma. Use interpreters or cultural advisors if needed.
• Determine recommended actions. Take into account: DFAT advice; cultural expectations within Afghanistan (consider seeking expert advice on Afghan culture, possibly through DFAT or consultants); risk of making funds available to sanctioned persons, terrorist organisations, or criminal organisations; living standards, work status, and circumstances of each recipient; relationship and dependency for unlawful killing cases; risk of endangering the recipient; and other cultural, gender, societal, economic, or geopolitical factors (s 6(3)). Document reasoning for each factor.
• Prepare a report to the Chief containing the recommendation, information considered, and any information relevant to informing recipients or other persons (s 7(1)). Recommendations can include monetary or other compensation, apologies, or no action (s 7(2)).
• Do not solicit claims. Do not undertake investigations into whether wrongs occurred. Do not enter contracts on behalf of the Commonwealth.
• If the Chief requests assistance in implementing a decision, assist where practicable (s 11(1)(c)). This may involve contacting recipients or providing advice.
• Maintain records of all decisions, consultations, and communications.

For delegates (senior officers and SES Band 2): Comply with written directions from the Chief of the Defence Force (s 17(2)). Exercise powers and functions only as delegated. Do not exceed the delegation. If making a decision, ensure it is clearly recorded. Be aware that decisions may be reviewed by the Chief.

For the Minister: Appoint the Advocate by written instrument, on a part-time basis. Determine terms and conditions under s 10(4). Delegate this function only to appropriate senior officers or SES Band 2 employees (s 16). Monitor the 15-day notifications from the Chief.

For the Department of Defence and DFAT: DFAT must provide advice when consulted under s 6(2)(a). This includes legal advice on sanctions and practical advice on foreign policy. Defence must provide staff to assist the Advocate (s 13). The Chief may engage consultants (s 14). Finance should ensure any payments are authorised under s 9 and proper under the PGPA Act.

For potential applicants: There is no compliance obligation on you. You cannot apply. If you believe you are an eligible recipient not yet referred, you may contact the Australian Defence Force or seek legal advice, but the instrument does not require the Chief to accept your self-identification. You may wish to engage a representative and monitor for any outreach. If you receive a letter from the Chief’s delegate, you may request review under s 18 if you disagree.