Customs Ordinance 1993 (CKI)

Applied customs law is the central concept. It means a law of the Commonwealth in its application to the Territory in accordance with the Ordinance (section 2). This is not a static incorporation: the application is as the laws exist from time to time, so amendments to the Commonwealth Customs Act or regulations automatically flow through to the Territory unless the Ordinance provides otherwise. The Ordinance also expressly modifies those laws via the schedules, so the applied customs law is a hybrid: the Commonwealth text as altered by the Ordinance.

Comptroller is the head of the Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service, appointed in writing by the Customs Minister (section 6). The Comptroller has the powers that the Commonwealth Act gives to the Comptroller‑General of Customs, but the modifications re‑define that term to mean the Comptroller of the Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service (Schedule 1, item 2). The Comptroller can appoint customs officers (section 7) and delegate functions or powers under the Ordinance or an applied customs law (section 7A). The Comptroller also determines information technology requirements for electronic communications after consulting persons likely to be affected (section 126DA, as modified).

Customs officer is defined broadly (section 2) to mean the Comptroller or a person appointed under section 7. In the applied Customs Act, the definition of “officer of Customs” is replaced to mean a customs officer within the meaning of the Ordinance (Schedule 1, item 5). Similarly, references to “Collector” become references to a customs officer (item 6). This means the local officers exercise all the powers and duties that the Commonwealth Act vests in officers of Customs: search, seizure, detention, boarding, questioning, and demand of information. The modification ensures that Commonwealth powers are exercised by locally appointed personnel rather than the Australian Border Force.

Modifications are the specific changes made to the Commonwealth laws. They are substantive and procedural. Substantively, the definition of Comptroller‑General, judges, magistrates and officers are replaced to reflect local institutions. Procedurally, many sections that previously required communication “electronically” are amended to allow “by document or electronically” (e.g., items 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48). This is a critical accommodation for a small community where reliable electronic lodgement may not always be feasible. New subsections are inserted setting out requirements for documentary reports: they must be in writing, in an approved form, communicated to an officer doing duty at the appropriate location, contain required information, and be signed in a manner specified in the form (e.g., items 11, 13, 15, 21, 25). For electronic reports, the requirement remains to communicate such information as is set out in an approved statement.

Territorial scope is limited by section 3 of the applied Act (Schedule 1): goods moving between Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island are not treated as imports or exports for the purposes of the Act. This removes the customs entry and reporting obligations for goods moving between the two Indian Ocean Territories. The Ordinance does not otherwise define the Territory’s borders; it adopts the geographical definition of the Territory under the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act 1955.

The Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service is established by section 5 as a separate body, distinct from the Australian Border Force. It comprises the Comptroller and customs officers. Its establishment reflects the fact that the Commonwealth customs agency does not automatically exercise jurisdiction in the Territory; a separate service is needed. The Customs Minister, not the Minister for Home Affairs, has administrative responsibility for this service and for the applied customs laws generally (section 4 redefines “Minister” as the Customs Minister).

The Ordinance directly affects any person who imports goods into or exports goods from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, including residents, businesses, government agencies and carriers. Because the Territory is small and remote, the affected population is modest, but the legal duties are real. Importers of food, building materials, vehicles, fuel and household goods must comply with the same reporting and entry requirements as mainland importers, but with the local modifications. Exporters of local products, such as coconuts, fish or tourism services, must also comply.

Carriers - airlines, shipping lines and freight forwarders - are affected by the reporting obligations for ships and aircraft (sections 64AA, 64AAB, 64AAC, 64AB, 64ABAA as modified). The Ordinance allows documentary reports as an alternative to electronic reports, but the format must be approved. Carriers must submit cargo reports, outturn reports and crew reports using the prescribed methods. They must also comply with movement applications for goods under customs control (section 71E as modified).

Customs brokers and logistics providers operating in the Territory must adapt to the local administration. The Comptroller may approve forms and statements for documentary communications, which may differ from Commonwealth forms. The requirement for an approved form (documentary) or approved statement (electronic) creates a dual system. The delegation power (section 7A) means that decisions on forms, IT requirements and enforcement are made locally, not by the national Australian Border Force. Brokers need to know the local officer cadre and the Comptroller’s determinations.

Government and enforcement agencies are also affected. The Customs Minister appoints the Comptroller (section 6). The Comptroller appoints customs officers (section 7) and can delegate to them. The local courts, specifically the Supreme Court of Western Australia, are the designated Division 1B Judges for customs‑related warrants and orders (Schedule 1, item 3). Magistrates of Western Australia are the Division 1B Magistrates (item 4). This means that the Western Australian judiciary, not the Federal Circuit Court or local Cocos courts, handles urgent customs applications such as search warrants, seizure orders or detention applications. For a remote territory, requiring a WA judge or magistrate adds logistical cost and delay.

Individuals who travel to or from the Territory are affected by the self‑assessed clearance declaration regime (section 71AAAF). They may make a declaration by document or electronically. The documentary form must be approved and signed in a specified manner. The electronic form must communicate an approved statement. The authentication provision (section 126DB) creates a risk: an electronic communication is taken to be made by a person even if not authorised, unless the person notified the Department of a security breach before the communication. This puts a burden on individuals to promptly report any suspected unauthorised use of their electronic credentials.

The Cocos (Keeling) Islands Shire Council and any other local government body may need to comply when importing goods for public works, infrastructure or supplies. They have no special exemption; they are subject to the same applied customs laws as any other importer.

Christmas Island residents and businesses are affected indirectly: the special rule in section 3 of the applied Act means trade between Cocos and Christmas Island is not treated as import/export for customs purposes. This reduces compliance costs for those who trade across the two Indian Ocean Territories, but it also means that if goods enter the Territory from Christmas Island, they must still comply with any other non‑customs regulatory requirements (quarantine, biosecurity, import bans) that are not part of the applied customs law carve‑out.

Legal practitioners advising on customs matters in the Territory need to understand the interplay between the Commonwealth Act, the Ordinance and the Schedules. They cannot rely solely on the Commonwealth legislation; they must check the modifications. The deletion of sections 126E to 126G and Divisions 3 to 5 of Part XI (Schedule 1, items 55, 56) removes certain Commonwealth provisions concerning electronic communications, penalties and offences, but only for the Territory. The Ordiance text does not reveal what those provisions originally contained, but their repeal means the Territory has a different enforcement path.

Duty to report arrival of ships and aircraft. The applied Act sections 64AA, 64AAB and 64AAC require the master of a ship or pilot of an aircraft arriving in the Territory to report. As modified, the report can be documentary or electronic. If documentary, it must be in writing, in an approved form, communicated to an officer doing duty in relation to reporting at the port or airport of arrival, contain required information, and be signed as specified (items 11, 13). If electronic, it must communicate information set out in an approved statement. The report must be made before the ship or aircraft enters the Territory (the pre‑arrival timing remains unchanged from the Commonwealth Act). A failure to report is an offence under the Act.

Duty to make cargo reports. Section 64AB obliges the carrier of cargo to report it. Again, documentary or electronic is permitted. The documentary report must meet the same formalities: writing, approved form, delivered to an officer doing duty at the port or airport, required content, and signed. Electronic reports must follow an approved statement. The approved form or statement is to be approved by the Comptroller (as the modified definition of Comptroller‑General). The carrier must also comply with outturn reporting (section 64ABAA) using equivalent methods.

Right to make self‑assessed clearance declarations. Section 71AAAF allows a person to make a self‑assessed clearance declaration to clear goods for home consumption. The modified section allows documentary or electronic declaration. The documentary form must be approved and signed; the electronic must follow an approved statement. This is a significant right: it permits the declarant to self‑assess the classification, valuation and origin of goods without requiring a formal entry processing by a customs officer. The Comptroller may approve different forms for documentary or different statements for electronic communications.

Right to apply for movement of goods. Section 71E(2B) now permits a movement application under subsection (2A) to be made by document or electronically. A documentary application must be communicated by giving it to an officer doing duty in relation to import entries or movement of goods. This right is important for goods still under customs control but needing to move within the Territory.

Duty to authenticate electronic communications. Sections 71M and 119E (as substituted) require that electronic communications permitted by the relevant Division must contain the signature of the person making it and, if IT requirements have been determined under section 126DA, must meet those requirements. Failure to meet signature or IT requirements means the communication may not be valid. The Comptroller may determine IT requirements after consultation (section 126DA) but is not obliged to publish them in the Gazette; the former requirement to publish is removed. This gives the Comptroller discretion over the technical standards but may create uncertainty if those requirements are not publicly accessible.

Right to use documents instead of electronic. Across many provisions, the Ordinance inserts “by document or electronically” into sections that previously only permitted electronic submission. This is a practical concession for a Territory with limited internet reliability. However, the documentary route still requires a physical presence at the customs office: the form must be given to an officer doing duty in relation to the specific type of report (arrivals, cargo, clearance). For remote residents, that may still be costly.

Right to withdraw electronic communications. Section 71AAAP(5) is amended to say “An electronic withdrawal” (rather than “A withdrawal”). This suggests that only electronic withdrawals of self‑assessed clearance declarations are contemplated; documentary withdrawals are not expressly provided for. The implication is that a documentary declaration, once given, may need to be amended or withdrawn by a separate process not specified in the modifications.

Duty to notify security breaches. Section 126DB creates a powerful presumption: an electronic communication is taken to be made by a person if the communication meets any determined IT requirements, unless the person notified the Department of a breach of security before the communication. This shifts the burden to the user to proactively notify any compromise. If a person fails to do so, they are deemed to have made the communication even if it was unauthorised. They can only rebut the presumption by providing evidence to the contrary. This is a heightened obligation compared to the general law of agency.

Delegation of powers. The Comptroller may delegate any functions or powers under the Ordinance or an applied customs law to a customs officer (section 7A). This enables the Comptroller to distribute decision‑making without requiring the Comptroller’s personal involvement in every matter. However, it also means that decisions on matters such as approval of forms, IT requirements, and enforcement actions may be made by officers without the same level of seniority or independence. The delegate must exercise the power in accordance with any written directions.

The Ordinance itself does not create specific penalty provisions. Instead, it applies the penalty framework of the Commonwealth Customs Act 1901 to the Territory. That Act contains numerous offence provisions, such as failure to report (sections 64AA, 64AAB, etc.), making false declarations (section 71AAAF), hindering officers (section 215), smuggling (section 233), and other customs offences. Penalties include imprisonment (up to 10 years for smuggling), fines, and forfeiture of goods. Because the Ordinance makes the Commonwealth Act apply as a law of the Territory, those penalties become Territory penalties enforceable in local courts.

The modifications do not change the penalty quantum or the enforcement machinery, but they do alter who enforces. Under the applied Act, officers of Customs are the local customs officers appointed under section 7 of the Ordinance. They have the powers of search, seizure, arrest and detention conferred by the Act. However, the Ordinance modifies the definition of “Division 1B Judge” and “Division 1B Magistrate” to refer to Western Australian judges and magistrates (Schedule 1, items 3, 4). This means that for certain enforcement actions requiring judicial authority - such as search warrants under Division 1B of the Act, orders to produce documents, or warrants for arrest - the applicant must go to a Supreme Court Judge of Western Australia or a WA Magistrate. Given the distance between Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Western Australia, this imposes a practical hurdle. There is no local judicial officer with Division 1B authority.

The authentication provision (section 126DB) also has enforcement consequences. If a person is accused of making a false declaration electronically, the prosecution can rely on the presumption that the communication was made by the person if the IT requirements were met and the person did not notify of a breach. The person must then provide evidence to the contrary. This reverses the usual evidentiary burden of proof at least as to authorship.

The repeal of sections 126E to 126G (Schedule 1, item 55) and Divisions 3 to 5 of Part XI (item 56) removes certain provisions of the Commonwealth Act that dealt with electronic communications, record‑keeping, and offences specific to electronic transactions. The content of those repealed provisions is not given in the source. However, their removal means that the Territory’s applied Act lacks those provisions. This could create gaps: if a Commonwealth provision that provided a defence for unintentional electronic submissions was repealed, Territory residents may not have that defence available. Conversely, if the repealed provisions created onerous obligations, their removal reduces the compliance burden.

Section 270 of the Commonwealth Act is repealed entirely (item 57). That section in the Commonwealth Act dealt with certain regulations or evidentiary matters (the text is not reproduced). Its repeal affects the proof of customs documents and the admissibility of certain records in Territory proceedings. Practitioners should proceed with caution and verify the original section’s content.

The Comptroller may also use section 126DA to determine IT requirements. A failure to meet those requirements could render an electronic communication invalid, potentially leading to refusal of clearance, detention of goods, or deemed non‑reporting with penalty consequences. Since the requirement to publish in the Gazette was removed (item 52), the Comptroller’s determinations may be less accessible, raising rule‑of‑law concerns.

Enforcement powers against goods include forfeiture for certain offences under the Act (e.g., prohibited imports, smuggling). The Ordinance does not modify these provisions. Customs officers may seize goods and apply to the Western Australian Supreme Court for forfeiture orders.

The Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service is funded by the Commonwealth, but the operational resources are likely limited. Enforcement activity may be reactive rather than proactive, increasing the risk that non‑compliance may go undetected but, if detected, may be dealt with severely.

The primary interaction is with the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act 1955. The Ordinance is made under that Act (see section 12(2) of the Act, referenced in the note to section 1). The Ordinance’s validity and any amendment by regulation (section 8) ultimately derive from the parent Act. The note indicates the Ordinance commences on gazettal, a procedural requirement under the Act.

The Ordinance creates a category of applied customs law. That law is taken to be a law of the Territory. It therefore interacts with other Territory laws. For example, the Territory’s criminal law would apply to offences committed under the applied customs law (theft of excisable goods, assault on a customs officer). But the applied customs law also includes its own penalties, which may be enforced by Territory courts. Jurisdiction is likely in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which has jurisdiction over the Territory under the parent Act. The Ordinance confirms that Division 1B Judges are Supreme Court Judges of WA.

The Ordinance excludes duties of customs from the applied laws (section 3(1)). This means that the Customs Tariff Act 1995 and any regulations imposing customs duty rates do not apply as Territory laws. Duties of customs are levied under Commonwealth law, and the Commonwealth collects them at the border even in the Territory. The Ordinance therefore only covers the procedural, enforcement and administrative aspects, not the taxation.

There is a special relationship with Christmas Island. Schedule 1, section 3 of the applied Act provides that importation from Christmas Island is not treated as importation for the Act, and exportation to Christmas Island is not treated as exportation. This means goods moving between the two Indian Ocean Territories are not subject to customs entry, reporting or clearance under the Ordinance. However, other Commonwealth laws may apply, such as the Biosecurity Act 2015, the Commerce (Trade Descriptions) Act 1905, or the Imported Food Control Act 1992, which are not part of the customs law carve‑out. The Ordinance does not create a free trade zone; it only removes the customs process for inter‑territory trade.

The Ordinance modifies the Customs Regulation 2015 by repealing section 101 and Part 13 (Schedule 2). Part 13 of the Commonwealth Regulation deals with cargo clearance, communications, or similar matters (exact content not specified). Its repeal means that those regulation provisions do not apply in the Territory. The Ordinance also modifies the Customs (International Obligations) Regulation 2015 by repealing Part 4 (Schedule 3). That Part likely contains provisions implementing international conventions on customs procedures, such as the Revised Kyoto Convention or the Convention on Temporary Admission. Its repeal may mean the Territory does not have those streamlined procedures, such as the ATA Carnet system for temporary imports. Importers of commercial samples, exhibition goods or professional equipment may need a different clearance pathway.

The applied customs laws interact with state and federal laws through the cross‑definition of judicial officers. The reliance on Western Australian judges and magistrates means that the laws of Western Australia regarding the appointment, jurisdiction and procedures of those officers become relevant. An application for a search warrant under the applied Act would be governed by the Customs Act as modified, but the judge’s power to issue it derives from the Ordinance’s incorporation of WA judicial officers. The laws of evidence and procedure in the WA Supreme Court would apply to customs proceedings.

The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ordinarily interacts with Commonwealth laws to permit electronic communications. However, the Ordinance creates its own regime for electronic communications in customs matters (sections 126DA, 126DB, 71M, 119E). Those provisions specifically require a signature and compliance with IT requirements. The Ordinance does not reference the Electronic Transactions Act, so it is likely that the specific customs regime overrides the general law for customs communications in the Territory.

The delegation power under section 7A means that decisions made by the Comptroller may be subject to judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), as the applied customs law is a law of the Territory but made under a Commonwealth Act. However, because the Ordinance applies the Commonwealth Act as a Territory law, the ADJR Act may not automatically apply. Review would likely be available through the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Western Australia or the High Court.

The trade between the Territory and the rest of the world is subject to the same international obligations that bind Australia, but the local modification of international obligations regulation (repeal of Part 4) may limit the effect of certain international instruments in the Territory. Importers should not assume that treaty‑based advantages available in mainland Australia (like duty‑free temporary admission under the Istanbul Convention) are available in Cocos (Keeling) Islands.

The source text does not include the original enactment date or any amendment history. The Ordinance is titled “Customs Ordinance 1993”, suggesting it was originally made in 1993. The note under section 1 says it commences on gazettal under section 12(2) of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act 1955. The text appears to be a consolidated version that includes all amendments up to the time of the provided content. The schedules contain detailed modifications that were likely introduced by subsequent amendment ordinances, but no specific amendment dates or ordinances are listed.

The reference to “Customs Regulation 2015” and “Customs (International Obligations) Regulation 2015” indicates that the Ordinance has been updated to reference the current Commonwealth regulations (rather than earlier versions). The modifications to those regulations (Schedule 2 and 3) may have been made when the Commonwealth regulations replaced earlier ones. The Ordinance also references the “Customs Act 1901 (C.K.I.)” as the applied Act, and gives it a special citation. That citation was likely introduced by an amendment to the original 1993 Ordinance.

The modifications to reporting provisions (items 11, 13, 15, 21, 25, etc.) that insert “by document or electronically” appear to be a response to practical difficulties in requiring exclusively electronic communications in the Territory. These were probably added by an amendment in the 2010s as electronic systems matured but were not always reliable in remote locations.

The repeal of sections 126E to 126G, Divisions 3 to 5 of Part XI, and section 270 (items 55, 56, 57) suggests a deliberate removal of Commonwealth provisions that were either inapplicable or superseded by the Territory’s own regime. The exact history of those amendments is not given.

The Ordinance appears to be amended periodically via amending ordinances made under the parent Act. The regulation‑making power (section 8) allows the Minister to prescribe matters, but those regulations would also amend the Ordinance indirectly. Without access to the full regulation‑making history, one cannot determine the precise timeline.

It is notable that the Ordinance does not contain transitional provisions or a commencement table. This may create difficulty in determining which version of the applied laws operated at any given time. However, since section 3(1) applies the laws “as in force from time to time”, the current text of the applied Commonwealth laws is the relevant version, subject to the modifications.

The source text contains no references to cases, litigation history, or judicial interpretation of the Ordinance. The deep dive cannot invent cases. It is likely that the small population of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands means very few customs disputes reach litigation. The Territory’s legal system does not have a dedicated customs court; any litigation would be in the Supreme Court of Western Australia or the Federal Court.

Given that the Ordinance applies the Commonwealth Customs Act as a Territory law, existing Commonwealth case law on the provisions of the Act would be persuasive authority for the interpretation of the applied Act. However, because the Ordinance includes modifications (e.g., redefining officers, allowing documentary reports, changing the authentication rule), the common law may not apply directly. Any litigation would need to address whether the Commonwealth case law is applicable given the modifications.

The authentication provision (section 126DB) could generate disputes about whether an electronic communication was authorised. The presumption in section 126DB is unusual and may be challenged under the implied constitutional requirement for a fair trial, or as incompatible with the right to silence. Such litigation would be novel and could arise if a person is prosecuted for a false declaration based on an electronic communication they deny making.

Other potential areas of litigation include: the validity of a search warrant issued by a WA Supreme Court Judge for a search in the Territory; whether the Comptroller’s delegation under section 7A is validly exercised; whether the Comptroller’s determination of IT requirements (section 126DA) is a legislative instrument requiring registration; and whether the carving out of duties of customs is consistent with the parent Act.

The repeal of Part 4 of the Customs (International Obligations) Regulation 2015 could be challenged if an importer claims the Ordinance fails to give effect to an international treaty obligation. However, treaties are not directly enforceable, and the Ordinance only modifies subordinate legislation.

In summary, there is no known litigation history. The Ordinance has operated largely without judicial scrutiny. This may change if enforcement activity increases or if a commercial dispute arises over goods valuation or movement.

The duties of customs carve‑out is narrower than it appears. Section 3(1) says the applied laws apply “except to the extent that they deal with duties of customs”. The phrase “deal with duties of customs” is ambiguous. It likely excludes provisions that impose, collect, or calculate duty, but it may not exclude provisions that interact with duty, such as valuation for duty purposes, tariff classification, or rules of origin. Those provisions remain part of the applied Act because they also serve non‑duty functions like statistics and trade compliance. An importer who assumes that all duty‑related sections are inapplicable may still need to comply with classification and valuation rules for the applied Act’s purposes.

The authentication provision is a trap. Section 126DB creates an automatic deemed authorisation unless the person notified the Department of a security breach before the communication. The word “before” is critical. If you discover a breach after an unauthorised communication has been sent, you cannot avoid liability by notifying later. You must notify proactively, before any communication is made. For a small business with minimal IT security, this is a serious risk. The only escape is to provide “evidence to the contrary”, but the onus is on you.

Documentary reports require a physical presence. Many provisions require that a documentary report be communicated by sending or giving it to an officer “doing duty in relation to” the relevant type of report at the port or airport of arrival. The Territory likely has limited customs office hours. If you arrive outside hours, you cannot lodge a documentary report until a customs officer is on duty, which may cause delays. The Ordinance does not provide for dropping off a report at a secure box or sending it by post; it must be given to an officer.

The Comptroller’s IT determinations may not be published. The modification to section 126DA removes the requirement to have determinations published in the Gazette. The Comptroller may instead make them available by other means (email, website, or not at all). This creates a compliance risk: you cannot know the IT requirements unless you ask. If you fail to meet unpublished requirements, your electronic communication may be invalid, and you may be deemed not to have reported.

Approved forms may differ from Commonwealth forms. The Comptroller may approve forms for documentary reports that differ from the Commonwealth’s approved forms. A person using a Commonwealth form (e.g., the standard passenger arrival card) may find it rejected in the Territory because it does not comply with the local form. The Ordinance does not require consistency with Commonwealth forms.

Movement applications by document must be given to the right officer. Section 71E(2BA) requires that a documentary movement application be communicated to the Department by giving it to an officer “doing duty in relation to import entries or to the movement of goods subject to customs control”. If no such officer is present, you cannot lodge the application in documentary form. There is no fallback to mailing it.

There is no provision for electronic payments or certificates. The Ordinance does not modify provisions on electronic payment of duty, refunds, or certificates. The applied Act likely has provisions for those, but the modifications to reporting may not extend to financial transactions. Check the Commonwealth Act for those parts; they are not altered by the Ordinance.

The special rule for Christmas Island trade applies only to imports/exports. Section 3 of the applied Act excludes trade with Christmas Island from the import and export definitions. However, goods that are moved from Cocos to Christmas Island and then exported to a third country may need to be reported as exports from Christmas Island (under the Commonwealth Act as applied in Christmas Island). The Ordinance does not create a unified customs territory; it only simplifies bilateral trade.

The repeal of Part 13 of the Customs Regulation 2015 removes certain clearance facilitations. Part 13 likely contained provisions for self‑assessment, simplified clearance, or accelerated release. Its repeal means that those facilitations are not available in the Territory. Importers may expect longer clearance times for low‑risk goods that would have benefited from the phased‑out provisions.

No transitional provisions for electronic to documentary shift. The Ordinance does not say what happens if a person previously used electronic reporting and now wants to switch to documentary. There is no requirement to notify or re‑register. But the approved documentary form may need to be obtained from the Comptroller, and there is no guarantee that the Comptroller will approve a form promptly.

Step 1: Determine if the Ordinance applies to your transaction. If you are importing goods into the Cocos (Keeling) Islands from outside Australia (including from mainland Australia), or exporting from the Territory to a place other than Christmas Island, the applied customs laws apply. If trading only with Christmas Island, no customs reporting is needed.

Step 2: Identify the correct reporting pathway. Decide whether to use documentary or electronic reports. Electronic reports require compliance with any IT requirements determined by the Comptroller under section 126DA. Document reports require the use of an approved form, which must be obtained from the Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service. There is no automatic approval of Commonwealth forms; obtain the local form.

Step 3: For arrivals of ships or aircraft, ensure the pre‑arrival report is made. Section 64AAB and 64AAC as modified permit documentary reports. The report must be given to an officer at the port or airport of arrival. Since officers may not be on duty 24/7, plan arrival during operating hours or make electronic report if possible.

Step 4: For cargo, make a cargo report under section 64AB. Use the approved documentary form or electronic statement. For outturn, use section 64ABAA and the same method. Ensure the cargo report includes all required information and the signature if documentary.

Step 5: For goods to be cleared, make a self‑assessed clearance declaration under section 71AAAF. This requires an approved form (documentary) or approved statement (electronic). Declare the goods correctly. Failure to declare accurately is an offence.

Step 6: Secure your electronic communications. If using electronic means, you must implement security measures to prevent unauthorised use. Monitor your systems for breaches and immediately notify the Department of any security compromise. It is prudent to report potential breaches even if unsure, to avoid the deemed authorisation presumption. Also ensure your electronic signature mechanism complies with determined IT requirements. If no IT requirements have been determined, you still need a signature (section 71M). Signature can be a typed name, a digital certificate, or other method.

Step 7: Retain records. Although the Ordinance does not specify retention periods, the applied Act likely requires records of declarations, reports and communications to be kept for at least five years (section 126DA as modified does not prescribe record‑keeping, but Division 2 of Part XI in the applied Act may apply; check the current Commonwealth Act). Since the Ordinance repeals Divisions 3 to 5 of Part XI, record‑keeping obligations in those divisions are removed, but the applied Act’s general provisions on records (section 240) still apply.

Step 8: Check for the Comptroller’s determinations. Contact the Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service to obtain copies of any approved forms, approved statements, and IT requirements determinations. Do not rely on outdated versions.

Step 9: Obtain legal advice on enforcement and penalties. If you face a compliance action or prosecution, engage a lawyer experienced in Western Australian court procedures. The relevant forum is the Supreme Court of Western Australia or a WA Magistrates Court. Evidence of customs documentation may be affected by the repeal of section 270; ensure you can prove authenticity through officer testimony.

Step 10: Monitor amendments. The Ordinance applies Commonwealth laws as in force from time to time. Changes to the Commonwealth Act, regulations or instruments automatically apply in the Territory (subject to the Schedules). Subscribe to Commonwealth legislative updates and watch for amendments to the Ordinance.

Practical tip for businesses: Given the small market, consider appointing a customs agent or broker who is familiar with the Territory’s regime. The cost of non‑compliance (fines, forfeiture, delays) can be disproportionate to the value of the goods. The dual documentary/electronic option is a flexibility, not a relaxation of substantive obligations. Ensure that any documentary form is physically delivered to the right officer; retain a copy with proof of delivery.

Public bodies should coordinate with the Comptroller on forms for bulk imports (e.g., for infrastructure projects). The Comptroller may be willing to approve a form tailored to repeated consignments, reducing the administrative burden. The delegation power (section 7A) means that many decisions can be made by a customs officer, not only the Comptroller, so the point of contact need not always be the senior official.