Application means an application for assistance made under section 7. Applications must be made in accordance with the requirements of an approved program (s 7). There is no free-form application route; the program defines the process.

Approved program means a program approved under section 6(7). The Secretary develops a draft program at the Minister's request (s 6(1)) and may consult with any person or body, including an expert panel (s 6(2)). A program may include details of the relevant area of the cultural and creative industries, eligibility information, assessment criteria, type and level of assistance, whether an expert panel will consider applications, and terms and conditions (s 6(3)). The Minister may approve the program with or without alterations (s 6(7)), and may alter a draft program to require expert panel assessment even if the Secretary proposed otherwise (s 6(8)). The program is the central mechanism through which the Minister's broad statutory power is narrowed and made accessible to applicants.

Expert panel means an expert panel appointed under section 9. The Secretary appoints an uneven number of members selected from the register of experts (ss 9(1)-(3)). The Secretary must not direct or attempt to influence the panel (s 9(4)). The panel considers applications on merit in accordance with the relevant approved program (s 10(2)(a)), and recommends to the Minister whether assistance should be provided and in what amount and form (s 10(1)). If the panel cannot agree, it may refer the application to the Secretary for assessment (s 10(4)), who then makes a recommendation to the Minister (s 10(5)). The panel regulates its own proceedings (s 12(1)) but must keep minutes and records (s 12(2)).

Register of experts is established by the Minister under section 8(1). It comprises persons the Minister considers experienced, independent, suitably qualified, and well respected within the sector, or who have relevant technical expertise. The Minister must take into account the need for diversity of backgrounds, experience, and qualifications (s 8(2)). The register provides the pool from which expert panel members are selected.

Assistance is defined broadly in section 5(2) to include grants, subsidies, loans, equity investment, scholarships, payments to cover losses, and any other initiative the Minister considers appropriate. Loans require approval of the interest rate by the Treasurer and are subject to security and repayment terms determined by the Minister (s 5(4)). The Minister may also enter into commissioning or purchase agreements for works and deal with property or rights (s 5(3)).

Conflict of interest is defined specifically for expert panel members in section 14(2): a member has a conflict if they know or reasonably ought to know that considering an application could confer a direct or indirect financial benefit on the member, an immediate relative, personal friend, or close business associate. A member must not consider an application if they have a conflict (s 14(1)), and must declare it as soon as practicable after becoming aware (s 14(3)).

Dissolution of the Board occurs on the commencement day (1 January 2018) under section 18. The Tasmanian Arts Advisory Board ceases to exist. Its assets vest in the Crown, its liabilities become Crown liabilities (s 19(1)), references in documents to the Board become references to the Crown (s 20), and legal proceedings are continued by or against the Crown (s 21). The Board's enabling Act, the Tasmanian Arts Advisory Board Act 1975, is repealed (s 26, Schedule 1).

These concepts form a procedural architecture that replaces a standing board with a flexible, ministerial-driven system of program-based assistance and temporary expert panels. The absence of a definition of "cultural and creative industries" leaves the scope of the Act almost entirely to ministerial discretion, subject only to procedural requirements in program development.

The Act directly affects four categories of persons and entities: applicants, the Minister and Secretary, expert panel members, and the Department of State Growth. Indirectly it affects the broader arts and cultural sector in Tasmania, taxpayers who fund the assistance, and persons who previously engaged with the Tasmanian Arts Advisory Board.

Applicants are persons or organisations that apply for assistance under an approved program (s 7). They must meet the eligibility criteria set out in the program (s 6(3)(b)). There is no limit on who can apply - the Act does not restrict applicants to Tasmanian residents, incorporated bodies, or particular industry sectors, though those limitations may appear in the program terms. Applicants bear the compliance burden of preparing applications and then have no statutory right to review or appeal if assistance is refused. The Minister is not required to give reasons for a decision, nor is there a merits review mechanism in the Act.

The Minister and Secretary exercise the core powers. The Minister decides on assistance (s 5(1)), approves programs (s 6(7)), establishes the register of experts (s 8(1)), and may delegate approval power to State Service employees (s 5(5)). The Secretary develops programs (s 6(1)), appoints expert panels (s 9(1)), and may take over assessment of an application if the panel cannot agree (s 10(5)). The Secretary must not direct or attempt to influence an expert panel (s 9(4)). Both are subject to limited procedural checks: the Minister must not approve a program without expert panel consideration unless satisfied, based on the Secretary's written reasons, that a panel is not required (s 6(5)-(6)). The Act thus centralises significant discretionary authority in two individuals, with only weak internal procedural safeguards.

Expert panel members are appointed from the register of experts to consider applications (ss 9, 10). They must assess applications on merit (s 10(2)(a)), avoid conflicts of interest (s 14), maintain confidentiality (s 13), and refrain from being improperly influenced (s 11). They are protected from personal liability for acts done in good faith (s 15(1)), but that protection does not preclude Crown liability (s 15(2)). They are entitled to remuneration and expenses determined by the Secretary (s 17). The imposition of criminal penalties for breach of confidentiality (s 13) and for failing to declare a conflict (s 14(3)) means panel members bear real personal legal risk.

The Department of State Growth is the responsible department, headed by the Secretary, and provides administrative support (s 25). State Service employees may be delegated powers to approve assistance (s 5(5)) or to provide advice and secretarial assistance to panels (s 10(3)). The Department bears the operational cost of program development, panel management, and disbursement.

The broader sector includes artists, cultural organisations, arts workers, and businesses in creative industries. The Act shapes the funding environment. A person who previously served on the Tasmanian Arts Advisory Board loses that position upon its dissolution. Entities that held contracts with the Board now contract with the Crown (s 21(e)). Taxpayers fund the assistance through appropriations from the Public Account (s 23). The concentration of grant-making discretion in a single Minister with no statutory criteria for decision-making creates uncertainty for applicants and may favour well-connected applicants over others, though the expert panel process is designed to provide some insulation through merit-based assessment.

Minister’s duties. The Minister must approve programs in accordance with the procedural requirement in section 6(6) - not approving a program that bypasses an expert panel unless satisfied that a panel is not required based on the Secretary’s written reasons. The Minister must establish a register of experts (s 8(1)) and, in selecting persons for it, must take into account the need for diversity of backgrounds, experience, and qualifications (s 8(2)). Apart from these limited procedural duties, the Minister has broad discretion. There is no duty to give reasons for refusing assistance, no duty to follow an expert panel’s recommendation, and no duty to ensure that assistance is distributed equitably across the sector or that public money achieves value.

Secretary’s duties. The Secretary must develop programs when requested by the Minister (s 6(1)). If a draft program provides for applications to be considered without an expert panel, the Secretary must provide the Minister with written reasons why a panel is not required (s 6(5)). The Secretary must appoint an expert panel to consider an application or group of applications (s 9(1)), unless the approved program specifies otherwise. The Secretary must not direct or attempt to influence an expert panel (s 9(4)). The Secretary may delegate powers to State Service employees (s 16) and may authorise State Service officers to provide advice or secretarial assistance to a panel (s 10(3)).

Duties of expert panel members. A member must not consider an application if he or she has a conflict of interest (s 14(1)). A member must declare a conflict as soon as practicable after becoming aware of it (s 14(3)). A member must not divulge information obtained by virtue of membership except in the course of duties, as authorised, or when required by a court or tribunal (s 13). In considering an application, the panel must assess it on the basis of merit and in accordance with the applicable approved program (s 10(2)(a)). The panel may seek advice from the Department (s 10(2)(b)). If the panel cannot agree on an assessment, it may refer the application to the Secretary (s 10(4)). The panel must keep minutes and records of its recommendations (s 12(2)). The panel regulates its own proceedings (s 12(1)), but its function is advisory only.

Rights of applicants. The only right expressly conferred on applicants is the right to apply for assistance in accordance with an approved program (s 7). There is no right to have an application considered; the Minister may simply not respond. There is no right to a hearing, to reasons for refusal, to receive the minimum amount specified in a program, or to internal or external review. An applicant who is refused assistance has no statutory avenue of challenge. The only possible recourse would be through general administrative law principles such as judicial review for jurisdictional error, manifest unreasonableness, or failure to take into account a relevant consideration, but the broad discretion conferred by the Act would make such challenges difficult. The Act does not create a private right of action for breach of its provisions.

Protection from liability. Section 15(1) provides that an expert panel member does not incur personal liability for acts done in good faith in the exercise of their responsibilities. This is a standard statutory indemnity but does not protect the member from criminal prosecution under sections 11, 13, or 14, which are strict liability or knowledge-based offences. The Crown may still be liable (s 15(2)).

General duties. No person may attempt to influence the Secretary in appointing an expert panel or to influence a panel or its members in considering an application, unless the advice is sought under section 10(2)(b) (s 11, penalty 50 penalty units). This creates a broad prohibition that could catch lobbying, advocacy, or even informal discussions about an application, depending on interpretation. The Crown is bound by the Act (s 4).

The Act creates three criminal offences, each with a monetary penalty expressed in penalty units. The value of a penalty unit in Tasmania is set by the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005; at the time of commencement it would have been approximately $150 per unit, making 50 units around $7,500 and 20 units around $3,000. These are summary offences.

Attempting to influence a panel (s 11). A person must not attempt to influence, by any means, the Secretary in appointing an expert panel, or a panel or a member in considering an application, unless the person’s advice is sought under section 10(2)(b). The maximum penalty is 50 penalty units. The offence is broad: “by any means” extends to direct communication, indirect lobbying, public commentary, or economic pressure. The only exception is when the panel or Department formally seeks advice. There is no statutory defence of public interest, good faith, or following a ministerial request. The provision effectively criminalises unauthorised advocacy directed at panel members or the Secretary regarding the appointment or decision-making process. This may chill legitimate representations from stakeholders, particularly if the boundary between seeking to assist the panel and attempting to influence it is unclear. The Crown is bound (s 4) and could in theory be liable, though in practice prosecution of Crown servants or agents is unlikely.

Divulging information (s 13). A member of an expert panel, or a person employed or engaged in work related to the affairs of a panel, must not divulge information obtained by virtue of that office or position except in the course of duties, as authorised by or under this or any other Act, or when required by a court or tribunal. Maximum penalty 20 penalty units. This covers both panel members and departmental staff. The exception for “authorised by or under this Act or any other Act” is potentially wide, but in practice likely limited. The offence does not require proof of harm or intent beyond knowing the information was obtained by virtue of the position. There is no public interest defence for whistleblowing or exposing maladministration.

Failure to declare a conflict (s 14(3)). A member of an expert panel must declare a conflict of interest as soon as practicable after becoming aware of it. Maximum penalty 20 penalty units. The prosecution would need to prove that the member knew or ought reasonably to have known that their consideration could confer a direct or indirect financial benefit on themselves, an immediate relative, personal friend, or close business associate (s 14(2)). The inclusion of “personal friend” and “close business associate” is notably broad and imposes a high burden on members to monitor relationships that may not be clearly defined.

Enforcement. The Act does not establish a dedicated enforcement body, inspectorate, or compliance unit. Offences would be prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecutions in the ordinary summary jurisdiction. There are no civil penalties, infringement notices, or administrative sanctions for breach of the Act. The only consequence for a breach of a duty not backed by a criminal penalty is potential reputational damage or ministerial direction (though there is no statutory power for the Minister to remove expert panel members; the Secretary appoints them (s 9(1)) and presumably may revoke appointment at common law). The absence of a review mechanism for applicants means that even if the Minister or a panel breaches procedural requirements (e.g., fails to assess on merit), the applicant has no direct statutory remedy.

The narrow range of enforcement tools - three criminal offences with modest fines - reflects the Act’s character as an enabling statute rather than a regulatory one. The real “enforcement” risk for applicants is not having their application approved. The real risk for panel members is criminal liability for a broad range of conduct.

Crown immunity and binding effect. Section 4 provides that the Act binds the Crown in right of Tasmania and, so far as legislative power permits, in all its other capacities. This means the State and its agencies are subject to the Act’s provisions, including the criminal offences. However, the Crown is unlikely to prosecute itself. The provision ensures that the dissolution of the Board and transfer of assets and liabilities to the Crown (Part 3) are effective, and that the Crown may be sued on pre-existing Board contracts.

Repeal of the Tasmanian Arts Advisory Board Act 1975. Section 26 and Schedule 1 repeal the 1975 Act. The Board ceases to exist. All assets and liabilities transfer to the Crown (s 19). Any ongoing legal proceedings are taken over by the Crown (s 21). Contracts and arrangements the Board entered into become contracts of the Crown (s 21(e)). Documents referencing the Board are read as referencing the Crown (s 20). This interaction is the most direct: the prior statutory scheme is replaced wholesale.

State tax exemptions. Section 19(2) exempts from State tax any document, transfer, or transaction done to give effect to the transfer of Board assets and liabilities to the Crown. Section 22 provides that instruments to which the Crown is a party by virtue of the Act, and the Crown itself insofar as it would be liable to State tax in relation to a matter to which the Act relates, are not liable to State tax. State tax includes stamp duty, land tax, and payroll tax. This reduces the cost of the transition but does not affect Commonwealth taxes (GST, income tax, fringe benefits tax). The exemption applies only to the extent necessary to give effect to the Act’s purposes; it does not create a general exemption for all artistic funding activities.

Administrative Arrangements Act 1990. Section 25 provides that until an order is made under section 4 of the Administrative Arrangements Act 1990, the administration of this Act is assigned to the Minister for the Arts and the responsible department is the Department of State Growth. This is a transitional provision that could be superseded by a future administrative order reassigning responsibility (e.g., to a new Department of Culture). Practitioners need to check current administrative arrangements.

Financial management legislation. Section 23 requires that moneys for loans under the Act be issued out of the Public Account as provided by Parliament, and repayments of loan principal and interest are paid to the Treasurer and dealt with as if the loan were an advance from the Treasurer out of that Account. This interacts with the Public Account and Financial Management and Audit Act 1990, imposing standard appropriations and accounting requirements. Expenses of the Minister and expert panels are similarly drawn from the Public Account as provided by Parliament (s 23(2)).

Regulation-making power. Section 24 allows the Governor to make regulations for the purposes of the Act. No specific matters are set out for regulation. This power could be used to prescribe procedures, forms, fees, or further criteria, and must be checked for any regulations currently in force.

No interaction with Commonwealth laws. The Act does not refer to or seek to interact with Commonwealth legislation such as the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (regarding deductibility of donations, tax treatment of grants), the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth), or the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Grants under this Act may have Commonwealth tax implications for recipients, but the Act is silent on them. Recipients remain subject to all otherwise applicable laws.

No override of other State laws. The Act does not contain a provision that it prevails over inconsistent State laws. It operates alongside other Tasmanian laws, including anti-corruption and integrity legislation (e.g., the Integrity Commission Act 2009). An attempt to influence a panel (s 11) could also constitute an offence under general bribery or misconduct provisions.

The Act commenced on 1 January 2018 (s 2). It was passed as Act No. 53 of 2017. The only amendment noted in the source text is to section 23, which was amended by No. 38 of 2020, Schedule 1, with an applied date of 27 November 2020. The source text includes editorial annotations but does not specify what the amendment changed. Given that section 23 deals with expenses of the Act and the drawing of moneys from the Public Account, the amendment likely involved machinery updates to financial provisions - possibly to reflect changes in appropriation procedures or to align with the Public Account legislation. No other amendments are recorded in the source text. The Act appears to have remained largely unchanged since commencement, suggesting it has been stable and not subject to significant policy revisions. However, the regulation-making power (s 24) may have been used to alter operational details without amending the primary Act.

The source text does not refer to any litigation. There are no provisions for review, appeal, or dispute resolution within the Act itself, which makes the Act a low-litigation risk in the sense of statutory appeals. However, the broad discretionary power granted to the Minister and Secretary could give rise to judicial review applications in the Supreme Court of Tasmania under the common law and the Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas). Potential grounds include: the Minister failing to consider the merit assessment of an expert panel (though the Act does not require the Minister to follow it), the Secretary directing a panel in breach of s 9(4), or the Minister approving a program without being satisfied that an expert panel is not required (s 6(6)). An applicant might also challenge a decision as irrational or made for an improper purpose. No reported cases were identified in the source, but that does not mean none exist; the absence of citation suggests either no litigation has occurred or it has not reached reported status. The Act’s structure - discretion without criteria - generally makes successful judicial review difficult, as plaintiffs would need to show the Minister acted beyond power or failed to follow a mandatory procedure. The offence provisions (ss 11, 13, 14) could be litigated in the Magistrates Court, but again no cases are noted.

No right to a decision. The Act does not require the Minister to respond to an application. An applicant who submits an application under s 7 has no statutory right to have it considered or decided within a timeframe, or at all. The Minister may simply not act. This is a significant gap for applicants who need timely funding decisions. While common law principles may imply a duty to consider an application, the Act does not provide for it.

No merits review. There is no internal or external merits review of any decision under the Act. A refused applicant cannot appeal to a tribunal or ask the Minister to reconsider. The only avenue is judicial review, which is limited to procedural fairness and jurisdictional error, not the merits of the decision. Combined with the broad discretion, this gives the Minister effectively unreviewable power over public arts funding.

Broad definition of “conflict of interest” includes personal friends. Section 14(2) defines conflict to include any situation where consideration could confer a financial benefit on a “personal friend” or “close business associate” of the member. This is unusually broad for a conflict provision and places a heavy due-diligence burden on panel members. A member who has a casual acquaintance who is also an applicant may need to assess whether that person is a “personal friend”. There is no guidance in the Act. The penalty for failing to declare is 20 penalty units, so members face real risk if they misjudge the relationship.

Criminal offence for “attempting to influence” is broad. Section 11 prohibits “any means” of attempting to influence the panel or the Secretary in appointments or decisions. This could capture an email from a community group supporting an application, a phone call from a local MP, or public advocacy. The only exception is when advice is sought under s 10(2)(b). There is no exemption for ministerial direction (the Minister may not be able to direct the panel, but could the Minister’s office seek to influence? That would be an offence). The provision creates a chilling effect on legitimate stakeholder engagement.

Expert panel independence is fragile. The Secretary must not direct the panel (s 9(4)), but the panel’s recommendations are not binding on the Minister. The Minister can reject them without reasons. Moreover, if the panel cannot agree, the matter goes to the Secretary for assessment (s 10(4)-(5)), who is a departmental official, not an independent expert. This undermines the independence of the panel model in cases of disagreement.

No statutory criteria for ministerial decisions. The Act does not require the Minister to consider any particular matters when deciding whether to give assistance. The only guidance is the “purpose of supporting the creative and cultural industries” in s 5(1). The Minister could, for example, decide to fund only one type of art or to favour politically connected applicants, and that would not be inconsistent with the Act’s plain terms. The expert panel’s merit assessment is only a recommendation.

Applicants cannot see panel recommendations. The Act does not require that an applicant be given the expert panel’s recommendation, the reasons for a decision, or even notice of a decision. The confidentiality obligations (s 13) would likely prevent panel members from disclosing their own recommendations to applicants. This leaves applicants in the dark about why they were or were not successful.

Delegation waters down accountability. The Minister may delegate approval power to any State Service employee (s 5(5)), and the Secretary may delegate any power except delegation itself (s 16). A decision that ultimately may affect a person’s livelihood could be made by a junior officer without the applicant knowing. The Act does not require disclosure of the delegate’s identity or qualifications.

Remuneration of panel members is at Secretary’s discretion. Section 17 provides that panel members are entitled to remuneration and expenses determined by the Secretary. There is no standard rate or appeal if the Secretary sets a low amount. This could deter qualified experts from serving, undermining the quality of assessment.

Approved programs are not public documents unless the Minister publishes them. The Act does not require programs to be publicly available. A potential applicant may not know what programs exist, what criteria apply, or when to apply. The only reference is that an application must be “in accordance with the requirements of an approved program” (s 7), but there is no obligation on the Minister or Secretary to publish programs. In practice, programs likely would be published, but there is no statutory mandate.

Regulations may expand or modify the scheme. Section 24 permits the Governor to make regulations for the purposes of the Act. Regulations could prescribe additional requirements, create new offences, or impose obligations on applicants. The Act does not limit the scope of regulation-making power beyond the general purpose of the Act. Anyone dealing with the Act needs to check current regulations.

For applicants. The first step is to ascertain what approved programs exist under the Act. Since the Act does not require public notice, applicants should contact the Department of State Growth or monitor the relevant government website for program announcements. Once a program is identified, the applicant must apply in accordance with its requirements, including eligibility criteria, application form, lodgement method and deadline, and any supporting documents (s 7). The application will be assessed on merit in accordance with the program’s criteria if an expert panel is involved (s 10(2)(a)). If the program does not provide for an expert panel, the assessment will be done within the Department. The applicant should ensure all representations to the Department are carefully documented and do not constitute “attempting to influence” the panel if one is appointed (s 11). Direct communication with panel members is prohibited unless formally sought. The applicant has no right to be notified of the outcome or to receive reasons, but may request this informally. There is no internal appeal process, so if the application is rejected, the only recourse is to apply for a different program if available, or to consider judicial review if there is a clear legal error.

For expert panel members. Before considering any application, the member must review the register of experts obligations, ensure they have disclosed any potential conflicts of interest as defined in s 14(2) - including financial benefits to themselves, immediate relatives, personal friends, and close business associates. A member who is uncertain should err on the side of disclosure and seek guidance from the Secretary. The member must not consider an application where a conflict exists (s 14(1)). The member must maintain confidentiality of all information obtained through panel service, only disclosing in the course of duties or as required by law (s 13). The member must assess applications on the basis of merit and in accordance with the approved program criteria (s 10(2)(a)). The member must not allow any external influence and should refuse any attempted influence, as such attempts are criminal offences (s 11). The member should keep minutes and records of recommendations as required by s 12(2). If the panel cannot reach agreement, the member should participate in referring the application to the Secretary (s 10(4)). The member should keep personal records of their service in case of later allegations. The protection from liability in s 15(1) only applies if the member acts in good faith.

For the Secretary. When the Minister requests program development, the Secretary must develop a draft program that includes the matters in s 6(3). If the program will not involve an expert panel, the Secretary must provide the Minister with written reasons explaining why a panel is not required (s 6(5)). The Secretary must submit the draft to the Minister for approval (s 6(4)). When appointing an expert panel, the Secretary must select an uneven number of members from the register of experts who have relevant experience or expertise (s 9(2)-(3)). The Secretary must not direct or attempt to influence the panel (s 9(4)). If a panel refers an application to the Secretary, the Secretary must consider it and recommend to the Minister (s 10(5)). The Secretary may authorise State Service staff to provide advice or secretarial assistance to the panel (s 10(3)). The Secretary may delegate powers to State Service employees (s 16). The Secretary must ensure that any advice provided to the panel does not attempt to influence the outcome.

For the Minister. The Minister must establish and maintain the register of experts, taking into account diversity of background, experience, and qualifications (s 8). The Minister must not approve a program that bypasses an expert panel unless satisfied, based on the Secretary’s reasons, that a panel is not required (s 6(6)). When approving assistance, the Minister should document the basis for the decision, particularly if departing from an expert panel’s recommendation, although the Act does not require reasons. The Minister may delegate approval power to State Service employees (s 5(5)). The Minister should avoid any communication that could be construed as attempting to influence a panel or its members, as that would be an offence under s 11.

For all parties. Understanding that the Act is a discretionary grants scheme with minimal procedural safeguards, all parties should document all interactions, decisions, and reasons in writing. Expert panel members should obtain independent legal advice if uncertain about conflict obligations. Applicants should not rely on the Act to provide any right to funding or review. Compliance with the criminal offence provisions is essential; there is no de minimis exception for well-meaning advocacy. Anyone interacting with the Act should monitor for regulations that may impose additional obligations or modify procedures.