The Act operates on a handful of discrete legal concepts, all defined by their statutory mechanics rather than by detailed policy exposition.

• Certification and formality. A judge or justice must make a written certificate "under his hand" in the form contained in Schedule 1 for fines (s 3(1)) and Schedule 3 for forfeited recognizances (s 4(2)). The delivery or posting of that certificate to the Attorney-General is a statutory trigger. The text emphasises a formal, signed document as the evidentiary basis for further action.

• Attorney-General's ministerial role in judgment creation. Upon receipt of the certificate, the Attorney-General "shall cause a final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court" for prescribed sums and costs (s 3(2); s 4(3)). The word "shall" imposes an obligation on the Attorney-General to cause the judgment to be signed once the certificate and, for recognizances, the recognizance itself, are received.

• Finality and exclusion of appeal. Judgments produced under the Act are insulated from writ of error or appeal (s 3(3); s 4(4)). The Act therefore converts an administrative fiscal claim into a Supreme Court final judgment that is declared non-appealable within the Act’s parameters.

• Judicial review limited by procedure for vacatur. The Supreme Court or any judge may order satisfaction to be entered on such a judgment, but only via a rule nisi or summons calling upon the Attorney-General to show cause, and only on proof by affidavit that the judgment has been satisfied or equity requires vacatur (s 5(1)-(2)). This provides a single, defined pathway for challenging or setting aside the statutory judgment.

• Exclusions. The Act explicitly excludes enforcement of sums due under specified taxation and estates statutes, and recognizances in the Criminal Code (s 19). Those subject matters are therefore carved out of the Act’s mechanisms.

• Forms and schedules. The Act contains Schedules 1-4 as the prescribed forms for the certificates and judgments (Schedules include graphic images). Several sections and schedules are repealed or amended as indicated in the text; those changes affect the current content and application of the Act.

Taken together, these concepts implement a two-step conversion: a judicial/justice certification followed by an Attorney-General-initiated Supreme Court judgment, with a curtailed right of appeal and a narrowly defined route for vacation of the judgment.

The Act identifies three categories of actors with direct roles and several groups with consequential exposure.

• Judges and Justices. A judge of the Court "by which, or the justice by whom" a fine is imposed must prepare and sign the certificate, including the name and residence or business of the person fined, the cause, and the amount (s 3(1)). For forfeited recognizances, the judge or justice must similarly certify the forfeiture, and deliver or post the recognizance and writing to the Attorney-General (s 4(2)). The Act therefore imposes an administrative duty on judicial officers who impose fines or who preside when recognizances are forfeited.

• Attorney-General. The Act centralises responsibility in the Attorney-General who "shall cause a final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court" upon receipt of the certificate (s 3(2); s 4(3)). The Attorney-General acts as the executive funnel through which administrative fines and forfeited recognizances are converted into enforceable judgments.

• Persons fined otherwise than by judgment or conviction. The Act applies where fines "shall be imposed upon any person otherwise than by a judgment or conviction of a court or a justice" (s 3(1)). The text does not enumerate which bodies impose such fines, so the statutory wording covers any non-judicial fine that meets that description. Those persons risk having a final Supreme Court judgment entered against them if the certificate procedure is followed and they do not pay immediately.

• Persons who entered recognizance to His Majesty. Where a recognizance to His Majesty is forfeited and not exempted, the judge or justice may cause the recognizance to be estreated and send it, with certification, to the Attorney-General (s 4(1)-(2)). The Act therefore directly affects obligors on recognizances to His Majesty, unless the recognizance falls within the Criminal Code’s recognizance provisions which are expressly excluded by s 19.

• Supreme Court registry and enforcement officers. The Attorney-General causes a final judgment to be "signed in the Supreme Court" (s 3(2); s 4(3)), so the court registry and any enforcement mechanisms associated with a Supreme Court judgment become implicated. The Act allows execution to have been issued before vacatur (s 5(1)), which implies registry and enforcement activity, although the Act does not itself specify execution procedure beyond that reference.

• Excluded groups. The Act does not apply to enforcement of sums under the Land and Income Taxation Act 1910, the Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Act 1931, or to recognizances mentioned in the Criminal Code (s 19). Persons whose obligations arise under those statutes or under criminal-code recognizances are therefore outside the Act's conversion process.

Who pays, who decides, what changes. The immediate payer is the person fined or the recognizor whose recognizance is forfeited; the immediate decision-maker to translate the fiscal claim into a Supreme Court judgment is the Attorney-General upon receipt of the judge or justice certificate; the judge or justice decides whether to sign the certificate and to send it to the Attorney-General. Behavioural change likely to follow includes judicial officers adhering to the prescribed certificate forms and the Attorney-General engaging registry processes to sign judgments. The Act narrows procedural avenues for the subjects of these converted judgments by excluding appeals from the judgments obtained via the Act.

The Act sets out a tight set of procedural duties on judicial officers and the Attorney-General, and a narrow set of rights for affected persons.

Duties imposed by judges and justices

• Certification obligation. When a fine is imposed otherwise than by a judgment or conviction of a court or a justice, the judge of the Court by which, or the justice by whom, it is imposed "shall, by writing under his hand, in the form contained in Schedule 1, certify" the fact of imposition and non-payment, the person's name and place of abode or business, and the cause and amount of the fine, then deliver or send that writing to the Attorney-General (s 3(1)). For forfeited recognizances the judge or justice must certify the forfeiture "by writing under his hand, in the form contained in Schedule 3" and deliver or post the recognizance and writing to the Attorney-General (s 4(2)).

Duties imposed on the Attorney-General

• Mandatory cause-to-sign duty. Upon receipt of the judge's or justice's certified writing, the Attorney-General "shall cause a final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court" for the fine and costs not exceeding $10 in the case of fines (s 3(2)), and for the amount of the recognizance and $10 for costs in the case of a forfeited recognizance (s 4(3)). The obligation is unqualified in the text, creating a ministerial duty to prompt the Supreme Court judgment-signing process once the prescribed certification arrives.

Judicial rights and mechanisms to set aside

• Power to vacate. The Supreme Court or any judge may order satisfaction to be entered upon a final judgment signed under the Act (s 5(1)). However, that power is constrained. An order to vacate may only be made upon a rule nisi or summons calling upon the Attorney-General to show cause, and only where it is proved by affidavit to the satisfaction of the Court or judge that the judgment has been satisfied, or that equity and good conscience and the real merits and justice of the case require that the defendant not be required to satisfy it (s 5(2)). This prescribes a specific procedural route for defendants to challenge the judgment.

Rights curtailed by the Act

• No appeal. Every judgment signed under the Act can be in the form contained in the relevant schedules and "no writ of error or appeal shall lie or be had therefrom" (s 3(3); s 4(4)). This clause removes the statutory right of appeal from those particular judgments, subject only to the limited vacation process described in s 5.

Form and procedural obligations

• Prescribed forms. The Act makes the schedule forms the vehicle of certification and of the resulting judgment. The judge's or justice's certificate must be "in the form contained in Schedule 1" for fines and in Schedule 3 for recognizances; every such judgment "may be in the form contained in Schedule 2" or Schedule 4 as applicable (s 3(1), (3); s 4(2), (4)). Schedules include images of the forms embedded in the text.

Exemptions reducing duty scope

• Exclusions. The Act expressly excludes enforcement of sums due under specified taxation and estate statutes and recognizances in the Criminal Code (s 19). Where an obligation arises under those statutes, neither the certification/estreat pathway nor the Attorney-General’s cause-to-sign duty applies.

These duties create a pipeline from initial imposition or forfeiture through judicial certification to a final, non-appealable Supreme Court judgment, subject to a single, specified remedy to seek vacatur.

The Act itself does not create new substantive criminal penalties. Rather, it establishes an enforcement mechanism to turn existing fines and forfeited recognizances into enforceable civil judgments in the Supreme Court, with the following enforcement-relevant features.

Conversion to final judgment

• Mechanism for enforcement. Once the judge or justice certifies a non-judicial fine or a forfeited recognizance and forwards the necessary documents to the Attorney-General, the Attorney-General must cause a final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court in the amounts set out (s 3(2); s 4(3)). The judgment is final under the Act and is declared not subject to writ of error or appeal (s 3(3); s 4(4)). The statutory effect is to place the fiscal obligation within the Supreme Court's enforcement architecture.

Costs and monetary limits

• Cost cap. The Attorney-General is to cause judgment to be signed for the amount of the fine and costs not exceeding $10 in the case of fines (s 3(2)). For recognizances the judgment is for the amount of the recognizance and $10 for costs (s 4(3)). The Act therefore fixes a modest fixed cap for recoverable costs incidental to the conversion to judgment. Those caps are specified in the statute text as amended by later instruments noted in the Act.

Execution and finality

• Execution reference. Section 5(1) contemplates that execution may have been issued upon such judgment, stating that the Supreme Court or any judge may order satisfaction to be entered upon such judgment "whether execution shall have been issued upon such judgment or not" (s 5(1)). The Act therefore permits execution to proceed once a final judgment is signed, and it allows the court to entertain vacatur motions even where execution has been issued.

Limits on appellate redress

• No appeal or writ of error. The Act removes the right to a writ of error or appeal from those final judgments produced under the Act (s 3(3); s 4(4)). Practitioners must therefore expect that the usual appellate path will be unavailable for these particular statutory judgments, and that relief will be sought under the vacatur provision of s 5.

Process for vacatur as relief rather than appeal

• Rule nisi or summons. The Act specifies the procedural route to challenge or vacate a judgment: a party must seek a rule nisi or summons calling the Attorney-General to show cause, and must satisfy the court by affidavit that the judgment has been satisfied or that, in equity and good conscience, the defendant should not be required to satisfy it (s 5(1)-(2)). This procedural channel is the statutory substitute for appeal in respect of judgments entered under the Act.

Practical enforcement implications

• Central role of the Attorney-General. Because the Attorney-General must initiate the process of signing the judgment, enforcement timing and resourcing depend upon that office taking the required procedural step once the judge's certificate is received (s 3(2); s 4(3)). The Act itself does not allocate enforcement costs beyond the fixed $10 cost allowance, nor does it detail the court's methods of enforcing the resulting judgment beyond the reference to execution in s 5(1).

In sum, the Act converts administrative fines and forfeited recognizances into Supreme Court final judgments with a statutory bar on appeal, a modest fixed costs allowance, and a specific vacatur pathway, thereby embedding those fiscal claims in the civil enforcement apparatus without creating new penal offences.

The Act defines its scope and exclusions with direct cross-references to specific statutes and to the Criminal Code, and it contains repeal and amendment annotations that affect interaction with earlier and later statutory instruments.

Express exclusions

• Taxation and estates statutes. Section 19 provides that "the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enforcement of payment of any sum of money due and payable by any person to His Majesty under the provisions of the Land and Income Taxation Act 1910, or the Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Act 1931" (s 19). Those express exclusions mean that enforcement mechanisms under those statutes remain outside the certification-to-judgment pipeline the Crown Remedies Act establishes. Implementers must therefore look to the procedural and enforcement provisions within those specific statutes for recovery of taxes and estate duties.

• Criminal Code recognizances. Section 19 also excludes "any recognizance mentioned in the Criminal Code" from the Act’s operation (s 19). For recognizances that fall within the Criminal Code, the seizable or forfeitable consequences are to be handled under the Criminal Code’s statutory scheme rather than via the estreat-and-judgment route in this Act.

Procedural complementarity with Supreme Court processes

• Use of Supreme Court judgment machinery. The Act requires the Attorney-General to cause a "final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court" (s 3(2); s 4(3)). The Act supplies the form of judgment in Schedules 2 and 4, which allows the conversion to fit into existing court recordkeeping and enforcement procedures. The Act’s reference to execution (s 5(1)) implies the judgments may be enforced through ordinary enforcement processes associated with Supreme Court judgments, though the statute does not itself specify execution procedure.

Interplay with appeal and vacatur rights

• Statutory removal of avenue of appeal. By specifying that no writ of error or appeal shall lie from the judgments created under the Act (s 3(3); s 4(4)), the statute displaces typical appellate remedies with a single statutory vacatur route. Where other statutes provide appeal rights from judgments under their own processes, the Crown Remedies Act’s bar will apply only to judgments created under its processes.

Amendment and repeal consequences

• Repealed sections. Numerous sections and schedules have been repealed by later instruments noted in the text, for example by 23 Geo. V No. 58 (see notes attached to ss 2, 6-18 and Schedules 5-7). Those repeals alter the Act’s interaction with other laws to the extent they removed overlapping or contradictory provisions. Practitioners must read the Act as it appears with those repeals and amendments reflected.

Form-based interaction

• Prescribed forms. The Act’s reliance on Schedules for the certificate and judgment forms (Schedules 1-4) imposes a formal interface with court registry practices. The Act’s forms are embedded in the schedules as images, and amendments to the schedules are noted in the text. Users must ensure the prescribed forms are used where the Act is invoked, otherwise the procedural trigger for the Attorney-General's duty may be affected.

Limits on scope where other recovery regimes apply

• Narrow domain of application. Because the Act expressly excludes certain taxes and recognizances, and because it addresses fines "otherwise than by a judgment or conviction of a court or a justice" (s 3(1)), it leaves room for other statutes and administrative regimes to contain their own enforcement and conversion rules. The Act therefore operates in parallel with, rather than as a universal substitute for, other statutory enforcement regimes.

In short, interaction with other laws is predominantly a matter of non-application where other statutes are specifically named, and of procedural integration where the Act uses the Supreme Court's judgment machinery while curtailing appellate routes for those specific judgments.

The statute text as presented contains embedded amendment and repeal annotations. These annotations must be read with the operative provisions when assessing current effect.

• Short title substitution. Section 1 is shown as "Substituted by No. 36 of 1958" in the Act text. The short title thus appears in its present form by that substitution note (s 1 note).

• Amendments to s 3 and s 4. Section 3 contains an annotation that subsection (2) was amended by No. 55 of 1965, s 5; the text as printed includes that amendment in the operative provision that the Attorney-General shall cause a final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court for the amount of the fine and costs not exceeding $10 (s 3(2) note). Section 4 likewise notes that subsection (1) was amended by 25 Geo. V No. 78; and subsection (3) of s 4 was amended by No. 55 of 1965, s 5 (s 4(1) and s 4(3) notes). The effect of those annotations in the printed statute is that the current text of those subsections reflects the later instruments.

• Amendment to s 5. Section 5 carries an annotation "Amended by No. 36 of 1958," indicating that s 5 as printed incorporates that amendment.

• Amendments and repeals by 23 Geo. V No. 58. Multiple sections (s 2 and ss 6-18) are marked as repealed by 23 Geo. V No. 58. Schedules 5, 6 and 7 are also marked as repealed by 23 Geo. V No. 58, s 2. The presence of these repeal annotations indicates that portions of the original 1891 Act were removed or replaced by that later instrument.

• Schedule amendments. Schedule 1 is annotated as amended by No. 55 of 1965, s 5. Schedule 2 carries annotations indicating amendments by 25 Geo. V No. 78 and No. 55 of 1965, s 5. Schedule 4 is annotated as amended by 25 Geo. V No. 78 and No. 55 of 1965, s 5. The schedules therefore reflect changes made by multiple subsequent instruments.

• Historical layering visible in the text. The textual presentation associates specific amendment instruments with particular subsections and schedules; practitioners must therefore rely on the printed notes to identify which parts of the Act are operative in their current form. The Act itself does not provide full amendment transcripts within the operative provisions; it instead marks sections and schedules as substituted, amended, or repealed by subsequent numbered instruments.

• No amendment detail within source beyond references. The Act text lists the amendment instrument identifiers and the affected sections, but it does not contain the full text of the amending instruments within the printed Act. Where the Act records that a subsection or schedule "amended by" a numbered instrument, the reader must consult the printed statute as presented for the operative wording.

This amendment history, as recorded in the Act text, shows incremental change to the short title, certification and cost caps, and the removal of several sections and schedules. The Act therefore operates in its present form subject to those modifications noted inline.

The Act text supplied contains no case law citations, reported decisions, or references to judicial interpretation beyond the statutory provisions themselves and their forms. The statute does not cite any judicial authority or provide annotated case notes, and there are no sections in the Act text that list judicial determinations. Two practical consequences follow, as indicated by the source material.

• No litigation record in the statute. The absence of case references in the Act means the statute itself provides no record of how courts have applied its provisions in particular disputes. The Act therefore stands purely as statutory direction without embedded exemplars of judicial application in its text.

• Reliance on statutory wording for procedure. Because the Act declares judgments created under it to be final and non-appealable (s 3(3); s 4(4)), the Act reduces the availability of appellate precedent that would otherwise flow from contested appeals in the usual way. Where the Act is invoked, the statutory bar on writs of error and appeals narrows the formal channels for generating appellate decisions concerning the statutory judgments themselves, leaving the more limited vacatur process in s 5 as the principal judicial avenue for contesting those judgments.

The Act’s text therefore supplies no litigation history within itself. Practitioners seeking to understand how courts have treated the Act in practice must look outside the statute for reported cases, but that material is not present in the Act as supplied. The Act’s internal exclusion of appeals for the judgments it produces (s 3(3); s 4(4)) may also influence the body of case law that can develop from disputes specifically about those statutory judgments, because the statute channels disputes into the vacatur pathway of s 5 rather than into ordinary appellate courts.

The Act’s drafting and structure present several features that can produce practical pitfalls if overlooked.

• Narrow triggering words, uncertain coverage. Section 3 applies when "any fine shall be imposed upon any person otherwise than by a judgment or conviction of a court or a justice" (s 3(1)). The statute does not enumerate the bodies that may impose such fines, which raises immediate ambiguity about whether particular administrative penalties imposed by a tribunal, regulator, or municipal authority fall within the phrase. The Act’s operative text does not resolve that boundary; reliance on the Act therefore requires careful identification of the original imposition source and whether it meets the statutory description.

• Formality of certification and strict delivery requirement. The judge or justice must certify "by writing under his hand, in the form contained in Schedule 1" and "deliver or send by the post such writing to the Attorney-General" (s 3(1)). For recognizances the recognizance itself must be delivered or posted with the writing (s 4(2)). Failure to use the prescribed form, to sign "under his hand", or to deliver/post the certificate and recognizance as required may jeopardise the Attorney-General’s obligation to cause a judgment to be signed, because the statute conditions that obligation on receipt of the prescribed documentation.

• Centralisation of the Attorney-General’s role. The Attorney-General is the obligor charged with causing the Supreme Court judgment to be signed (s 3(2); s 4(3)). That centralisation creates a single office responsible for triggering the court mechanism. Practically, this can mean a single point of delay or administrative oversight; the Act does not provide a delegated-agent route or alternative where the Attorney-General does not act.

• Fixed, seemingly nominal cost caps. The Act allows costs not exceeding $10 for fines and $10 for recognizances (s 3(2); s 4(3)). Depending on current cost structures this fixed figure may be inconsequential relative to real administrative or enforcement expenses. The Act does not provide for indexation or variation in that figure; the precise numeric cap appears as amended in the text and may be anachronistic if currency value changes are relevant in practice.

• No appeal from the judgment. The Act’s bar on writs of error and appeals from the judgments (s 3(3); s 4(4)) removes an ordinary avenue for legal challenge. Affected persons must therefore resort to the vacatur procedure in s 5, which requires a rule nisi or summons calling the Attorney-General to show cause and proof by affidavit of satisfaction or equitable grounds (s 5(1)-(2)). Practitioners must plan procedures accordingly and ensure timely pursuit of vacatur relief where appropriate.

• Vacatur limited to affidavit proof and equity. Section 5(2) conditions vacatur on proof by affidavit that the judgment has been satisfied, or on proof that equity and good conscience and the real merits and justice of the case require non-enforcement. That standard is statutory and procedural. Petitioners may need to marshal affidavits specifically satisfying the court on those grounds; the Act does not provide for alternative forms of challenge such as statutory appeals or other interlocutory applications.

• Exclusions to watch. Section 19 excludes enforcement under the Land and Income Taxation Act 1910, the Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Act 1931, and recognizances in the Criminal Code (s 19). Practitioners must not attempt to use the Crown Remedies Act for recoveries falling within those excluded statutes or recognizances; doing so would be to invoke an inapplicable statutory route.

• Repealed content. Several provisions and schedules have been repealed by later instruments (notes in ss 2, 6-18; Schedules 5-7). Users must not assume that deleted provisions remain available. The schedule images in Schedules 1-4 remain part of the Act as printed, but Schedules 5-7 are repealed.

• Form images in the schedule. The Act embeds graphic images of the forms in the Schedules. Practitioners should verify that the printed form content, as shown in the schedule images, is used in practice, because the Act conditions the validity of the certification on the prescribed form being used (s 3(1); s 4(2)).

These specific textual and procedural features are the concrete operational risks and practical "gotchas" identified directly from the Act’s wording.

This section sets out, in sequence, the concrete steps and evidentiary expectations the Act imposes on each principal actor, drawn directly from the statutory text.

For judges and justices who impose fines or handle forfeited recognizances

1. Identify whether the fine has been "imposed otherwise than by a judgment or conviction of a court or a justice" (s 3(1)). If it meets that description and is unpaid, the judge or justice must proceed with the certificate step.
2. Prepare the certificate "by writing under his hand" using the form contained in Schedule 1 for fines (s 3(1)), or Schedule 3 for forfeited recognizances (s 4(2)). The certificate must state that the fine has been imposed and not paid, and must include the individual's name and place of abode or business, and the cause and amount of the fine (s 3(1)). For recognizances the judge or justice must include the recognizance with the writing when delivering or posting to the Attorney-General (s 4(2)).
3. Deliver or send the certificate to the Attorney-General, using post if required by the text (s 3(1); s 4(2)). Retain any local copies or receipt evidence consistent with registry practice.

For the Attorney-General

1. Upon receipt of the judge's or justice's certified writing (and the recognizance where applicable), the Attorney-General must "cause a final judgment to be signed in the Supreme Court" for the amount specified and for costs not exceeding $10 in the case of fines, and for the amount of the recognizance and $10 for costs in the case of recognizances (s 3(2); s 4(3)). The duty is mandatory once the prescribed documentation is received.
2. Ensure the judgment conforms to the form contained in Schedule 2 for fines and Schedule 4 for recognizances as the Act permits judgments "may be in the form contained in" those schedules (s 3(3); s 4(4)).
3. Coordinate with the Supreme Court registry to have the final judgment signed and entered. The Act’s language contemplates that execution may follow, and the Attorney-General’s action initiates the conversion into the court’s judgment roll (s 5(1)).

For persons subject to fines or forfeited recognizances

1. Pay the fine immediately when it is imposed if practical, because the Act operates where fines are "not immediately paid" (s 3(1)).
2. If a judgment is signed under the Act and a party wishes to challenge it, apply for a rule nisi or file a summons calling upon the Attorney-General to show cause under s 5(2). Prepare an affidavit that proves either that the judgment has been satisfied, or that equity and good conscience and the real merits of the case require that the defendant not be required to satisfy the judgment (s 5(2)).
3. Recognise that the Act bars writs of error or appeals from such judgments (s 3(3); s 4(4)), and therefore plan litigation strategy around the vacatur procedure in s 5 rather than an appellate route.

Administrative and registry practice

1. Use the prescribed forms in Schedules 1-4, as the Act requires certification "in the form contained in" the schedules and allows judgments "may be in the form contained in" the schedules (s 3(1), (3); s 4(2), (4)). The schedule images are embedded in the Act text and should be reproduced where required.
2. Maintain documentary proof of posting or delivery to the Attorney-General, because the statutory trigger depends on receipt by the Attorney-General (s 3(2); s 4(3)).
3. For the Attorney-General’s office, implement a registry check to process received certificates promptly, because the Act uses mandatory "shall" language for causing the judgment to be signed upon receipt (s 3(2); s 4(3)).

Matters to verify before invoking the Act

1. Confirm the obligation is not excluded under s 19, which exempts enforcement under the Land and Income Taxation Act 1910, the Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Act 1931, and recognizances mentioned in the Criminal Code (s 19).
2. Verify that the original imposition qualifies as a fine "otherwise than by a judgment or conviction" under s 3(1), because the Act applies only to fines of that character.
3. Ensure compliance with the formalities of signature, form, and delivery to avoid any procedural challenge to the Attorney-General’s duty to convert the claim into a Supreme Court judgment.

By following the certification, delivery and judgment-signing steps and by using the prescribed schedules, judicial officers, the Attorney-General and affected persons can comply with the Act’s procedural pipeline. The statutory vacatur route (s 5) should be used in preference to appeal routes for judgments entered under this Act, because the Act expressly removes appeals from those judgments (s 3(3); s 4(4)).