The Act defines several key terms that shape its operation. An “existing life prisoner” is a person serving a life sentence (imprisonment for the term of their natural life) in respect of whom no order has been made under s 12BA(1) of the Parole Act 1975, and who is not on parole (s 7). This excludes prisoners who have already received a non-parole period direction under that section and those who have been released. The “original sentence” is the life sentence being served at the time the prisoner applies. A “life sentence” is defined as imprisonment for natural life, distinct from a fixed term or an indefinite sentence. “Dangerous criminal” is defined by cross‑reference to s 392(1) of the Criminal Code - a declaration that the person is a dangerous criminal. An “unsentenced dangerous criminal” is a dangerous criminal who has not yet been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the crime that led to the declaration and who is not on parole (s 13). This category is transitional: it captures those who were declared dangerous but, for whatever reason, never received a determinate or indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. The “applicant” under Part 3 is an existing life prisoner who has applied to be resentenced (s 7). The Act does not define “applicant” for Part 4 separately, but it reads as the unsentenced dangerous criminal who applies for sentencing. The central concept in Part 3 is resentencing: the Court is to treat the application as if it were sentencing the applicant for the first time for the original crime, but with the critical constraint that the prisoner’s conduct while serving the life sentence cannot be used against him or her (s 9(4)(a)). This exclusion of prison conduct is a deliberate break from the usual sentencing approach, where behaviour on remand or under sentence can be a mitigating or aggravating factor. The Act also distinguishes between the original sentence (which is annulled upon resentencing) and the new sentence (which stands for all purposes but with specific rules for remission and parole credit). For dangerous criminals, the Act introduces the concept of an application for sentencing where no prior sentence existed, thus converting a declaration into a judicial sentence with a defined term (or potentially another life sentence). The transitional nature of Part 4 means that those who do not apply remain subject to the pre‑commencement Parole Act (s 16), preserving their status quo until either they apply or the declaration is discharged.

The Act directly affects three categories of prisoners. First, “existing life prisoners” - persons serving a natural‑life sentence who have not had a non‑parole period order made under s 12BA(1) of the Parole Act 1975 and who are not on parole. This is a narrow class: it excludes prisoners who have already been given a non‑parole period (which would already have set a minimum term) and those who have been released on parole. The practical effect is that only life prisoners who remain in full‑time custody without any non‑parole order may apply. Second, “unsentenced dangerous criminals” - persons declared dangerous under the Criminal Code but never sentenced to imprisonment for that crime and not on parole. These individuals are in a legal limbo: they have been declared dangerous but lack a judicial sentence, likely because the declaration itself operated as a form of indeterminate detention. The Act gives them the right to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, ending that uncertainty. Third, dangerous criminals who were on parole at the commencement of the Act: section 17 preserves the old Parole Act regime for them until the dangerous criminal declaration is discharged, so they are indirectly affected by the transitional rules.

Beyond prisoners, the Act imposes obligations on the Supreme Court. The Court must resentence (Part 3) or sentence (Part 4) an applicant upon application; it cannot refuse to do so. The Court also gains the power to order a later commencement date for the new sentence (s 9(5)), overriding the general sentencing rules. The Director of Public Prosecutions must appear at the hearing of an application (s 11(3)) and must be served with a copy of the application (s 11(2)). This places a resource and compliance burden on the DPP to be involved in every application, even if the prisoner is ultimately unmeritorious. The Attorney‑General acquires a right of appeal against the new sentence (s 12), as does the applicant. The Parole Board and correctional authorities are affected indirectly: the calculation of remission under the Prison Act 1977 is reset to the resentencing date (s 10(1)(c)), and time on parole before resentencing does not count towards sentence completion (s 10(1)(d)). Corrections must adjust their records accordingly. Finally, the broader public and taxpayers bear the cost of court hearings, legal aid (likely for many applicants), and continued incarceration if resentencing results in a longer or different term. The Act does not limit the number of applications; each existing life prisoner can apply only once (since the original sentence is annulled), but there could be many applicants.

The Act confers a right on existing life prisoners and unsentenced dangerous criminals to apply to the Supreme Court. For life prisoners, that right is unqualified: they may apply regardless of the nature of the original crime or time served. For unsentenced dangerous criminals, the right is to be sentenced, ending their unsentenced status. The prisoner’s right is subject to the court’s leave to withdraw or discontinue (s 9(2), s 15(2)), so once an application is made, it cannot be revoked unilaterally. The Court has a duty to resentence or sentence the applicant upon receiving the application. This is mandatory: the Court “must” resentence (s 9(1)) and “must” sentence (s 15(1)). The Court does not have discretion to dismiss the application on the merits; it must conduct a resentencing hearing and impose a sentence. However, the Court is constrained in what it may consider. In resentencing a life prisoner, it cannot take into account the applicant’s conduct as a life prisoner under the original sentence (s 9(4)(a)). This means that even exemplary behaviour or serious misconduct inside prison cannot be raised by either side to affect the new sentence. The Court may consider other sentences of imprisonment that the applicant served after becoming a life prisoner (s 9(4)(b)), such as a later fixed term for another offence. If it does so, it may order the new sentence to commence at a later date than the original sentence (s 9(5)). The Court also has the same powers and duties as if sentencing after the Act commenced (s 9(3), s 15(3)), meaning it can impose any sentence available for the original crime, including a life sentence again, a fixed term, or an indefinite sentence under the Criminal Code. But the sentence must be for the same crime; the Court cannot change the conviction. The Director of Public Prosecutions must appear at the hearing (s 11(3)), which is a duty on the Crown to be represented. The applicant and the Attorney‑General both have the right to appeal the new sentence under s 401 of the Criminal Code (s 12). The appeal is treated as if the new sentence were the original sentence for the purposes of appeal rights. This gives both sides a remedy if the sentence is seen as too harsh or too lenient. The applicant also retains the right not to apply; the Act does not compel anyone to seek resentencing. If a life prisoner chooses not to apply, the original sentence remains in force. Similarly, an unsentenced dangerous criminal can remain unsentenced and continue under the old parole regime (s 16). The Act thus offers a voluntary path, not a mandatory review.

The Act itself does not create new offences or penalties. Its operation is purely procedural: it provides a mechanism for existing prisoners to be resentenced, and the penalties that result are those available under the Criminal Code at the time of resentencing. However, the Act has significant practical implications for the length and nature of imprisonment that a prisoner may ultimately serve. For an existing life prisoner, the new sentence could be a life sentence again, a fixed term of years, or an indeterminate sentence. If the new sentence is a fixed term, the prisoner may become eligible for parole or release at an earlier date than under the original life sentence, depending on the term set. Conversely, if the Court exercises its power under s 9(5) to order a later commencement date, the prisoner could serve longer overall. The Act does not cap the new sentence; the Court is limited only by the sentencing options for the original crime. The annulment of the original sentence (s 10(1)(a)) means the prisoner loses any accrued rights under that sentence, such as a future non‑parole period that might have been set later. Section 10(1)(c) resets remission calculations to the resentencing date. This could disadvantage a prisoner who had earned substantial remission under the original sentence; they may lose that credit. Similarly, s 10(1)(d) provides that time on parole before resentencing does not count towards sentence completion. If a life prisoner was previously released on parole but that parole was revoked, the pre‑resentencing parole time is disregarded. This could extend the total time served. For unsentenced dangerous criminals, the new sentence is a first sentence for the crime, so they finally receive a determinate or indeterminate term, ending the uncertainty of an unsentenced declaration. The penalty imposed will be whatever the Court deems appropriate under the sentencing laws then in force. The Act does not provide for any enforcement mechanism beyond the usual appeal process. The DPP’s appearance ensures the Crown can argue for a higher sentence. If an applicant fails to comply with procedural requirements (e.g., serving the application on the DPP), the Court may refuse to hear the application or grant leave to withdraw. There are no fines or contempt penalties under this Act.

The Act explicitly interacts with several other statutes, primarily through direct provisions and cross‑references. Section 9(6) states that subsection (5) applies despite anything to the contrary in the Sentencing Act 1997. This overrides the general commencement rules in the Sentencing Act, allowing the Court to order a later commencement date for the resentence based on other sentences served. Section 10(1)(c) ties remission calculations to the Prison Act 1977: the resentence is taken to have been imposed on the resentencing date for calculating remission entitlements. This could reduce the amount of remission a prisoner would have accrued if the original sentence had run earlier. Section 10(1)(d) refers to the Corrections Act 1997 (which succeeded the Prison Act for sentence completion purposes) and provides that pre‑resentencing parole time does not count. The Parole Act 1975 is central. The definition of “existing life prisoner” excludes those who have had an order under s 12BA(1) of the Parole Act - that section allows the Sentencing Court to set a non‑parole period for life prisoners. So prisoners who already have a non‑parole period cannot apply. For unsentenced dangerous criminals, s 16 preserves the pre‑commencement Parole Act for eligibility until sentencing. Section 17 preserves the pre‑commencement Parole Act for dangerous criminals on parole at commencement until the declaration is discharged. The Criminal Code is the primary statute amended. Part 2 notes that amendments have been incorporated into the authorised version of the Criminal Code Act 1924. The declaration of dangerous criminal under s 392(1) of the Criminal Code is the trigger for Part 4. The discharge of that declaration under s 393(3) of the Criminal Code ends the transitional application of the old Parole Act for prisoners on parole (s 17(2)). The Sentencing Act 1997 is overridden in part (s 9(6)). The Prison Act 1977 and Corrections Act 1997 are referenced for remission and sentence completion calculations. The Act also interacts with the general law of appeals: s 12 makes the appeal process under s 401 of the Criminal Code available. That section governs appeals against sentence generally, so the resentence is treated as a sentence for appeal purposes. The Act does not affect the law of convictions; the original conviction stands. It does not interact with the common law or human rights legislation directly in the text, but in practice, the resentencing process must comply with constitutional limitations and any applicable Charter of Human Rights (Tasmania has a Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, but the Act predates it; however, later interpretation would be subject to that Charter). Overall, the Act creates a bespoke procedural regime that overrides several general sentencing and correctional laws to facilitate the resentencing of these two categories.

The Act has been amended by at least two subsequent enactments, as indicated by amendment notes in the text. Section 9(4) was substituted, and subsections (5) and (6) were inserted, by No. 44 of 2004, s. 26, applied from 16 November 2004. The original s 9(4) as enacted in 1994 apparently allowed the Court to consider the applicant’s conduct as a life prisoner, because the 2004 amendment changed it to prohibit that consideration. The current text reflects the substituted provision: the court “is not to take into account the applicant’s conduct as a life prisoner under the original sentence”. This is a significant change in policy; previously, prison conduct could have been considered (either mitigating or aggravating). The 2004 amendment also added the power to order a later commencement date (s 9(5)) and its overriding clause (s 9(6)). This gave the Court additional flexibility to deal with other sentences served. Section 10(1) was amended by No. 59 of 1997, Schedule 1, applied from 1 August 1998. That amendment replaced references in paragraphs (c) and (d) from the Prison Act 1977 to the Corrections Act 1997 and adjusted the calculation rules. The original references were likely to the Prison Act 1977 for both remission and completion, but the Corrections Act 1997 superseded it. The Schedule 1 amendment updated the cross‑references. The Act itself commenced on a day to be proclaimed (s 2). The proclamation date is not given in the text, but it is likely that the Act came into force in 1994 or 1995. The amendment history shows that the Act has been fine‑tuned to address practical issues: the prohibition on considering conduct may have been added to ensure fairness and to avoid penalising prisoners for behaviour that might be influenced by the original sentence’s indefinite nature. No further amendments are noted. Part 2 amendments are incorporated into the Criminal Code, so their text is not directly visible in this Act. However, those amendments may themselves have been amended later. The Act is short, and its amendment history is limited, indicating that it was a targeted transitional measure that did not require frequent legislative changes.

The source text does not contain any references to litigation history. This is an amending and procedural Act; any litigation arising from its operation would likely be in the form of appeals under s 12 against sentences imposed under s 9 or s 15. The availability of appeal to the Attorney‑General suggests that the government has used this route to challenge unduly lenient sentences. Without reported cases in the source, we cannot identify specific decisions. However, one can infer potential litigation issues: the meaning of “conduct as a life prisoner under the original sentence” (s 9(4)(a)) might be litigated - whether it includes offences committed while on temporary release, or only conduct within prison walls. The interplay between s 9(5) (later commencement) and the Sentencing Act 1997 might have been tested. The provision that the court “must resentence” (s 9(1)) has likely been considered as mandatory, but could there be challenges if the court refused? The annulment of the original sentence (s 10(1)(a)) could raise questions about the validity of prior actions taken under that sentence (e.g., disciplinary proceedings). Section 10(2) says nothing in subsection (1) impugns the lawfulness of the original sentence, but that may not prevent civil claims if a prisoner argues the original sentence was unlawful. The definition of “existing life prisoner” might be litigated: does “in respect of whom an order has not been made under section 12BA(1) of the Parole Act” mean no order at any time, or no order currently in force? If a prisoner had an order that was later revoked, they might argue they are now eligible. The safe reading is that any order, past or present, disqualifies, but text unclear. The dangerous criminal provisions might be litigated on whether an unsentenced dangerous criminal who applies can be sentenced to a term that is effectively indefinite again, and whether that is consistent with the Criminal Code’s scheme. Also, the transitional preservation of the old Parole Act (s 16, s 17) could lead to disputes about whether a prisoner’s parole eligibility under the old law differs from new law. Without specific case citations, a practitioner would need to search Tasmanian Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeal decisions. The Act’s narrow scope suggests limited litigation, but any resentencing under Part 3 or Part 4 is appealable, so there will be some appellate case law.

Several provisions in this Act contain traps for the unwary prisoner, legal practitioner, or government lawyer. The most significant is s 9(4)(a): the court cannot consider the applicant’s conduct as a life prisoner. This means that a prisoner who has been a model prisoner cannot use that to argue for a lower sentence, but it also means that a prisoner with a history of violence inside prison cannot be punished further by the resentencing court. However, the prisoner still faces the risk of being resentenced to a term that is effectively longer if the court takes into account other sentences served (s 9(4)(b)) and exercises the power to order a later commencement date (s 9(5)). That power could result in a sentence that starts years after the original sentence, meaning the prisoner serves consecutive time for other offences even though those other sentences may have already been served. The interaction with remission is another trap. Under s 10(1)(c), remission is calculated from the date of resentencing, not from the original sentence date. A prisoner who has served, say, 15 years of a life sentence might have earned significant remission credits under prison rules. Those credits are wiped out when the original sentence is annulled. The new sentence is treated as imposed on the resentencing date, so remission starts accruing from that day. This could extend actual time served, even if the new sentence is nominally shorter. Section 10(1)(d) provides that time spent on parole before resentencing does not count toward sentence completion. If a prisoner was on parole for several years and then had that parole revoked, that time is lost for the new sentence. The prisoner may have to serve that period again. For unsentenced dangerous criminals, s 15(4) prohibits the court from considering conduct as a prisoner during the period they were a dangerous criminal. This is similar to the life prisoner rule, but it means that any misconduct during that long period (which could be many years) cannot be used to justify a longer sentence. Conversely, good conduct cannot be used to mitigate. The Act also preserves the old Parole Act for those who remain unsentenced (s 16) or who are on parole (s 17). This could create a situation where two dangerous criminals who committed similar crimes are subject to different parole rules depending on whether they applied or when the declaration is discharged. An unsentenced dangerous criminal considering applying might be worse off if the new sentence imposes a fixed term with a non‑parole period longer than what the old Parole Act would allow. Another gotcha is the mandatory appearance of the DPP (s 11(3)). The Crown must appear, so an applicant cannot have an unopposed hearing; the DPP will argue for an appropriate sentence, likely a high one. The applicant must also serve the application on the DPP (s 11(2)), and failure to do so may cause delays or dismissal. The appeal rights are broad: the Attorney‑General can appeal the new sentence, so even if the applicant obtains a favourable sentence, it may be overturned. Finally, the Act’s commencement depends on proclamation (s 2). If it was proclaimed on a certain day, prisoners who became life prisoners after that day are not “existing life prisoners” and cannot apply. And the Part 4 transitional provisions only apply to those declared dangerous before commencement. There is no prospect of future prisoners using these provisions. The Act is a one‑time window.

Compliance with this Act is primarily procedural and falls on the applicant (prisoner), the Supreme Court, and the Director of Public Prosecutions. For an existing life prisoner who wishes to apply for resentencing, the first step is to prepare a written application under s 8(1) and s 11(1). The application must be in writing; there is no prescribed form, but it should identify the prisoner, the original sentence, the crime, and the date of conviction. The application must then be served on the Director of Public Prosecutions (s 11(2)). The prisoner should ensure the DPP receives it in sufficient time before the hearing. The prisoner may be entitled to legal aid, but the Act does not guarantee representation. The applicant should also consider the strategic implications: does the benefit of a possible reduction in sentence outweigh the loss of remission credits and the potential for a later commencement date? Legal advice is essential.

The Supreme Court, upon receiving the application, must list it for hearing. The Court must proceed as if sentencing the applicant for the first time (s 11(4) applies Part 3 procedure through s 15(5) for Part 4). The Court must comply with the restrictions in s 9(4): it cannot receive or consider evidence of the applicant’s conduct as a life prisoner. Both the Crown and the applicant should be precluded from raising it. The Court may, however, receive evidence of other sentences the applicant has served since becoming a life prisoner (s 9(4)(b)). If it does, it may consider ordering a later commencement under s 9(5). The Court must also be aware of the effect of s 10(1)(c) and (d) and should calculate the sentence accordingly. The Court should give reasons that address why any later commencement is necessary.

The DPP must appear at the hearing (s 11(3)). The DPP should prepare submissions on the appropriate sentence, taking into account the prohibition on considering prison conduct. The DPP may also bring to the Court’s attention any other sentences served and argue for a later commencement date if appropriate. The DPP should also note the effect on remission and parole credit.

After the sentence is imposed, either the applicant or the Attorney‑General may appeal under s 12. The appeal is under s 401 of the Criminal Code, so normal appeal procedures apply, including time limits and grounds. The appeal is treated as against the new sentence, not the original. The applicant should note that the appeal period runs from the resentencing date.

For unsentenced dangerous criminals, the procedure is identical through the operation of s 15(5), which applies ss 11 and 12. So the same compliance steps apply: written application, service on DPP, hearing, appeal.

For correctional authorities, compliance means recalculating remission and sentence completion dates according to s 10(1)(c) and (d). They must disregard pre‑resentencing parole time and treat the new sentence as imposed on the resentencing date. They should also update their records to reflect the annulment of the original sentence.

For the Parole Board, compliance with s 16 and s 17 means applying the pre‑commencement Parole Act to unsentenced dangerous criminals who have not yet applied, and to those on parole at commencement until the declaration is discharged. The Board should identify which prisoners fall under these transitional rules and apply the old law accordingly.

Overall, compliance is straightforward but requires careful attention to the specific constraints on evidence and the calculation of time served.