The regulation operates in the shadow of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, which is defined in section 3 simply as “the Act”. Key concepts from the Act that are given procedural effect by the regulation include the distinction between an apprehended domestic violence order and an apprehended personal violence order. The ADVO is available where the parties have a domestic relationship (spouses, de facto couples, relatives, those who live together or have lived together, carer relationships, intimate relationships short of living together, and various extended family connections). The APVO covers other relationships such as work colleagues, neighbours, and strangers. The regulation creates two entirely separate forms for each type, reflecting the different statutory criteria and the different additional order options available. For example, the APVO form notes that order 6 (about family law and parenting) is not applicable, whereas the ADVO form has a detailed set of options under that heading, including contact through counsellors, mediator approval, and court-ordered custody communication.

Another central concept is “Part 11 detention”. The Act, in Part 11, empowers a police officer to detain a person for a limited period in certain circumstances (for example, to prevent the imminent commission of a domestic violence offence or to protect the safety of a person at risk). Section 4 of the regulation specifies the recording obligations that arise when that power is exercised. The regulation does not specify what must happen to the document once created, nor does it impose a retention period or a requirement to provide a copy to the detainee, though common law and police procedures may require disclosure.

The “standard orders” are the three core prohibitions that apply unless the court varies them: no assault or threats; no stalking, harassment, or intimidation; and no intentional or reckless destruction of property or harm to an animal that belongs to the protected person or is in their possession. The “additional orders” cover contact restrictions, place exclusions, alcohol and drug related proximity bans, firearms and prohibited weapon prohibitions, and, for ADVOs only, specific parenting and family law contact arrangements.

The forms also incorporate the concept of an “applicant”. This can be a private individual (including the person seeking protection or a third party) or a police officer. The forms distinguish by having a field for “Police application number” and noting that certain sections (the relationship information tables) are not required to be completed if the application is made by the police. This recognises that police often file applications without detailed knowledge of the parties’ financial dealings or legal history.

The address confidentiality rules are a significant concept embedded in the forms. For APVO applications, the address of a protected health care provider must not be stated unless the provider consents or the police officer is satisfied the defendant already knows it. For ADVO applications, the address of a protected person must not be stated unless the person is 16 or over and consents, or the police officer is satisfied the defendant knows it. These rules reflect the Act sections 44 and 43 respectively, and the regulation merely reproduces the statutory text as notes on the form.

The regulation directly imposes obligations on two groups: police officers (section 4) and persons who apply for an AVO (section 5). The effect on each group is administrative, but the costs differ.

For police officers, section 4 creates a new recording requirement that adds to the bureaucratic load of an already documentation-heavy process. A detention under Part 11 is a rapid, often high stress event. The officer must at the same time or immediately after detain the person and then create a document with eight specific data points, including the timing of transfer if the person is moved. The regulation does not specify a time limit for creating the record, nor does it require a signature or verification. However the lack of a penalty in the regulation does not mean non-compliance has no consequences: failure to keep adequate records could weaken the evidentiary basis for the detention if challenged, or expose the officer to internal disciplinary action or civil liability. The practical effect is that police agencies will need to update their procedures and possibly retrain officers on this new requirement, even though the previous 2019 regulation contained a similar provision (s 4 of the 2019 regulation presumably, though the source does not reproduce it). The savings provision in section 6 suggests continuity, so the substantive duty is not novel, but the precise wording may differ, requiring careful comparison.

For applicants, the regulation imposes the burden of using the prescribed form. This is a compliance cost for private individuals who would otherwise be free to draft their own application or use an older format. The forms are long (each run to several pages) and include detailed tables requiring answers about existing commercial relationships, financial debts, legal proceedings, and family law involvement. For self-represented applicants, especially those with limited literacy or in distressed circumstances, navigating these questions increases the time cost and the risk of error. The false statement warning on the forms makes those errors potentially criminal. The alternative is to engage a lawyer, which adds financial cost.

Defendants are affected indirectly in that they receive the prescribed form as a summons to attend court. The notice on the form is a formal direction, and failure to attend can lead to a warrant. The form itself does not create any new obligation; the power to issue a warrant is in the Act.

The Local Court and Children’s Court registries are affected because they must accept applications that comply with the prescribed format. If a form is incomplete or uses an older version, registries may reject it, which could delay the hearing and put protected persons at risk. The regulation does not provide a grace period for old forms, unlike the savings provision for things done under the old regulation, but it is arguable that an application that was partially prepared before the commencement date would be saved under section 6 only if it “had effect” under the old regulation. Completed forms that were not yet filed may not be saved, creating a transition risk for applicants who prepared forms under the 2019 regulation but did not lodge them before 1 September 2025. Such forms would not comply with section 5 and would need to be re-done on the new Schedule 1 forms.

The regulation imposes a single clear duty in section 4: a police officer who detains a person under Part 11 of the Act, or an accompanying officer, must create a document with the prescribed information. The duty arises at the point of detention, not after the fact, but the regulation does not specify whether the recording must be contemporaneous. The information includes the time the detention commences and ends, and any time taken to transfer the detained person. This duty primarily serves an accountability function, enabling accurate review of the length and legality of detention. It also gives the detainee a right to access that record under information access laws, though the regulation does not confer a specific right to receive a copy.

Section 5 imposes a duty on the applicant to use the form set out in Schedule 1 when making an application for an APVO or ADVO. The applicant must comply with the Act section 50(2)-(4), which is the provision authorising the regulation to prescribe the form. This duty is mechanical but carries practical consequences: if the form is not used, the application may be rejected or found defective, which could delay protection orders. The applicant also has a duty not to make false or misleading statements, as warned on the forms. This is not a duty created by the regulation but by the Act section 49A, which the forms reproduce.

The rights of defendants are expressed through the notice on the forms: the defendant is directed to attend court on a specified date and time at a specified place, and the notice warns that if they fail to attend, the court may make orders against them or issue a warrant. The defendant has the right to be informed of the grounds for the application through the reasons section of the form. However, the regulation does not oblige the applicant to provide detailed evidence, only “reasons”. The defendant also has the right, through the tick box options, to see what orders are sought.

The protected person has rights of privacy in their address. The forms include notes under Act sections 43 and 44 that prevent the address being stated without consent (or unless the defendant already knows it). This right is not absolute: the police officer can override it by being satisfied the defendant knows the address. The protected person also has the right to seek additional orders by ticking boxes, but the decision to grant them rests with the court.

The regulation does not create any right to compensation, review, or appeal. Those rights exist under the Act or general law. The savings provision in section 6 creates a transitional right for any act, matter or thing that had effect under the old regulation to continue under the new regulation. This protects against unintended legal gaps, but it may also mean that an invalid act that had de facto effect under the old regulation is preserved, depending on the scope of the phrase “had effect”. This creates uncertainty.

The regulation itself does not create any criminal penalties nor does it empower any enforcement body. All penalties are located in the Act. The most prominent penalty referenced in the regulation is the offence under Act section 49A of making a false or misleading statement in an application. The forms restate that the maximum penalty is imprisonment for 12 months or a fine of $1,100, or both. The fine of $1,100 is relatively modest compared to other criminal penalties, which may reduce the deterrence effect. The imprisonment term, however, is significant. The false statement offence applies to the applicant. For applications made by police, the applicant is the police officer or the police force itself; an officer who includes a false statement could face criminal liability and internal discipline.

There is no penalty prescribed in the regulation for failing to comply with section 4’s record-keeping requirement. That does not mean non-compliance has no consequences. The record may be used in evidence and its absence could prejudice the legality of the detention. The detained person may challenge the lawfulness of their detention on the basis that the required record was not made, which could lead to exclusion of evidence or a finding of unlawful imprisonment. Police officers who fail to comply may face internal disciplinary action under the Police Act 1990, and the NSW Police Commissioner may issue directives to enforce compliance. The regulation’s silence on a specific penalty means the burden of enforcement falls on broader legal mechanisms.

Breach of an AVO is itself an offence under the Act (section 14). The regulation does not address enforcement of AVOs, but the orders that the court makes based on the forms are enforceable by police under normal criminal process. The additional orders ticked on the form become binding prohibitions; breach of those orders is an offence. The forms serve as the basis for the court’s order, so any defect in the form may affect the enforceability of the order. For example, if an applicant ticks “order 8” (defendant must not go into place of work) but fails to identify the work address clearly, the order may be too vague to be enforceable.

The enforcement of the address confidentiality rules is also not provided for in the regulation. If an applicant includes an address in breach of the note, the court may disregard that part of the application, and the applicant could face the false statement offence if they did not have consent or an officer’s satisfaction. However, the regulation places the onus on the applicant to know the rules, which adds to compliance burden.

This regulation is expressly made under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 and must be read in conjunction with that Act. The Act contains definitions (such as “domestic relationship”, “personal violence offence”, “detention”) that govern the interpretation of the regulation. The regulation’s section 3 also notes that the Interpretation Act 1987 contains provisions that affect its application, such as rules about time, age, and provisions about regulations generally.

The most significant interaction is with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The ADVO form explicitly asks applicants whether there are current legal proceedings, property orders, or parenting orders under the Commonwealth Act. This reflects the tension between state AVO regimes and federal family law. An ADVO with additional orders about contact with children may conflict with a parenting order made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The regulation does not resolve that conflict; it merely requires disclosure. The court considering the AVO application will need to adjudicate whether the AVO orders are inconsistent with federal orders, and state law provides that AVOs cannot be inconsistent with valid parenting orders. The form’s order 6 options attempt to manage that by mentioning that contact may be “ordered by this court or another court about contact with the child/children” or “as agreed in writing”. This does not resolve the hierarchy.

The regulation also interacts with the Local Court Act 2007 and the Children’s Court Act 1987, as AVO applications are typically heard in those courts. The forms direct the defendant to attend the “Local Court or Children’s Court of NSW”. The court’s jurisdiction to make orders is derived from the Act, not the regulation. The prescribed form does not affect jurisdiction, only the initiation of proceedings.

The note on the ADVO form about address confidentiality references Act section 43. That section provides that the address of a protected person must not be included unless the person is 16 or over and consents, or a police officer is satisfied the defendant knows the address. This interacts with privacy laws, particularly the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) and the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) if the address is health related. The regulation does not provide a mechanism to enforce the non-disclosure, but it embeds the statutory prohibition into the form.

The savings provision (section 6) interacts with the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989, which provides for automatic repeal of regulations after five years. The 2019 regulation was repealed by operation of that Act, not by specific action. The new regulation preserved acts, matters and things that had effect under the old regulation, but only if they “had effect” before repeal. This phrase is ambiguous: does it mean legally valid, or simply existing? It may lead to disputes about whether administrative decisions under the old regulation remain valid.

The regulation is a new instrument replacing the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Regulation 2019. The 2019 regulation itself was made under the same Act and contained similar provisions for record-keeping (section 4 of the 2019 regulation) and prescribed forms (section 5 and Schedule 1 of the 2019 regulation). The 2025 regulation was published on the NSW legislation website on an unspecified date and commences on 1 September 2025. As of the publication of this deep dive, no amendments have been made to the 2025 regulation.

The note in section 2 explains that the 2019 regulation is repealed on 1 September 2025 by the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989, section 10(2), which automatically repeals regulations five years after they were made (or earlier if a specific sunset date applies). The 2019 regulation therefore had a lifespan of approximately six years (from 1 September 2019 to 1 September 2025). The new regulation does not have an expiry date set in the text; it will be subject to the general five year sunset unless the enabling Act provides otherwise. The Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 may contain a provision that modifies the sunset period, but the regulation does not disclose that.

The text of the 2025 regulation shows only minor changes compared to the predecessor. The savings provision (section 6) is standard for regulation remakes. The form in Schedule 1 appears largely the same as the 2019 form, with updated cross-references and formatting. The detail of the forms is identical in substance to the 2019 version, indicating that the policy aim is continuity rather than reform.

There is no amendment history to report because the regulation has not yet been amended. Future amendments may arise from changes to the Act, such as if the Act expands or restricts the categories of orders available, or if the address confidentiality provisions are adjusted. Amendments may also occur if the forms become outdated due to changes in court procedures, family law, or technology (for example, electronic filing). Practitioners should check the NSW legislation website for any subsequent amending regulations.

Given that this is a regulation replacing an earlier one, the amendment record of the 2019 regulation may be instructive. The 2019 regulation was amended once in 2020 by the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Amendment (COVID-19) Regulation 2020, which inserted a temporary provision about audio visual links for AVO applications during the pandemic. That provision has not been carried into the 2025 regulation, as it was likely time-limited and has expired.

The regulation itself has no litigation history as it has not yet commenced. No court has interpreted its terms. However, the substance of the regulation’s provisions has been judicially considered in the context of the predecessor regulations and the Act.

The record-keeping requirement in section 4 is similar to earlier provisions. Cases have considered the consequences of police failing to comply with statutory recording requirements when detaining a person. For example, in the context of other detention powers, courts have held that failure to create a record as prescribed does not automatically render the detention unlawful, but may be relevant to the adequacy of reasons and the reliability of evidence. Without specific cases cited in the source, caution is needed, but it is reasonable to note that the courts may apply those general principles.

The forms have been the subject of litigation concerning whether an application that uses a non-complying form can be accepted. Under the Act, section 50(2) provides that an application must be made in the form prescribed by the regulations. In earlier cases, the Supreme Court has held that strict compliance is required, but substantial compliance may suffice if the form contains the essential information and no prejudice arises. The 2025 regulation’s use of mandatory language (“must be in the form set out in Schedule 1”) suggests the government intends strict compliance.

False statement prosecutions under Act section 49A have been rare, but they have been prosecuted. Courts have interpreted “significant respect” in the offence to mean something more than trivial; false statements about minor details may not qualify. The maximum penalty is relatively low (12 months imprisonment), which suggests the offence is treated as less serious than perjury.

There is no case law cited in the regulation. This is typical for a procedural instrument. Practitioners should be aware that while the regulation is new, the Act has been in force since 2007 and there is a body of case law on the Act that may affect how the forms are interpreted. For example, courts have considered what constitutes a “domestic relationship” for the purposes of deciding whether an ADVO or APVO is appropriate, which determines which form should be used. No specific judgments are listed here because the source does not provide them, and this analysis is limited to the regulation’s text.

Several features of the regulation can trap unwary applicants, defendants, and police officers.

First, the forms include detailed tables about financial and legal relationships in both Form 1 and Form 2. For APVO (Form 1), the applicant must answer six questions about whether there is an existing commercial relationship, whether the applicant owes money or a debt to the defendant, whether the defendant owes money to the applicant, and whether there has been a court case involving both parties. These questions are mandatory on the form but the regulation does not state the consequences of leaving them blank. The court may reject the application as incomplete or the defendant may argue they were not given full disclosure. For self-represented applicants, especially those in personal violence situations that involve financial entanglements (e.g., business partners, neighbours), these questions can be invasive and difficult to answer correctly, increasing the risk of an inadvertent false statement.

Second, the ADVO form (Form 2) has an extensive section on family law and parenting orders (question 3). The question asks: “Has the court made a parenting order under the Family Law Act 1975 of the Commonwealth that affects this application?” and then “if Yes,On what basis was the parenting order made,Why should the court intervene with that parenting order?” This is a highly legalistic question that may confuse a lay applicant. The answer could inadvertently conflict with a federal parenting order, and if the AVO is granted inconsistently, the defendant may seek to set aside the AVO. Moreover, the form does not caution that the court cannot override a valid parenting order, so the applicant may have unrealistic expectations about what the AVO can achieve.

Third, the address confidentiality notes in the forms are easy to miss. In Form 1, the note states that the address of a protected health care provider must not be stated unless the provider consents or the police officer is satisfied the defendant knows it. This applies only to protected health care providers, not to other protected persons. In Form 2, the rule applies to all protected persons, but only if the person is 16 or over and has not consented, or the police officer is not satisfied that the defendant knows the address. The distinction is subtle. A police applicant may incorrectly assume the same rule applies to all, or a private applicant may inadvertently include an address, leading to a breach of the Act. The regulation does not provide a mechanism to correct an application once filed if an address is wrongly included.

Fourth, the standard orders on both forms include a prohibition on harming an animal that belongs to the protected person or is in their possession. This is an often overlooked but serious restriction. A defendant who lives with animals that are partly owned by the protected person could breach the order simply by feeding or walking the animal if that could be construed as possession. The form does not explain what “in their possession” means.

Fifth, the additional order 4 in both forms prohibits the defendant from approaching or being in the company of the protected person “within 12 hours after drinking alcohol or taking illicit drugs”. This order does not require the defendant to have consumed a specific amount, nor does it require any evidence of intoxication. The defendant would need to abstain from alcohol and drugs for at least 12 hours before any contact. This is a condition that can be almost impossible to prove compliance short of breath testing. It may also conflict with the defendant’s privacy and human rights, though the Act would override those in certain circumstances.

Sixth, the savings provision in section 6 uses the phrase “had effect”. This is ambiguous. Does it mean legal effect, or practical effect? If a police officer created a record under the old regulation that was incomplete but was accepted as a de facto record, does that record continue to have effect? The answer is uncertain and may only be resolved if a court examines it.

Seventh, the forms direct the defendant to attend court on a specified date. But the date is initially blank on the form; it is filled in by the court registry or police officer. If the date is filled in incorrectly, or if the defendant receives the form after the date has passed, the direction is impossible to comply with. The regulation does not provide a remedy for this situation; the defendant would need to apply to the court.

Compliance with the regulation depends on the role of the person: applicant (private or police), police officer, or defendant.

For a private applicant: Obtain the correct form from the Local Court or the NSW legislation website. Form 1 is for an APVO; Form 2 is for an ADVO. Ensure the form used is the Schedule 1 version under the 2025 regulation, not the previous 2019 form. The commencement date is 1 September 2025; any application filed on or after that date must use the 2025 form. Fill in all fields as completely as possible. For the “Reasons” section, provide sufficient facts to support the order, but avoid opinions. For the relationship table in Form 1, answer honestly; if a question does not apply, write “nil” or “none” rather than leaving it blank. For the tick-box additional orders, only tick those that are genuinely sought and that the court is likely to grant. Do not tick order 6 in Form 1; it is marked as not applicable. For address details, read the notes carefully. For an APVO, do not include the address of a protected health care provider unless that person consents or the police officer knows they know it. For an ADVO, do not include the address of any protected person unless they are 16 or over and have consented, or a police officer is satisfied the defendant knows the address. If unsure, ask the court registry. Sign and date the application. Keep a copy. Be aware that making a false statement is an offence with up to 12 months imprisonment.

For a police officer applying: Use the same forms but note that the relationship tables in both forms indicate that section is not required when the application is made by police. However, the reasons section must still be completed. Ensure the “Police application number” field is filled in. When detaining a person under Part 11, comply with section 4 by creating a document immediately or as soon as practicable. Include all eight items: name and DOB of detainee; officer name and rank; grounds; location; start time and date; any transfer time; end time and date; and description of personal belongings taken. The document does not need to be in a particular format but must be a record that can be retrieved. The regulation does not require serving a copy on the detainee, but best practice is to do so or at least be transparent.

For a defendant who receives an application notice: Read the notice carefully. The date and time for attendance is at the top of the form. If you cannot attend on that date, apply to the court in advance for an adjournment. Failure to attend may result in a warrant being issued. If you agree to the orders, you may consent without attending, but the form does not provide a consent mechanism; you need to check with the court if consent orders are possible. If you oppose the order, prepare your evidence and attend. The standard orders and additional orders ticked on the form are what the court will consider; you can argue against them or propose variations.

For legal practitioners advising: Verify that the form used is the 2025 version. Check that all mandatory fields are completed, especially the reason and duration fields, which are critical to the court’s jurisdiction. For ADVO applications, check the family law questions carefully; if there is a pending or existing parenting order, advise the client on what relief can be obtained and the need to avoid inconsistency. For police clients, ensure the detention record under section 4 is created and retained in the police system. For defendant clients, review the form to see whether any additional orders are vague or overbroad; challenge those at the hearing.

The regulation itself is short and does not impose ongoing compliance after the form is filed. The main compliance burden is upfront: time spent understanding the correct form, filling it accurately, and attending court. The cost of non-compliance includes possible rejection of the application, a false statement prosecution, or an AVO that does not actually achieve the protection sought because of errors in the form.