The regulation revolves around a small set of concepts and legal relationships. Definitions in regulation 3 set the starting point. The key defined terms are alternate, application, monitor and the Act. Alternate means a person designated as an alternate for the monitor under regulation 5. Application means an application to the Court under the Act, Part 2 or 3, or a criminal intelligence application under the Act, Part 3B. Monitor is defined as the criminal intelligence monitor within the meaning of the Act, Part 3B, and the Act is the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (regulation 3).

Designation is a discretionary Ministerial power. The Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, designate a person of the kind referred to in the Act, section 28C(1) as the monitor (regulation 4(1)). That discretion is limited by an exclusion: the Minister must not designate a person specified in Schedule 1 (regulation 4(2)). Schedule 1 lists four categories: the Director of Public Prosecutions, members of the NSW Police Force, staff employed in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the New South Wales Crime Commission Staff Agency, and persons holding equivalent offices or employed in equivalent positions in other jurisdictions (Schedule 1, items 1-4).

Alternate arrangements are similarly Ministerial. The Minister may designate alternates in the same way as the monitor (regulation 5(1)), but only persons eligible for designation as monitor may be named as alternates (regulation 5(2)). Up to three alternates may be designated (regulation 5(3)). When the monitor is unavailable for an application, an alternate may exercise the monitor functions and is taken to be the monitor while exercising those functions (regulation 5(4)). The regulation clarifies that an express written notice from the monitor to the Commissioner constitutes unavailability (regulation 5(5)).

Information flow and timing are tightly specified. If the monitor or an alternate is unavailable in relation to an application, they must, as soon as practicable, give written notice of their unavailability to the Commissioner, and give the material required by the Act, section 28E either to the Commissioner or, with the Commissioner’s consent, directly to the person who will exercise the monitor functions (regulation 6(a)-(b)). The Commissioner must ensure that all material required to be given to the monitor under the Act, section 28E is given to the monitor at least 28 days before the application is heard, or to the alternate at least 21 days before the application is heard (regulation 7(a)-(b)). The regulation therefore establishes differential minimum lead times for the monitor and an alternate.

Accountability and disclosure are regulated through annual reporting. The monitor and any alternate who exercises the monitor functions in a calendar year must prepare an annual report on their exercise of the functions (regulation 8(1)-(2)). The report must not contain criminal intelligence and must be prepared and presented to the Minister within three months after the end of the calendar year to which it relates; the Minister must table the report in both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after receipt (regulation 8(3)-(4)). The requirement to exclude criminal intelligence from the report emphasises a separation between classified operational material and public accountability material.

Finally, the regulation places a professional conduct-type restriction on lawyers who have exercised the monitor functions. A lawyer who has acted as the monitor must not represent an organisation or person if the lawyer knows, or should reasonably know, that the organisation or person was a respondent to an application under the Act, or was a member of an organisation so described, or if the lawyer obtained criminal intelligence about them when exercising monitor functions (regulation 9(a)-(c)). This uses an objective "should reasonably know" test as part of the restriction.

The instrument also cross-references the Act and its provisions, notably section 28C(1) for the class of persons who may be designated, and section 28E for the material the monitor must receive, indicating that the regulation is procedural and subordinate to substantive provisions in the Act (regulation 3 note; regulations 4 and 6 referencing those Act provisions). The repeal and savings clause in regulation 10 repeals the 2019 regulation but preserves existing acts, matters and things that had effect under it immediately before repeal (regulation 10(1)-(2)).

These core concepts create a chain of legal relationships: Ministerial designation determines who can act as monitor or alternate; monitor/alternate availability drives notification duties and material flow; the Commissioner has a timing obligation to supply material; annual reports and practice restrictions impose post-service constraints; and Schedule 1 limits the candidate pool.

The regulation creates duties and constraints that fall on a small set of identifiable actors.

Minister. The Minister holds the designation power for the monitor and alternates (regulation 4(1), 5(1)). The Minister decides who is appointed subject to eligibility constraints in the Act, section 28C(1) and the Schedule 1 exclusions (regulation 4(2), regulation 5(2)). Publication in the Gazette is the required form of designation (regulation 4(1)). The Minister also receives and tables annual reports prepared by the monitor and alternates (regulation 8(3)-(4)).

Monitor and alternates. The monitor is the central office holder. The role is defined by reference to the Act, Part 3B (regulation 3). Alternates are persons the Minister designates to act when the monitor is unavailable, with a maximum of three alternates (regulation 5(1)-(3)). Monitors and alternates have notification duties where they are unavailable to exercise functions for an application: they must give written notice to the Commissioner and ensure that material required under the Act, section 28E is provided to the Commissioner or, with consent, directly to the person who will exercise the functions (regulation 6). Monitors and alternates must also prepare an annual report about their exercise of functions in a calendar year, excluding criminal intelligence, and must provide it to the Minister within three months of year end (regulation 8(2)-(3)). If a lawyer exercises monitor functions, that person is subject to subsequent restrictions on representing certain organisations and persons (regulation 9).

Commissioner. The Commissioner has an operational duty to ensure timely delivery of material to the monitor or alternate. Regulation 7 requires the Commissioner to ensure all material required under the Act, section 28E is given to the monitor at least 28 days before an application is heard, or to an alternate at least 21 days before the application is heard. The Commissioner also is the recipient of written notices of unavailability from the monitor or alternates (regulation 6(a)). The Commissioner has the discretion to consent to direct provision of material from monitor or alternate to the person who will exercise the functions (regulation 6(b)(ii)).

Lawyers who act as monitor. Regulation 9 imposes a practice restriction on any lawyer who has exercised monitor functions. Such a lawyer must not represent an organisation or person if the lawyer knows, or should reasonably know, that the organisation or person is or was a respondent to an application under the Act, is or was a member of such an organisation, or if the lawyer obtained criminal intelligence about them while acting as monitor (regulation 9(a)-(c)). This restricts future private legal work for former monitors, in specified circumstances.

Persons and organisations who are respondents to applications under the Act. By reference, the regulation affects respondents to applications and members of declared organisations because the monitor and alternates will receive material in relation to such applications and because ex-monitors who obtained criminal intelligence about respondents are restricted from acting for them subsequently (regulation 3 definition of application; regulation 9 note).

Public service agencies and offices. Schedule 1 specifically excludes certain office-holders and employees from eligibility to be monitor. These include the Director of Public Prosecutions, members of the NSW Police Force, employees of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and employees of the New South Wales Crime Commission Staff Agency, along with persons holding equivalent positions in other jurisdictions (Schedule 1 items 1-4). The effect is that those offices and employees are precluded from being appointed monitor, and consequently from alternateship, under this regulation.

Parliament. Parliament is an indirect participant because the Minister must table the monitor and alternates’ annual reports in both Houses once received (regulation 8(4)). That creates a public accountability channel.

Courts and parties in applications under the Act. The timing provisions (regulation 7) affect the scheduling of hearings and the flow of material to the monitor or alternate, which in turn can affect the court process in applications under the Act. The regulation defines "application" to include criminal intelligence applications under Act Part 3B (regulation 3), so these court proceedings are directly influenced by the monitor and material-timing rules.

Notably absent from the regulation are express provisions about remuneration, administrative support, or mechanisms for enforcing breaches of the duties set out. The regulation does not itself create fines, criminal offences or a disciplinary mechanism for non-compliance. Enforcement of the practice restriction on lawyers or of timing duties will therefore involve application of other statutory or professional frameworks or administrative remedies outside this regulation. The savings and repeal clause preserves any existing acts or arrangements that had effect under the repealed 2019 regulation, so individuals and agencies currently operating under the 2019 regulation continue to have effect under this new instrument (regulation 10(1)-(2)).

This regulation prescribes specific duties for the Minister, the monitor and alternates, and the Commissioner, and imposes a post-service professional restriction on lawyers who have acted as monitor.

Ministerial duties and limits. The Minister has the power to designate the monitor and alternates by Gazette order (regulation 4(1), 5(1)). The regulation also places an affirmative prohibition on the Minister: the Minister must not designate a person specified in Schedule 1 (regulation 4(2)). That is a mandatory constraint on the Minister’s discretion. The Minister also has a duty to table annual reports received from the monitor or alternates in both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after receipt (regulation 8(4)).

Monitor and alternate duties and capacities. The monitor and any alternate are required to prepare an annual report in relation to their exercise of functions in the relevant calendar year (regulation 8(2)). The report must not contain criminal intelligence and must be prepared and presented to the Minister within three months after the end of the calendar year to which the report relates (regulation 8(3)(a)-(b)). The monitor or an alternate must, if unavailable in relation to an application, give written notice of unavailability to the Commissioner and give the material provided under the Act, section 28E to the Commissioner or, with the Commissioner’s consent, directly to the person who is to exercise the monitor functions (regulation 6(a)-(b)). The "as soon as practicable" language in regulation 6 imposes a timeliness obligation on the monitor and alternates for the notification and transfer of material.

Alternates are explicitly given the capacity to exercise the monitor functions when the monitor is unavailable; while doing so, the alternate is taken to be the monitor (regulation 5(4)). Regulation 5(5) confirms that a written notice from the monitor to the Commissioner constitutes unavailability, a procedural rule that converts a paper notification into legal unavailability.

Commissioner duties. The Commissioner must ensure that all material in relation to an application that is required to be given to the monitor under the Act, section 28E is given to the monitor at least 28 days before the application is heard, or to an alternate at least 21 days before the application is heard (regulation 7(a)-(b)). This creates a minimum lead time obligation on the Commissioner that is differentiated depending on whether material is provided to the monitor or to an alternate.

Limits on practice for former monitors. Regulation 9 imposes a professional restriction: a lawyer who has exercised the functions of the monitor must not represent an organisation or person in circumstances where the lawyer knows, or should reasonably know, that the organisation or person is or was a respondent to an application under the Act, is or was a member of such an organisation, or obtained criminal intelligence about the organisation or person while exercising monitor functions (regulation 9(a)-(c)). This establishes a disqualification from subsequent representation where the prior role created knowledge or access to sensitive material.

Rights and discretionary pathways. The regulation sets out a number of discretionary pathways that amount to rights or operational options. The Minister has the discretion to designate the monitor and alternates within the eligibility constraints (regulations 4 and 5). The Commissioner may consent to the monitor or alternate giving material directly to the person who will exercise the monitor functions (regulation 6(b)(ii)), which is an explicit permitting discretion. Alternates, when exercising functions, are "taken to be" the monitor (regulation 5(4)), a right of legal status that is conferred upon them for the period of exercise.

Timing mechanics and implied process duties. The combined effect of the monitoring, notice and delivery rules is to structure pre-hearing material flow. The monitor or alternate must ensure material is passed to the Commissioner with sufficient lead time that allows the Commissioner to comply with the 28-day or 21-day requirement. The regulation therefore creates interdependent duties where failure by one actor can affect compliance obligations of another.

Absence of express enforcement mechanisms. The regulation imposes duties and prohibitions but does not itself specify penalties, fines or criminal offences for non-compliance. That absence means that enforcement or consequences for breach of duties will occur through other legal or administrative mechanisms outside the instrument, or through the exercise of the Minister’s administrative powers, or professional regulatory frameworks in the case of lawyers, rather than via express sanctions in this regulation.

Interaction with the Act. Several duties in the regulation are framed by reference to the Act (for example, whether material is required under the Act, section 28E), meaning compliance requires reference to the Act’s substantive provisions to determine what material falls within the scope of the regulation’s timing and transfer duties (regulations 3 note, 6 and 7).

The regulation does not create express criminal offences, civil penalties, administrative fines or an enforcement regime within its text. It prescribes duties and prohibitions, but contains no provision that attaches a specified monetary penalty, licence consequence, or criminal sanction to failure to comply with any of those duties.

Implications of the absence of in-regulation penalties. Where the regulation states that a person "must" not do something, for example the Minister must not designate a person specified in Schedule 1 (regulation 4(2)), the regulation itself does not articulate a sanction for breach. The same applies to obligations such as the monitor’s duty to give written notice of unavailability and to provide material under regulation 6, the Commissioner’s timing obligation in regulation 7, the annual report duties in regulation 8, and the practice restriction for lawyers in regulation 9. Enforcement therefore depends on other mechanisms outside the instrument.

Likely external enforcement channels and their textual basis. The regulation references the Act and other legislation as relevant nodes for interpretation and operation (regulation 3 note). Consequences for non-compliance will therefore be realised through:

• Administrative remedies and oversight linked to the Minister’s duties. The Minister’s actions are public via Gazette designation and parliamentary tabling of annual reports, creating political and administrative accountability (regulations 4(1), 8(4)). Where a designation contravened the Schedule 1 exclusion, review or corrective administrative action may follow through standard executive processes, though the regulation does not specify this.

• Professional regulation for lawyers. The prohibition on representation by a lawyer who has acted as monitor (regulation 9) will intersect with professional conduct and ethics obligations administered by the legal profession regulators. The regulation itself does not specify disciplinary procedures, so compliance and enforcement of that restriction would operate through professional regulation or through civil procedures if a contravention gives rise to a cause of action.

• Judicial review and statutory remedies. Acts or decisions by the Minister or Commissioner inconsistent with the Act or this regulation may be susceptible to review under general administrative law principles. The regulation does not mention judicial review remedies, but the existence of mandatory duties and improper exercises of discretion can give rise to remedies outside the regulation.

• Internal administrative controls. The Commissioner’s duty to ensure delivery of material within the specified timeframes (regulation 7) will likely be enforced by internal agency procedures and performance management frameworks, but the regulation does not specify internal disciplinary consequences.

No enforcement provisions for breaches of the prohibition on representation. Regulation 9 prohibits a former monitor who is a lawyer from representing certain organisations or persons, but it does not create a statutory penalty for breach. That omission leaves enforcement to external mechanisms such as professional disciplinary bodies, client remedies, or civil liability, none of which are specified or created by this regulation.

Reporting and parliamentary oversight as accountability tools. The annual report requirement (regulation 8) and the Minister’s duty to table those reports in both Houses of Parliament (regulation 8(4)) create transparency-based accountability rather than sanction-based enforcement. The tabling requirement exposes monitor activity to parliamentary scrutiny, which can produce political and public consequences if non-compliance or maladministration is revealed.

Practical consequence: compliance risk is regulatory and reputational as well as legal. Because the regulation imposes mandatory duties but lacks express internal penalties, entities and actors must manage compliance risk through internal procedures, professional obligations, administrative oversight and, if necessary, remedies available under other statutes or through judicial review.

The regulation is expressly subordinate to and interactive with the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (the Act) and the Interpretation Act 1987. Several cross-references demonstrate that the regulation is procedural and designed to operate within the Act’s substantive framework.

Direct cross-references to the Act. The definition of monitor is given by reference to the Act, Part 3B, and designation powers are limited to persons of the kind referred to in the Act, section 28C(1) (regulations 3 and 4(1)). The regulation instructs that the material to be provided is that required under the Act, section 28E (regulations 6 and 7). The term application is defined to include an application to the Court under the Act, Part 2 or 3, or a criminal intelligence application under the Act, Part 3B (regulation 3). These references make clear that the monitor’s functions, the types of material covered, and the class of applications are governed substantively by the Act; the regulation supplies timing, designation and reporting detail.

Interaction with the Interpretation Act 1987. The regulation notes that the Act and the Interpretation Act 1987 contain definitions and other provisions that affect interpretation and application of the regulation (regulation 3 note). This signals that ordinary interpretive rules, including commencement, service, and interpretation of "must" and "may," will follow statutory interpretation rules in the Interpretation Act where relevant.

Relationship to the repealed subordinate legislation. The regulation repeals the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Regulation 2019 (regulation 10(1)) and contains a savings provision preserving acts, matters or things that had effect under the 2019 regulation immediately before repeal (regulation 10(2)). That interaction maintains legal continuity for existing arrangements.

Overlap with other statutory offices and agencies. Schedule 1 excludes certain public office-holders and staff from eligibility to be designated monitor. Those exclusions explicitly reference the Director of Public Prosecutions and the NSW Police Force, as well as employees of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the New South Wales Crime Commission Staff Agency, and equivalent offices in other jurisdictions (Schedule 1). This creates an explicit statutory boundary between the monitor role and prosecutorial, policing and certain investigative agency staff roles, requiring cross-referencing with remuneration, employment and conflict-of-interest provisions that apply to those offices under other legislation or employment law.

Implications for legal practice and professional regulation. Regulation 9 restricts lawyers who have exercised monitor functions from representing certain parties. That restriction will intersect with the legal profession’s regulatory framework, including duties of confidentiality, conflict of interest rules and disciplinary procedures administered under legal profession legislation and professional rules. The regulation itself does not create a disciplinary regime; enforcement of the practice restriction will therefore depend on interaction with professional regulation and possibly civil or administrative remedies outside this instrument.

Potential intersection with administrative law remedies. Because the regulation imposes mandatory duties and Ministerial discretions, acts or decisions under the regulation that contravene legal requirements or are procedurally unfair could be subject to administrative review or judicial review under general administrative law principles. The regulation itself does not reference judicial review, but its mandatory language and procedural constraints indicate possible interactions with judicial oversight mechanisms.

No direct interaction with criminal penalty statutes. The regulation does not create or reference specific criminal offences or penalties. Where conduct falls within criminal statutes outside this instrument, those statutes would apply against individuals independently. The regulation does not purport to displace other laws; rather it operates as a subordinate procedural instrument within the Act’s framework.

In summary, the regulation is procedural in nature and intended to be read and applied in conjunction with the Act, the Interpretation Act 1987 and the broader statutory and professional frameworks governing public office-holders, police and legal practice. For practical compliance and legal effect, actors must consult the Act’s substantive provisions governing monitor functions and the external legal regimes that govern public servants, police, prosecutors and lawyers.

This instrument states its commencement date and its relationship to the predecessor regulation, but contains no internal amendment schedule beyond repeal and savings.

Commencement. Regulation 2 provides that the regulation commences on the day it is published on the NSW legislation website (regulation 2). The commencement note adds context, stating that the regulation repeals and replaces the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Regulation 2019, which would otherwise be repealed on 1 September 2024 by section 10(2) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (regulation 2 note). The practical effect is immediate commencement upon publication.

Repeal of predecessor. Regulation 10(1) expressly repeals the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Regulation 2019. The repeal is immediate upon commencement.

Savings provision. Regulation 10(2) saves any act, matter or thing that, immediately before the repeal of the 2019 regulation, had effect under that regulation, by providing that such acts, matters or things continue to have effect under this regulation. That is a standard transitional provision that preserves existing legal effects and arrangements established under the repealed instrument. There are no other transitional or savings details in the text.

No recorded amendments within the instrument. The regulation as provided does not contain any amending provisions, schedules of prior amendments, or retrospective clauses other than the savings provision. It does not list an enactment date other than the commencement mechanism, and it does not record prior versions. Accordingly, the amendment history in the instrument is limited to the repeal of the 2019 regulation and the immediate substitution of the new regulation on publication.

Dependencies on the Act for change. Several regulatory provisions refer to the Act for substantive definitions and obligations, for example the monitor definition (regulation 3) and material required under section 28E of the Act (regulations 6 and 7). Amendments to the Act will therefore have consequential effects on how this regulation operates, and any future amendment history should be read with reference to changes in the Act.

No explicit sunset or review clause. The regulation does not include a clause requiring periodic review or a sunset provision. Its repeal history is tied to the repeal of the predecessor instrument, but this instrument contains no automatic expiry clause. Its continued validity will therefore depend on subsequent legislative action.

Summary. The instrument’s amendment history is essentially a single-step substitution: it repeals and replaces the 2019 regulation on commencement, with a savings clause to preserve existing effects. There are no further in-instrument amendments recorded.

The regulation text includes no references to litigation, court decisions, or judicial interpretations. It does not name any cases, nor does it set out any court proceedings that have interpreted or applied its provisions. The only legal instruments cited are the Act, the Interpretation Act 1987, and the repealed 2019 regulation.

Because the regulation is procedural and subordinate to the Act, any litigation that interprets or challenges duties created by the regulation would likely arise in the context of proceedings under the Act or through administrative law challenges to Ministerial or Commissioner decisions made under the regulation. The regulation itself contains no litigation record, and no decisions are referenced in the text.

For practitioners seeking case law or litigation history relevant to the monitor role, the regulation indicates that the substantive duties and the nature of the material flow are governed by the Act, including Part 3B and specifically sections referenced in the regulation (for example, Act, sections 28C(1) and 28E). Any authoritative judicial interpretations of monitor duties or the material-supply obligations will therefore be found in cases addressing the Act or related proceedings, rather than within the regulation text. The regulation does not provide or summarise such cases.

In short, the regulation contains no litigation history. Any analysis of judicial application or review will require consulting court decisions that interpret the Act and its monitor-related provisions, which are not included in this instrument.

This regulation contains several precise procedural rules and exclusions that may produce operational or compliance pitfalls if not followed closely. The following points identify potential practical issues and clarifications that parties should note, grounded in the text.

Schedule 1 exclusions limit candidate pool. Regulation 4(2) mandates that the Minister must not designate a person specified in Schedule 1. Schedule 1 excludes the Director of Public Prosecutions, members of the NSW Police Force, employees in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the New South Wales Crime Commission Staff Agency, and persons holding equivalent offices in other jurisdictions (Schedule 1 items 1-4). Designating any person in these categories would breach a mandatory prohibition in the regulation.

Alternates must themselves be eligible as monitors and are limited in number. Regulation 5(2) requires that an alternate must be a person who may be designated as the monitor, so the Schedule 1 exclusions and the Act’s eligibility conditions apply to alternates. Regulation 5(3) caps alternates at three, so operational reliance on a larger alternate pool is impermissible.

Timing differentials are tight. The Commissioner must ensure the material required under the Act, section 28E is given to the monitor at least 28 days before the hearing, or to an alternate at least 21 days before the hearing (regulation 7). These are minimum lead times; scheduling or late production of material may make it impossible for the Commissioner to comply. The difference between 28 days and 21 days creates an operational need to know in advance whether the monitor or an alternate will be exercising functions, and to plan accordingly.

Unavailability mechanics require prompt written notice and material handover. If the monitor or an alternate is unavailable, they must as soon as practicable give written notice to the Commissioner and give the material required by Act section 28E either to the Commissioner or, with the Commissioner’s consent, directly to the person who will exercise the functions (regulation 6). The "as soon as practicable" standard introduces a reasonableness timing test, but the regulation does not quantify it; delays could undermine the Commissioner’s ability to meet the 28/21 day rule.

Direct delivery requires Commissioner consent. Regulation 6(b)(ii) allows a monitor or alternate to, with the Commissioner’s consent, deliver material directly to the person who will exercise the functions. This requires active consent and cannot be assumed. Operational planning must secure that consent early where direct transfer is contemplated.

Annual reports must exclude criminal intelligence. Regulation 8(3)(a) requires that annual reports prepared by the monitor or alternates "not contain criminal intelligence." The regulation does not define criminal intelligence; the Act likely contains definitions and rules relevant to what must be excluded. Preparing a report that is both meaningful and compliant with the exclusion will require careful redaction or aggregation strategies to avoid contravening the prohibition.

Report timing and parliamentary tabling. Reports must be prepared and presented to the Minister within three months after the end of the calendar year to which they relate (regulation 8(3)(b)). The Minister must table the report in both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after receipt (regulation 8(4)). Missing the three-month window or failing to present could delay parliamentary notice and raise accountability issues.

Practice restriction uses an objective knowledge test. Regulation 9 forbids a lawyer who acted as monitor from representing certain organisations or persons if the lawyer "knows, or should reasonably know" that the organisation or person was a respondent or a member, or if the lawyer obtained criminal intelligence about them when acting as monitor. The "should reasonably know" test is objective and may capture situations of constructive knowledge, not merely subjective awareness. That can require lawyers who served as monitor to maintain rigorous conflict registers and to proactively decline work where doubt exists.

No sanctions specified in-regulation. The regulation does not specify penalties or enforcement mechanisms for violations of duties or the practice restriction. That can create uncertainty about the consequences of breach and necessitates attention to external enforcement frameworks and professional conduct obligations.

Ambiguity about what constitutes material under Act, section 28E. The timing and transfer duties hinge on "material in relation to an application that is required to be given to the monitor under the Act, section 28E" (regulations 6 and 7). Parties must consult Act, section 28E to know precisely what material is covered. Failure to identify all material may lead to non-compliance with the 28/21 day rule.

No remuneration, staffing or secretariat provisions. The regulation is silent on payment, administrative support, or resourcing for the monitor and alternates. Those arrangements must be made under other instruments or internal agency arrangements, and lack of resourcing could constrain timely performance.

Designation requires Gazette publication. Regulation 4(1) requires designation by order published in the Gazette. Failure to publish could give rise to questions over the legality or effect of a designation.

Repeal and savings continuity. Regulation 10(2) maintains that acts or arrangements under the 2019 regulation continue to have effect under the new regulation. Parties operating under arrangements established under the old regulation should verify that those arrangements are consistent with the new text, particularly with Schedule 1 exclusions and the 28/21 day timing regime.

In short, the main operational risks are: selecting eligible monitors/alternates; meeting the 28/21 day material deadlines; prompt written notification of unavailability; preparing annual reports that avoid disclosure of criminal intelligence; managing the objective knowledge test in the practice restriction; and ensuring designation formalities are observed. Each of these is grounded in the regulation’s text (regulations 4-9, Schedule 1, regulation 10).

This section sets out a practical compliance checklist for the principal actors named in the regulation, referencing the relevant provisions. It does not create new legal obligations beyond the regulation but organises the duties into actionable steps.

For the Minister (designating and receiving reports)

• Confirm eligibility before designation. Ensure any person proposed as monitor is of the kind described in the Act, section 28C(1), and is not a person listed in Schedule 1. Regulation 4(1) and 4(2) require the Minister to avoid designating persons in Schedule 1.

• Use the Gazette for formal designation. Publish the designation order in the Gazette to satisfy regulation 4(1).

• Limit alternates. If designating alternates, ensure they are eligible monitors and the total number of alternates does not exceed three (regulation 5(1)-(3)).

• Arrange for timely tabling of annual reports. When presented with annual reports from the monitor or alternates, table them in both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable (regulation 8(3)-(4)). Establish administrative handling to receive reports and ensure timely tabling.

For the Commissioner (material delivery and consent for direct transfer)

• Establish material-handling protocols linked to Act, section 28E. Identify all material that the monitor must receive under the Act, section 28E, and set internal workflows to compile and deliver that material in accordance with timing rules (regulations 6 and 7).

• Meet the 28/21 day deadlines. Ensure material is given to the monitor at least 28 days before the application is heard, or to an alternate at least 21 days before the application is heard (regulation 7). Build scheduling buffers and an internal calendar to track hearing dates and delivery deadlines.

• Provide timely consent or refusal for direct transfer. If a monitor or alternate seeks to deliver material directly to the person who will exercise the functions, respond to any consent request promptly (regulation 6(b)(ii)). Implement a consent form and retention policy that records such decisions.

• Record and archive notices of unavailability. Maintain a clear record of all written notices of unavailability received from the monitor or alternates to trigger alternate activation and to evidence compliance with procedural steps (regulation 6 and 5(5)).

For the monitor and alternates (notification, material transfer, reporting)

• Notify Commissioner promptly if unavailable. If the monitor or an alternate is unavailable in relation to an application, give written notice of unavailability to the Commissioner "as soon as practicable" (regulation 6(a)). Draft a standard notice template to ensure consistency and speed.

• Transfer material as required. Ensure the material required under the Act, section 28E, is given either to the Commissioner or, with the Commissioner’s consent, directly to the person who will exercise the functions (regulation 6(b)). Keep records of what was transferred and when.

• Prepare annual report within three months. If the monitor or an alternate exercises functions in any calendar year, prepare an annual report on that exercise and present it to the Minister within three months after the end of the calendar year (regulation 8(2)-(3)). Plan report drafting timelines to meet this deadline.

• Exclude criminal intelligence from reports. Ensure the annual report does not contain criminal intelligence (regulation 8(3)(a)). Consult the Act for the definition of criminal intelligence, and implement redaction or summary protocols to remove or anonymise material that would qualify as criminal intelligence.

• Maintain conflict and knowledge registers. Because regulation 9 creates a subsequent restriction on representing certain clients, monitors who are lawyers should keep contemporaneous records of any criminal intelligence accessed and of individuals and organisations who are respondents to applications, to support future decisions about conflicts and representation (regulation 9).

For lawyers who have acted as monitor (managing future practice)

• Apply the "knows, or should reasonably know" test conservatively. Regulation 9 prohibits representation where a former monitor knows, or should reasonably know, that an organisation or person is or was a respondent to an application under the Act or a member of such an organisation, or where criminal intelligence was obtained about them when exercising monitor functions. Adopt conservative screening procedures that identify potential conflicts arising from prior monitor knowledge or access.

• Decline or refer work where restriction applies. If the facts indicate that regulation 9 applies, do not accept or continue representation of the relevant organisation or person. Document the steps taken to assess the restriction and any reasons for declining or withdrawing.

• Seek guidance where uncertain. Where it is unclear whether a person "should reasonably know" they were a respondent or member, or whether criminal intelligence was obtained, obtain internal or external legal advice and document the basis for the advice before accepting representation.

Organisational and procedural steps (agencies and firms)

• Map dependencies against the Act. Because the regulation repeatedly references the Act for definitions and material scope (regulations 3 note, 6 and 7), build a cross-reference matrix between the Act’s sections (for example, section 28C and section 28E) and the regulation to determine precise material and role definitions.

• Implement scheduling and document-management systems. Given the 28/21 day minimums, implement calendar management and document-transmission protocols to ensure materials are prepared, redacted (where necessary) and delivered on time.

• Ensure record-keeping for transparency. Maintain records of Gazette designation, written notices of unavailability, material transfers, Commissioner consent for direct transfer, and the content and timing of annual reports, to evidence compliance and to support parliamentary tabling obligations (regulations 4(1), 5(5), 6, 7 and 8).

• Train staff on confidentiality boundaries. Because annual reports must exclude criminal intelligence and other material is sensitive, train relevant staff in classification, redaction and secure handling of criminal intelligence to avoid inadvertent disclosure (regulation 8(3)(a)).

• Verify resourcing and administrative arrangements. The regulation does not specify remuneration or support for the monitor, alternates, or the Commissioner. Agencies should ensure appropriate resourcing and administrative support are arranged through other instruments or internal procedures.

• Review legacy arrangements from the 2019 regulation. The savings clause preserves acts and arrangements from the prior regulation (regulation 10(2)). Review existing practices to ensure they conform to the new regulation’s requirements, especially with respect to Schedule 1 exclusions and the 28/21 day requirements.

Practical checklist summary (by role)

• Minister: Confirm eligibility, publish Gazette designation, ensure alternates ≤3, receive and table annual reports.

• Commissioner: Identify Act section 28E material, meet 28/21 day deadlines, process consent for direct transfers, keep records of unavailability notices.

• Monitor/Alternates: Provide written notice when unavailable, transfer material as required, prepare annual report within three months excluding criminal intelligence, maintain conflict/knowledge registers.

• Lawyers (former monitors): Screen for conflicts under regulation 9, decline or withdraw where restriction applies, document decisions.

Following these steps will align operations with the regulation’s mandatory wording (regulations 3-10, Schedule 1) and the cross-referenced Act provisions.