Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry—Supermarkets) Direction 2024

The instrument rests on a small set of conceptually significant definitions and directions that structure the inquiry.

Definitions and cross‑references. Section 4 states that expressions have the same meaning as in the Act, pursuant to the Legislation Act 2003 (s4 note). The instrument therefore relies on existing statutory definitions for “inquiry”, “price”, “supply” and “State or Territory authority” (s4). It also adopts defined terms from the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct for “retailer”, “supplier” and “wholesaler” (s4).

Groceries, and upstream reach. The instrument defines “groceries” to include the groceries in the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct and raw materials that are to be processed into, or used in the manufacture of, those groceries (s4). That definition pushes the inquiry upstream of point-of-sale grocery products to include inputs and processing-stage goods, broadening the scope of economic analysis to upstream supply-chain dynamics and input pricing.

Inquiry scope and explicit exclusions. Section 5(1) instructs the Commission to hold an inquiry into markets for the supply of groceries. At the same time the instrument carves out explicit limits: it excludes the supply of goods or services by a State or Territory authority (s5(1)(a)); it excludes a general review of other Australian laws relating to groceries except as necessary to consider the matters in s6 (s5(1)(b)); and it excludes reviewing the operation or scope of the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct except as necessary for the s6 matters (s5(1)(c)). Section 5(3) further specifies that the inquiry is not to be held in relation to the supply of goods and services of that description by a particular person or persons.

Directed matters. Section 6 is the operational heart of the instrument. It directs the Commission to take into consideration a prescribed list of matters when holding the inquiry, including: market structure across suppliers, wholesalers and retailers with attention to levels and nature of competition and inter‑party relationships (s6(a)); competitiveness of small and independent retailers, including regional and remote stores (s6(a)(iii)); technological change such as online shopping (s6(a)(iv)); pricing approaches including data analytics (s6(b)); factors affecting the price of inputs in the supply chain, including impediments to availability and efficient pricing and price differences between what different levels pay and charge (s6(c)); and non‑price competition, with specific call‑outs for loyalty programs and discounts for future purchases (s6(d)).

Reporting timetable. Sections 7 and 8 direct the Commission’s procedural output: an interim report to the Treasurer by no later than 31 August 2024 (s7) and completion and a final report to the Treasurer by no later than 28 February 2025 (s8). These dates are binding directions under subsection 95J(6) and 95K(1) of the Act as referenced in the instrument.

Interaction with other instruments. The Food and Grocery Code of Conduct is explicitly referenced (s4). Section 4 notes the Code appears in Schedule 1 to the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Food and Grocery) Regulation 2015, so the inquiry’s definitions and some of its substantive scope are anchored in that Code and regulation. The instrument also invokes the Act as the legal basis for the direction (s3).

In short, the main concepts are: (1) a directed, Commission‑led inquiry into grocery markets that explicitly includes upstream inputs; (2) a bounded scope with statutory exclusions and a prohibition on person‑specific inquiries; (3) a detailed set of topics the Commission must consider (market structure, pricing practices including data analytics, input‑pricing frictions, and non‑price competition); and (4) a fixed reporting timetable.

This direction names actors and classes across the grocery supply chain and identifies who participates in or is excluded from the inquiry.

Primary decision‑maker and addressee. The Commission is the entity required to hold the inquiry and deliver reports to the Treasurer (s5(1); s7; s8). The Treasurer is the recipient of both the interim and final reports (s7; s8) and is the Minister issuing the direction (cover page and signature).

Suppliers, wholesalers and retailers. The operative language in s6 frames the inquiry around the markets for the supply of groceries by suppliers, wholesalers and retailers. The Food and Grocery Code of Conduct definitions apply to the terms “supplier”, “wholesaler” and “retailer” (s4). The Commission therefore must consider conduct and outcomes across those three levels of the supply chain (s6(a)), bringing suppliers, wholesalers and retailers into the inquiry’s ambit.

Small and independent retailers, and regional/remote businesses. Section 6(a)(iii) expressly requires consideration of the competitiveness of small and independent retailers, including those in regional and remote areas. That puts small, independent and geographically dispersed retailers into a distinct class for the Commission’s analysis.

Consumers and loyalty‑programme participants. Although the instrument does not define “consumer” or prescribe direct consumer processes, s6(d) requires the Commission to consider non‑price competition features such as loyalty programmes and discounts for future purchases. Those commercial mechanisms implicate consumer experience and choice and therefore consumers are indirectly affected through the Commission’s analysis and any subsequent policy choices or enforcement actions that might flow from the inquiry’s findings.

State and Territory authorities , excluded. The instrument specifically excludes the supply of a good or service by a State or Territory authority from the inquiry (s5(1)(a)), so those entities are carved out of the Commission’s directed investigation.

Entities protected from person‑specific scrutiny. Section 5(3) directs that the inquiry is not to be held in relation to the supply of goods and services of that description by a particular person or persons. That exclusion limits the inquiry to market‑level or class‑level analysis rather than firm‑specific investigation into particular suppliers or retailers.

The Commission’s resource allocation, and indirectly taxpayers. The Commission, as the body required to conduct the inquiry (s5(1)), will allocate staff time and resources to meet the direction and the reporting timetable (s7; s8). The instrument does not set out funding, but the obligation to hold the inquiry will have resource implications internal to the Commission’s budget and operational calendar; those costs are borne by the Commission and, indirectly, by its funding source (the Act and annual appropriation framework govern funding but are not set out in this instrument).

Third parties who may have to supply evidence. Because s6 prescribes the matters the Commission must consider, suppliers, wholesalers, retailers and small and independent retailers may find themselves invited to provide information or submissions on market structure, pricing practices (including the use of data analytics), input prices and non‑price competition mechanisms. The instrument itself does not set out compulsion powers for evidence gathering; it simply directs the Commission to hold an inquiry and take certain matters into account (s5; s6). Any compulsion to produce documents or witnesses would arise from the Commission’s statutory powers under the Act rather than from this direction alone.

Regulated instruments referenced. Parties who operate under the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct or who are defined by it will be affected by the inquiry because the instrument imports definitions from that Code and contemplates considering aspects of the Code only to the extent necessary to address the s6 matters (s4; s5(1)(c)).

In short, the instrument centrally affects the Commission and the Treasurer procedurally, and affects suppliers, wholesalers, retailers (with a special focus on small and regional retailers), participants in loyalty and discount schemes, and the upstream input sector as captured by the extended definition of groceries. State and Territory authorities and firm‑specific supplies are expressly excluded.

This section explains the legal obligations established by the direction and the limited rights or protections the instrument creates.

Commission’s duties. Section 5(1) imposes the primary duty: the Commission is required to hold an inquiry into the markets for the supply of groceries. That obligation is framed as being given under subsection 95H(1) of the Act (s5(1)). The Commission is further directed to take into consideration the specific topics listed in section 6 when holding the inquiry (s6). Under subsection 95J(6) of the Act as referenced, the Commission must give an interim report to the Treasurer by no later than 31 August 2024 (s7), and, under subsection 95K(1) of the Act as referenced, the inquiry is to be completed and a report given to the Treasurer by no later than 28 February 2025 (s8). Those timing obligations are explicit statutory directions.

Scope limits as duty constraints. The Commission’s duties are constrained by express exclusions in s5(1). The inquiry must not extend to the supply of goods or services by a State or Territory authority (s5(1)(a)). The Commission is also directed not to review the operation of any Australian law other than the Act in relation to groceries, except where necessary to consider the matters in s6 (s5(1)(b)). Similarly, the Commission should not review the operation or scope of the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct except as necessary for the s6 matters (s5(1)(c)). Finally, the inquiry may not be held in relation to the supply of goods and services of that description by a particular person or persons (s5(3)). Those exclusions shape the Commission’s inquiry remit and limit the range of findings or recommendations that may consider law reform beyond the Act or direct firm‑level adjudication.

Rights and protections for specified entities. The most concrete restriction that functions like a right for entities is the prohibition on person‑specific inquiries (s5(3)). That provision protects individual suppliers, wholesalers or retailers from being the subject of the directed inquiry; it preserves the inquiry for market‑level analyses. The instrument does not create formal procedural rights (for example, rights to be heard, to cross‑examine witnesses, or to access interim materials). It also does not prescribe rules for confidentiality or public consultation. Those procedural modalities would be exercised by the Commission using its statutory powers under the Act and its usual inquiry practices, but they are not set out in this direction.

Obligations to consider enumerated matters. Section 6 directs the Commission to take into account an explicitly enumerated list of matters, including market structure (s6(a)), pricing approaches and data analytics (s6(b)), input‑price factors (s6(c)), and non‑price competition measures (s6(d)). While the instrument does not spell out the depth of analysis required, it makes the consideration of these topics mandatory for the Commission’s inquiry.

No penalty or enforcement mechanics in the instrument itself. The direction does not create new prohibitions, offences, or penalties. Its operative function is to oblige the Commission to examine particular markets and report to the Treasurer by specified dates. Any enforcement action arising from issues uncovered by the inquiry would rely on the Act’s existing enforcement and remedy framework; the instrument does not itself grant the Commission new enforcement powers or civil/criminal sanctions.

Reporting obligations to the Treasurer. The Commission must report, via an interim report and a final report, to the Treasurer by the dates in s7 and s8. The instrument does not prescribe what the content of those reports must be beyond the requirement that the Commission take the s6 matters into consideration in holding the inquiry. The direction therefore imposes an output obligation on the Commission (reporting by set dates) rather than prescribing specific remedial outcomes or follow‑on actions.

In short, the Commission’s core duties under the instrument are to hold an inquiry into groceries, focus the inquiry on the enumerated topics in s6, respect the carve‑outs in s5, and produce the interim and final reports by the dates mandated in s7 and s8. The instrument creates a protective limit against person‑specific inquiry but otherwise leaves procedural rights and enforcement pathways to the Act and the Commission’s exercise of its statutory powers.

This instrument does not itself create criminal offences, civil penalties, or new enforcement mechanisms. Its operative effect is to direct the Commission to hold a specified inquiry and to report to the Treasurer; it is not framed as a regulatory instrument that imposes sanctions on private parties.

No statutory penalties in the direction. Nowhere in the text of the Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry,Supermarkets) Direction 2024 are fines, civil penalties, injunctions, or remedial powers imposed on suppliers, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, or any other private actor. The instrument’s provisions are procedural and directive in nature: it compels the Commission to carry out an inquiry (s5(1)), to have regard to the matters listed in section 6, and to deliver reports by specified dates (s7; s8). It does not criminalise conduct or specify enforceable obligations for market participants.

Enforcement and remedies remain governed by the Act. The instrument is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s3) and explicitly references provisions of that Act (for example, subsection 95H(1), 95J(1), 95J(2), 95J(6), 95K(1) are cited in ss5-8). Any enforcement powers, compulsory information‑gathering powers, or remedies that the Commission may exercise during or after the inquiry would therefore arise from the Act itself, not from this direction. The instrument does not expand or circumscribe the Commission’s statutory powers under the Act in respect of enforcement; it issues an obligation to conduct an inquiry within the limits prescribed.

No enforcement consequences for missing reporting deadlines stated. The instrument directs the Commission to provide an interim report by 31 August 2024 (s7) and to complete the inquiry and report by 28 February 2025 (s8). The instrument does not specify consequences if the Commission fails to meet these dates. Any legal consequence for non‑compliance with the direction would have to be determined with reference to the Act’s mechanisms and the administrative law framework governing ministerial directions and statutory agencies, none of which are detailed within this instrument.

Commission’s investigatory powers not altered by the instrument. The direction does not specify the Commission’s investigatory methods, powers to compel documents or testimony, or confidentiality procedures. Those aspects are governed by the Act and the Commission’s standard practice. The direction neither grants new investigatory powers nor removes existing ones; it confines itself to setting the subject and timetable for the inquiry and prescribing the topics to be considered.

Implication for regulated entities. While the instrument imposes no direct penalties, its findings could precipitate enforcement action under the Act if the Commission identifies conduct that breaches the law. The instrument itself makes no binding statement about subsequent enforcement action; it simply requires the Commission to investigate and report.

In short, the direction is a non‑punitive, procedural instrument that obliges the Commission to investigate specified matters and report within set timelines. Any penalties, compulsory powers, or enforcement responses remain matters for the Act and the Commission’s exercise of its statutory powers, not for this direction itself.

The direction is expressly connected to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct, and it circumscribes its reach vis‑à‑vis other Australian laws.

Primary statutory basis: the Act. Section 3 states the instrument is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The instrument repeatedly references specific subsections of the Act as the legal mechanism for what it directs the Commission to do (for example, subsection 95H(1) in s5(1); subsections 95J(1), 95J(2), 95J(6) and 95K(1) in ss5-8). The instrument therefore operates within the Act’s framework and does not purport to displace or alter the Act’s substantive provisions. Because definitions for “inquiry”, “price”, “supply”, and “State or Territory authority” are taken from the Act (s4 note), the Act’s definitions directly shape the instrument’s operational scope.

Reference to the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct. Section 4 defines “Food and Grocery Code of Conduct” as the code in Schedule 1 to the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Food and Grocery) Regulation 2015 and imports the Code’s definitions for retailer, supplier and wholesaler. Section 5(1)(c) states the inquiry must not review the operation or scope of that Code, except as necessary to consider the s6 matters. This makes the Code a point of reference for definitional clarity while limiting the inquiry’s power to engage in broad code reform assessments except insofar as required by the enumerated matters.

Limits on reviewing other laws. Section 5(1)(b) directs that the inquiry is not to extend to reviewing the operation of any Australian law other than the Act in relation to groceries, except as necessary to consider the s6 matters. That restriction circumscribes the Commission’s ability to make findings or recommendations that would amount to a wholesale review of other statutes affecting grocery supply, unless the review is necessary to address the specific analytical matters listed in s6. Parties seeking broader legal reform should note this statutory limit.

Dependency on regulation and code definitions. Because “groceries” is defined with reference to the Food and Grocery Code, and because retailer/supplier/wholesaler are defined by that Code (s4), the instrument’s substantive reach is tied to the regulatory architecture created by the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Food and Grocery) Regulation 2015. If those definitions change in the future, the practical scope of any future direction using the same language would change accordingly.

No change to enforcement architecture. The direction does not alter the Commission’s existing enforcement rights or the civil/criminal penalties that flow from the Act. The instrument does not create new statutory powers for the Commission nor does it limit the Act’s enforcement provisions; it simply directs the Commission to carry out an inquiry under the Act and to have regard to specified matters.

Interplay with administrative law and ministerial direction norms. The instrument is a statutory ministerial direction to the Commission. The direction’s legal effect and any challenge to it would be governed by administrative law principles and by the statutory framework that permits such directions, as reflected in the Act references in ss5-8. The instrument itself, however, does not include procedural or judicial review mechanisms; any legal contestation would require recourse to the broader administrative law and Act‑based regime.

In essence, the direction operates within and draws its definitions from the Act and the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct but limits the Commission’s license to review other laws and to investigate State or Territory authorities or particular persons. It relies on, and does not alter, the existing statutory enforcement and investigatory framework in the Act.

The instrument records its commencement details and contains a short note about the scope of the commencement table. There is no amendment history recorded within the text of the instrument itself.

Commencement. Section 2 sets out commencement. The “Commencement information” table states that the whole of the instrument commences “the day after this instrument is registered” (s2(1) table entry). The instrument also contains a standard note that the table relates only to the provisions as originally made and will not be amended to deal with later amendments of the instrument (s2 note). The instrument is dated 1 February 2024 (cover page).

No recorded amendments. The text contains no schedules or later amendments; no amendment dates or amending instruments are shown. The instrument’s own note in s2(1) confirms the table records only the original provisions. Therefore, as presented, there is no amendment history within the instrument.

References to other instruments. Section 4 cross‑references the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Food and Grocery) Regulation 2015 for the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct and references the Legislation Act 2003 to support the use of expressions with the same meaning as in the Act. Those cross‑references mean that any amendments to those external instruments (the Regulation, the Code or the Act) could alter the practical effect of this direction if their definitions or operative text were changed. The instrument itself does not include saving or transitional provisions addressing future changes in those instruments.

Practical implication for tracking amendments. Because the instrument imports definitions from external instruments and the Act, practitioners should track amendments to the Act and the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct and its regulation to understand how future changes could affect interpretive issues arising under this direction. The instrument contains no internal amendment mechanism; any modification would require a new direction or an amending instrument issued under the Act.

In summary, the instrument commenced the day after registration and has no amendment history recorded in the text. Its substantive scope is tied to definitions in the Act and the Food and Grocery Code and therefore to any amendments made to those external instruments.

The instrument itself does not record or reference any litigation, judicial decisions, or prior legal challenges. It is an administrative direction from the Treasurer to the Commission and contains no case law citations or references to prior judicial interpretation.

Absence of litigation record in the text. There are no cases named, no judicial determinations cited, and no mention of litigation in the instrument’s text. The document is a stand‑alone ministerial direction dated 1 February 2024 and its content is limited to directing the Commission to undertake an inquiry and to report to the Treasurer by the dates specified (s5; s7; s8).

Implications for contentiousness. The instrument does not identify disputed legal points or contested factual findings that have been subject to prior litigation. It is, however, a form of ministerial direction exercising statutory powers under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s3). Any legal challenge to the validity of the direction or to aspects of its application would be pursued in the usual courts or administrative law fora; the instrument itself neither anticipates nor reports any such proceedings.

What litigation might concern in practice. Although the instrument contains no litigation history, the likely grounds for any future litigation arising from the direction would be procedural or jurisdictional: for example, whether the Treasurer properly exercised power under the Act to issue the direction, whether the Commission complied with the direction’s scope limits (for example, by avoiding person‑specific inquiry or matters excluded in s5(1)), or whether the Commission’s processes in conducting the inquiry accord with administrative law requirements. None of these potential issues are discussed in the instrument itself.

No precedent cases named. The instrument does not reference case law interpreting the Act, the Food and Grocery Code, or ministerial directions generally. It provides no legal analysis or statement of precedent.

In short, the instrument contains no litigation history. Any judicial review or enforcement litigation that might later arise would need to be traced through court records and would not be reflected in the text of this direction.

This instrument is short and targeted, but several interpretive and practical pitfalls arise from its language and structure. Practitioners and affected parties should note the following concrete risks and points of attention, each grounded directly in the instrument’s text.

Upstream scope extends to raw materials. The definition of “groceries” includes raw materials to be processed into, or used in the manufacture of, grocery items (s4). That reach brings upstream suppliers, processors and input markets into the inquiry. Entities that do not consider themselves “grocery” businesses because they sell to processors rather than retail consumers may nonetheless be within scope.

Exclusion of State and Territory authority supply. The inquiry is not to extend to the supply of a good or service by a State or Territory authority (s5(1)(a)). Where a grocery supply or an input is provided by a State or Territory agency, that part of the market is out of scope. Parties should carefully map their supply chains to identify any State/Territory authority nodes because those nodes will be excluded from the Commission’s directed examination.

No person‑specific inquiries. Section 5(3) directs that the inquiry is not to be held in relation to the supply of goods and services by a particular person or persons. That protects individual firms from being the target of this market inquiry, but it also means that evidence framed narrowly as a firm‑specific complaint is not the appropriate vehicle for the Commission under this direction.

Limited review of other laws and the Food and Grocery Code. The Commission must not review the operation of any Australian law other than the Act, or the operation or scope of the Food and Grocery Code, except to the extent necessary to consider the s6 matters (s5(1)(b)-(c)). That constraint limits the Commission’s ability to make wide‑ranging law reform recommendations outside the Act, unless it can demonstrate the law review is necessary to address the enumerated s6 topics.

Mandatory consideration of particular topics. Section 6 mandates that the Commission take into account specific matters including the use of data analytics in setting prices (s6(b)), impediments to efficient availability and pricing of inputs (s6(c)(i)-(ii)), and non‑price aspects such as loyalty programmes and future‑purchase discounts (s6(d)). Parties whose business practices touch on these areas should be aware that the Commission must consider such topics and may therefore probe into data analytics practices, loyalty-programme structures, and input‑pricing arrangements.

Timing is compressed. The direction is dated 1 February 2024, requires an interim report by 31 August 2024 (s7) and a final report by 28 February 2025 (s8). The interim deadline gives less than seven months from the instrument date to assemble a detailed market inquiry; the overall inquiry is required to be concluded within approximately 12 months. The compressed timetable will force prioritisation of evidence gathering and analysis by the Commission and may limit the time available for prolonged consultation.

No procedural or confidentiality rules specified. The direction does not set out the Commission’s procedures for public consultation, confidential treatment of submissions, or evidentiary standards. Those procedural matters fall to the Commission’s usual practice and statutory powers under the Act, which are not detailed in the instrument. Parties should expect to engage with the Commission’s standard inquiry procedures rather than bespoke rules created by this direction.

No penalties or mandatory remedies in the instrument. The direction imposes no sanctions or specific remedial outcomes (see “Penalties and enforcement” above). The presence of the inquiry does not itself change legal obligations for retailers, wholesalers or suppliers; it does, however, create the possibility that findings may be followed by policy or enforcement action under the Act.

Ambiguities flow to external definitions. Section 4 imports meanings from the Act and the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct. Any ambiguity in those external instruments will therefore affect the interpretation of this direction. Practitioners should check current text of the Act and the Code/regulation for definitional nuances, as the direction’s practical scope depends on those instruments.

Potential for focused scrutiny on pricing algorithms and loyalty schemes. Section 6(b) specifically requires consideration of the use of data analytics in setting prices and s6(d) singles out loyalty programmes and discounts for future purchases. Businesses using dynamic pricing, personalisation algorithms, or loyalty discounts should expect those practices to be areas of targeted inquiry.

Possible tension between market‑level focus and practical evidence collected. The prohibition on person‑specific inquiry (s5(3)) may limit the Commission’s ability to drill into firm‑level conduct that materially affects market outcomes. The Commission’s methodological choices about when firm‑level evidence is necessary to answer market‑level questions could become contested; parties should be attentive to how the Commission frames requests for information.

In sum, the main practical “gotchas” are the upstream scope to raw materials, State/Territory exclusion, prohibition on person‑specific inquiry, mandatory topics that include data analytics and loyalty schemes, compressed timeline, and the fact that procedural and evidentiary modalities are left to the Commission and the Act rather than to this direction.

The instrument requires the Commission to hold an inquiry and to consider specific topics; it does not prescribe actions that private parties must take. Nevertheless, affected entities should prepare to engage with the Commission’s inquiry process and to assemble evidence addressing the mandated matters in s6. The following is a practical compliance checklist grounded in the instrument’s text.

1. Map whether your activity falls within the definition of “groceries”. Section 4 defines “groceries” to include the Code’s groceries and raw materials destined to become those groceries. Businesses supplying food inputs, processors, packers, and manufacturers should evaluate whether their products fall within that definition and therefore within the inquiry’s scope.

2. Identify whether any supply node is a State or Territory authority. The inquiry excludes the supply of goods or services by a State or Territory authority (s5(1)(a)). If part of your supply chain involves a public authority, document that fact; the Commission is directed not to extend the inquiry to those supplies.

3. Prepare evidence on market structure across levels. Section 6(a) directs the Commission to analyse the structure of markets for the supply of groceries by suppliers, wholesalers and retailers, including levels and nature of competition and relationships between parties. Compile data and narrative on: market shares, vertical relationships and contracts, entry and exit dynamics, concentration at each level, and regional variations.

4. Assemble information on small and independent retailers. Section 6(a)(iii) requires examination of the competitiveness of small and independent retailers, including in regional and remote areas. If you represent or operate such retailers, prepare documents on pricing, supply agreements, margins, logistics costs, and how those factors differ from larger chains.

5. Document technological change and online shopping impacts. Section 6(a)(iv) requires attention to technological change. Businesses should collect evidence on e‑commerce sales, fulfilment costs, online pricing strategies, and how online sales interact with bricks‑and‑mortar operations.

6. Provide detailed material on pricing approaches and data analytics. Section 6(b) requires the Commission to consider approaches to setting prices, including the use of data analytics. Entities using dynamic pricing, algorithmic price setting, personalised offers, or sophisticated price optimisation should prepare technical descriptions of models, governance and controls, anonymised examples of price application, and documentation of how analytics feed into price decisions.

7. Prepare analysis on input‑price factors. Section 6(c) focuses on factors affecting prices of inputs, including impediments to efficient availability and pricing, and differences between prices paid and prices charged across the supply chain. Gather procurement contracts, freight and logistics cost data, seasonal supply variations, regulatory constraints on inputs, and anonymised margin data across supply chain nodes.

8. Document non‑price competitive features. Section 6(d) requires analysis of loyalty programmes and discounts for future purchases. Prepare descriptions of loyalty scheme structures, participation rates, discount mechanics, accounting treatment, how programmes influence consumer choice and competitor responses, and any contractual ties with suppliers (for example, promotions funded by suppliers).

9. Consider confidentiality and data protection constraints. The instrument does not set out confidentiality rules. If providing commercially sensitive data to the Commission, be prepared to assert confidentiality and to justify the need for protective treatment under the Commission’s usual procedures. Preserve supporting data in auditable form (dates, sources, calculation methods).

10. Plan for timing and resource allocation. The Commission must provide an interim report by 31 August 2024 (s7) and a final report by 28 February 2025 (s8). Although the direction does not set submission deadlines for stakeholders, the compressed timetable suggests early engagement. Prepare executive summaries and succinct data packages to facilitate timely Commission review.

11. Prepare to explain vertical and contractual relationships. Section 6(a)(ii) explicitly asks about relationships between parties at different levels of the markets. Prepare copies or summaries of standard supply contracts, terms of trade, promotional funding arrangements, rebates, slotting fees, or any other contractual architectures that affect pricing or supply.

12. Anticipate requests on regional logistics and supply impediments. Because s6(c)(i) asks the Commission to consider impediments to the efficient availability of inputs, parties should prepare logistics cost studies, supply chain risk assessments, and examples of bottlenecks or procurement restrictions that affect pricing or availability.

13. Coordinate with industry associations where appropriate. Many of the s6 topics are industry‑wide (market structure, data analytics, non‑price competition). Coordinated, anonymised industry submissions can help present macro data while protecting individual firms from disclosure. Careful coordination will also avoid submissions that inadvertently convert market‑level analysis into a person‑specific complaint, which the direction forbids (s5(3)).

14. Keep track of the Food and Grocery Code definitions and any relevant regulation. Because definitions are imported from the Code and its regulation (s4), ensure your categorisation of goods, roles and contractual positions aligns with the current text of those instruments.

15. Legal and compliance review. Have legal counsel review any documents proposed for submission to ensure no privileged communications are waived and that commercial confidentiality is protected where appropriate.

These are compliance‑oriented steps suggested by the instrument’s mandatory matters in s6 and its timing obligations in ss7-8. The direction does not itself create obligations to provide materials or to participate; procedural modalities and compulsory powers are governed by the Act and the Commission’s usual practice. Nonetheless, entities that wish to influence the Commission’s findings or that may be affected by potential policy responses should organise and prepare the categories of evidence the direction requires the Commission to consider.