Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry— Perishable Agricultural Goods) Direction 2020

Definitions and referential structure. The instrument relies on a series of definitions that are not reproduced in full inside it; instead it incorporates the meanings used in the Act. Section 4 states that expressions have the same meaning in this instrument as in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 as in force from time to time, and it expressly points readers toward subsection 95A(1) of the Act for the meanings of several terms, including “exempt supply”, “goods”, “inquiry”, “services”, “State or Territory authority” and “supply” (s 4). The instrument defines “perishable agricultural goods” by reference to the descriptions in s 5(2) of the direction (s 4).

Product categories in scope. The direction lists four product groupings as the subject of the inquiry (s 5(2)):

• animal meat products containing, in whole or part, meat from pig, bovine, sheep, chicken, fish or shellfish (s 5(2)(a));
• plants, fungi, or their products or parts (explicitly including “seeds, spores, bulbs and similar things”) (s 5(2)(b));
• dairy products (s 5(2)(c)); and
• eggs of a domestic hen (s 5(2)(d)).

Market levels and bargaining power. A core concept is “relative power held by different suppliers… at each level of the domestic supply chain” (s 6(a)(i)). The Commission is told to consider concentration of power among and between suppliers at each level, bargaining power and any imbalance between levels and whether that imbalance leads to harmful outcomes, the nature of inter-supplier relationships, and allocation of risk among suppliers (s 6(a)(i)-(iv)). The instrument also directs consideration of the operation of the Act and instruments made under the Act on those matters (s 6(a)(v)).

Behavioral and consumer effects. The Commission is directed to study supplier practices and behaviours and their effects on consumers and the broader economy (s 6(b)). The term “harmful outcome” is used in s 6(a)(ii) and s 7(a); the direction asks the Commission to assess whether identified imbalances lead to harmful outcomes for participants in the markets, including through supplier behaviour or pricing and other terms and conditions offered by suppliers (s 6(a)(ii)).

Regulatory interface and the Dairy Regulations. The instrument places particular emphasis on the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Dairy) Regulations 2019, directing the Commission to assess whether those regulations adequately address power imbalances among dairy suppliers across the supply chain and to examine regionally differentiated costs and productivity of producing dairy milk, supply levels and how those factors influence bargaining power, as well as the interaction between the Dairy Regulations and other regulations made for the purposes of subsection 51AE(1) of the Act (s 6(c)(i)-(v)).

Scope limits and exclusions. The direction sets a series of explicit exclusions that narrow the inquiry’s remit: supply by State or Territory authorities; exempt supplies; reviews of other Australian laws (other than the Act or instruments under it); reviews of the Horticulture Industry Code (the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Horticulture) Regulations 2017); reviews of Commonwealth-funded programs or Commonwealth policies other than those relating to competition and consumer protection; and reviews of the Commonwealth policy that there is to be no regulation of prices in the markets for perishable agricultural goods (s 5(1)(a)-(f)).

Process obligations. The Commission must assess imbalances and recommend options to enhance competition (s 7(a)-(b)). Recommended options must include potential impacts on suppliers (at each level), consumers, the broader economy and Australian suppliers’ global competitiveness (s 7(c)). Confidential handling of submissions is specifically permitted (s 8). The inquiry must be completed and reported to the Treasurer by a fixed date (s 9).

Temporal limitation. The instrument imposes a fixed completion date of 30 November 2020 (s 9). The commencement clause confirms the instrument came into effect immediately upon registration (s 2).

Legal provenance. The direction is issued by the Treasurer under express powers in the Act and invokes specific Act provisions in its text (see s 5-9 which cite subsections 95H(1), 95J(1), 95J(2), 95J(6), 95R(1) and 95K(1) of the Act).

Primary decision-makers and operational actor. The direction imposes duties on the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to hold the inquiry and to carry out specified investigatory and reporting tasks (s 5(1); s 6; s 7; s 9). The Treasurer is the initiating actor , the instrument is made by the Treasurer and directed to the Commission (instrument header and s 3).

Suppliers in perishable agricultural goods markets. The instrument explicitly targets “suppliers in the markets for the supply of perishable agricultural goods” and requires analysis across “each level of the domestic supply chain” (s 6(a)(i)). That formulation brings into scope multiple categories of market participants without naming them: parties operating at upstream, midstream and downstream levels of domestic supply chains for the products enumerated in s 5(2). The text requires the Commission to consider bargaining power among suppliers at different levels and allocations of risk between suppliers (s 6(a)(ii)-(iv)). Dairy suppliers are singled out for further scrutiny via the direction to assess the effectiveness of the Dairy Regulations 2019 and to examine regional costs and productivity for dairy milk production (s 6(c)).

Excluded actors. The instrument excludes the supply of goods or services by State or Territory authorities from the inquiry (s 5(1)(a)). It also excludes “exempt supply” as defined by subsection 95A(1) of the Act (s 5(1)(b)). The direction prohibits the inquiry being held in relation to the supply of goods and services by a particular person or persons (s 5(3)), which means the Commission must not structure the inquiry to focus on individual named suppliers as the subject of the inquiry.

Regulatory actors and instruments. The instrument brings regulatory instruments into analytic scope: the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Dairy) Regulations 2019 are to be assessed for effectiveness (s 6(c)); the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Horticulture) Regulations 2017 are specifically excluded from the inquiry (s 5(1)(d)). The instrument also directs consideration of the operation of the Act and instruments made under it on market power and related matters (s 6(a)(v)).

Consumers and the broader economy. The Commission is directed to consider the effect of supplier practices and behaviours on consumers and the broader economy (s 6(b)), and to assess the potential impact of recommended options on consumers and the broader economy (s 7(c)). The instrument therefore places the interests of end-users and macroeconomic effects within its analytical remit.

Commonwealth policy and programs. The direction excludes review of Commonwealth-funded programs or policies except those relating to competition and consumer protection (s 5(1)(e)). It also excludes reviewing the Commonwealth policy that there is to be no regulation of prices in these markets (s 5(1)(f)), although that policy is to be taken into account as a matter in the inquiry (s 6(d)).

Stakeholders wishing to make confidential submissions. The direction permits the Commission to receive and consider written submissions in confidence and requires the inquiry to be held in private to the extent necessary for that purpose (s 8). This affects participants who may provide commercially sensitive information.

Legal advisers, consultants and data providers. These advisors will be called upon by suppliers and the Commission to gather and present the evidence the Commission is directed to assess: market concentration, bargaining power, contractual terms, allocation of risk, costs and productivity (particularly for dairy in specified regions), and the economic effects of recommended regulatory options (s 6 and s 7). The direction’s focus on region-specific dairy milk costs and productivity (s 6(c)(iii)) will make regional data providers and analysts particularly pertinent.

Indirectly affected parties. The direction’s required assessment of effects on the ability of Australian suppliers to compete in global markets (s 7(c)) reaches exporters and their advisers insofar as recommendations might be framed with international competitiveness in view; however the instrument itself does not directly regulate export or import activities.

Duties imposed on the Commission. The primary duty is to hold an inquiry into the markets for the supply of perishable agricultural goods as defined by the instrument (s 5(1); s 5(2)). The Commission is directed to take specified matters into consideration in conducting the inquiry (s 6). Those matters are detailed and prescriptive; they cover market structure (concentration), bargaining power and its consequences, supplier practices and behaviours, and regulatory effectiveness (including a detailed list of issues relating to the Dairy Regulations 2019) (s 6(a)-(d)).

Analytical and reporting duties. The Commission has a duty to assess whether imbalances in power lead to harmful outcomes (s 7(a)), to recommend options to enhance competition (s 7(b)), and to provide an impact assessment for each recommended option on suppliers at each market level, on consumers, the economy, and on the ability of Australian suppliers to compete in global markets (s 7(c)). For dairy products, the Commission is specifically directed to generate options to amend the Dairy Regulations 2019 if necessary to improve competition (s 7(b)(i)). For other goods the Commission is directed to recommend how to better leverage existing regulatory arrangements (s 7(b)(ii)). The Commission must complete the inquiry and provide a report to the Treasurer by 30 November 2020 (s 9).

Process and confidentiality duties. The Commission is directed to hold parts of the inquiry in private to receive and consider written submissions provided in confidence (s 8). The direction cites the Act’s s 95R(1) as authority for holding the inquiry in private to that extent (s 8).

Limits on inquiry scope as compulsory constraints. The Commission must not extend the inquiry to matters expressly excluded by the instrument: supply by State or Territory authorities, exempt supplies, reviewing Australian law other than the Act or instruments under it, reviewing the Horticulture Industry Code, reviewing Commonwealth-funded programs or policies other than competition and consumer protection policies, and reviewing the Commonwealth policy that there be no regulation of prices (s 5(1)(a)-(f)). The Commission is also prohibited from holding the inquiry in relation to supply by particular person(s) (s 5(3)). These exclusions are mandatory constraints on the Commission’s duties.

Rights afforded (within the instrument). The instrument gives the Commission rights indirectly as part of its investigatory function under the Act. It is empowered to receive and consider confidential submissions and to hold the inquiry partly in private to that end (s 8). The direction does not, however, create procedural rights for suppliers or other stakeholders inside the instrument itself: it does not specify rights to be heard, rights of access to materials, or specific disclosure obligations beyond the Commission’s duty to take the listed matters into consideration and to report its findings and recommendations to the Treasurer (s 6; s 7; s 9).

No penalty regime or enforcement powers in the instrument. The direction imposes no civil or criminal penalties, and contains no enforcement powers against suppliers. Its operative effect is to set inquiry tasks for the Commission rather than to regulate conduct directly. Any enforcement or sanctioning measures would arise, if at all, from separate provisions of the Act or other instruments under the Act; those are not reproduced within this instrument (s 3; s 4).

Temporal duty. The Commission’s duty to complete the inquiry and report to the Treasurer by a specified date (30 November 2020) creates a firm time condition on the Commission’s obligations (s 9). The instrument therefore constrains the Commission’s time available for data collection, consultation, analysis and drafting of recommendations.

No penalty or sanction provisions inside the direction. The instrument itself imposes no penalties, fines or enforcement mechanisms against private parties. It is a direction to the Commission to undertake an inquiry and to report on matters identified; it does not change legal liabilities, create offences or prescribe enforcement actions against suppliers (contrast s 5-9 which focus on tasks and considerations). The instrument therefore does not directly affect the legal exposure of market participants in terms of civil or criminal penalties.

No enforcement powers for the Commission conferred by the instrument. The direction does not grant the Commission new investigative or coercive powers beyond the authority the Act provides. The instrument repeatedly references provisions of the Act (for example s 95H(1), s 95J(1), s 95J(2), s 95J(6), s 95R(1), and s 95K(1) , see s 5-9). Any compulsory powers to obtain documents or require attendance would derive from those statutory provisions in the Act, not from the direction itself. The instrument does not reproduce or modify such powers.

Reporting as the principal outcome. The direction requires the Commission to complete the inquiry and deliver a report to the Treasurer by a set date (s 9). The report is the instrument’s output mechanism. The instrument does not require the Treasurer or any other public authority to act on the Commission’s recommendations; it simply mandates the Commission to provide options and impact assessments (s 7(b)-(c)).

Confidential submissions and private procedure. The instrument requires the Commission to hold parts of the inquiry in private insofar as it must receive and consider written submissions provided in confidence (s 8). That procedural design may affect transparency of the inquiry but does not create enforcement capacity. The Commission’s handling of confidential information during the inquiry is therefore governed by the direction’s procedural instruction, and by whatever confidentiality rules and statutory protections exist under the Act and the Commission’s usual administrative practice.

Implications for compliance or regulatory change. While the instrument itself does not impose penalties or new regulatory obligations on suppliers, the Commission’s eventual report may recommend regulatory or legislative changes (s 7(b)-(c)). Any such recommendations, if adopted by the Commonwealth, could lead to new obligations and enforcement mechanisms introduced by separate legislative or regulatory instruments. The direction mandates that recommended options include an assessment of potential impacts on suppliers, consumers and international competitiveness (s 7(c)), which is relevant when considering the likely design and cost of any subsequent enforcement regime.

Operative statutory basis. The instrument is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s 3). It repeatedly cites specific inquiry-related provisions of the Act , s 95H(1), s 95J(1), s 95J(2), s 95J(6), s 95R(1), and s 95K(1) , as the legal authorities under which the Commission must act (s 5-9). Section 4 expressly aligns the instrument’s terminology with subsection 95A(1) of the Act, so the definitions of key terms such as “goods”, “services”, “supply”, and “exempt supply” are those of the Act as in force (s 4).

Direct interaction with industry codes. The instrument interacts with existing industry code regulations in two ways. First, it excludes review of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Horticulture) Regulations 2017 from the inquiry (s 5(1)(d)). Second, and conversely, it expressly requires the Commission to consider the effectiveness of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Dairy) Regulations 2019, with granular matters to analyse including whether those regulations adequately address power imbalances across supply chain levels for dairy goods, regional costs and productivity for producing milk, supply levels, and interactions with other regulations made for the purposes of s 51AE(1) of the Act (s 6(c)(i)-(v)). The instrument therefore treats the Dairy Regulations as an active regulatory object for evaluation, while the Horticulture Code is carved out of the inquiry’s scope.

Limitation on review of Australian laws and policies. The direction prohibits the Commission from reviewing the operation of any Australian law other than the Act or an instrument made under the Act (s 5(1)(c)). It also excludes review of Commonwealth-funded programs or policies, except for policies relating to competition and consumer protection (s 5(1)(e)). Additionally, the Commonwealth policy that there is to be no regulation of prices in these markets is placed out of scope for review (s 5(1)(f)), although the policy is to be taken into account as a matter in the inquiry (s 6(d)). These clauses make the instrument’s investigative reach firmly bounded to competition/consumer matters and regulatory instruments under the Act.

Reference to subsection 51AE(1). Section 6(c)(v) directs the Commission to consider “the interaction of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Dairy) Regulations 2019 and other regulations made for the purposes of subsection 51AE(1) of the Act on suppliers and the supply of dairy products.” The instrument therefore signals an explicit need to examine how the Dairy Regulations operate together with any other regulations linked to s 51AE(1). The instrument does not describe s 51AE(1) itself, but the reference binds the Commission’s analysis to the regulatory landscape that has been structured around that subsection.

Confidential treatment pursuant to the Act. The private handling of confidential submissions is mandated by the instrument (s 8), with the direction invoking s 95R(1) of the Act as the source of the authority to hold parts of the inquiry in private. This ties the procedural regime of the inquiry back to the Act’s provisions on confidential information during inquiries.

No amendment of other instruments or laws by this instrument. The direction itself does not amend other laws, nor does it authorise the Commission to change the content of the Dairy Regulations or any other regulatory instrument. It obliges the Commission to recommend options, which may include recommending amendments to the Dairy Regulations 2019 (s 7(b)(i)), but any legislative or regulatory change would require separate processes external to this direction.

Definitions and cross-references. Section 4 anchors the instrument’s vocabulary to the Act by referring to subsection 95A(1). As a result, the instrument’s interaction with other laws is mediated through the Act’s definitions and inquiry procedures rather than by directly prescribing how other laws should be interpreted.

Original commencement. The instrument contains an explicit commencement table (s 2). It states that the whole of the instrument commences, or is taken to have commenced, “Immediately after this instrument is registered.” That is the sole commencement detail provided (s 2 and the table).

No subsequent amendments recorded in the text. The instrument includes a note that the commencement table relates only to provisions of the instrument “as originally made” and will not be amended in the instrument to deal with later amendments (s 2(1) note). The text supplied contains no later amendments, amendment dates, or records of modification to its terms. Therefore, based on the instrument itself, its operative terms are the original ones as registered and commenced.

Meta note about published versions. Section 2(2) notes that any information in column 3 of the commencement table is not part of the instrument and may be inserted or edited in published versions. That is an advisory note about publication practice rather than an amendment history. The instrument does not contain any subsequent entries or replacement wording.

Implication for legal research. The instrument’s own text does not record an amendment history beyond its immediate commencement. Researchers seeking any later amendments, repeal or replacement would need to consult the legislative register or the Commonwealth Gazette for any actions taken after registration; such material is outside the instrument’s text and is not reproduced here.

No litigation recorded in the instrument. The direction itself contains no references to litigation, case law, or judicial decisions. It contains no account of past litigation about these matters and does not identify any legal proceedings relying on or reacting to the direction.

No procedural rights or judicial review paths specified in the instrument. The instrument does not create procedural entitlements for third parties within its text (for example, it does not specify rights to be heard or to access materials outside the confidentiality allowance in s 8). Because the instrument is a direction to the Commission rather than a legislative or regulatory change that imposes obligations on private parties, the instrument itself does not generate private causes of action or statutory enforcement rights.

Potential for legal challenge not addressed in the instrument. The instrument mandates that parts of the inquiry be held in private to receive and consider confidential submissions (s 8). The instrument does not discuss or constrict any legal avenues that might be available outside the instrument (for example, judicial review of administrative decisions of the Commission taken during the inquiry), nor does it attempt to oust any established judicial review rights. The instrument itself is silent on litigation topics.

What the instrument does show about litigation-relevant choices. The instrument sets a short, firm deadline for completion (s 9) and prescribes out-of-scope matters (s 5(1)). Those constraints might shape the Commission’s decision-making and the evidence it seeks, which in turn could affect potential legal disputes about how the Commission performed its duties under the Act. However, the instrument’s text does not catalogue litigation outcomes or historical disputes, and it does not provide any commentary on how the Commission should respond to legal challenges.

For formal litigation history regarding the Act, the Dairy Regulations, the Horticulture Code or related competition law, the instrument does not supply case names or decisions; the instrument’s text contains no litigation record.

Scope exclusions narrow investigative reach. The instrument excludes several matters from review: supply by State or Territory authorities (s 5(1)(a)); exempt supplies as defined in the Act (s 5(1)(b)); the operation of any Australian law other than the Act or instruments under the Act (s 5(1)(c)); the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,Horticulture) Regulations 2017 (s 5(1)(d)); Commonwealth-funded programs/policies other than those relating to competition and consumer protection (s 5(1)(e)); and the Commonwealth policy that there is to be no regulation of prices (s 5(1)(f)). Practitioners should note these carve-outs restrict the Commission’s mandate and mean that certain structural or policy drivers of market outcomes are explicitly off-limits for review inside the inquiry.

The instrument forbids inquiry in relation to particular person(s). Section 5(3) requires that the inquiry “is not to be held in relation to the supply of goods and services by a particular person or persons.” This prevents the Commission from structuring the inquiry to single out named actors as the subject of the inquiry. Stakeholders expecting an inquiry targeted at specific firms or individuals must adjust expectations accordingly.

Tight timeline. The Commission is required to complete the inquiry and report by 30 November 2020 (s 9). That is a fixed and short completion window for a cross-sector inquiry that spans multiple product categories and requires region-specific analysis for dairy. The deadline compresses time for data collection, stakeholder consultation, and in-depth econometric or market-concentration analysis.

Confidential submissions and private procedure reduce public transparency. The direction explicitly instructs the Commission to hold parts of the inquiry in private to receive and consider written submissions in confidence (s 8). While this is necessary to handle commercially sensitive material, it may reduce the transparency that would otherwise accompany inquiries, limit public access to evidence and reasoning, and affect how stakeholders perceive the inquiry’s openness.

Dairy-specific granularity introduces data demands. The direction asks for a granular assessment of the Dairy Regulations 2019 with attention to region-specific costs of producing dairy milk, productivity by region, and how supply levels affect bargaining power (s 6(c)(iii)-(iv)). That requires the Commission to obtain detailed regional production cost and productivity data. The availability, comparability and timeliness of those data will materially affect the analysis the Commission can perform within the prescribed timeframe.

Interaction with other regulations is required but not defined. Section 6(c)(v) asks the Commission to consider the interaction of the Dairy Regulations with other regulations made for the purposes of subsection 51AE(1) of the Act. The instrument does not enumerate those other regulations or provide operational guidance on how to analyse regulatory interaction. The Commission must identify and evaluate those other regulations as part of its mandate, which increases the scope of legal and regulatory mapping required.

No enforcement or implementation obligation for recommendations. The instrument obliges the Commission to recommend options and assess impacts (s 7(b)-(c)), but it does not require any entity to adopt those recommendations. The instrument stops at reporting; any consequential regulatory change would require separate action outside this instrument. Parties anticipating immediate regulatory change should note that this direction only creates a reporting requirement.

Limit on reviewing general laws. By prohibiting review of Australian laws other than the Act (s 5(1)(c)), the direction constrains opportunities to examine non-competition policy drivers such as environmental regulation, food safety requirements, taxation or trade policy that might materially affect supply or bargaining power. If systemic market problems have roots in those other regimes, the inquiry’s mandated remit will not permit a full legal-policy root-cause analysis inside the report.

Potential for overlap or duplication with other instruments. The direction requires the Commission to evaluate the Dairy Regulations 2019 and to consider options including amendment (s 7(b)(i)). If other regulatory review processes or parliamentary inquiries are concurrently examining the same subject matter, there is a risk of duplication or mixed recommendations. The instrument does not prescribe coordination with other review mechanisms.

For the Commission (operational checklist). To comply with the direction, the Commission must, in summary:

• Confirm the product scope and ensure the inquiry covers only the goods and services described in s 5(2) (animal-meat categories, plants/fungi and their products, dairy products, eggs of a domestic hen) and ensure it does not hold the inquiry in relation to any particular person(s) (s 5(2); s 5(3)).
• Respect the exclusions in s 5(1)(a)-(f), ensuring the inquiry does not review out-of-scope matters such as supply by State or Territory authorities, exempt supplies, non-Act Australian laws, the Horticulture Code, Commonwealth-funded programs or policies (except those about competition and consumer protection), or the Commonwealth policy of no price regulation (s 5(1)).
• Take into consideration the specific matters listed in s 6: market concentration and bargaining power across supply-chain levels, supplier behaviours and their effects, and the detailed dairy-related considerations in s 6(c)(i)-(v).
• Carry out the analytical tasks in s 7: assess whether power imbalances cause harmful outcomes (s 7(a)); develop options to enhance competition, including options to amend the Dairy Regulations 2019 where relevant and to leverage existing regulatory arrangements for other goods (s 7(b)); and for each option, prepare impact assessments covering effects on suppliers at each level, consumers, the broader economy and Australia’s global competitiveness (s 7(c)).
• Manage confidential submissions in accordance with s 8, holding parts of the inquiry in private to the extent necessary to receive and consider written submissions provided in confidence, invoking the Act’s s 95R(1) authority as required.
• Complete the inquiry and provide a report to the Treasurer by 30 November 2020 (s 9).

For suppliers and stakeholders (evidence and submission strategy). Parties seeking to engage with the inquiry should:

• Confirm whether their products or activities fall within the enumerated categories in s 5(2).
• Prepare submissions focused on the specific matters the Commission is directed to consider (s 6). That includes evidence on:
  • market concentration and measures of bargaining power at the relevant supply-chain levels (s 6(a)(i));
  • evidence of bargaining power imbalances and whether any imbalance leads to harmful outcomes, including illustrative contracts, pricing terms, and evidence of behaviour by counterparties (s 6(a)(ii));
  • descriptions of relationships between suppliers and allocation of risk in contractual arrangements (s 6(a)(iii)-(iv));
  • the operation of the Act or instruments made under the Act as relevant to the above (s 6(a)(v));
  • supplier practices and behaviours and their effects on consumers and the broader economy (s 6(b));
  • for dairy suppliers, region-specific data on costs of production, productivity measures, supply levels, and any observed impacts on bargaining power, with detail aligned to s 6(c)(iii)-(iv).
• If submissions include commercially sensitive information, include a clear request and justification for confidentiality and provide a redacted public version where possible, noting the Commission is directed to handle confidential written submissions in private (s 8).
• Provide quantitative and contemporaneous data where available to support assertions about concentration, bargaining power and effects on prices or supply; where data are limited, explain data gaps and provide best-available proxies, particularly for region-specific dairy metrics required by s 6(c)(iii).
• For proposed regulatory options, supply an impact assessment aligned with s 7(c) that quantifies or qualitatively addresses impacts on suppliers at each level, consumers, the broader economy and Australia’s international competitiveness.

For legal advisers and policy teams (targets for analysis). Counsel and policy advisers assisting clients should:

• Map client activities to the supply-chain levels referenced in s 6(a)(i) and be prepared to demonstrate how bargaining power is exercised across contractual relationships and risk allocation (s 6(a)(ii)-(iv)).
• Annotate existing contractual arrangements to show pricing mechanisms, pass-through of costs, and allocation of risk , items directly called out in the direction for consideration (s 6(a)(ii)-(iv)).
• For dairy clients, assemble regionally disaggregated cost and productivity data, and evidence on supply dynamics relevant to bargaining power (s 6(c)(iii)-(iv)).
• Consider potential regulatory changes that could be recommended, and prepare impact modelling addressing the categories required in s 7(c).
• Prepare submissions that fit within the direction’s exclusions; do not attempt to reframe the inquiry as a vehicle to review non-Act laws, horticulture code operation, or Commonwealth policy on price regulation , those items are out of scope (s 5(1)(c), (d), (f)).

For State/Territory authorities and public-sector actors. Because supply by State or Territory authorities is excluded (s 5(1)(a)), public-sector suppliers should nevertheless prepare to be transparent if voluntary engagement is useful, but understand the direction prevents the Commission from holding the inquiry in relation to such supplies.

Timeliness and practicalities. The Commission and interested stakeholders must work within the short timeline specified (s 9). Practically, that means prioritising the most directly relevant evidence linked to s 6 and s 7, preparing confidential submissions early where necessary under s 8, and focusing analysis on practicable, evidence-backed options that the Commission can reasonably assess for impact by the deadline.

Documentation and traceability. Given the Commission must recommend options and provide impact assessments (s 7(b)-(c)), stakeholders should provide source data, assumptions, sensitivity analysis and clear provenance for claims about costs, productivity or market effects so that the Commission can incorporate that material into its assessment within the compressed timeframe.

In sum, compliance for the Commission is a matter of following the defined remit, exclusions, analytic tasks and timeline in sections 5-9. Compliance for stakeholders means tailoring submissions and evidence to the instrument’s specified matters, meeting confidentiality requirements where needed, and providing regionally disaggregated and supply-chain-specific data where the instrument requests it, particularly for dairy.