Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry—Natural Gas) Direction 2025

This instrument is a Treasurer’s direction to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to conduct a statutory price inquiry into the market for the supply of natural gas in Australia. It is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (the Act) and is titled the Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry,Natural Gas) Direction 2025 (s 1, s 3). The direction came into force the day after registration (s 2).

Mechanically, the instrument:

• Requires the Commission to hold an inquiry into the market for the supply of natural gas in Australia under subsection 95H(1) of the Act (s 5(1)).
• Specifies the matter of inquiry as “all goods and services relating to the supply of natural gas” for the purposes of subsection 95J(1) (s 5(2)).
• Carves out categories the inquiry must not cover: supplies that are “exempt supply” and supplies by a State or Territory authority (s 5(3)(a)-(b)); and it expressly prohibits holding the inquiry into the supply of those goods and services by a particular person or persons (s 5(4)).
• Directs the Commission to take a specified list of matters into consideration while holding the inquiry, including transparency of arrangements, supply and demand for gas and substitutes, transportation services, pricing and availability of offers to supply, volumes available now and in the future (including imports), domestic versus export pricing and volumes, and the pricing and availability of enabling goods and services such as drilling, storage, liquefaction and transport (s 6(a)-(g)).
• Directs procedural and information-use approaches: to make use of publicly available information, specifically naming three energy agencies, to provide the Treasurer with an interim report by 30 September 2025 and at least two reports for every subsequent six month period after that due date, and to provide anonymised data and analysis to the market where appropriate on estimates of LNG netback prices (s 7(a)-(c)).
• Fixes a completion date for the inquiry and the final report to the Treasurer by no later than 30 June 2030 (s 8).

Definitions relevant to scope are supplied in the instrument, including a defined meaning for “natural gas” and for “LNG netback price”, and a statement that certain expressions take their meaning from subsection 95A(1) of the Act (s 4). The instrument therefore sets scope, mandatory considerations, interim reporting cadence, a public-data obligation for some analysis, and an end date, while relying on the Act for statutory foundation and for the meanings of many technical terms.

The direction’s central legal concept is a statutory price inquiry into the “market for the supply of natural gas in Australia” (s 5(1)). The instrument frames the inquiry in terms of goods and services “relating to the supply of natural gas” (s 5(2)). The Act-based terms such as “inquiry”, “price”, “goods”, “services”, “exempt supply”, and “State or Territory authority” are incorporated by reference to subsection 95A(1) of the Act (s 4). The instrument therefore depends on the Act for core statutory definitions, while it provides targeted, stand-alone definitions for aspects relevant to this direction.

LNG netback price is explicitly defined in the instrument as the effective price of natural gas at a specific location or defined point, calculated from the delivered price of liquefied natural gas minus, as applicable, costs incurred between that specific location or defined point and the delivery point for LNG, including gas transmission, liquefaction and shipping costs (s 4). The inclusion of this bespoke definition identifies a focal analytic construct the Commission is directed to use and, where appropriate, to publish anonymised estimates of (s 7(c)).

The instrument prescribes the matters the Commission must take into account in the inquiry (s 6). Those matters are wide ranging and include: transparency of arrangements for supply (s 6(a)); supply and demand for natural gas and possible substitutes, whether produced domestically or imported (s 6(b)); supply and demand for transportation services for natural gas (s 6(c)); pricing and availability of offers to supply natural gas to Australian consumers and businesses (s 6(d)); volumes of natural gas available for current and future supply, including imports (s 6(e)); the relation between domestic and export pricing, volumes and availability (s 6(f)); and the pricing, volume and availability of goods and services that enable supply (s 6(g)). Each item is an explicit statutory consideration that will shape the Commission’s evidence gathering, analysis and reporting.

Procedural concepts include the Commission’s required use of publicly available information where appropriate, and the instrument specifically directs use of information published by three named energy institutions (s 7(a)(i)-(iii)). Reporting cadence is also a statutory concept here: an interim report to the Treasurer is due by 30 September 2025 and thereafter at least twice in every six month period after that due date (s 7(b)(i)-(ii)). The final report and completion of the inquiry are fixed by statute to no later than 30 June 2030 (s 8).

Exclusions and limits on targeting are conceptually important. The direction excludes “exempt supply” and supplies by State or Territory authorities (s 5(3)). It also prohibits holding the inquiry in relation to supply by a particular person or persons (s 5(4)). Those clauses frame the inquiry as systemic rather than a directed investigation at named commercial actors, while the precise meaning of “exempt supply” and the limits of “particular person or persons” are institu­tion­al terms defined in the Act rather than within the instrument (s 4).

The direction primarily affects three institutional actors by name: the Treasurer, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and market participants in the natural gas supply chain, broadly defined.

• The Treasurer is the originator of the direction and the statutory recipient of reports from the Commission (s 7(b), s 8). The instrument formalises a reporting relationship in which the Commission must report to the Treasurer on the inquiry’s progress and outcomes (s 7(b)(i)-(ii), s 8).
• The Commission is the body required to hold the inquiry and to conduct the directed analysis and reporting, under the Act’s inquiry provisions cited in the instrument (s 5(1), s 6, s 7, s 8). The instrument imposes obligations on the Commission to take specified matters into account (s 6), to use specified sources of public information where appropriate (s 7(a)), to provide interim and periodic reports to the Treasurer (s 7(b)), to provide anonymised LNG netback estimates to the market where appropriate (s 7(c)), and to complete the inquiry by a fixed date (s 8).
• Participants in the natural gas market will be affected indirectly through the inquiry process and outputs. The instrument defines the inquiry’s subject as “all goods and services relating to the supply of natural gas” (s 5(2)). That phrase is broad and reaches upstream and downstream elements of the gas supply chain, including producers, pipeline and transport service providers, liquefaction and storage operators, intermediaries and retail/industrial purchasers insofar as they are tied to goods and services relating to supply. The matters the Commission must consider include market transparency, supply and demand, transportation services, pricing and availability of supply offers, volumes for current and future supply including imports, domestic vs export price and volume comparisons, and pricing and availability of enabling goods and services such as drilling, storage, liquefaction and transport (s 6(a)-(g)). Those directed topics mean the Commission’s evidence collection and published analysis will likely touch on commercial practices, contract structures and pricing across the value chain.

Two named exclusions narrow immediate application: the inquiry must not cover goods or services that are “exempt supply”, and it must not cover supply by a State or Territory authority (s 5(3)(a)-(b)). The instrument also directs that the inquiry must not be held “in relation to the supply of goods and services of that description by a particular person or persons” (s 5(4)). Those exclusions affect market actors in two ways. First, parties whose supplies fall within “exempt supply” or who are State or Territory authorities are formally outside the direction’s scope. Second, the prohibition on targeting particular persons means the Commission should not use this inquiry as a vehicle to single out named commercial entities for investigation, although market-wide analyses that cover activities of market participants generally are within scope.

The instrument assigns specific duties to the Commission and establishes rights in the form of reporting obligations to the Treasurer and to the market.

Duties imposed on the Commission

• Hold the inquiry into the market for the supply of natural gas in Australia (s 5(1)). This is framed as a requirement “Under subsection 95H(1) of the Act”, meaning the direction invokes the inquiry powers found in the Act (s 5(1)). The instrument does not restate the Act’s powers or procedures.
• Conduct the inquiry in relation to “all goods and services relating to the supply of natural gas” (s 5(2)). That is an explicit scope duty and will shape the Commission’s terms of reference for the inquiry.
• Exclude specified subject matter from the inquiry. The Commission must not hold an inquiry into a good or service that is an “exempt supply” or where the supply is by a State or Territory authority (s 5(3)(a)-(b)). The Commission must also not hold the inquiry in relation to supply by a particular person or persons (s 5(4)). These are negative duties constraining the inquiry’s target.
• Take into consideration the specific list of statutory matters in conducting the inquiry. The instrument directs that the Commission must have regard to transparency of arrangements, supply and demand (including substitutes and imports), transportation services, pricing and availability of offers, volumes available for current and future supply, domestic vs export comparisons, and enabling goods and services such as drilling, storing, processing and transporting natural gas (s 6(a)-(g)). This is a statutory checklist that must inform evidence collection, analysis and reporting.
• Use publicly available information “where appropriate” and specifically consider information published by three named energy agencies (s 7(a)(i)-(iii)).
• Provide an interim report to the Treasurer by 30 September 2025 and thereafter at least twice in every six month period after that due date (s 7(b)(i)-(ii)). This imposes a recurring reporting schedule.
• Where appropriate, provide anonymised data and analysis relating to estimates of LNG netback prices to the market (s 7(c)). This is a directed public disclosure duty, subject to the Commission’s judgment about appropriateness.

Rights and constraints

• The direction confers a right on the Treasurer to receive interim reports and the final report (s 7(b), s 8). This is an institutional reporting right rather than an individual right.

The direction itself does not specify penalties, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms for non‑compliance by private parties. It is a statutory direction to the Commission made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s 3). The instrument sets obligations on the Commission , to hold the inquiry, to take into account specified matters, to use certain public information where appropriate, to report to the Treasurer on a specified schedule, and to provide anonymised LNG netback analysis to the market where appropriate (s 5-8) , but it does not provide a disciplinary regime, fines, or criminal provisions within its text.

Enforcement and penalties must therefore be located in the Act’s inquiry framework that the direction invokes by reference. The instrument repeatedly cites subsections of the Act (for example, subsection 95H(1), subsection 95J(1), subsection 95J(2), subsection 95J(6), and subsection 95K(1); s 5(1), s 5(2), s 5(4), s 6, s 8). Any statutory enforcement powers, information‑gathering powers, coercive notices, or penalties available to the Commission when conducting an inquiry would be those supplied by the Act. The direction does not reproduce those powers or describe them.

Two practical enforcement-related points arise from the instrument’s text:

• Reporting obligations: The Commission has express timing obligations to report to the Treasurer and to publish anonymised data as appropriate (s 7(b)-(c)). Internal compliance by the Commission with these timing duties is an obligation created by the instrument. The instrument does not specify consequences for the Commission failing to meet its internal reporting deadlines; any consequences would derive from the statutory relationship and administrative law principles rather than from an explicit penalty in the instrument.
• Scope prohibitions: The instrument instructs the Commission not to hold the inquiry into exempt supplies, supplies by a State or Territory authority, or into the supply of goods and services by a particular person or persons (s 5(3)-(4)). If a dispute arises about whether the Commission has exceeded the direction, remedies would lie in judicial review or other statutory mechanisms under the Act or general administrative law, but such remedies are not specified in the instrument itself.

Given the absence of penalty provisions in the direction, those seeking to understand coercive aspects or enforcement by the Commission should consult the underlying sections of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 referenced in the instrument for any statutory powers to compel information, impose penalties or otherwise enforce compliance in the context of a price inquiry. The instrument itself establishes duties for the Commission and reporting obligations to the Treasurer and the market, while leaving enforcement mechanics to the Act.

The instrument is explicitly made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and repeatedly cross-references subsections of that Act for both authority and definitions (s 3, s 4 note, s 5(1), s 5(2), s 5(4), s 6, s 8). It therefore operates within the legal framework of the Act. The instrument does three things that structure its interaction with other laws.

First, it adopts, by reference, statutory meanings from the Act. The instrument declares that expressions have the same meaning as in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 “as in force from time to time” and specifically notes subsection 95A(1) as the source for terms such as “exempt supply”, “goods”, “inquiry”, “price”, “services”, “State or Territory authority” and “supply” (s 4). That means the instrument’s substantive reach depends on the Act’s definitions. Any change to those definitions in the Act would, as drafted, alter the meaning of those terms within the direction unless the direction itself is amended.

Second, the instrument invokes specific inquiry provisions of the Act as its statutory foundation. It directs the Commission under subsection 95H(1) to hold the inquiry and references subsections 95J(1), 95J(2), 95J(6) and 95K(1) when setting scope and duties (s 5(1)-(2), s 5(4), s 6, s 8). The procedural and coercive powers, confidentiality protections and other litigation‑relevant mechanisms that govern how the Commission conducts the inquiry are therefore matters for the Act. The direction does not restate or alter those provisions. Practically, the Commission’s ability to issue notices, require information, or manage confidential material will be governed by the Act’s inquiry regime rather than by this instrument.

Third, the instrument references other regulatory agencies as information sources and thereby aligns the inquiry’s evidence base with outputs of other regulatory regimes. Section 7(a) directs the Commission to make use, where appropriate, of publicly available information published by the Australian Energy Market Commission, the Australian Energy Market Operator, and the Australian Energy Regulator. Those agencies operate under separate statutory regimes. By mandating the use of their publicly available material, the direction ties the inquiry’s analysis to findings and data produced under energy law and market rules. It does not modify those agencies’ statutory responsibilities or transfer powers to them; it simply instructs the Commission to use their public outputs where appropriate.

Areas of potential overlap or clarification:

• State and Territory regulation: The direction excludes supplies by State or Territory authorities from the inquiry’s scope (s 5(3)(b)). That exclusion recognises a boundary between federal inquiry scope and State/Territory-controlled supply activities, but the instrument does not define “State or Territory authority” within its text because that term is defined in the Act (s 4). Interaction with State territory laws will hinge on the Act’s definition and the factual status of particular entities.

The instrument contains its own commencement table and a note that the table relates only to the provisions “as originally made” (s 2 and the commencement table note). The instrument records the date of the direction as 28 August 2025 and that it is given by the Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, with the instrument titled Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry,Natural Gas) Direction 2025 (heading and s 1). The commencement clause provides that the whole instrument commences on the day after registration (s 2).

The instrument itself includes a procedural note in s 2(2) that any information in column 3 of the commencement table is not part of the instrument and that such information may be edited in published versions; this is a standard publication note rather than an amendment record (s 2(2)).

No amendments are recorded within the body of this instrument. The instrument does not include a schedule of amendments or a later commencement or sunset provision beyond the fixed completion date for the inquiry (s 8). The completion date requires the inquiry to be finished and the report to be given to the Treasurer by no later than 30 June 2030 (s 8). There is no provision made in the instrument for automatic renewal, extension, or variation of the direction.

If an amendment were to be made to the instrument after registration, that amendment would appear as a subsequent instrument or variation and would be recorded separately; the instrument’s commencement table note indicates it will not itself be revised to capture later amendments (s 2 note). The instrument does not supply an amendment power within its text; any variation would be effected by the Treasurer issuing a new direction or by the statutory mechanisms for amending legislative instruments.

In practical terms, therefore:

• The instrument as presented contains no post‑enactment amendments.
• It commenced the day after registration, is dated 28 August 2025, and sets a final inquiry completion date of 30 June 2030 (s 2, s 8).
• Any future changes to the instrument would be documented in subsequent instruments or public records outside the text of this direction.

Readers seeking an authoritative amendment history should consult the legislative instrument registry and public notices where new instruments and variations are registered, because this instrument’s text itself does not record later amendments or variations.

The instrument contains no litigation history within its text. It is a statutory direction given by the Treasurer to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and does not cite or record any judicial proceedings relating to its making, content, or implementation.

Because the instrument operates by reference to provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 for its authority and for core definitions (s 3, s 4 note, s 5(1)), any legal disputes about the Commission’s exercise of powers during the inquiry, or about whether the Commission has complied with the direction’s constraints, would engage the Act’s statutory framework and administrative law principles. Such disputes could, in theory, give rise to judicial review or other litigation, for example to adjudicate whether the Commission exceeded the scope prescribed by the direction or misconstrued the exclusion for “exempt supply” or “State or Territory authority” (s 5(3)). The instrument itself does not set out or reference any particular cases.

As of the instrument’s text, no court judgments, applications for judicial review, or other litigation matters are recorded. Parties wanting to assess litigation risk should monitor court filings and potential challenges that could arise from how the Commission conducts the inquiry, notably where there is disagreement about scope, confidentiality, or release of anonymised LNG netback data (s 5(2)-(4), s 7(c)). Any litigation history relevant to the instrument will therefore be external to it and must be sought in public court records or through the Commission’s published record of the inquiry.

The instrument is brief but contains several drafting features and cross‑references that present practical interpretation and implementation issues. Below are concrete points to watch, grounded in the instrument’s text.

1. Broad scope phrasing: “All goods and services relating to the supply of natural gas” (s 5(2)) is wide. The breadth reaches upstream and downstream activities, and the instrument does not limit that phrase by further definition. Parties should not assume the inquiry is confined to commodity pricing alone.

2. Dependence on Act definitions: Key terms such as “exempt supply”, “goods”, “services”, “inquiry”, “price”, “State or Territory authority”, and “supply” are defined by subsection 95A(1) of the Act, not in the instrument (s 4). Determining whether a particular supply is “exempt supply” or whether an entity is a “State or Territory authority” thus requires reference to the Act. The instrument’s exclusions (s 5(3)) hinge on those external definitions.

3. Exclusion for particular persons: The direction states the inquiry must not be held “in relation to the supply of goods and services of that description by a particular person or persons” (s 5(4)). What counts as a “particular person or persons” may be litigable in edge cases. For example, industry participants could disagree over whether Commission analysis focusing on a narrow commercial segment constitutes improper targeting. The instrument does not define tests for this exclusion.

4. “Where appropriate” discretion repeated: The Commission is told to use publicly available information “where appropriate” and to provide anonymised LNG netback estimates “where appropriate” (s 7(a), s 7(c)). Those phrases create substantive discretion for the Commission but do not state criteria for deciding appropriateness. Market participants may be uncertain about when anonymised outputs will be published.

5. LNG netback price formulation: The instrument defines “LNG netback price” as an “effective price” at a location after deducting costs such as transmission, liquefaction and shipping (s 4). That definition allows multiple cost inclusion choices and does not fix methodology, currency adjustments, or assumptions about load factors. Different methodological choices can materially affect reported netback estimates. The instrument gives the Commission latitude to choose methods.

6. Reporting cadence ambiguity and intensity: The Commission must give an interim report by 30 September 2025 and “at least twice for every 6 month period after the interim report ... is due to be given” (s 7(b)(i)-(ii)). That language requires ongoing reporting but is phrased in a way that may prompt questions about timing start points and whether reports should be evenly spaced. The practical interpretation is that after the initial due date, the Commission must provide at least two reports in every subsequent six month period, which implies frequent reporting over the inquiry’s multi‑year life.

The instrument places direct obligations on the Commission and creates expectations for market participants and other information providers. Compliance for private parties is not set out as a discrete statutory duty in the instrument, but the practical steps below are grounded in the instrument’s requirements and its likely operationalisation.

For the Commission

• Establish a project plan that meets the fixed deadlines: ensure an interim report to the Treasurer is prepared for delivery by 30 September 2025, and then schedule at least two reports in every subsequent six month period after that due date (s 7(b)(i)-(ii)). Map deliverables to the final completion deadline of 30 June 2030 (s 8).
• Frame the inquiry terms of reference to encompass “all goods and services relating to the supply of natural gas” while respecting the exclusions for “exempt supply” and State or Territory authority supplies, and the prohibition on targeting particular person(s) (s 5(2)-(4)).
• Put in place decision protocols to determine when use of public information and provision of anonymised LNG netback analysis are “appropriate” (s 7(a), s 7(c)). Document anonymisation standards and methodologies to withstand scrutiny, because the instrument directs anonymity but does not specify method.
• Adopt a clear, reproducible methodology for LNG netback price estimation aligned with the instrument’s definition (s 4). Specifically document which costs are deducted (transmission, liquefaction, shipping and other applicable costs) and how location‑specific adjustments are handled.
• Coordinate with the named energy agencies for timely access to public data sets and clarify how to integrate their outputs into Commission analysis (s 7(a)(i)-(iii)).
• Ensure legal and procedural alignment with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010’s inquiry powers and confidentiality regimes, because the direction invokes the Act for authority and definitions (s 3, s 4 note).

For market participants (producers, transport providers, traders, large purchasers, service providers)

• Review whether your supplies fall within the instrument’s scope by reference to the Act’s definitions, particularly the definition of “exempt supply” and the definition of a “State or Territory authority” in subsection 95A(1) of the Act, because those determinations affect whether the inquiry may cover your business activities (s 4, s 5(3)).
• Prepare data and analytic capabilities to engage with Commission requests or to respond to public Commission outputs. Even if the direction does not itself compel information, the Commission’s inquiry powers under the Act may do so. Align internal data on volumes, offers, prices, transport costs, liquefaction and shipping costs to produce defensible LNG netback estimates consistent with the instrument’s definition (s 4).