Competition and Consumer (Price Inquiry—Electricity) Direction 2025

The Direction builds on statutory concepts in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 by invoking the Act’s framework for price inquiries and by importing the Act’s definitions. The principal concepts in the instrument are the inquiry into supply, the market scope, issue scope, evidentiary inputs, and reporting obligations.

Core statutory concepts and how the Direction uses them:

• Inquiry: The Direction invokes the Commission’s obligation to hold an inquiry under subsection 95H(1) of the Act (s 5(1)). The instrument’s operative effect is to require the ACCC to exercise the statutory function of conducting an inquiry into electricity supply in the national electricity market.
• Supply of goods that are electricity: The Direction specifies that the inquiry is to be held in relation to the supply of goods that are electricity (s 5(2)). That fixes the object of inquiry as the sale or supply of electricity considered as a good, rather than other market inputs or services, unless they fall within the Act’s definitions as adopted by the Direction.
• Exclusions: The Direction expressly excludes “exempt supply” and supplies by a State or Territory from the inquiry (s 5(3)(a) and (b)). The Direction also forbids the Commission from conducting the inquiry in relation to supply by a particular person or persons (s 5(4)). These exclusions narrow investigatory targets and limit the inquiry’s ability to single out specific suppliers.
• Matters to be taken into consideration: The Direction prescribes matters the Commission must take into account (s 6). These items define the analytic frame that the Commission must use. The list is: retail electricity prices and their variations and the impact of wholesale prices on retail prices (s 6(a)); wholesale market prices and contributing factors, including bidding behaviour of generators (s 6(b)); margins and profits of generators and retailers and contributing factors (s 6(c)); and the impact of policy changes in the national electricity market (s 6(d)).
• Use of public information: The Direction requires the Commission, in holding the inquiry, to make use of publicly available information and specifically to include relevant published information from the AER, AEMC and AEMO (s 7(a)(i)-(iii)). This sets expectations about sources and suggests reliance on officially published energy-sector material.
• Reporting and recommendations: The Direction requires an interim report to the Treasurer by 31 December 2025 and completion of the inquiry with delivery of a final report by 30 June 2026 (s 7(b); s 8). It permits the Commission, where appropriate, to make recommendations to the Treasurer for “any proportional and targeted action considered necessary to remedy any failure” by market participants or the market as a whole to deliver competitive and efficient electricity prices for customers (s 7(c)).

Definitions and referential concepts:

• The Direction imports the definition of “national electricity market” from the National Electricity Law as in force at commencement (s 4). That fixes the geographical and institutional market boundaries for the inquiry to the NEM as defined at the moment the Direction commenced.
• The Direction uses terms defined in s 95A(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, including “exempt supply”, “goods”, “person”, “price”, “services”, “State or Territory authority”, and “supply” (s 4). The Direction therefore depends on the Act’s technical definitions to specify what falls inside or outside the inquiry.

Mechanisms the Direction sets in train:

• Information aggregation and synthesis by the Commission, with an emphasis on published regulator and market operator material (s 7(a));
• Analysis of price transmission from wholesale to retail, bidding behaviour, and profit margins (s 6(a)-(c));
• Time-bound reporting to the Treasurer that is capable of generating policy options (s 7(b), (c); s 8).

The Direction does not create new definitional content beyond adopting statutory definitions and the NEM meaning at commencement. Nor does it itself grant investigatory powers (the instrument instructs the Commission to hold an inquiry under the Act, but it does not in the text create new powers or penalties). The instrument therefore functions as a directional, time-limited mandate to the Commission to examine a defined set of matters and report to the Treasurer.

The Direction’s text identifies and implicates several classes of actors through the scope of the inquiry and the specified matters to be considered. The instrument itself makes the Commission the principal actor required to act; the Treasurer is the recipient of the interim and final reports; and the inquiry’s subject is electricity supply in the national electricity market. Parties likely to be materially affected, as indicated by the Direction, include electricity retailers and generators, market institutions and regulators, consumers, and State and Territory governments, though the Direction excludes some supplies.

Directly named or legally implicated actors

• The Commission (ACCC). The Direction imposes a statutory obligation on the Commission to hold the inquiry and to follow the requirements set out in the instrument (s 5(1); s 6; s 7; s 8). The Commission is the decision-maker for the inquiry’s conduct within the Direction’s constraints.
• The Treasurer. The Treasurer (the maker of the Direction) is the addressee of the interim report (due 31 December 2025) and of the final report (due 30 June 2026). The Direction also permits the Commission to make recommendations to the Treasurer for remedial action (s 7(b), (c); s 8).
• The Australian Energy Regulator (AER), Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), and Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO). The Direction instructs the Commission to make use of publicly available information, including relevant material published by those bodies (s 7(a)(i)-(iii)).

Market participants implicated by the substance of the inquiry

• Generators and retailers. The Direction explicitly instructs the Commission to consider bidding behaviour of electricity generators in the wholesale market and to analyse margins and profits of generators and retailers (s 6(b)(i); s 6(c)). Those market participants are therefore directly within the analytic frame of the inquiry.
• Consumers. The Direction requires consideration of prices offered to consumers and variations to those prices and an analysis of the impact of wholesale prices on retail prices (s 6(a)). Consumers are the expressly stated end-point whose pricing outcomes the inquiry must evaluate.
• Market participants other than generators and retailers. The Direction’s scope,supply of goods that are electricity within the national electricity market,can encompass other participants such as traders and some intermediaries insofar as they are involved in supply of electricity as a good (s 5(2); s 4 by importing definitions).

Actors not within the inquiry

• State or Territory governments and their supply activities. The Direction excludes inquiries into supplies by a State or Territory (s 5(3)(b)). That exclusion removes Commonwealth-directed scrutiny of those supplies under this inquiry.
• Exempt supplies. The Direction excludes any supply that is an “exempt supply” as defined by subsection 95A(1) of the Act (s 5(3)(a)). The instrument therefore does not cover some off-market or small-scale supplies if they meet the statutory definition of exempt supply.
• Particular persons. The Direction forbids the Commission from holding the inquiry in relation to the supply of electricity by a particular person or persons (s 5(4)). This prevents the inquiry being framed as an investigation into one firm or a named set of firms.

Who pays, who decides, and who changes behaviour

• Who pays: The Direction does not create new financial charges or fees. However, market participants (generators, retailers) and regulated entities may incur costs in responding to the inquiry through the time and resources needed to assemble and provide information, prepare submissions, and potentially respond to any recommendations that the Treasurer chooses to pursue. The Direction itself does not provide for cost recovery or funding mechanisms; it simply sets the Commission’s mandate and timetable (s 5(1); s 7(b); s 8).
• Who decides: The Commission decides the conduct, scope within the Direction’s bounds, and analytic methods of the inquiry, subject to the Direction’s mandatory matters and requirements. The Treasurer receives the reports and is the intended recipient of recommendations (s 7(b), (c); s 8).
• Behaviour changes: The Directive is designed to elicit analysis of pricing, bidding behaviour, profit margins, and policy impacts. The immediate behavioural pressures are informational: generators, retailers, and their advisers may choose to prepare explanatory materials, public submissions, and engage with regulators to shape findings. The possibility of Commission recommendations to the Treasurer for “proportional and targeted action” (s 7(c)) may also alter business incentives if market participants expect regulatory or policy responses.

Geographic and legal boundaries

• The inquiry is limited to the “national electricity market” as defined by the National Electricity Law as in force at the commencement of the Direction (s 4). That fixes the legal and geographic perimeter of the inquiry to the NEM as it existed at the instrument’s commencement date.
• The Direction’s exclusions of exempt supply and State or Territory supply (s 5(3)) further shape which commercial arrangements and actors are within scope.

The Direction imposes duties on the Commission and establishes procedural rights implicitly affecting interested parties by prescribing matters for consideration and reporting timelines. It does not explicitly impose duties on private market participants; rather, it sets the ACCC’s obligations and reporting requirements and specifies the inquiry’s analytical focus.

Duties imposed directly by the Direction

• Duty to hold an inquiry. The Commission is required to hold an inquiry into the supply of electricity in the national electricity market under subsection 95H(1) of the Act, as given effect by the Direction (s 5(1)).
• Duty to limit scope to electricity as a good. The Direction requires the inquiry to be held in relation to the supply of goods that are electricity (s 5(2)).
• Duty to exclude certain supplies. The Commission must not hold the inquiry in relation to exempt supplies or supplies by a State or Territory (s 5(3)(a)-(b)).
• Duty not to target particular person(s). The Commission is directed not to hold the inquiry in relation to the supply of electricity by a particular person or persons (s 5(4)).
• Duty to take specified matters into consideration. The Commission is directed to take into consideration the list of matters in s 6, including retail prices offered to consumers, the impact of wholesale prices on retail prices, wholesale market prices and contributing factors (including generator bidding behaviour), margins and profits of generators and retailers and their drivers, and the impact of policy changes (s 6(a)-(d)).
• Duty to use certain information sources. In holding the inquiry, the Commission is directed to make use of publicly available information and in particular to use relevant material published by the AER, AEMC and AEMO (s 7(a)).
• Duty to report in time. The Direction mandates an interim report to the Treasurer by 31 December 2025 and completion with a final report by 30 June 2026 (s 7(b); s 8).
• Duty to consider recommendations. Where appropriate, the Commission is to make recommendations to the Treasurer for any proportional and targeted action considered necessary to remedy market failures affecting competitive and efficient electricity prices for customers (s 7(c)).

Rights, powers and limits implicit in the Direction

• Commission discretion within bounds. The Commission retains discretion to design the inquiry’s methodology and to draw conclusions, subject to the mandatory matters to be considered and the express exclusions (s 6; s 5(3)-(4)). The instrument therefore confines but does not micromanage the Commission’s analytic choices.
• Access to public information. The Direction privileges use of publicly available material, including AER, AEMC and AEMO publications (s 7(a)); interested parties have the right to rely on those public documents to understand the Commission’s evidentiary base.
• No new rights for private parties. The Direction does not confer statutory rights on private market participants (for example, it does not create rights to compel action by the Treasurer or to veto recommendations). It also does not specify formal rights to be heard or procedural protections for market participants. Any engagement rights would therefore depend on the Commission’s inquiry procedures under the Act or its own published practices, which the Direction does not alter.

What the Direction does not do

• The Direction does not create offence provisions, civil penalties, or enforcement mechanisms; it does not itself order remedial action. Instead it contemplates possible recommendations to the Treasurer (s 7(c)).
• The Direction does not require the Commission to obtain non‑public or confidential data, although the Commission’s existing statutory powers under the Act may allow it to seek such information; the Direction itself directs the Commission to make use of publicly available sources (s 7(a)).

Practical duties for third parties

• Preparation and information provision. Although the instrument does not itself mandate that market participants provide information, the subjects singled out in s 6 , bidding behaviour, margins and profits, and price transmission , signal likely areas where the Commission may seek input, submissions, and clarifications. Generators and retailers are the parties most directly implicated by the specified matters (s 6(b)(i); s 6(c)).

The Direction itself does not create penalties, enforcement mechanisms, or new investigatory powers. Its operative effect is to require the Commission to conduct an inquiry and to report to the Treasurer; remedial or enforcement outcomes are a separate step not enacted by the instrument.

What the Direction says about enforcement and remedies

• Recommendations only. The Direction permits the Commission, where appropriate, to make recommendations to the Treasurer for “any proportional and targeted action considered necessary to remedy any failure by market participants (or the market as a whole) to deliver competitive and efficient electricity prices for customers” (s 7(c)). This is framed as recommendations to the Treasurer, not as directives with immediate legal force.
• No penalties in instrument. The instrument contains no provision that creates offences, civil penalty regimes, administrative sanctions, or mandatory corrective orders. The Direction does not itself compel the Treasurer or any other authority to adopt the Commission’s recommendations.

Implications for enforcement paths

• Commission-led enforcement would require action outside this Direction. If the Commission were to pursue enforcement measures (for example, through the Act’s competition provisions or consumer protection provisions), such measures would be pursued under other statutory powers in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 or other relevant legislation; the Direction does not, on its face, authorise or specify such measures. The Direction is silent about the Commission taking enforcement action; it authorises only that the Commission hold an inquiry and may recommend remedial action to the Treasurer (s 5(1); s 7(c)).
• Treasurer and executive action. The Commission’s recommendations are to be made to the Treasurer (s 7(c)). Any government response, including policy, regulatory or legislative changes, would arise from the Treasurer’s or other responsible agencies’ decisions and existing legal powers, not from the Direction itself.

Practical enforcement consequences for market participants

• Expectation management rather than immediate sanction. For market participants, the immediate practical consequence is reputational and informational: the inquiry may expose bidding patterns, margins, and price transmission relationships in public reporting, and that exposure can influence political and regulatory appetite for subsequent enforcement or policy change. The Direction does not itself initiate enforcement proceedings.
• Downstream regulatory action possible. If the Commission’s final report recommends action, that can lead to regulatory proposals, legislative changes, or enforcement investigations under other statutory regimes. The Direction sets the inquiry as an investigative step potentially preceding such actions, not as an enforcement instrument in its own right.

The Direction is made under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and therefore sits as an instrument that directs the operation of provisions within that Act. The Direction also references the National Electricity Law for its definition of the national electricity market and instructs the Commission to use material published by energy-sector regulators and operators. The Direction’s interplay with other laws is primarily referential and procedural rather than substantive.

Direct statutory interactions recorded in the Direction

• Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The Direction is made under the Act and explicitly uses the Act’s statutory framework for price inquiries. It invokes specific subsections of the Act: subsection 95H(1) (that the Commission hold an inquiry), subsection 95J(1) (inquiry held in relation to goods that are electricity), subsection 95J(2) (prohibition against holding inquiry in relation to supply by a particular person), subsection 95J(6) (direction to take particular matters into consideration), and subsection 95K(1) (period for completing the inquiry) (ss 5(1)-(4); s 6; s 8). The Direction therefore functions as a statutory direction under the Act’s parts that govern price inquiries.
• National Electricity Law. The Direction defines “national electricity market” by reference to the National Electricity Law as set out in the Schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996, as in force at commencement (s 4). This pins the inquiry’s geographical and legal market definition to the NEM as legally constituted at the Direction’s commencement date.
• Public-sector energy institutions. The Direction requires the Commission to make use of publicly available information, including that published by the AER, AEMC and AEMO (s 7(a)(i)-(iii)). Those bodies operate under separate statutory frameworks (outside the text of this Direction), and the Direction expressly directs the Commission to use their public outputs as part of the inquiry’s evidence base.

Limits and gaps in legal interaction specified in the Direction

• No amendment of other statutes. The Direction does not itself amend, suspend, or derogate from other statutory regimes. It simply channels the Commission’s inquiry function under the Act and instructs the Commission to draw on certain publicly available sources (s 5; s 7(a)). The Direction does not create cross-vested powers or alter the legal powers of other agencies.
• Exclusions are statutory limits. By excluding exempt supplies and State or Territory supplies (s 5(3)(a) and (b)), the Direction interacts with the Act’s definition of “exempt supply” (s 4 references subsection 95A(1) of the Act). The net effect is that parts of electricity supply that meet the Act’s definition of exempt supply are outside this inquiry’s legal reach.
• Relationship to investigatory and compulsory powers. The Direction does not address or modify the Commission’s statutory investigatory powers under other parts of the Act. It directs the Commission’s inquiry programme and the matters to be considered (ss 5-8), but it does not state whether the Commission should or should not exercise compulsory information-gathering powers the Act may otherwise provide. Those powers, if used, would be exercised under the Act’s terms, not this instrument.

Operational interdependence

• Evidence base depends on other agencies’ publications. The Direction expressly channels the Commission toward public outputs of the AER, AEMC and AEMO (s 7(a)). Those agencies’ statutory remits and data-collection capabilities therefore materially affect the Commission’s evidentiary resources for the inquiry. The Direction does not, however, require cooperation or mandate inter-agency data sharing beyond use of public information.
• Treasurer’s political and administrative role. The Direction frames the Commission’s reporting to the Treasurer (s 7(b); s 8) and contemplates recommendations to the Treasurer (s 7(c)). Any legal or regulatory action arising from the inquiry’s findings would occur through the existing legal powers of relevant agencies and instruments, not through the Direction itself.

What the Direction leaves for other laws and actors

• Enforcement and remedial action are left to other legal processes. The Direction contemplates recommendations but does not provide enforcement measures; subsequent legal or regulatory responses will depend on the Act, energy sector legislation, or executive decisions (s 7(c)).
• Definitions and exclusions rely on the Act and the National Electricity Law. Parties must consult the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (for s 95A definitions) and the National Electricity Law (for the NEM definition) to determine precise scope and boundaries (s 4).

The Direction’s amendment history, as contained in the instrument text, is limited to commencement information and an explicit note that the commencement table relates only to the instrument as originally made. The instrument records its commencement and indicates that the whole instrument commences the day after registration (s 2 and the commencement table).

Specific items in the instrument relating to amendments or lack thereof

• Commencement. Section 2(1) and the associated commencement table state that “The whole of this instrument” commences “The day after this instrument is registered.” The table carries the note that it relates only to the instrument as originally made (s 2 and the commencement table).
• Non‑amendment note. Section 2’s table includes the explicit note that the table relates only to provisions as originally made and will not be amended to deal with later amendments. This is a standard drafting device indicating the commencement table is a record of original commencement, not a dynamic amendment record.
• No other amendment entries. The instrument as provided contains no entries, schedules, or notes indicating any subsequent amendments, repeals, or variations. There is no express provision in the instrument that amends other instruments or that has itself been amended.

Practical interpretation for readers

• Single-stage instrument. The instrument should be treated as a single, stand-alone direction with the initial commencement day recorded. Any alteration to its content would, under normal statutory processes, require a new instrument or an amendment instrument; nothing in the text suggests any such amendment has been made or is incorporated.
• Check register for updates. The instrument’s own note that the commencement table is not updated means that readers seeking later changes must consult the official legislative instrument register and the Federal Register of Legislation for any subsequent instruments or revocations. The instrument itself contains no history beyond the original commencement.

The Direction’s text contains no references to litigation, judicial review, or existing cases. It does not document any judicial consideration of the instrument, nor does it name any litigation concerning its content. The Direction is an administrative instrument that directs the Commission to hold an inquiry; the instrument itself does not reflect past court decisions or ongoing litigation.

Consequences of absent litigation history in the instrument

• No precedential judicial interpretation. Because the Direction contains no litigation history, there is no judicially articulated interpretation of its scope, the meaning of its clauses, or the Commission’s obligations under it recorded in the instrument.
• Potential for future challenges. The instrument could, in principle, be subject to judicial review if a person or entity affected by the Commission’s conduct under the Direction alleges jurisdictional error, procedural unfairness, or other legal defects in the way the Commission implements the Direction. The instrument itself does not describe such avenues or their outcome.
• Reliance on statutory framework. Any legal challenge to the inquiry’s conduct would engage the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and general administrative law principles. The Direction by itself provides the text of the mandate; judicial review would turn on whether the Commission acted within the Direction and applicable law. The Direction’s prohibition on inquiries into specific persons (s 5(4)), exclusions of exempt supplies and State/Territory supply (s 5(3)), and the mandatory matters to be taken into account (s 6) would be touchpoints in any legal argument about scope or procedural fairness.

Practical note for practitioners

• No reported cases in the instrument. Practitioners should not expect to find case law interpreting this Direction within the instrument. To assess legal risk or grounds for challenge arising from the inquiry, consult administrative law principles and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 as applicable, and monitor whether any judicial review proceedings are filed in respect of the Commission’s inquiry process.

The Direction contains several drafting choices and constraints that create practical pitfalls and implementation risks for the Commission, market participants, and policy-makers. These are not judgments about the policy but are mechanistic effects of the instrument’s language and structure.

1. Scope fixed to “goods that are electricity” (s 5(2))

• The Direction specifies the inquiry is to be held in relation to the supply of goods that are electricity. That focuses the inquiry on electricity as a commodity. Other related elements of the energy sector, for example network services, ancillary services, or contractual arrangements that are not supply of electricity as a good, may not be directly within the Direction unless they fall within the Act’s definitions as adopted by the Direction. Parties should not assume the inquiry will encompass every aspect of energy markets.

2. Exclusions of exempt supplies and State/Territory supplies (s 5(3)(a)-(b))

• The Direction excludes “exempt supply” and supplies by a State or Territory. Market participants that rely on off-market or small-scale arrangements that qualify as exempt supply under s 95A(1) of the Act will be outside the statutory inquiry’s remit. Similarly, State or Territory government supplies are excluded. Stakeholders may be surprised if parts of the market they consider relevant are legally excluded.

3. Bar on targeting particular persons (s 5(4))

• The Direction forbids the Commission from holding the inquiry “in relation to the supply of electricity by a particular person or persons.” This prevents the inquiry from being framed as a firm-specific investigation and constrains any attempt to single out firms for scrutiny. If the Commission’s analysis reveals apparent wrongdoing by a firm, further action would need to be taken under other statutory powers or through separate processes.

4. Emphasis on publicly available information (s 7(a))

• The Direction instructs the Commission to “make use of publicly available information, including” AER, AEMC and AEMO publications. This reduces the Direction’s emphasis on the Commission obtaining confidential or proprietary data; it may limit the Commission’s visibility into private bidding or contract data unless the Commission uses other statutory powers under the Act. Parties should be aware that lack of access to non-public information could constrain the Commission’s ability to test certain hypotheses about market behaviour.

5. Tight deadlines (s 7(b); s 8)

• The Direction requires an interim report by 31 December 2025 and a final report by 30 June 2026. Those time limits compress the Commission’s investigatory and consultation timetable. The Commission must assemble data, conduct analysis, and draft reports within a finite window; tight timelines could affect the depth of empirical analysis or the Commission’s ability to seek extensive non-public information.

6. Definition of “national electricity market” fixed at commencement (s 4)

• The Direction defines the national electricity market by reference to the National Electricity Law as in force at the Direction’s commencement. This locks in the market boundary to the legal state of the NEM at that point. Subsequent changes to the National Electricity Law or to the composition of the NEM after the Direction’s commencement are not reflected in the instrument’s definition.

7. “Margins and profits” and “bidding behaviour” identified, but remedies left to Treasurer (s 6(b)(i); s 6(c); s 7(c))

• The Direction requires analysis of margins, profits and bidding behaviour, and allows for recommendations for “proportional and targeted action” to the Treasurer. However, any remedial or enforcement steps are for the Treasurer and responsible agencies to take after receiving the Commission’s recommendations. The Direction does not itself mandate remedies, so parties should not assume that findings will automatically produce regulatory consequences.

8. Reliance on definitions in s 95A(1) of the Act (s 4)

• Important concepts such as “exempt supply”, “price”, “person”, “goods”, and “services” are imported from subsection 95A(1). The practical coverage of the inquiry therefore depends on statutory interpretation of those definitions; interested parties must consult the Act to determine whether specific arrangements fall inside or outside the inquiry’s scope.

9. No express procedural protections or consultation requirements in the Direction

• The instrument does not specify formal consultation processes, rights to be heard, confidentiality protections for submitted information, or publication rules for the Commission’s working papers. The Commission’s usual practices and the Act’s general procedural framework will therefore govern stakeholder engagement. Participants should not assume bespoke procedural guarantees from the Direction itself.

10. Potential for political signalling without immediate regulatory change

• The Direction requires reporting to the Treasurer and contemplates recommendations to the Treasurer. The public release of interim or final reports can generate political pressure and shape policy debate. However, recommendations do not equate to immediate legal changes. Stakeholders should temper expectations about immediate remedial action following publication of the Commission’s findings.

This section overviews practical steps that interested parties should consider, grounded in the Direction’s requirements and constraints. The Direction primarily binds the Commission, but market participants (generators, retailers, advisers, and other stakeholders) will be de facto participants in the inquiry process and can take preparatory and responsive actions.

1. Understand the legal definitions that determine scope

• Consult subsection 95A(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 for the definitions the Direction imports (s 4). Determine whether specific supplies, contracts or arrangements meet the Act’s definition of “exempt supply” or otherwise fall within the definitions of “goods”, “supply”, “price”, and “person”. The Direction excludes exempt supplies and State/Territory supplies from the inquiry (s 5(3)(a)-(b)), so accurate mapping of your arrangements to those definitions is essential.

2. Map whether you are inside the national electricity market as defined at commencement

• The Direction fixes the “national electricity market” by reference to the National Electricity Law as in force at commencement (s 4). Confirm whether your operations, assets, and contracts fall within that legal market boundary at the direction’s commencement date.

3. Prepare targeted information on the mandatory matters

• The Direction requires the Commission to take into consideration retail prices and variations, the impact of wholesale prices on retail prices (s 6(a)); wholesale market prices and contributing factors including bidding behaviour of generators (s 6(b)); margins and profits of generators and retailers and their drivers (s 6(c)); and the impact of policy changes (s 6(d)). Parties should collate accurate and defensible data and explanations that speak directly to these issues:
  • Retail pricing frameworks, tariff structures, and explanations for price movements.
  • Wholesale bidding strategies, bidding records where available, and the commercial rationales underpinning bidding behaviour.
  • Cost and revenue analyses that explain margins and profit outcomes, including pass-through effects of wholesale costs, hedging practices, and contractual arrangements.
  • Explanations of how policy changes (for example, changes to market rules, environmental or reliability policy) have affected costs, investment, or pricing.

4. Use publicly available reports and be prepared to reference them

• The Direction places emphasis on using publicly available information, including publications by AER, AEMC and AEMO (s 7(a)). Parties should draw together public reports, data tables, and market commentaries from those sources to ensure submissions engage with the Commission’s anticipated evidence base. Where possible, annotate or reconcile any proprietary data you provide with public datasets to increase transparency.

5. Anticipate potential ACCC requests and plan confidentiality protection

• While the Direction emphasises public information (s 7(a)), the Commission may still seek non-public data under its statutory powers (the Direction does not restrict the Act’s other mechanisms). Prepare internal procedures to:
  • Identify and catalogue potentially sensitive material that addresses bidding behaviour, margins, contracts and hedging positions.
  • Prepare confidentiality claims and summaries that allow the Commission to use core information without disclosing commercially sensitive details to the public, consistent with the Commission’s information-handling practices.
  • Ensure timely and accurate responses to information requests to avoid being portrayed as uncooperative in the inquiry process.

6. Consider timing and resource allocation in light of report deadlines

• The Commission must provide an interim report by 31 December 2025 and finalise the inquiry by 30 June 2026 (s 7(b); s 8). Expect compressed engagement windows. Allocate legal, economic and regulatory resources to prepare submissions and to be available for possible meetings, clarifications, or data requests within these deadlines.

7. Craft submissions that address both empirical analysis and policy implications

• Given that the Direction asks the Commission to consider both empirical factors (prices, bidding, margins) and the impact of policy changes (s 6(a)-(d)), submissions should combine rigorous data analysis with clear statements of policy effects and any unintended consequences. Where recommending action, market participants should offer targeted, proportionate measures or alternatives that the Commission and Treasurer can assess relative to the Direction’s objective of achieving competitive and efficient prices for customers (s 7(c)).

8. Monitor public consultation opportunities and follow Commission practice

• The Direction does not specify procedural steps for consultation. Monitor the Commission’s public notices, inquiry terms of reference (if published separately), consultation timetables, and any opportunities for submissions or hearings. Participate early to influence the framing of issues that the Direction requires the Commission to consider (s 6; s 7(a)).

9. Prepare for reputational exposure

• Analysis of bidding behaviour, margins, and price transmission is likely to be public in interim or final reports. Firms should plan corporate communications, investor relations and stakeholder engagement strategies to explain commercial practices and any remedial steps they propose if the Commission’s findings are critical.

10. Track downstream policy and regulatory implications

• The Commission’s recommendations will go to the Treasurer (s 7(c)). If the Commission proposes “proportional and targeted action,” that may result in legislative proposals, regulatory rule changes, or enforcement activity under other statutory regimes. Market participants should watch for policy initiatives following the final report and be ready to engage in subsequent rule-making, consultation or legislative processes.

Concluding practical point

• The Direction prescribes the inquiry’s analytical agenda and reporting timetable but leaves remedies to the Treasurer and other legal processes (s 7(c)). Compliance, therefore, is dual: complying with the immediate information and engagement expectations of the inquiry, and preparing for potential downstream policy and regulatory responses.