Clean Energy Regulator (Human-Induced Regeneration Projects) Direction 2023

The instrument relies on and defines a small set of technical concepts that determine scope and operation. These definitions are set out in section 4 and by reference to other statutory instruments.

• HIR methodology. Defined to mean the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Human-Induced Regeneration of a Permanent Even-Aged Native Forest,1.1) Methodology Determination 2013 and any earlier version of that determination applicable to a project for a reporting period in accordance with sections 125, 126, 127 or 130 of the CFI Act (s 4). This means the direction attaches to the specified methodology determination(s) and to earlier versions where those earlier versions remain applicable under the CFI Act transition or application provisions.
• HIR project and HIR project proponent. A HIR project is a project for which the HIR methodology is the applicable methodology determination, and a HIR project proponent is a project proponent of an eligible offsets project that is an HIR project (s 4). The instrument therefore targets projects that are eligible offsets projects under the CFI Act and to which the HIR methodology applies.
• Final Report of the Independent Review of ACCUs. The instrument expressly incorporates the Final Report authored by Professor Ian Chubb and others, dated December 2022, and ties the object of the instrument to implementation of recommendation 8 of that Final Report (s 4, s 5). The instrument repeatedly directs the Regulator to act in ways consistent with particular sub-recommendations (8.1-8.3) referenced in the Final Report (ss 6-7).
• Audit Determination, CFI Act, CFI Rule, NGER Regulations. The Audit Determination is the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Audit) Determination 2009, and the instrument references other statutory instruments: the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (CFI Act), the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Rule 2015 (CFI Rule), and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Regulations 2008 (NGER Regulations) (s 4). Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations are specifically invoked for auditor conduct and independence requirements when auditing HIR proponents (s 9(2)(c)).
• “To the extent permitted by law” qualifier. The duties to administer the HIR methodology consistently with certain recommendations and to publish information are each expressly qualified by the phrase “to the extent permitted by law” (ss 6-7). The instrument also states that it applies subject to the Act, the CFI Act, the CFI Rule, the NGER Regulations, the Audit Determination and the HIR methodology (s 10). Those textual limits are the instrument’s primary legal constraints.

A recurring theme in the instrument is that the Regulator must operationalise administrative and enforcement practices to conform with specified parts of the independent review’s recommendation 8, while remaining within existing statutory frameworks, auditor standards, and audit independence rules (ss 6-9). The instrument therefore modifies administrative priorities and selection criteria rather than substituting or amending primary legislation or methodology texts directly.

The instrument directly binds and instructs the Clean Energy Regulator, and it imposes operational consequences that affect HIR project proponents and registered auditors. The principal affected parties, and the source-based description of how they are affected, are:

• Clean Energy Regulator. The Regulator is the addressee of the Ministerial direction and must implement the specified measures. The Regulator must administer the HIR methodology in a manner consistent with recommendations 8.1 and 8.2 of the Final Report (s 6), publish information recommended by recommendation 8.3 (s 7), give priority to compliance audits of HIR project proponents (s 8), and satisfy specified criteria before appointing auditors for HIR audits (s 9). These directives shape the Regulator’s internal prioritisation, publication and auditor-appointment processes.
• HIR project proponents. Defined at s 4, HIR project proponents are the subjects of a prioritised audit stream (s 8). The Regulator must give priority to audits of their compliance with the CFI Rule, particularly eligibility requirements under section 9AA of the CFI Rule (s 8 note). Practically this increases the likelihood that proponents will be audited earlier or more often relative to other project types, subject to the Regulator’s assessment of project risk.
• Registered greenhouse and energy auditors and audit team members. The Regulator retains the power under s 215 of the CFI Act to appoint registered greenhouse and energy auditors as audit team leaders (s 8 note). When audits concern HIR project proponents, the Regulator must be satisfied the chosen audit team leader has appropriate skills and experience, and either possesses ecological assessment skills or will include team members who do (s 9(2)(a)-(b)). Auditors must comply with the Code of Conduct and independence requirements set out in Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations and the Audit Determination when carrying out audits (s 9(2)(c)). This imposes a substantive professional competency requirement for those auditors undertaking HIR-focused audits.
• The public and information users. Section 7 directs publication of information recommended by the Final Report, to the extent permitted by law. This widens the set of stakeholders who will receive published HIR project information, although the scope of publication is limited by legal constraints.
• Other statutory actors and instruments. By applying subject to the Act, the CFI Act, the CFI Rule, the NGER Regulations, the Audit Determination and the HIR methodology (s 10), the instrument affects how those statutory frameworks operate in practice through the Regulator’s changed priorities; however, it does not amend those instruments.

Who pays, in practice, is implicit in the instrument’s design. The Regulator will bear administrative costs of reprioritisation, publication and auditor selection. HIR proponents face increased compliance and audit risk and therefore potential direct costs from audits and indirect costs from additional eligibility scrutiny. Auditors undertaking HIR audits either must possess or procure ecological expertise, which can increase audit cost and complexity. The instrument does not create novel statutory liabilities or penalties itself, but it reallocates enforcement attention and administrative resources toward HIR projects (ss 6-9).

The instrument creates and clarifies particular duties for the Regulator and conditions for auditors, while it reiterates existing compliance obligations for HIR project proponents under other laws. The operative duties and related rights are described below with direct references to the instrument.

Regulator’s duties

• Administer the HIR methodology consistently with recommendations 8.1 and 8.2 of the Final Report, “to the extent permitted by law” (s 6). This is a positive administrative duty to align application and interpretation of the HIR methodology with specific review recommendations, subject to legal constraints.
• Publish information recommended by recommendation 8.3 of the Final Report “to the extent permitted by law” (s 7). This is an affirmative publication duty that requires the Regulator to make certain project information publicly available, subject to legal limits.
• Prioritise compliance audits. When initiating compliance audits under subsection 215(1) of the CFI Act, the Regulator must give priority to audits of HIR project proponents’ compliance with the CFI Rule, particularly eligibility requirements under section 9AA of the CFI Rule, taking into account project risk (s 8). This imposes a prioritisation rule on the exercise of audit initiation powers, with a specified focus on eligibility.
• Satisfy auditor appointment criteria. Before appointing a registered greenhouse and energy auditor as an audit team leader for an audit of an HIR project proponent, the Regulator must be satisfied that the auditor has appropriate skills and experience; either has ecological assessment skills or will include audit team members with those skills; and will comply with specified NGER Regulations subdivisions and the Audit Determination when carrying out the audit (s 9(1)-(2)).

Auditor duties and constraints

• Audit team leaders and members must comply with Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations, which relate to the Code of Conduct, general independence requirements and other independence requirements, and with the Audit Determination (s 9(2)(c)). The instrument therefore imposes auditor professional standards and independence obligations as preconditions to appointment for HIR audits.

Proponent obligations and rights

• The instrument directs regulatory attention to compliance with existing obligations under the CFI Rule, particularly eligibility under s 9AA of the CFI Rule (s 8 note). The direction does not itself alter the content of those eligibility obligations, it instructs the Regulator to prioritise audits checking compliance with them.
• The instrument does not confer explicit new rights on proponents. It retains the statutory landscape set out in the Act, CFI Act, the CFI Rule and the NGER regime; the instrument’s s 10 states it applies subject to those instruments.

Limits, discretion and qualifying language

• Many duties are expressly qualified “to the extent permitted by law” (ss 6-7). Section 10 reiterates that the direction applies subject to the Act, the CFI Act, the CFI Rule, the NGER Regulations, the Audit Determination and the HIR methodology. These textual limits preserve the operation of higher-order legal constraints and provide the Regulator with a legal hierarchy to respect.
• The Regulator’s audit prioritisation is also qualified by “taking into account project risk” (s 8), which embeds a discretionary risk-based triage element into how the Regulator will prioritise audits.

Rights of appeal, review or legal contest are not created or modified by this instrument. Any legal consequences of audits, audit findings, or administrative decisions taken by the Regulator will proceed under the relevant existing statutory provisions to which the instrument defers (s 10). The instrument therefore reorganises administrative emphasis and the selection criteria for auditors, while leaving substantive statutory rights and duties under the CFI Acts and NGER regime intact.

This instrument is an administrative direction; it does not itself create new criminal offences, civil penalties or novel statutory enforcement powers. The instrument’s text references existing statutory powers and enforcement pathways in the CFI and NGER regimes. The enforcement and penalty architecture therefore remains that of the underlying statutory instruments to which the direction applies, specifically the CFI Act, the CFI Rule and the NGER Regulations.

Relevant references and consequences in the instrument

• Audits and enforcement mechanism. The instrument instructs the Regulator to prioritise audits initiated under subsection 215(1) of the CFI Act (s 8). The instrument contains a note that the Regulator has a power under section 215 of the CFI Act to appoint a registered greenhouse and energy auditor as an audit team leader to carry out an audit of a person’s compliance with one or more aspects of the Act, the CFI Rule, and relevant sections of the Criminal Code (s 8 note). The instrument does not amend section 215; it adjusts the Regulator’s priorities in using that power.
• Auditor obligations affecting enforcement. Before appointing auditors for HIR audits, the Regulator must be satisfied the auditor will comply with Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations and the Audit Determination (s 9(2)(c)). Those subdivisions and the Audit Determination describe auditor conduct standards and independence; failures by auditors to comply with those requirements are governed by the NGER regulatory framework and the Audit Determination, not by this instrument.
• Publication of information. The instrument directs the Regulator to publish information recommended by recommendation 8.3 of the Final Report (s 7), to the extent permitted by law. Publication may have enforcement-adjacent effects, such as public scrutiny or reputational consequences for project proponents, but the instrument does not itself establish penalties tied to publication.

What the instrument does not do

• Create new penalties. There are no clauses in the instrument imposing fines, civil penalties, criminal sanctions or new enforceable private rights.
• Alter the content of existing offences or penalty provisions in the CFI Act, CFI Rule or NGER Regulations. The instrument is explicitly subject to those instruments (s 10).

Practical enforcement implication

• The instrument reallocates enforcement attention. By directing prioritisation of audits and setting auditor competence requirements for HIR audits, it increases the probability that HIR projects will be audited and that audits will include ecological expertise. Enforcement outcomes, including statutory penalties for non-compliance discovered by audits, will continue to flow from the underlying statutory frameworks referenced in the instrument (s 8 note; s 10).

Readers should therefore treat the instrument as a re-prioritisation tool for the Regulator’s enforcement resources and as a set of appointment and publication instructions, not as a statutory penalty regime in itself.

The instrument is explicitly framed to operate within and subordinate to existing statutory instruments, and it cross-references several other legal instruments and statutory provisions. Those interactions determine legal limits, the scope of the direction, and operative connections to audit and methodology regimes.

Statutory hierarchy and deference

• Express subjecting clause. Section 10 states the direction “applies subject to the Act, the CFI Act, the CFI Rule, the NGER Regulations, the Audit Determination and the HIR methodology.” That clause places the direction within the existing legal hierarchy and confirms it does not override those instruments.
• Source of authority. The instrument is made under subsection 41(1) of the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (s 3). The direction therefore invokes the Ministerial power to give directions to the Regulator under the Act, and the instrument is an exercise of that power.

Interaction with audit and auditor rules

• Audit initiation power retained under CFI Act. The instrument instructs the Regulator to prioritise audits when initiating compliance audits under subsection 215(1) of the CFI Act (s 8). The instrument does not change or expand the statutory audit initiation power, it directs how the Regulator should prioritise use of that power.
• Auditor conduct and independence requirements. Section 9(2)(c) requires auditors appointed for HIR audits to comply with Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations and with the Audit Determination. Those provisions (as identified) govern the Code of Conduct and independence requirements of registered greenhouse and energy auditors, so the instrument embeds those regulatory standards into the selection and operation of HIR audits.

Interaction with methodology and eligibility rules

• HIR methodology definitions and transitional application. The definition of HIR methodology includes earlier versions applicable to a project for a reporting period in accordance with CFI Act sections 125-130 (s 4). This ties the instrument’s scope to the CFI Act’s methodology application rules and transitional arrangements.
• Focus on CFI Rule eligibility. The instrument directs prioritisation of audits focusing on compliance with the CFI Rule, particularly eligibility requirements under section 9AA of the CFI Rule (s 8 note). The instrument therefore operationally integrates the Regulator’s audit prioritisation with the CFI Rule’s substantive eligibility requirements.

Parliamentary oversight and Legislation Act interactions

• Commencement note on disallowance and sunsetting. The commencement note states that section 42 (disallowance) and Part 4 of Chapter 3 (sunsetting) of the Legislation Act 2003 do not apply to this instrument, because regulations were made for the purposes of paragraphs 44(2)(b) and 54(2)(b) of that Act (s 2 note). That note indicates the instrument was made in circumstances where specified parliamentary disallowance and sunsetting scrutiny provisions are not applicable. Readers should treat that as a declared legislative context rather than a substantive legal modification by the instrument itself.

Net effect

• The instrument does not amend the content of other laws, but it shapes how the Regulator will exercise its statutory powers under those laws, particularly the audit power in s 215 of the CFI Act and the Regulator’s administration of the HIR methodology. It also embeds compliance with existing NGER auditor requirements into the Regulator’s auditor appointment process for HIR audits (s 9(2)(c)).

For any specific legal question about conflicts between the direction and other statutory provisions, the instrument’s own text directs that the other statutes prevail (s 10), and the Regulator’s obligations are limited by the “to the extent permitted by law” qualifier (ss 6-7).

The instrument itself records its date and commencement. It is dated 3 May 2023 and commences on the day after registration on the Federal Register of Legislation (title page; s 2). The instrument contains no internal clauses that amend earlier legislative texts; rather, it is a stand-alone Ministerial direction made under subsection 41(1) of the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (s 3). There are a few textual notes that affect how the instrument sits in the legislative landscape:

• Non-application of certain Legislation Act provisions. The commencement note states that section 42 (disallowance) and Part 4 of Chapter 3 (sunsetting) of the Legislation Act 2003 do not apply to this instrument, because regulations were made for the purposes of paragraphs 44(2)(b) and 54(2)(b) of that Act (s 2 note). That is a statement about parliamentary oversight mechanisms relevant to the instrument’s lifecycle, not an amendment of substantive provisions in primary legislation.
• Referential links to other instruments. The instrument’s definitions incorporate other determinations and rules by reference, for example the Audit Determination and the HIR methodology, and it references the Final Report dated December 2022 (s 4). The HIR methodology definition explicitly includes any earlier version applicable to a project for a reporting period in accordance with sections 125-130 of the CFI Act (s 4). This means the instrument anticipates that different versions of the HIR methodology may continue to govern particular projects under the CFI Act transitional or application rules; that continuity is preserved rather than amended by the direction.

No amendments, revocations or replacement instruments are recorded in this instrument’s text. The instrument therefore appears as a single-purpose Ministerial direction given the date shown. The instrument does not provide a mechanism for its own amendment; any change to it would require a subsequent direction made under the Minister’s statutory power or amendment by the instrument’s maker.

Where the instrument directs the Regulator to act in ways consistent with parts of the Final Report (s 6-7), it does not itself adopt or embed the Final Report’s recommendations into primary legislation, nor does it alter or amend the HIR methodology itself. Instead, the instrument instructs the Regulator to administer and publish consistent with those recommendations, within the existing statutory frameworks.

Readers interested in any subsequent amendment should check the Federal Register of Legislation for further directions under subsection 41(1) of the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 and for any regulations or statutory instruments that might affect the instruments named in section 10; the instrument’s own text contains no further amendment history.

The instrument contains no record of litigation, court decisions, judicial review, or contested legal proceedings. There are no cases, disputes, judicial interpretations, or proceedings referenced in the text. The instrument is a Ministerial direction and, in its own terms, does not report or summarise any judicial engagement with it or with the Regulator’s execution of the direction.

Relevant textual facts for readers assessing potential litigation risk

• Ministerial direction as administrative action. The instrument is made under subsection 41(1) of the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (s 3). Ministerial directions to statutory agencies have been subject to legal challenge in other contexts, but this instrument contains no record of such challenges and does not create new statutory causes of action; its effect is to shape administrative priorities and selection criteria for auditors and publication (s 6-9).
• Limits on parliamentary disallowance and sunsetting. The commencement note states that particular parliamentary oversight provisions in the Legislation Act 2003 do not apply to this instrument (s 2 note). That procedural context may be relevant to claims about parliamentary scrutiny but the instrument itself records only the non-application, not litigation arising from it.
• Subject-to clause. Section 10 places the direction explicitly under the existing statutory framework (Act, CFI Act, CFI Rule, NGER Regulations, Audit Determination, HIR methodology). Any challenge that alleges the direction conflicts with higher-order statutory requirements would thus engage those statutes and their courts or tribunals, but the instrument itself contains no litigation history.

Because the instrument contains no litigation history, this section cannot list cases, judgments, or procedural outcomes based on the text. Any user needing litigation precedent or subsequent judicial treatment must obtain statutory case law or administrative law decisions from external legal research sources; that material is outside the instrument’s text. The instrument’s silence on litigation history is therefore a factual point recorded in the instrument itself.

The instrument contains multiple drafting features and qualifying phrases that create practical implementation caveats and operational uncertainties. The following points are grounded in the instrument’s text and identify specific risks, discretionary nodes and operational consequences that practitioners should note.

“To the extent permitted by law” qualifier

• Sections 6 and 7 require the Regulator to administer the HIR methodology consistently with parts of the Final Report and to publish certain information, but both duties are qualified “to the extent permitted by law.” This phrase signals that the Regulator must consider statutory constraints, confidentiality obligations, privacy laws, and any other legal limits before acting. Practitioners should not assume the direction automatically overrides legal protections or other obligations set out in the statutes listed in s 10.

Scope tied to the applicable HIR methodology

• The definition of HIR methodology includes earlier versions applicable to a project for a reporting period under sections 125-130 of the CFI Act (s 4). That means some projects may be governed by an earlier methodology version and the Regulator must treat methodology application in accordance with the CFI Act’s transitional provisions. A proponent’s project status therefore depends on the interplay between the methodology determination and the CFI Act’s application rules.

Audit prioritisation is subject to risk-based discretion

• Section 8 directs the Regulator to “give priority to audits” of HIR project proponents “taking into account project risk.” Priority is thus not absolute; the Regulator retains discretion to triage between projects based on risk assessments. This leaves room for differential treatment among HIR projects and potential disputes about how project risk is assessed.

Ambiguity about the content of recommendations 8.1-8.3

• The instrument requires administration consistent with recommendations 8.1 and 8.2 and publication consistent with recommendation 8.3 of the Final Report (ss 6-7). The instrument does not itself restate the content of those recommendations. Implementers must therefore interpret those recommendations in context; ambiguity about the recommendations could create differing views between proponents and the Regulator about the extent of administrative change required.

Auditor selection threshold and proof of competence

• Section 9 requires the Regulator to be satisfied that the auditor has “appropriate skills and experience” and either has ecological assessment skills or will include team members who do (s 9(2)(a)-(b)). The instrument does not specify objective thresholds, accreditation, or minimum qualifications for ecological assessment expertise. Appointments therefore depend on the Regulator’s evaluative satisfaction, which can be a source of contest or procurement complexity.

Independence and compliance obligations for auditors

• Auditors appointed for HIR audits must comply with Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations and the Audit Determination (s 9(2)(c)). These requirements impose professional conduct and independence obligations, and failure to observe them could affect the admissibility of audit findings or create grounds for procedural challenge by audited parties.

Publication scope and confidentiality

• Section 7’s publication obligation is qualified “to the extent permitted by law” and requires publication of information recommended by recommendation 8.3. Proponents should be aware that some project information may be published, subject to legal limits. The instrument does not list which information will be published, creating uncertainty for proponents around confidentiality, commercially sensitive material and data disclosure.

No new penalties or adjudicative processes

• The instrument does not create penalties or new adjudicative mechanisms. Enforcement remains under the CFI Act, CFI Rule and NGER regime (s 10). Practitioners should therefore not expect novel adjudicative relief from this direction itself; outcomes are determined under existing statutory frameworks.

Parliamentary oversight note

• The commencement note indicates that certain provisions of the Legislation Act 2003 do not apply to this instrument (s 2 note). That procedural fact may have governance or political implications, but it is a factual statement recorded in the instrument rather than an operational direction.

Practical points for parties

• HIR proponents: anticipate an increased chance of being audited and a higher probability that audits will include ecological expertise and focus on CFI Rule eligibility requirements (s 8 note; s 9).
• Auditors: be prepared to demonstrate ecological competence or to provide suitably qualified team members; ensure strict compliance with NGER auditor codes and independence rules where HIR audits are concerned (s 9(2)(b)-(c)).
• Regulator: must operationalise subjective satisfaction standards and balance publication duties against legal constraints; the Regulator must also design a risk-based prioritisation protocol that aligns with s 8.

In short, the instrument reallocates administrative focus and imposes qualitative requirements rather than specifying quantitative thresholds. That leaves a number of discretionary and interpretive points that parties should model and document carefully.

Compliance obligations created or clarified by the instrument fall on three principal groups: the Clean Energy Regulator, HIR project proponents, and registered auditors. The following are practical, source-grounded compliance actions rooted in the instrument’s text (citations in parentheses).

For the Clean Energy Regulator

• Document how the HIR methodology will be administered consistent with recommendations 8.1 and 8.2 of the Final Report, and publish that internal interpretation framework, subject to legal constraints. Ensure any administrative reinterpretation is demonstrably aligned with those recommendations and can be justified under the relevant statutory provisions (s 6).
• Prepare a publication plan and legal review process for the information recommended by recommendation 8.3 of the Final Report. The plan must incorporate legal vetting to ensure publication only proceeds “to the extent permitted by law” (s 7). The plan should identify categories of information that will be published, legal bases for publication, and redaction or exemption criteria.
• Implement a risk-based audit prioritisation protocol that gives priority to HIR project proponents when initiating audits under subsection 215(1) of the CFI Act, but retains a risk-assessment mechanism to apply the “taking into account project risk” qualifier (s 8). Record the risk criteria and the rationale for prioritisation decisions to support administrative transparency.
• Establish auditor appointment procedures for HIR audits that include pre-appointment checks for: appropriate general auditing skills and experience; ecological assessment competence in the team; and express commitments to comply with Subdivisions 6.6.2-6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations and the Audit Determination (s 9(2)(a)-(c)). Keep records of the Regulator’s satisfaction assessments and the basis for choosing specific auditors.
• Ensure internal legal advice is sought on conflicts between the direction and other statutes or regulations, remembering s 10 requires application subject to the Act, the CFI Act, the CFI Rule, the NGER Regulations, the Audit Determination and the HIR methodology.

For HIR project proponents

• Maintain clear and accessible documentary evidence demonstrating eligibility under the CFI Rule, with particular attention to the eligibility requirements under section 9AA of the CFI Rule, because the Regulator is directed to prioritise audits that test those requirements (s 8 note). Keep contemporaneous records that would support eligibility in an audit.
• Anticipate ecological assessment scrutiny. Ensure ecological baseline data, regeneration evidence, and any expert reports are current, defensible, and promptly accessible for audit teams that will include ecological expertise under s 9(2)(b).
• Prepare for publication. Identify commercially sensitive information that may be implicated by the Regulator’s publication duties and prepare legal arguments or evidence to support non-disclosure where a legal basis exists, given the “to the extent permitted by law” qualification (s 7).
• Monitor Regulator communications and audit prioritisation announcements to understand risk ranking and timing; ensure rapid response capability for audit requests under subsection 215(1) of the CFI Act (s 8).

For auditors and audit firms

• Verify and, where necessary, acquire ecological assessment capability. Before accepting an appointment for an HIR audit, confirm that either you possess the requisite ecological expertise or that the audit team will include members with such expertise, consistent with the Regulator’s s 9 requirements.
• Ensure compliance with Subdivisions 6.6.2 to 6.6.4 of the NGER Regulations and the Audit Determination in every HIR audit engagement. That includes observing the Code of Conduct and independence requirements referenced in s 9(2)(c).
• Prepare documentation demonstrating competence and independence for submission to the Regulator at the time of appointment. The Regulator must be satisfied of these matters before appointing auditors (s 9(1)-(2)).
• Maintain rigorous file management and audit trail practices, in recognition that audits of HIR proponents are being prioritised and may attract greater scrutiny (s 8).

Cross-cutting steps

• Legal review and risk assessment. All parties should conduct a legal review to understand how the “to the extent permitted by law” limits apply in their specific situations, including privacy, confidentiality, commercial-in-confidence protections, and any procedural protections in the CFI Act and NGER Regulations.
• Record-keeping. The Regulator should record its administrative rationales, risk assessment criteria, and auditor satisfaction checks. Auditors and proponents should maintain records that would support compliance findings or rebut allegations in an audit, particularly in relation to ecological assessments and eligibility under the CFI Rule (s 8 note; s 9).
• Engagement. Proponents should consider early engagement with auditors and the Regulator to clarify evidence expectations around eligibility and ecological assessment, thereby reducing the risk of disputed findings during an audit.

These compliance steps flow from the textually specified duties and qualifications in sections 6-10. The instrument reallocates enforcement focus and imposes qualitative standards rather than prescriptive numeric thresholds, so compliance will turn on robust documentation, verified ecological expertise where required, and proactive legal review of publication and disclosure obligations.