Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions—Iran) Regulations 2025

The Regulations are structured around a set of operationally defined legal concepts. They reference external international documents (INFCIRC/254 Parts 1 and 2, S/2010/263 and particular Security Council resolutions) and then translate those references into domestic prohibitions.

• Sanctioned supply (s 7): A person makes a sanctioned supply when they supply, sell or transfer goods that meet the definition of export sanctioned goods (s 8) and those goods are, directly or indirectly, transferred to Iran or incorporated into goods transferred to Iran. The definition therefore captures both direct shipments and supply chains where goods become part of final goods going to Iran.

• Export sanctioned goods (s 8): This is a layered definition. It includes goods listed in a Minister‑determined document or, if no such determination is in force, goods in INFCIRC/254/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Part 2 or S/2010/263 (s 8(1)(a), (4)). It also covers goods designated by the Security Council or the Committee for particular paragraphs of UNSC resolutions, arms listed in a UN General Assembly annex, goods the Minister determines under s 8(5), and goods that are key components or subassemblies of those goods (s 8(1)(b)-(e)). The Regulations provide an objective test for component status , integral and not goods used extensively for ordinary purposes (s 8(6)).

• Permissible goods (s 5): A narrow carve‑out. Permissible goods are items listed in INFCIRC/254/Part 1 Annex B for light water reactors, certain low‑enriched uranium assembled for light water reactor fuel elements, and goods listed in INFCIRC/254/Part 2 solely for exclusive use in light water reactors and necessary for specific IAEA technical cooperation (see s 5). The instrument therefore recognises limited civil nuclear cooperation but ties it to specified IAEA frameworks.

• Sanctioned service (s 15): Broadly framed. It includes technical assistance, training, financial support, brokering, investment services, transfers of financial resources and transportation of goods that directly assist a sanctioned supply, or the manufacture/use by or on behalf of Iranian persons of export‑sanctioned goods (s 15(a)-(d)). The definition deliberately links services to the underlying goods‑centric prohibitions.

• Designated person or entity and controlled asset (ss 18, 20): A “designated” person or entity is one designated by the Committee or Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1737 or subject to Iranian asset freeze measures (s 18). A “controlled asset” is an asset owned or controlled by a designated person/entity or by entities acting on their behalf or owned or controlled by them (s 20). Prohibitions on making assets available, holding or dealing with controlled assets follow (ss 19, 21).

• Prohibition notices (s 11): The Minister may issue a written prohibition notice to a person that prohibits the supply, sale or transfer of goods not already captured as export sanctioned goods when the Minister is satisfied the goods could be (directly or indirectly) supplied to Iran and would contribute to prohibited activities as listed (s 11).

• Sensitive commercial activity (s 23): Defined to include uranium mining and production, use of nuclear materials or technology listed in INFCIRC/254/Part 1, and development of ballistic‑missile‑related technology capable of delivering nuclear weapons (s 23(3)). Selling or making available interests in such activities to Iranian‑connected parties is prohibited (s 23(1)).

• Extra‑territorial thresholds (s 29): The Regulations apply to conduct occurring wholly or partly in Australia, on Australian ships or aircraft, or to conduct outside Australia that produces a result in Australia or occurs while the actor is an Australian citizen or an Australian incorporated body (s 29(1)). Section 29(2) also creates a limiting principle: conduct wholly in a foreign country by non‑Australian nationals/corporates does not contravene if a corresponding prohibition exists in that foreign country.

• Permit architecture: Multiple permits are available (ss 10, 17, 22, 26, 28) and are subject to statutory conditions, advance Committee notifications, and, in some cases, prerequisites such as end‑user guarantees and commitments from the Government of Iran (ss 10(1)(a)-(b), 17(1)(b), 22(3)-(10)).

The Regulations rely heavily on imported international technical lists and Security Council or Committee determinations (see s 6 about references to Security Council documents being read as revised). That importation gives the Minister scope to designate additional documents or goods by legislative instrument (for export or import sanction categories, see ss 8(2), 8(5), 13(2)). Permissibility is therefore dynamic: changes to international lists or Ministerial determinations will change the domestic prohibited set without further amendment to the Regulations themselves.

The Regulations affect multiple categories of persons and entities across trade, finance, transport, asset custody and corporate governance. The statutory language identifies several groups directly and through extra‑territorial hooks.

• Exporters, manufacturers and suppliers of goods: Any person who supplies, sells or transfers “export sanctioned goods” in circumstances leading to transfer to Iran contravenes the prohibition unless a permit authorises the supply (ss 7-9, 10). That includes suppliers of components that are “key components or a subassembly” (s 8(1)(e), (6)).

• Importers and procurers: Persons who procure “import sanctioned goods” from Iranian persons or entities contravene s 14(1). The import‑related definition applies regardless of origin (s 13(1)).

• Transport operators and logistics providers: The Regulations expressly capture use of Australian ships or aircraft in connection with transporting sanctioned goods or procuring import sanctioned goods (ss 9(3), 14(3)). Section 15(d) also identifies transportation of goods as a sanctioned service when tied to a sanctioned supply or procurement from Iran.

• Financial institutions, brokers, insurers and investment managers: Sanctioned services include financial assistance, investment, brokering or other financial services and transfers of financial resources in relation to sanctioned supplies or manufacture/use of export‑sanctioned goods (s 15(a)-(c)). Section 19 prohibits making assets available to designated persons or entities.

• Asset holders, custodians and trustees: Holding, dealing with or allowing use of controlled assets contravenes s 21 unless authorised by a permit under s 22. Banks, trustees, custodians and those administering funds are therefore directly affected.

• Entities conducting business in sensitive commercial activities: Parties involved in uranium mining or nuclear‑related technology (as defined in s 23(3)) are prevented from selling or otherwise making available interests in those activities to Iranian‑connected parties (s 23(1)).

• Shipping service providers offering bunkering services: The Regulations prohibit providing bunkering services to Iranian vessels from Australia or by Australian nationals (s 25), except where the Minister grants a permit (s 26). The Minister must not grant a bunkering permit if the vessel is reasonably believed to carry export or import sanctioned goods that have not been inspected/seized unless supply is necessary for humanitarian reasons (s 26(2)).

• Australian nationals and entities subject to Australian jurisdiction: Extra‑territorial coverage extends to Australian citizens and bodies corporate incorporated under Australian law (s 29(1)(c)). Section 27(1) explicitly makes the prohibition on conducting business with specified entities apply to Australian nationals and entities subject to Australian jurisdiction.

• Legal, accounting and compliance advisers: Advisors working with clients exposed to these provisions will need to evaluate export controls, end‑use guarantees, permit applications, asset freeze obligations and the risk of contraventions under the extra‑territorial rules.

• Iranian persons and entities and designated persons: The Regulations identify Iranian persons or entities (s 4) and designated persons or entities (s 18) as direct targets of property freezes, prohibitions on dealings, and contractual exclusion (s 31).

Public and private sector procurement officers, shipping agents, port authorities, insurers, banks, and multinational corporations with Australian‑connected operations or Australian‑based employees are affected by the instrument’s extra‑territorial reach and by the potential for unintentional contraventions through supply chains. The Minister’s power to list entities by legislative instrument (s 27(2)) and to determine documents or goods by legislative instrument (ss 8(2), 13(2)) creates a compliance requirement for continuous monitoring of legislative instruments and UN lists.

The Regulations delineate specific duties and create corresponding rights to apply for permits; they also impose procedural obligations relating to notification of international bodies.

Duties

• Do not supply export sanctioned goods unless authorised: A person contravenes s 9(1) if they make a sanctioned supply that is not an authorised supply. Authorisation requires a permit under s 10 or a properly granted foreign permit that accords with Security Council obligations (s 9(4)).

• Do not provide sanctioned services unless authorised: Section 16(1) prohibits provision of sanctioned services unless authorised by a permit (s 17) or provided in relation to an authorised supply (s 16(3)-(4)).

• Do not procure import sanctioned goods from Iranian persons or entities: Section 14(1) creates that prohibition.

• Do not make assets available to, or deal with, designated persons/entities or controlled assets without a permit: Sections 19 and 21 operate as asset freeze measures, subject to permits under s 22.

• Observe extra‑territorial thresholds: Conduct involving Australian ships/aircraft, Australian citizens or Australian corporates, or conduct producing an Australian result can contravene the prohibitions (s 29).

• Comply with prohibition notices: If a person has been given a prohibition notice under s 11, they must refrain from supplying the specified goods; contravention is an offence under s 12.

• For bunkering services, do not supply from Australia or by Australian nationals to Iranian vessels without a permit and without satisfying inspection/surrender requirements where goods are suspected aboard (ss 25-26).

Procedural obligations and constraints

• End‑use and end‑use location verification: For permissible goods, the Minister must be satisfied that guidelines in INFCIRC/254 Parts and S/2006/985 have been met and that Australia has a right to verify end‑use and end‑use location and is in a position to exercise that right effectively (s 10(1)(a)(i)-(iii)).

• End‑user guarantees and Iranian government commitments: For non‑permissible goods, applicants must secure contractual end‑user guarantees and commitments from the Government of Iran, and the Committee must determine in advance under paragraph 9 of Resolution 1737 that the goods would clearly not contribute to proliferation (s 10(1)(b)).

• Notifications to the Committee and IAEA: If a permit is granted for permissible goods, the Minister must take steps to ensure that notification is given to the Committee and, where applicable, to the IAEA within 10 days after the supply (s 10(3)-(4)). For asset permits, different notification timelines apply , basic expenses require a 5 working‑day notification period (s 22(7)), required payments 10 working days (s 22(9)), extraordinary expense dealings require Committee approval (s 22(10)), and permissible nuclear dealings require notification before granting (s 22(6)).

Rights and powers

• Right to apply for permits: Multiple statutory permissions are available on application , permits to make sanctioned supplies (s 10), to provide sanctioned services (s 17), to make assets available or deal with controlled assets (s 22), to provide bunkering services (s 26), and to conduct business with specified entities (s 28).

• Permit conditions and appeals: The Regulations provide that permits are subject to conditions (ss 10(2), 17(2), 22(2), 28(3)). The instrument does not specify an internal merits appeal in the text; applicants therefore have the right to apply but the Regulations do not set out a statutory appeal route within their own provisions.

• Ministerial discretion and delegations: The Minister may make legislative determinations (ss 8(2), 8(5), 13(2), 27(2)) and may delegate powers to the Secretary of the Department or an SES employee (s 32), subject to written directions and exclusions on delegating the power to make legislative instruments (s 32(4)).

Caveats and constraints

• False or misleading information: Notes within the Regulations reference section 13A of the Act, which provides that a permit is taken never to have been granted if the application contains false or misleading information in a material particular (see accompanying notes to ss 10, 17, 22). That cross‑reference is a statutory control on permit applications.

• Presumptions on foreign permits: Section 30 creates a legal presumption that, for the Regulations’ purposes, a foreign permit is taken not to have been granted unless a person adduces evidence suggesting a reasonable possibility that it was granted; if such evidence is adduced, the permit is taken to have been granted unless proved otherwise (s 30(1)). Section 30(2) treats permits as not properly granted where granted on false or misleading information or corrupt conduct.

• Committee interactions: Several permit categories require notification to, or approval by, the UN Committee established under UNSC resolutions (e.g. ss 10(1)(a)(v), 10(3)-(4), 22(6)-(10)). Those international interactions are built into procedural rights and constraints of the domestic permit scheme.

The Regulations thus create a balanced architecture of prohibitions coupled with conditional authorisations, administrative notifications and reliance on international verification and Committee determinations. The instrument relies on the Minister’s judgment and on evidence provided in permit applications; it also builds in presumption rules and false‑information consequences referenced to the Act.

The Regulations repeatedly state that certain conduct “contravenes this subsection” (for example, ss 9, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 23-25, 27). Within the text of the Regulations themselves there are no express penalty amounts, criminal offence labels, or civil pecuniary penalty schedules. The instrument is made under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (s 3), and the use of contravention language indicates that enforcement, sanctioning and penalty mechanisms are intended to be located in that enabling Act or in other Commonwealth enforcement machinery, but the Regulations provided do not themselves set out the penalties or prosecutorial arrangements. The text therefore requires readers to consult the parent Act and any enforcement provisions it contains to identify the precise penalties and prosecutorial procedures applicable to contraventions noted in the Regulations.

Enforcement‑relevant mechanisms and indicators appearing in the Regulations include:

• Contravention language and extra‑territorial reach: The Regulations make clear where conduct will attract contravention status, including conduct involving Australian ships/aircraft or Australian citizens or bodies corporate (s 29). That clarifies jurisdictional bases for enforcement action.

• Permit architecture with procedural constraints: The Regulations create statutory gates to lawful conduct and specify conditions and notification delays (ss 10, 17, 22). Failure to have a required permit will, where applicable, render conduct a contravention in those sections.

• Presumptions and evidential burdens: Section 30(1) contains a statutory evidential presumption about foreign permits; it notes that a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in paragraph (1)(a) by cross reference to Criminal Code s 13.3 (see note to s 30(1)). The Regulations therefore incorporate evidential rules that affect the allocation of proof in proceedings under these Regulations.

• Administrative discretion and notification to UN bodies: Several permit types require notifying the UN Committee or IAEA before or after action (ss 10(3)-(4), 22(6)-(10)). Those procedural requirements may affect enforcement timing and administrative review.

• Notes on materially false or misleading information: The instrument’s notes refer to s 13A of the Act, which treats permits as taken never to have been granted if the application contains false or misleading information in a material particular (see notes to ss 10, 17, 22). That cross‑reference has enforcement implications because making false statements in permit applications usually triggers administrative nullity and potentially separate offences under Commonwealth law.

What the Regulations do not provide in this text

• No penalties enumerated here: The Regulations do not themselves specify monetary fines, imprisonment terms or details of enforcement procedures (search, seizure, freezing orders, civil penalties). They therefore must be read alongside the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and other Commonwealth enforcement statutes for the operative sanctioning regime.

• No internal merits appeal procedure specified: The instrument provides for permit applications and conditions but does not set out an internal merits appeal mechanism or administrative review remedy within the Regulations; practitioners should look to the Act, general administrative law remedies, or other statutory appeal mechanisms for review options.

Operational implications for enforcement

• Prosecutorial bodies will need to demonstrate contravention as defined in these Regulations and will rely on the Act for specified penalties and processes. The extra‑territorial reach and evidential presumptions (s 30) will shape prosecution and defence strategies, especially in cross‑border permit reliance cases.

• The requirement for Ministerial notifications to the UN Committee and the IAEA creates an international reporting trail that can affect enforcement and intergovernmental cooperation.

Given the absence of explicit penalty clauses in the Regulations themselves, practitioners should consult the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and relevant Commonwealth penal and procedural legislation to establish the specific consequences of contraventions identified in these Regulations.

The Regulations operate as a domestic implementation of Security Council measures and are explicitly made under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (s 3). Their functionality therefore depends on interaction with several categories of law and international instruments.

• The Charter of the United Nations Act 1945: The Regulations sit beneath and are authorised by that Act (s 3). Enforcement, penalties and certain legal consequences (for example, the note on s 13A of the Act regarding false or misleading information) are located in the parent Act and must be read alongside these Regulations. The instrument’s contravention language therefore signals that penalties and prosecutorial processes under the Act will attach to breaches, though the Regulations themselves do not enumerate those penalties.

• International instruments and UN lists: The Regulations import and reference UN and IAEA documents (INFCIRC/254/Part 1 and Part 2, S/2010/263, S/2006/985, various UNSC resolutions and the Committee established under Resolution 1737). Section 6 provides that references to Security Council documents are taken to be references to their revised or replacement texts as those instruments change. This cross‑reference creates a living incorporation of international law into domestic regulatory operation.

• Criminal Code: The Regulations rely on Criminal Code definitions for “Australian aircraft” and “Australian ship” (s 4). They also reference Criminal Code evidential burden provisions by note (see note to s 30(1) referencing s 13.3 of the Criminal Code), so prosecutorial procedure and evidentiary burdens will be shaped by the Criminal Code when prosecutions arise.

• Charter of the United Nations (Dealing with Assets) Regulations 2008: Section 22(3) and its notes require compliance with categories of dealing (basic expense, legally required dealing, contractual dealing, required payment, extraordinary expense dealing) defined in regulation 5 of the Dealing with Assets Regulations 2008. That instrument thus forms part of the asset‑dealing framework for permits and exceptions.

• State and Territory laws and overriding federal effect: Section 31 expressly states that the prohibition on claims for breach of contract or failure to perform transactions applies despite any other law of the Commonwealth or any law of a State or Territory. That is a clear statutory override in contractual litigation involving the Government of Iran, Iranian persons/entities, and designated persons/entities where performance was prevented by these Regulations or relevant UN resolutions.

• Foreign law and comity: Section 29(2) provides a delimiting principle in respect of conduct wholly in a foreign country by non‑Australian actors , in those circumstances the Australian provision does not apply if the foreign country has a corresponding prohibition in force in the relevant part of its territory. That creates an interaction with foreign regulatory regimes and is effectively a comity‑based limitation on extra‑territorial application.

• Administrative law and ministerial discretion: The Minister’s powers to make legislative instruments (for example, determining documents or goods under ss 8(2), 8(5), 13(2), 27(2)), grant permits, and delegate powers (s 32) will intersect with general administrative law principles, including reasonableness and procedural fairness where those obligations are engaged. The Regulations themselves do not set out review processes; judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or common law certiorari/perhaps merits review regimes may therefore interact with exercise of those discretions, but those remedies are not addressed in the text of the Regulations.

• Contract law and commercial practice: Section 31’s prohibition on claims affects contractual remedies and insurance claims where performance was prevented by the Regulations or by Security Council resolutions. Commercial contracts, insurance policies, shipping documents and force majeure clauses will need review in light of that bar.

• International verification and export control frameworks: The Regulations’ permits for permissible nuclear dealings require adherence to INFCIRC guidance and confer duties to verify end‑use and end‑use locations (s 10(1)(a)(i)-(iii)). That intersects with export control compliance obligations, customs declarations, and IAEA verification regimes.

In practice, compliance requires coordination across statutes, regulatory instruments and international obligations. The Regulations import external lists and reference other domestic instruments, creating a legal network that demands continuous monitoring and cross‑disciplinary compliance processes.

The text contains no amendment schedule beyond its original making and transitional mapping from the previous instrument. What the source documents show is:

• This instrument is the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions,Iran) Regulations 2025 and is made under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (s 1; s 3). The commencement table (s 2) records that the whole instrument commenced the day after registration, with the commencement date indicated in the table as 12 December 2025. That table is explicitly stated to relate only to the instrument as originally made (s 2 note).

• Transitional arrangements are provided in Part 4, Division 1. Those provisions define “old Regulations” as the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions,Iran) Regulations 2016 as in force immediately before the old Regulations cessation day, and the cessation day is given as 28 September 2025 (s 33). Section 34 provides that pending applications made under the old Regulations before that cessation day are to be treated, on and after the commencement of the new instrument, as if made under corresponding provisions of the new instrument, and outstanding permits granted under the old Regulations continue in force as if granted under specified new provisions (s 34(1)-(2)). A mapping table in s 34(3) identifies which provisions correspond: for example, subsection 11(1) of the old Regulations maps to subsection 10(1) here; subsection 15(1) of the old Regulations maps to subsection 17(1); and subsection 18(1) maps to subsection 22(1).

• The instrument includes an ongoing mechanism for change by permitting the Minister to determine documents or goods by legislative instrument (ss 8(2), 8(5), 13(2), 27(2)). That means the substantive scope of export‑ and import‑sanctioned goods can be amended administratively by instrument without amending the Regulations directly. Section 6 also provides that references to Security Council documents are taken to include those documents as revised, reissued or replaced by the Security Council or the Committee. Consequently, material change to the domestic prohibited lists can be effected by international or Ministerial action.

• There is no record in the instrument of prior amendments to this 2025 instrument because the source supplied is the instrument as originally made and published. Any further amendment history (subsequent legislative instruments changing Ministerial determinations, or later amendments to the Regulations) is not shown in the provided text and therefore cannot be reported.

Practically, the key points for practitioners are that (a) the instrument replaced a prior 2016 instrument with a cessation day of 28 September 2025 and transitional provisions to carry over applications and permits (s 34), and (b) the instrument allows dynamic updating via Ministerial legislative instruments and automatic incorporation of revisions to referenced UN documents (s 6), so the effective scope of prohibited goods and specified entities can change without amendment to the core Regulations.

The Regulations as provided contain no litigation history, no references to judicial decisions, and no cases are cited in the text. The instrument itself does not list any judicial interpretations, and the source does not include any references to litigation arising under the Regulations or the prior 2016 Regulations. Because the Regulations are subordinate legislation made under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945, litigation resulting from enforcement, permit refusals, or interpretations would be brought under that Act or general administrative law and criminal law frameworks, but no such cases are contained within the provided instrument.

Practitioners seeking guidance from case law will therefore need to look beyond the instrument to:

• Judgments concerning the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and prior regulations (such as any litigation involving the 2016 Regulations), noting that the transitional provisions preserved outstanding applications and permits (s 34).

• Administrative law decisions about ministerial determinations, delegation and the exercise of discretion under export‑control style regimes that import international lists and permit conditions.

• Criminal or regulatory prosecutions arising from contraventions under the enabling Act that rely on the definitions and prohibitions in these Regulations.

Because no cases are specified in the statutory instrument, the Regulations do not offer judicial gloss in the text itself; any interpretive or enforcement precedent would need to be sourced from decisions applying the parent Act, the prior regulations, or related export control and sanctions litigation.

This instrument contains multiple specific legal traps for non‑specialists and for entities operating complex supply chains. Below are concrete operational "gotchas" grounded in the Regulations.

• Narrow permissible goods carve‑out: Section 5 defines “permissible goods” narrowly and ties them to INFCIRC/254 Part 1 and Part 2 lists and to light water reactor use. Goods not meeting those precise specifications are treated under the broader export sanctioned goods regime (s 8). Do not assume civilian nuclear inputs outside those explicit categories are permitted.

• Components captured: The definition in s 8(1)(e) captures goods that are key components or subassemblies of sanctioned goods; s 8(6) gives a two‑part test: integral and not goods used extensively for ordinary purposes. The example given (nuts and bolts) signals that commonplace hardware is unlikely to be treated as a key component, but specialised components integral to a system may be captured. Careful technical classification of parts is required.

• Extra‑territorial reach is broad: Section 29(1) covers conduct partly outside Australia if a result occurs in Australia, and it applies to Australian citizens and bodies corporate regardless of where conduct occurs. Entities with Australian nationals or branches must assess global operations.

• Use of Australian ships/aircraft: Sections 9(3), 14(3) and 16(2) make contraventions of supply, procurement and provision of services where Australian ships or aircraft are used. Shipping and aviation contracts that rely on Australian tonnage, crew or registration need particular checks.

• Foreign permits treated sceptically: Section 30(1) creates a presumption that a foreign permit is taken not to have been granted unless a person adduces evidence suggesting a reasonable possibility that it was granted. The note indicates an evidential burden falls on a defendant (Criminal Code s 13.3). Parties relying on foreign licences should obtain tangible documentary proof and be prepared for scrutiny.

• False information nullifies permits: The instrument notes that under s 13A of the Act a permit is taken never to have been granted if the application contains information that is false or misleading in a material particular (notes to ss 10, 17, 22). This exposes applicants to administrative nullity and potential separate offences.

• UN Committee and IAEA notifications and timing: Several permit types require notification to the UN Committee and/or the IAEA (s 10(4), s 22(6)-(10)). Some categories have mandatory waiting periods (basic expense 5 working days, required payment 10 working days, extraordinary expense requires Committee approval). Failure to account for these delays will cause non‑compliance if action is taken prematurely.

• Ministerial legislative instruments can expand scope: Sections 8(2), 8(5), 13(2) and 27(2) allow the Minister to determine documents or goods or to specify entities by legislative instrument. These are legally effective additions to the prohibited list once made and require continuous monitoring.

• No penalties set out in these Regulations: The Regulations use contravention language but do not itself set penalty levels. Practitioners must consult the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and other Commonwealth statutes for the specific sanctions and enforcement procedures.

• Contractual claims barred in certain situations: Section 31 prevents claims for breach of contract or failure to perform transactions against specified Iranian or designated parties where performance was prevented by these measures. Parties pursuing contractual remedies against such persons should note this statutory bar and build alternative risk allocation into contracts.

• Bunkering exceptions and inspection obligations: Section 26(2) prohibits a bunkering permit if the vessel is reasonably believed to carry export or import sanctioned goods that have not been inspected/seized/disposed of, unless supply is necessary for humanitarian purposes. Operators must have inspection procedures and documentary proof before providing bunkering services.

• Asset dealing categories and Committee oversight: Permits to deal with assets under s 22 must be for one of five specific categories (permissible nuclear dealing; basic expense; legally required; contractual; required payment; extraordinary expense dealing), and several require Committee notifications or approvals (s 22(3)-(10)). Misclassifying a dealing can mean no lawful permit route.

• Prohibition notices can be targeted: The Minister may issue a prohibition notice against specific goods to a person even when the goods are not otherwise export sanctioned goods (s 11). That allows fine‑targeted administrative restrictions that are not obvious from public lists.

These are concrete compliance risks rather than policy critiques. Each operates through a defined statutory mechanism set out in the Regulations and requires operational controls, legal verification of end‑use and end‑user guarantees, and careful documentation.

Compliance requires an integrated legal, operational and recordkeeping approach. Below is a practical checklist grounded in the Regulations’ specific requirements and timelines.

1. Map your exposure

   • Identify whether you are an exporter, importer, transport operator (ship/aircraft), financier, insurer, asset custodian, or service provider (technical assistance, brokering).
   • Determine whether you are an Australian citizen, an entity incorporated in Australia, or otherwise subject to Australian jurisdiction (s 29). Extra‑territorial rules can capture conduct by staff overseas.

2. Classify goods and services against statutory lists

   • Check whether goods are “export sanctioned goods” under s 8 by reference to INFCIRC/254 Parts 1 and 2, S/2010/263, Security Council/Committee determinations, or Ministerial legislative instruments (ss 8(1)(a), 8(1)(b), 8(1)(d)).
   • For imports, use s 13 to determine “import sanctioned goods”.
   • For permissible goods, use s 5’s narrow criteria linking to light water reactor use and the specified IAEA lists and Annexes.

3. Assess components and subassemblies

   • Use the s 8(6) two‑part test to assess whether components are “key” and not widely used for ordinary purposes. If components are integral to sanctioned systems, treat them as sanctioned goods unless documentation shows otherwise.

4. Secure and document end‑use and end‑user guarantees

   • For non‑permissible goods and certain permits, obtain contractual end‑user guarantees and, where required, commitments from the Government of Iran (s 10(1)(b), s 17(1)(b)).
   • Keep records of all due diligence, contractual warranties, technical specifications and end‑use monitoring arrangements.

5. Prepare permit applications and evidence

   • For sanctioned supplies, apply under s 10; for sanctioned services, s 17; for assets/controlled asset dealings, s 22; for bunkering, s 26; for business with specified entities, s 28.
   • Ensure applications specify the kind of dealing (s 22(5)), include all required supporting documentation and are materially accurate: false or misleading information will prevent a permit having legal effect (note to ss 10, 17, 22 referencing s 13A of the Act).

6. Anticipate and observe notification timelines

   • If permitted supplies are for permissible goods, ensure the Minister will notify the Committee and IAEA within 10 days after the supply (s 10(3)-(4)).
   • For asset permits, note the Committee notification and waiting periods: basic expenses 5 working days (s 22(7)), required payments 10 working days (s 22(9)), extraordinary expenses require approval (s 22(10)), and permissible nuclear dealings require notification before granting (s 22(6)).

7. Verify foreign permits and maintain evidence

   • If relying on a foreign permit, keep clear documentary evidence that a foreign country properly granted the permit in a manner that accords with Security Council obligations (s 9(4) and s 16(3)). Given s 30(1), be prepared to adduce proof that there is a reasonable possibility the foreign permit was granted.

8. Implement shipping and logistics checks

   • For transport involving Australian ships or aircraft, verify cargo, destination, and chain of custody (ss 9(3), 14(3)). Bunkering providers must check vessel manifest and avoid refuelling if there are reasonable grounds to believe sanctioned goods are onboard unless inspection/seizure has occurred and the supply is humanitarian (s 26(2)).

9. Asset freeze procedures

   • Implement procedures to identify designated persons/entities and controlled assets (ss 18-21). Freeze assets and do not make them available absent an s 22 permit. Classify proposed dealings under the permissible dealing categories in s 22(3) and the Dealing with Assets Regulations 2008 (reg 5).

10. Contractual and commercial mitigations

    • Include clauses in contracts addressing compliance with sanctions, the operation of s 31 (no claims for breach of contract for prevented performance), suspension rights, warranties about end‑use, and termination rights if permit is refused or revoked.
    • Confirm insurance coverage for sanctions‑related exclusions.

11. Internal compliance and training

    • Maintain a sanctions register tracking UN Committee lists, Ministerial legislative instruments, INFCIRC documents and any Ministerial determinations (ss 6, 8(2), 8(5), 13(2), 27(2)).
    • Train commercial, shipping and finance teams on recognition of sanctioned goods, components, end‑use red flags and the operation of s 29 extra‑territorial rules.

12. Liaise with the Department and seek pre‑application engagement

    • Engage early with the responsible Department for guidance on evidentiary standards, permit application formats and likely timelines for Committee notifications and approvals under ss 10, 17 and 22.

13. Prepare for audits and potential enforcement

    • Keep complete records of permit applications, end‑use verification, export/import manifests, shipping and aircraft logs, financial transaction records and correspondence with the Minister or Department, noting that enforcement action will rely on documentary trails and the s 30 evidential framework.

14. Manage transition from old permits

    • If holding a permit under the prior 2016 Regulations, verify its mapping to the new provisions under s 34, and confirm that conditions and notification obligations have been addressed under the new regime.

This compliance plan is operationally specific to avoid overbreadth. It treats each statutory mechanism in the Regulations as a compliance trigger and maps a practical response to that trigger, including risk allocation, documentation, and pre‑application engagement with government where necessary.