Cable Car (kunanyi/Mount Wellington) Facilitation Act 2017

The Act introduces several defined terms that structure its operation. “Project” is broadly defined to cover the construction of facilities necessary for one or more cable cars, including terminals, towers, and a cableway between towers, plus related facilities and their use. It also includes “other developments and uses forming part of that project”, which gives the Minister and the proponent flexibility but also ambiguity: the scope of the project is not fixed in the legislation, so subsequent amendments to the project design could potentially be accommodated without further legislative change, provided they fall within the definition. “Project land” means land that is within Wellington Park, owned by a council (in practice, likely the Hobart City Council), and required for the purposes of a project. It also includes any airspace to which an aerial easement relates. Because the land must be council-owned, the Act does not apply to freehold private land within the park (if any existed), nor to Crown land outside a council’s ownership. The term “aerial easement” is defined as an easement relating to airspace above that land, which is necessary for the cable car cables and towers to pass over land without physically occupying the surface. “Compensable loss” is exhaustive and includes damage to surface, crops, buildings, improvements, loss of opportunity to make planned improvements, deprivation of possession of surface, severance of land, loss of stock, loss of amenity (including recreation and conservation values), decrease in market value, and rehabilitation costs. This is a broad list; notably, it includes “loss of amenity” and “recreation and conservation values”, which opens the door to claims from users of Wellington Park who are not landowners but suffer a decrease in their recreational enjoyment or conservation values of the land. However, the compensation obligation in section 8 is triggered only by activities carried out under a ministerial authority under section 7, not by the later construction or operation of the cable car after a planning permit is issued. “Proponent” means a person who wishes to undertake all or part of a project,this could be a private company, a consortium, or a public entity. The Act does not name the proponent, so it remains project-specific but technically open to any entity that fits the description. “Public land” is defined by reference to the Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1991, which covers a broad category of Crown land and reserved land. The Wellington Park Management Trust is the statutory body established under the Wellington Park Act 1993 that manages the park. The Act requires the Minister to consult the Trust before granting an authority to enter land within the park, but does not require the Trust’s consent.

The primary beneficiary is the proponent of the cable car project,whoever that may be. The Act reduces the proponent’s regulatory burden: it removes one specific planning hurdle (section 52(1B) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993), provides a streamlined process for acquiring necessary interests in project land through compulsory acquisition under Part 1A of the Land Acquisition Act 1993, and grants a ministerial pathway to enter public land for pre-application testing without needing separate approvals under the Wellington Park Act or local planning schemes. The proponent also bears the risk of compensating third parties for compensable loss caused during those entry activities. The Hobart City Council is directly affected as the likely owner of the relevant land within Wellington Park. The Act implicitly authorises the compulsory acquisition of its land (or easements over it) for the project. While section 6 provides that the land remains part of Wellington Park after acquisition, the council loses its ownership interest in that land (the Crown acquires it). The council will receive compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1993, but the Act does not alter or augment that compensation regime. The Wellington Park Management Trust is affected because its management powers are overridden by a ministerial authority under section 7(5), which operates despite the Wellington Park Act 1993. The Trust must be consulted before the Minister grants such an authority, but it has no veto. Its ability to protect park values during the pre-application phase is therefore limited. Users of Wellington Park,hikers, conservationists, recreationists,are affected in two ways. First, they may suffer compensable loss (including loss of amenity and conservation values) due to entry and testing activities, and they have a right to claim compensation from the proponent under section 8. Second, the eventual project, if approved, will physically alter part of the park, but the Act does not itself approve that alteration; it only facilitates the preliminary steps. Other landowners adjacent to or within the park may be affected if their land is subject to an aerial easement or an easement to enter and exit project land, as defined in section 5(4). They would have compensation rights under the Land Acquisition Act 1993 for the acquisition of those easements. The Minister for State Growth and the Department of State Growth are assigned administrative responsibility until an order under the Administrative Arrangements Act 1990 provides otherwise. The Minister has discretion to grant, condition, and revoke authorities under section 7, and to decide whether to initiate compulsory acquisition under Part 1A.

The Act imposes few duties directly, mostly on the Minister and the proponent. The Minister has a duty to consult the Wellington Park Management Trust before granting an authority under section 7(1) for land within Wellington Park. If the land is not vested in the Crown, the Minister must also notify the person or body in whom the land is vested before granting the authority. The Minister may grant an authority subject to terms and conditions, and may revoke it by written notice. The proponent has the right to obtain an authority from the Minister to enter public land and carry out activities reasonably required for preparing a planning permit application. Once granted, the proponent and its agents may enter and remain on the land with necessary vehicles and equipment, despite the Wellington Park Act and the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act. This right is not absolute: it is subject to the terms and conditions specified in the authority. The proponent must not cause compensable loss (as defined in section 3) when exercising rights under an authority. That is the core duty in section 8(1): “A proponent … must not … cause a person to suffer, or to be likely to suffer, compensable loss.” This is framed as a prohibition, but breach does not create a criminal offence; it gives rise to an entitlement to compensation. If the proponent breaches that duty, any person who suffers or is likely to suffer compensable loss is entitled to receive from the proponent an amount of compensation sufficient to compensate for the loss. The proponent has a duty to pay that compensation. The person claiming compensation has a right to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the amount of compensation is reduced by the claimant’s failure to mitigate loss, as stated in section 8(4). The Act does not specify a particular court, so the Supreme Court of Tasmania would have jurisdiction for larger claims, and the Magistrates Court for smaller amounts. The proponent also has a right, under the application of Part 1A of the Land Acquisition Act 1993, to request that the Crown acquire project land or easements for the project. But the decision to acquire is the Crown’s, not the proponent’s. The proponent cannot compel acquisition; it can only benefit from the streamlined infrastructure classification. The Crown has the power to acquire, but section 5(3) prohibits selling the acquired land to anyone. The Crown must retain ownership, though it could grant leases or licences to the proponent. The public has a right to claim compensation under section 8, but only for loss caused by authorised entry activities, not for loss caused by later construction or operation. The Act does not create any new rights for public participation in the planning process; it removes one avenue for contesting a permit application (section 52(1B) disapplication).

The Act does not create any criminal offences or regulatory penalties. There are no fines, imprisonment, infringement notices, or demerit points for non-compliance. The only enforcement mechanism is civil: a person who suffers compensable loss may claim compensation from the proponent in a court of competent jurisdiction. The court would assess the amount sufficient to compensate for the loss, less any failure to mitigate. There is no statutory formula for calculating compensation; it is left to common law principles of damages, but the definition of compensable loss in section 3 provides a checklist of heads of damage. The court has discretion to award costs under its usual rules. If the proponent fails to pay a court-ordered amount, the claimant can enforce the judgment through ordinary civil enforcement mechanisms (garnishee, seizure of assets, etc.). The Act does not provide for any regulatory body to monitor compliance. The Minister could revoke an authority under section 7(6) if the proponent breaches conditions or causes loss, but revocation is discretionary and not automatic. There is no provision for the Minister to impose a penalty for breach. The Land Acquisition Act 1993 contains its own compensation and dispute resolution mechanisms for the acquisition of project land, and those would apply as modified by section 5. For example, disputes over the amount of compensation for an acquisition could be referred to the Land Acquisition Tribunal or the Supreme Court, as provided in that Act. Because section 5 does not displace those provisions, the usual avenues apply. Importantly, the Act does not create a cause of action for environmental damage per se; only for compensable loss as defined. That definition includes “damage to the surface of land” and “loss of amenity, including recreation and conservation values”, which could encompass environmental harm, but only if a specific person suffers that loss. A diffuse environmental injury that no individual can claim (e.g., harm to a threatened species habitat with no private interest) may not be actionable unless a person can demonstrate a direct loss of recreational or conservation value. The enforcement gap means that the proponent’s primary incentive to avoid compensable loss is the threat of civil litigation and the cost of compensation, not a regulatory penalty.

The Act expressly overrides two primary statutes. Section 7(5) provides that, despite the Wellington Park Act 1993 and the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, a proponent with a ministerial authority may enter and remain on public land and carry out activities. This means that during the pre-application phase, the proponent does not need a separate permit or consent under the Wellington Park Act (which normally controls activities within the park) or a planning permit under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act for those entry activities. However, those Acts still apply to the substantive project application; only section 52(1B) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act is disapplied by section 4. That subsection likely required consistency with a specific planning scheme provision that would have prevented the cable car. Section 4 removes that barrier, but the rest of the permit process (application, assessment, public notice, decision, appeal) remains in place. The proponent still needs a planning permit for the cable car construction; the Act only facilitates the application process. The Act applies Part 1A of the Land Acquisition Act 1993 to project land. Part 1A of that Act concerns “infrastructure” and provides a streamlined process for compulsory acquisition of land for infrastructure projects. By deeming cable car structures as infrastructure, the Act brings the project within that faster acquisition regime. However, section 5(2) disapplies one provision of that Part: section 7C(1)(b). That provision likely required a declaration that the acquisition is for a public purpose or that the land is required for a public work. By removing it, the Act allows acquisition even if the project is privately owned and operated, provided it qualifies as infrastructure. Section 5(3) prohibits the Crown from selling the acquired land, which modifies the usual power under the Land Acquisition Act to deal with acquired land. Section 5(4) extends the definitions of “land” and “easement” in the Land Acquisition Act to include aerial easements and access easements. Section 6 provides that project land acquired under Part 1A remains part of Wellington Park. This means the land retains its park status and is still subject to the Wellington Park Act except as overridden by section 7(5). The Trust’s management powers may still apply to activities not covered by an authority (e.g., the operation of the cable car after approval), subject to any planning permit conditions. The Act does not interact with the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) or any other Commonwealth law. Federal approvals, if required, are unaffected. The Act also does not override the common law of nuisance or trespass, except to the extent that the authority under section 7 provides a statutory defence to trespass for entry under that authority. But that defence is limited to the scope of the authority.

The text provided is a consolidated version as at 12 April 2026. The Act received Royal Assent on a date not specified in the extract, but the commencement provision says it commences on the day of Royal Assent. The short title suggests it was enacted in 2017. Based on the source text, no amendments have been made to the Act between its commencement and the consolidation date of 12 April 2026. The Act appears to be unamended. There are no schedules, no amending Acts referenced in the text, and no notes indicating any insertions or deletions. The interpretation section defines terms by reference to other statutes as they stood at the consolidation date (the references are hyperlinked to in-force versions). The Act is therefore stable and has not been subject to legislative adjustment since its original enactment. This may reflect its narrow, facilitative purpose: it is designed to enable a single private project, and once that project either proceeds or is abandoned, there may be no need for amendment. Users should verify the consolidation date and check for any subsequent amending Acts not included in the provided text. The Tasmanian Legislation website generally includes endnotes with amendment histories, but those are not reproduced here. If the Act has been amended after 12 April 2026, the current version will differ. The absence of amendment history in the source suggests that the Act may be one of a kind: a bespoke piece of project facilitation legislation that has not required alteration.

The source text contains no references to any litigation, court decisions, or tribunal rulings involving this Act. There are no numbered cases, no citations, and no mention of any challenge to the Act’s validity or application. The Act may have been the subject of judicial review or compensation claims, but the text does not record them. Given the Act’s narrow scope and the fact that it does not itself approve the project, the most likely litigation would arise from (a) the Minister’s decision to grant or refuse an authority under section 7, (b) the compulsory acquisition of project land under the Land Acquisition Act 1993 as applied, or (c) compensation claims under section 8. As at the consolidation date, no such litigation is noted. It is possible that the project has not yet reached a stage that generated contested court proceedings, or that disputes have been resolved without published decisions. Users should search the Supreme Court of Tasmania and the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for any unreported decisions. The Act’s exemption from section 52(1B) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 could also be challenged in the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal as part of a planning permit appeal, but that would be a challenge to the permit, not directly to the Facilitation Act. Any such challenge would test whether the Act is valid and whether the exemption applies. There is no indication in the source that such a challenge has occurred. The Act’s litigation history appears to be nil based on the provided material.

Several features of the Act could catch a proponent, a landowner, or a third party by surprise. First, the compensation obligation in section 8 applies only to loss caused by activities under a ministerial authority under section 7. It does not cover loss caused by the construction or operation of the cable car after a planning permit is obtained. Those later activities will be governed by the normal laws of nuisance, negligence, and statutory compensation under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act or the Land Acquisition Act. The proponent might assume the Act provides blanket protection, but it does not. Second, the definition of “compensable loss” includes loss of amenity and recreation and conservation values. This is unusually broad for a Tasmanian statute. A person who does not own any land but regularly hikes in Wellington Park could claim compensation if the authorised entry activities diminish their recreational enjoyment. However, such a claimant would need to demonstrate a specific loss, not a generalised concern, and would bear the burden of proof. Third, the proponent must ensure it does not “cause a person to suffer, or to be likely to suffer, compensable loss”. The phrase “likely to suffer” means that the right to compensation accrues before actual loss occurs, potentially allowing claims for anticipated loss. A proponent that proceeds with testing despite a high probability of causing loss may be liable even before the loss materialises. Fourth, the Act does not specify how compensation is assessed for loss of amenity. The court will have to apply common law principles, but the lack of a statutory formula creates uncertainty and litigation risk. Fifth, the authority under section 7 can be revoked at any time by the Minister without cause. The proponent has no contractual right to continue testing. If the political climate changes or the Minister’s views shift, the authority may be revoked, and any investment in preliminary activities is at risk. Sixth, section 5(3) prohibits the Crown from selling project land. This means the proponent cannot obtain freehold title to the land it needs for terminals or towers. If the project depends on ownership rather than a lease or licence, the Act does not facilitate that. Seventh, the Act requires consultation with the Wellington Park Management Trust before granting an authority, but not with the public. Interested parties have no right to be heard before the Minister decides. They must wait until a compensation claim arises. Eighth, the Land Acquisition Act 1993 as applied may allow the Crown to acquire only what is necessary. The proponent might not get exclusive use of the entire parcel; the aerial easement may conflict with other uses of the land below. Finally, the Act does not require the proponent to provide security or insurance for potential compensation claims. If the proponent is thinly capitalised, a successful claimant may struggle to recover compensation.

Compliance obligations under the Act fall almost entirely on the proponent. The first step is to obtain a ministerial authority under section 7 before entering any public land for testing or other pre-application activities. The proponent must apply to the Minister for State Growth, specifying the land, the activities proposed, and the duration. The Minister will consult the Wellington Park Management Trust if the land is within the park, and must notify the landholder if the land is not vested in the Crown. The proponent should prepare a detailed plan of the activities, including timing, location, machinery, and access routes, and be prepared to accept terms and conditions. The authority is a written instrument and may include conditions such as restrictions on times of entry, noise limits, rehabilitation requirements, or bonding. The proponent must strictly adhere to those conditions; breach could lead to revocation. While the Act does not criminalise breach of conditions, it may expose the proponent to greater liability if compensable loss occurs during unauthorised activities. Second, the proponent must ensure that neither it nor its agents cause compensable loss. This requires careful planning: before entry, conduct a baseline survey of the land’s condition, including vegetation, structures, and improvements. Identify any nearby landowners, users, or interest holders who might suffer loss. Engage specialists to assess risk of damage to surfaces, crops, buildings, or amenity. Implement measures to avoid or minimise harm, such as using temporary access tracks, scheduling activities outside peak visitor times, and maintaining buffer zones. Third, if compensable loss is likely, the proponent should negotiate a compensation agreement with affected persons before commencing activities. Section 8 does not require negotiation first, but doing so reduces litigation risk. If agreement cannot be reached, the proponent may still proceed but should document the reasons why loss is not likely or has been mitigated. Fourth, the proponent must maintain records of all activities under the authority, including dates, locations, any incidents, and steps taken to mitigate loss. These records will be critical in defending a compensation claim. Fifth, the proponent should obtain public liability insurance with adequate coverage for the types of loss listed in the definition of compensable loss, especially loss of amenity and decrease in market value. Standard insurance policies may exclude some heads of loss, so the proponent must review the policy carefully. Sixth, for the acquisition of project land, the proponent must work with the relevant government department (likely the Department of State Growth) to trigger the compulsory acquisition process under Part 1A of the Land Acquisition Act 1993. The proponent cannot force acquisition; it can only request it. The department will manage the acquisition, including negotiations, valuations, and compensation payments. The proponent may be required to indemnify the Crown for compensation costs. Seventh, the proponent should monitor any changes to the Act or related legislation. Although the Act has not been amended to date, a future government could introduce amendments or repeal it. Finally, the proponent must still pursue a planning permit under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 for the project itself. The Act only facilitates the application; it does not guarantee approval. The proponent should factor that uncertainty into its project timeline and budget.