Biosecurity (First Point of Entry—Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal) Determination 2019

Scope and definitions

• The instrument establishes its own definitions for the purposes of the instrument but relies on the Biosecurity Act 2015 for primary definitions. It defines “Act” to mean the Biosecurity Act 2015 and adopts the Act’s definitions for “aircraft” (s 9 of the Act) and “goods” (s 19 of the Act) (cl 4). The instrument further specifies that “goods” means goods that are subject to biosecurity control or goods in relation to which an exposed goods order is in force (cl 4).

First point of entry concept

• The instrument exercises the power to make a first point of entry determination under subsection 223(1) of the Biosecurity Act 2015 (cl 3). The instrument makes clear that a “first point of entry” designation can be restricted to particular classes of aircraft and goods. Here, Tindal is a first point of entry only for jet fighter aircraft (cl 5) and only for baggage carried on those jets (cl 6).

Biosecurity entry points

• The instrument distinguishes between a “first point of entry” for aircraft and goods and a “biosecurity entry point” within that first point of entry. The two concepts interact: an aircraft must be brought to a biosecurity entry point at a first point of entry if there is a biosecurity entry point for that aircraft at that first point of entry (note to cl 7, referencing s 238 of the Act). This instrument, however, does not designate any area of Tindal as a biosecurity entry point for aircraft (note to cl 7). It does designate a specific area,75 Squadron Operations,as the biosecurity entry point for baggage carried on jet fighter aircraft (cl 8 and the table in cl 8).

Temporal and procedural standards for notices

• Part 4 sets out different temporal standards for notice depending on the party and whether the change has already occurred or is proposed. Owners or lessees must give the Agriculture Department written notice “as soon as practicable” after becoming aware of an actual or imminent change to the business entity operating Tindal or a biosecurity entry point (cls 9(2)-(3)). A person or body responsible for carrying out operations must give the Agriculture Department “reasonable notice” in writing of proposed changes of the types listed in cl 9(5) (cl 9(4)).

Enumerated classes of changes that trigger obligations

• Clause 9(5) lists five types of changes that require prior notice under cl 9(4): changes to biosecurity procedures governing the management of biosecurity risk (9(5)(a)); changes to facilities or amenities available for biosecurity officials and human biosecurity officers to perform functions or exercise powers under the Act (9(5)(b)); changes to procedures that may affect ability to identify biosecurity risks (9(5)(c)); changes to procedures that may affect the ability for biosecurity officials/human biosecurity officials to be informed of identified risks (9(5)(d)); and changes to procedures for managing any other factors that may contribute to or affect the level of biosecurity risk (9(5)(e)).

Interaction with statutory provisions outside the instrument

• The instrument explicitly points readers to other relevant sections of the Biosecurity Act. For whether particular goods may be brought into a first point of entry it references ss 173 and 174 which govern prohibited goods and conditionally non‑prohibited goods respectively (note 2 to cl 6). For the requirement to bring unloaded goods to a biosecurity entry point it references s 147 (note to cl 8). For the rule on bringing aircraft to a biosecurity entry point it references s 238 (note to cl 7). The instrument does not restate those Act provisions; it signals where the Act’s substantive rules intersect with the designation.

Prescriptive and limited character

• The instrument is prescriptive in its limits: it restricts first point of entry status to a defined aircraft class and a specific class of goods. It prescribes a single internal area as the designated entry point for those goods. It imposes notification obligations but does not, within the instrument, set out inspection procedures, entry conditions, or penalties; it relies on the Act for those broader regimes.

Formal particulars

• The instrument includes formal commencement arrangements (cl 2) showing the whole instrument commenced on 16 June 2019. It records the maker and date of making and contains a contents list and formal parts and clauses in standard legislative form.

Primary regulated parties

• Operators of jet fighter aircraft using Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal are directly affected because the base is designated a first point of entry for that specific class of aircraft (cl 5). The instrument does not use the term “operator” in its operative clauses, but the designation applies to aircraft “that are subject to biosecurity control” as defined by the Act (cl 4). Any person or entity responsible for bringing such aircraft into Australia via Tindal will need to observe the consequences of the designation and the related requirements of the Biosecurity Act.

Owners and lessees of the base

• The owners and any lessees of Tindal have express obligations under the instrument. If an owner or a lessee becomes aware of an actual or impending change to the business entity operating Tindal or to a biosecurity entry point at Tindal, that owner or lessee must give written notice to the Agriculture Department “as soon as practicable” after becoming aware (cls 9(2)-(3)). This creates a monitoring and notification duty on property owners and lessees, irrespective of whether they operate the base day-to-day.

Persons or bodies carrying out operations

• A person or body responsible for carrying out operations at Tindal (which may include military command structures, contracted service providers, ground handling providers, or base management entities) must give the Agriculture Department reasonable written notice of proposed changes that are of the types listed in cl 9(5). The instrument does not define “person or body responsible for carrying out operations”, so practical identification of the notifying party will turn on the facts at the time and the internal arrangements at Tindal.

Biosecurity officials and human biosecurity officers

• The instrument references biosecurity officials and human biosecurity officers as users of facilities and recipients of procedural notifications (cl 9(5)(b), (d)). Those officials are not required to act under this instrument, but the instrument conditions design and procedural changes on their ability to perform functions and to be informed. The obligation is placed on owners/lessees/operators to maintain facilities and procedures that allow officials to exercise powers under the Act; improvements or reductions to available facilities must be communicated (cl 9(5)(b)).

Passengers and personnel whose baggage is carried on jet fighter aircraft

• Baggage carried on a jet fighter aircraft is explicitly within the instrument’s scope: Tindal is a first point of entry for that baggage class only (cl 6). The instrument designates 75 Squadron Operations as the biosecurity entry point for that baggage (cl 8). The instrument does not spell out passenger obligations but by designating a biosecurity entry point for baggage it triggers the Act’s baggage handling provisions (see note to cl 8 referencing s 147), which require unloading goods to be brought to the biosecurity entry point as soon as practicable.

The Agriculture Department (Department of Agriculture)

• The Department is the recipient of all required notices under Part 4 (cls 9(2)-(4)). The Department will therefore be a central actor in receiving and assessing information about changes to operators, procedures, facilities and risk management arrangements at Tindal. The instrument names the Department in those clauses and, separately, the maker of the instrument is a delegate within that Department (cl 3 and instrument preamble).

Indirectly affected parties

• Contractors supplying services at 75 Squadron Operations, entities responsible for the movement of baggage, logistics providers, and military supply chain participants are indirectly affected because changes to procedures or facilities that they implement may trigger notification obligations (cl 9(5)). Similarly, other Commonwealth agencies or state/territory authorities involved in the administration of Tindal may be affected in practice, to the extent they manage aspects of operations that alter biosecurity risk or the capacity for biosecurity officials to act.

Not affected

• The instrument explicitly excludes other classes of aircraft and goods from the declaration: Tindal is not a first point of entry for aircraft other than jet fighter aircraft and is not a first point of entry for goods other than baggage carried on such aircraft (note to cl 5 and note 1 to cl 6). Therefore, ordinary commercial flights, other military aircraft types, and unrelated categories of imported goods do not fall within this determination.

Who decides and who receives communications

• The decision-maker who made the instrument is a delegate of the Director of Biosecurity within the Department of Agriculture (instrument preamble and cl 3). The Department of Agriculture is the recipient of notices required by Part 4 (cls 9(2)-(4)). The instrument therefore centralises reporting and change supervision in the Department.

Designatory duties and immediate obligations

• The instrument establishes duties indirectly by creating a first point of entry and designating a biosecurity entry point. Where the Act prescribes duties that flow from those designations, those duties become operative insofar as they apply to the classes designated. The instrument itself does not restate all those duties but incorporates them by reference to the Act (see notes to cl 6 and cl 8; note to cl 7 referencing s 238 of the Act). For example, the instrument’s designation of baggage biosecurity entry point triggers the Act’s requirement that unloaded goods be brought to the biosecurity entry point as soon as practicable (note to cl 8 referencing s 147). The instrument also points to ss 173 and 174 of the Act for rules on whether particular goods may be brought into a first point of entry (note 2 to cl 6).

Notification duties on owners and lessees

• Owners (or an owner where there are multiple owners) and lessees (or a lessee where multiple lessees exist) of Tindal have an express duty to give written notice to the Agriculture Department “as soon as practicable after becoming aware” that there has been, or will be, a change to the business entity operating Tindal or a biosecurity entry point at Tindal (cls 9(2)-(3)). The duty attaches both to actual changes and to imminent ones, and the operative standard is awareness followed by prompt written notification.

Notice duty on persons or bodies carrying out operations

• A person or body responsible for carrying out operations at Tindal must give the Agriculture Department written “reasonable notice” of proposed changes of the types listed at cl 9(5) (cl 9(4)). The difference of standard between “as soon as practicable” and “reasonable notice” separates reactive notice for owners/lessees who become aware of a change from proactive notice for operators proposing specific procedural or facility changes.

Obligations as to content and mode of communication

• The instrument specifies form (writing) and recipient (Agriculture Department) for all notices under cl 9, but it does not specify detailed content requirements, filing addresses, or contact points; those details will be subject to the Department’s operational arrangements or further guidance. The instrument therefore creates an obligation to notify in writing but leaves the operational particulars to the Department.

Rights implicit in the designation

• The instrument also creates rights or expectations for biosecurity officials and human biosecurity officers in practice. Clause 9(5)(b) contemplates facilities and amenities available at Tindal for biosecurity officials to perform functions or exercise powers under the Act. Those officials thus have an implicit operational right to facilities and amenities adequate for carrying out their statutory roles at that biosecurity entry point, to the extent owners/operators maintain those facilities. The instrument does not specify standards, again leaving detail to the Department and the Act.

Limits on duties within the instrument

• The instrument expressly limits the scope of the first point of entry to jet fighter aircraft and baggage carried on those aircraft (cls 5-6 and accompanying notes), and it does not designate any area of Tindal as a biosecurity entry point for aircraft (note to cl 7). Therefore, the instrument does not impose duties under this determination for other aircraft types or other goods at Tindal.

Delegated decision-maker and administrative rights

• The instrument was made by the Director of Biosecurity’s delegate (instrument preamble and cl 3), which demonstrates administrative delegation under the Act. The Department of Agriculture holds the administrative role of receiving and assessing notices and potentially exercising the Act’s powers in light of those notices; the instrument gives the Department the right to be informed and to consider operational changes, though it does not on its face confer new regulatory powers beyond receiving notification.

No penalties in instrument; Act governs enforcement

• The instrument does not set penalties or enforcement mechanisms itself; that function resides in the Biosecurity Act 2015. Duties created by the instrument (for example, the notification duties) are legal obligations, but enforcement, compliance consequences, or sanctions for failure to comply are matters for the Act. The instrument therefore creates duties whose enforcement will depend on the Act and departmental practice.

Instrument’s silence on specific penalties

• This instrument does not itself set out any penalties, infringement notices, fines or enforcement mechanisms. It creates duties (principally written-notification requirements in Part 4) and designations (first point of entry and biosecurity entry point) that interact with the Biosecurity Act 2015, but it leaves enforcement to the Act. The instrument repeatedly references the Act for relevant procedural and substantive rules (see cl 3 and the various notes within Parts 2 and 3).

Enforcement framework referenced but not restated

• The instrument directs readers to specific sections of the Act that affect operation of the determination: s 147 (unloaded goods to be brought to a biosecurity entry point), ss 173 and 174 (prohibited and conditionally non-prohibited goods), and s 238 (aircraft must be brought to a biosecurity entry point at a first point of entry if one is designated) (notes to cls 6-8). Those Act provisions contain, or sit within regimes that contain, enforcement and penalty provisions, but the instrument does not reproduce those enforcement rules. Practitioners therefore must consult the Biosecurity Act 2015 for the precise enforcement consequences of failing to comply with obligations that arise from the instrument’s designations and for general enforcement powers exercisable by biosecurity officials.

Who enforces and who receives notice

• The Department of Agriculture (referred to as the Agriculture Department in the instrument) is the administrative centre for notices required by Part 4 (cls 9(2)-(4)) and is therefore positioned to be the first recipient of information about changes at Tindal that may affect biosecurity risk. Enforcement actions, if any, would be taken under the Biosecurity Act by authorised officers and officials operating under that Act. The instrument itself identifies the Department as the notification recipient but does not itself confer enforcement powers.

Practical enforcement levers implied by the instrument

• While concrete penalties are not enumerated in the instrument, it creates processual levers for the Department. The written-notice requirements produce information asymmetry reduction for the Department: having timely notice of ownership, lessee or procedural changes gives the Department the ability to assess whether the Act’s regulatory settings continue to be met at Tindal. If the Department determines the conditions of the first point of entry are no longer satisfied, the Department could, as a matter of the Act, take steps consistent with the Act’s powers (the instrument does not specify the steps). Practitioners should therefore treat the notification regime as a compliance checkpoint that may precipitate further departmental scrutiny or action under the Act.

Unspecified standards of compliance timing

• The instrument uses two temporal standards: “as soon as practicable” for owners and lessees when they become aware of changes (cls 9(2)-(3)) and “reasonable notice” for proposed changes from persons or bodies responsible for operations (cl 9(4)). These are flexible standards that will be interpreted in context. The instrument does not quantify timelines or document requirements and does not specify a departmental process for acknowledging receipt or for following up on notices. That introduces practical uncertainty about what constitutes compliance, meaning parties should err on the side of prompt and detailed written notice to the Department.

Administrative discretion and potential outcomes

• The instrument does not constrain the Department’s discretion once it receives notice. The Department’s responses, potential inquiries, requirement for further information, or decisions about continued designation or remedial steps will all flow from the Act and departmental practice. The instrument’s notification duties therefore function as triggers for administrative discretion exercised under the Act, rather than as self-executing sanctions.

Primary statutory anchor

• This determination is an instrument under the Biosecurity Act 2015. Clause 3 states that the instrument is made under subsection 223(1) of the Biosecurity Act 2015. The instrument therefore operates within the Act’s statutory framework and its force, effect and interpretation will be contingent on the provisions of the Act.

Definition cross-references

• The instrument depends on definitions in the Act. Clause 4 explicitly states that a number of expressions are defined in section 9 of the Act and then defines “Act” to mean the Biosecurity Act 2015. It defines “aircraft” by reference to section 9 of the Act and “goods” by reference to section 19 of the Act. The instrument also clarifies that “goods” for its purposes means goods that are subject to biosecurity control or goods subject to an exposed goods order (cl 4).

Operational cross-links with specific Act provisions

• The instrument identifies specific sections of the Act that materially interact with the determination:
  • Section 147 is referenced in the note to cl 8: if an aircraft has arrived at Tindal and goods are to be unloaded, those goods must be brought to a biosecurity entry point as soon as practicable (note to cl 8 referencing s 147).
  • Sections 173 and 174 are referenced in note 2 to cl 6 as relevant to whether particular goods may be brought into a first point of entry; these Act sections govern prohibited goods and conditionally non-prohibited goods respectively.
  • Section 238 is referenced in the note to cl 7: an aircraft must be brought to a biosecurity entry point at a first point of entry if there is a biosecurity entry point for that aircraft at that first point of entry (note to cl 7 referencing s 238).

Limits of the instrument relative to the Act

• The instrument limits the application of first point of entry treatment to jet fighter aircraft and baggage carried on such aircraft, but it does not displace or modify the Act’s substantive regimes concerning prohibited goods, biosecurity controls, powers of inspection, detention, treatment, or enforcement penalties. Practitioners must therefore consult the Biosecurity Act for the operative rules that apply once an aircraft or goods fall within the first point of entry and biosecurity entry point regimes created by this instrument.

Administrative law considerations

• The instrument is an administrative determination made under a statute. As such, it will be subject to administrative law constraints and judicial review principles applicable to statutory decision-making, to the extent those principles apply to the making and operation of delegated instruments. The instrument itself does not address matters such as merits review, judicial review, or appeals; those mechanisms, if available, will be found in the Act or other administrative law statutes and common law principles.

Interplay with other Commonwealth or state regulatory regimes

• The instrument makes no express reference to other Commonwealth or state legislation, inter-agency agreements, or Defence-specific regulations. In practice, Tindal is a Defence facility and operations at the base will be subject to Defence regulations and arrangements. The instrument, however, operates specifically under the Biosecurity Act and channels notices to the Agriculture Department. Any interaction with Defence, transport, customs, aviation regulation, or other regimes is not spelled out in the instrument and will be a matter of operational coordination between agencies under their respective statutory powers.

Separation of aircraft and goods designations

• The instrument’s explicit separation between designation for aircraft (cl 5) and for goods (cl 6 and cl 8) means that the Act’s rules that apply to aircraft and to goods will be triggered independently depending on the presence of a corresponding biosecurity entry point. The instrument does not designate a biosecurity entry point for aircraft at Tindal (note to cl 7), which limits the reach of certain Act provisions that apply to aircraft at biosecurity entry points (see s 238 reference).

Reliance on Act for enforcement and procedural detail

• As noted elsewhere, the instrument relies on the Act for enforcement, procedural instruction, and substantive biosecurity powers. This instrument functions as a location- and class-specific overlay: it creates the geographical and class boundaries within which the Act’s broader regulatory apparatus operates.

Instrument’s origination and commencement

• The instrument is dated 7 June 2019, signed by the delegate Dean Merrilees, Assistant Secretary Compliance Division, Department of Agriculture, and commenced in full on 16 June 2019 as recorded in the commencement table at clause 2. The instrument itself includes a commencement table noting that the whole instrument commenced on 16 June 2019 (cl 2).

No amendment notes within the instrument

• The instrument explicitly notes that the commencement table relates only to the provisions of the instrument as originally made and that it will not be amended to deal with later amendments of the instrument (cl 2(1)). Clause 2(2) further states that any information in column 3 of the table is not part of the instrument and may be edited in published versions. The instrument, as provided, contains no subsequent amendment provisions, repeal clauses, or sunset clauses.

Implication for future amendments

• While the instrument itself contains no later amendments, the mechanism used to create it,subsection 223(1) of the Biosecurity Act 2015,permits the Director of Biosecurity or the delegate to make determinations. Future amendments to the instrument would need to be made under the Act and would be recorded as separate instruments or as amended versions of this instrument in the Federal Register of Legislation or equivalent publication. The instrument’s own text cautions that its commencement table is historical and not updated to reflect future amendments (cl 2(1)).

Record of maker and date

• The instrument records the maker and date in the preamble and signature block: it was made by Dean Merrilees as a delegate of the Director of Biosecurity, dated 7 June 2019. That record is the formal signature of the decision-maker at the time of making.

No internal amendment history disclosed

• The text of the instrument that is supplied here contains no marginal notes, amendment schedules, or other evidence of alteration after the date of making. The instrument’s content and the commencement table therefore reflect the instrument as originally made with effect from 16 June 2019.

Practical steps for verifying amendment status

• To determine whether the instrument has been amended since commencement, practitioners must check the authoritative consolidation on the Federal Register of Legislation or the Department’s published instruments register. The instrument’s cl 2(1) reminds readers that the commencement table is only as made, and that official databases should be consulted for up-to-date status. The instrument itself does not provide an amendment history.

No cases or litigation referenced in the instrument

• The instrument contains no references to any court or tribunal decisions, and it does not include any litigation history or notation of disputes. It is a standalone administrative determination and the supplied text contains no mention of judicial or merits review proceedings relating to the determination.

Implications of absence of litigation references

• The absence of litigation references within the instrument means there is no internal record here of challenges to the designation, no reported disputes over the instrument’s validity, and no case law interpreting its terms. Practitioners seeking to understand how courts might construe the instrument, or how enforcement actions have been treated in litigation, will need to search external legal databases and the Federal Court or Administrative Appeals Tribunal records for any proceedings that expressly involve this instrument.

Potential causes of dispute (based on instrument content)

• Although the instrument itself does not report litigation, its terms create potential factual or legal dispute points that could give rise to litigation under the Act or in administrative law contexts. Those factual/legal points include: whether a particular aircraft qualifies as a “jet fighter aircraft” within the meaning applied by relevant authorities; whether particular baggage or goods fall within the class “baggage carried on a jet fighter aircraft” or are instead a category excluded by the Act’s prohibited-goods or conditionally non-prohibited goods regimes (notes to cl 6 referencing ss 173-174); whether notices given “as soon as practicable” or “reasonable notice” meet the instrument’s standards; and whether changes to procedures/facilities require prior notice under cl 9(4)-(5). Any litigation on these issues would arise under the Biosecurity Act’s framework and administrative law principles. The instrument itself, however, provides no record of such cases.

Recommended verification procedure if litigation is relevant

• For practitioners confronted with a dispute potentially implicating this instrument, the immediate step is to consult the consolidated Federal Register of Legislation entry for the instrument and to search federal jurisdiction databases (Federal Court, Administrative Appeals Tribunal) for any proceedings referencing the instrument or the clause numbers. The instrument alone cannot substitute for adjudicative history or interpretative precedent and contains no litigation narrative.

Narrow scope may be narrower than expectation

• The instrument’s designation is tightly confined. It makes Tindal a first point of entry only for “jet fighter aircraft” (cl 5) and only for “baggage carried on a jet fighter aircraft” (cl 6). The accompanying notes emphasise that Tindal is not a first point of entry for other aircraft or goods (note to cl 5; note 1 to cl 6). A common operational pitfall is to assume first point of entry status applies to all military aircraft or to other classes of goods; it does not. Practitioners and operational staff must not generalise beyond the classes expressly specified.

No designated biosecurity entry point for aircraft

• The instrument states it “does not designate any area of Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal as a biosecurity entry point for aircraft” (note to cl 7). That means the Act’s s 238 obligation to bring aircraft to a biosecurity entry point at a first point of entry is not operatively triggered at Tindal by this instrument for aircraft, because no aircraft-specific biosecurity entry point is designated here. Misunderstanding this could lead to incorrect operational requirements being applied to jet fighter aircraft arriving at Tindal.

Only one internal area designated for baggage

• While the instrument designates Tindal as a first point of entry for baggage carried on jet fighter aircraft, it designates a single area as the biosecurity entry point for those goods: 75 Squadron Operations (cl 8 and the table). If baggage is unloaded elsewhere on the base, the Act requires unloading goods to be taken to the biosecurity entry point as soon as practicable (note to cl 8 referencing s 147). Failure to move baggage to the designated area promptly may contravene the Act’s requirements.

Notification obligations have differing standards

• Owners and lessees must notify “as soon as practicable” after becoming aware of a change to the business entity operating the base or a biosecurity entry point (cls 9(2)-(3)). Operators must give “reasonable notice” of proposed changes (cl 9(4)). These are different legal standards with different practical implications. Parties accustomed to a single notification standard may err. Practically, both standards require prompt, written communication, but the instrument retains flexible, context-dependent timing that can be disputed later.

No content or recipient address specified

• The instrument requires “written” notice to the Agriculture Department but does not specify the address, form, or minimum content of that notice (cls 9(2)-(4)). This omission creates operational risk: a late or improperly addressed submission might be challenged as non-compliant. The prudent course is to use established Department contact channels and to document delivery and content thoroughly.

Who is “responsible for carrying out operations” may be unclear

• Clause 9(4) places the “person or body that is responsible for carrying out operations at Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal” under an obligation to give reasonable notice of proposed changes. The instrument does not define who that person or body is. In a Defence setting with layered command, contracting and lease arrangements, identifying the accountable entity may be non-trivial. Failure to attribute responsibility correctly could result in missed notifications.

Interplay with prohibited or conditionally non-prohibited goods regimes

• Note 2 to clause 6 points users to ss 173 and 174 of the Act for whether particular goods may be brought into a first point of entry. That cross-reference is crucial: even if baggage is within the class covered by this instrument, separate Act provisions might categorise particular items as prohibited or conditionally non-prohibited. Practically, this means baggage handlers and operators must not treat the instrument as an exemption from the Act’s substantive goods controls.

Operational coordination with Defence and other agencies

• The instrument centralises notification to the Agriculture Department but does not engage Defence-specific administration or specify coordination mechanisms. On a military base, Defence obligations, operational security or access rules may complicate notification, inspection, or facility provision. The instrument does not resolve these inter-agency implementation issues.

No penalty details, so compliance obligations are necessary to avoid downstream enforcement

• The instrument does not set penalties; instead enforcement is through the Act. That does not mean breaches are inconsequential. Ignoring the notification duties, or misapplying the scope, can prompt departmental scrutiny and steps under the Act. Practitioners should treat obligations in this instrument as compliance requirements notwithstanding the absence of express penalty clauses.

Record-keeping and evidence of “awareness”

• The owner/lessee duty to notify arises on becoming “aware” that a change has occurred or will occur (cls 9(2)-(3)). Establishing when a party “became aware” can be factual and contentious. Maintaining clear internal records, dates of meetings, and written approvals is therefore essential to demonstrate compliance with the “as soon as practicable” obligation.

Immediate checklist

• Identify whether operations fall within the instrument’s scope:
  • Confirm whether aircraft are “jet fighter aircraft” arriving at Tindal (cl 5).
  • Confirm whether the goods are “baggage carried on a jet fighter aircraft” (cl 6).
  • If yes to both, treat Tindal as a first point of entry for those specific aircraft/goods and manage baggage through the designated biosecurity entry point area, 75 Squadron Operations (cl 8).

Notices: who must notify and when

• Owners and lessees: If an owner (or an owner where multiple owners exist) or a lessee (or a lessee where multiple lessees exist) becomes aware that there has been, or will be, a change to the business entity operating Tindal or to a biosecurity entry point at Tindal, give written notice to the Agriculture Department as soon as practicable after becoming aware (cls 9(2)-(3)).
• Persons or bodies responsible for operations: If a person or body responsible for operations at Tindal proposes to make any of the changes listed in cl 9(5), give the Agriculture Department reasonable written notice of the proposed change (cl 9(4)).
• Form and recipient: All notices must be in writing and addressed to the Agriculture Department as the instrument specifies; the instrument does not give an address or contact details, so use the Department’s published contact channels and keep records of submission and receipt.

What changes trigger notice obligations

• Proposed or actual changes that require notice are those that:
  • Alter procedures at Tindal relating to biosecurity measures for managing biosecurity risk (cl 9(5)(a));
  • Alter facilities or amenities available for biosecurity officials and human biosecurity officers to perform functions or exercise powers under the Act (cl 9(5)(b));
  • Alter procedures affecting the ability of operational staff to identify biosecurity risks (cl 9(5)(c));
  • Alter procedures affecting the ability for biosecurity officials or human biosecurity officials to be informed of identified biosecurity risks (cl 9(5)(d));
  • Alter procedures for managing other factors that may contribute to, or affect, the level of biosecurity risk associated with operations (cl 9(5)(e)).

Practical content for notices

• Although the instrument does not prescribe notice content, practical compliance steps are:
  • State clearly the party giving notice and the role (owner, lessee, operator).
  • Describe the change that has occurred or is proposed, with dates and affected areas.
  • Explain how the change affects procedures, facilities, or the ability to identify/report biosecurity risks, with reference to the five categories in cl 9(5).
  • Provide contact details for follow-up and copies of supporting documents (e.g., new procedural documentation, floor plans, contracts transferring operational responsibility).
  • If relevant, identify a point of contact for coordination with biosecurity officials.

Timing and record-keeping

• Err on the side of early notification: where the standard is “as soon as practicable” or “reasonable notice”, earlier written notification reduces dispute risk about timeliness. Keep contemporaneous records evidencing the date on which the notifying party became aware of a change or the date a proposal was approved and sent. Maintain a log of notices sent, modes of delivery, acknowledgement receipts, and any departmental responses.

Baggage handling and movement to designated area

• If baggage carried on jet fighter aircraft is unloaded at Tindal, ensure unloaded goods are brought to the designated biosecurity entry point, 75 Squadron Operations, as soon as practicable (cl 8 and note referencing s 147). Update operational checklists and ground handling instructions to reflect the location and the requirement to move unloaded goods promptly to the designated area.

Coordination with biosecurity officials

• Where proposed changes affect facilities or amenities for biosecurity officials (cl 9(5)(b)) or the ability for officials to be informed of identified risks (cl 9(5)(d)), engage biosecurity officials as early as possible in the planning process to resolve practical issues and to avoid a failed notification process. Provide floor plans, amenity descriptions and proposed procedural changes for their review.

Addressing inter-agency and Defence constraints

• Given the operational context, coordinate internal Defence or base security requirements with the Department’s notification obligations. Where operational security or classified information limits what can be shared, provide the Agriculture Department with an appropriate point of liaison and where possible non-sensitive summaries that meet the instrument’s notice requirements while protecting operational constraints.

Review and update compliance procedures

• Implement an internal compliance procedure that:
  • Identifies who in the organisation is responsible for monitoring and giving notice under cl 9(2)-(4).
  • Contains a checklist of the types of changes falling under cl 9(5).
  • Sets internal deadlines for drafting and sending written notices “as soon as practicable” or as part of a “reasonable notice” period.
  • Keeps copies of all notices and departmental acknowledgements for audit and evidence of compliance.

Seek departmental clarification where uncertain

• Because the instrument does not prescribe detailed notice content, contact points, or timelines, obtain written clarification from the Agriculture Department when in doubt. Written departmental guidance or an acknowledgment email will reduce uncertainty about whether a notice meets the instrument’s requirements.

Consult the Biosecurity Act for substantive obligations

• Remember that the instrument does not replace the Biosecurity Act. For obligations concerning prohibited goods, unloading procedures, powers of inspection, detention, treatment, or sanctions, consult ss 147, 173, 174, 238 and other relevant Act provisions. Compliance with the instrument requires concurrently ensuring compliance with the Act.

Record evidence of “awareness”

• For owners and lessees, keep documentary evidence of when they became aware of changes (emails, board minutes, notices of assignment or sale, lease variations). This evidence will support a claim of having complied with the “as soon as practicable” requirement if timing is later questioned.

Engage legal or compliance counsel where changes are material

• If proposed changes materially affect biosecurity procedures, facilities or the ability to identify or notify biosecurity risks, involve legal or compliance advisors early to draft the notice and to liaise with the Department. This is especially advisable where the change may materially alter the risk profile or operational responsibilities at the base.