Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) List 2012

The instrument relies on three legal-concept hooks found in its text and Schedule. The first is the distinction between “designated persons and entities” and “declared persons”. The instrument explicitly makes people and entities “designated” under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 and people “declared” under paragraph 6(b) (s 3(1)-(2)). The instrument does not define in its text what legal consequences follow from those two labels; any difference in legal effect between a designation and a declaration is therefore determined by the Regulations referenced. The Schedule entries themselves mark which items are persons and which are entities, and frequently indicate an “instrument of first designation” and “instrument of first declaration”.

The second concept is continuity through amendment. Sections 4 to 8 are expressly “made for the purposes of subregulation 9(3) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011” (s 4). Those provisions identify particular items that “continue to have effect” despite the making of specified Amendment Instruments. For example, s 5(1) states the designation of the person in item 1 in Part 1 of Schedule 1, as in force immediately before the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons,DPRK) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2020, continues to have effect. Similar continuation clauses appear in ss 5(2)-(4), 6(1)-(3), 7(1)-(3) and 8(1)-(3). Those provisions operate as saving and transitional clauses that preserve the legal operation of specific listings across instrument amendment steps.

The third concept is granular identification for screening and enforcement. Schedule 1 items include multiple identifying data points: full names, alternative names and spellings, dates and places of birth (where known), passport numbers (often with expiry dates), addresses in different jurisdictions, and contextual notes describing a person’s connection to a designated entity or role (for example, “Representative of the Marine Transport Office in Vietnam”; “General Manager, Global Interface Company Inc.”). Entities are listed with alternative names, addresses in multiple countries, business registration numbers (for example Kohas AG C.R. No. CH‑217.0.135.79‑4), and other identifiers such as SWIFT codes for banks (for example Cheil Credit Bank SWIFT KYCBKPPYXXX). Those multiple identifiers are the instrument’s primary mechanism for operationalising its listings in screening, compliance and enforcement workflows.

Other recurring features in the Schedule reflect practical categorisation: many items carry an “Additional information” field that links individuals to entities (for example, persons “connected to” Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) or managers of Mansudae Overseas Projects), or describe alleged activity (for example, “facilitated proliferation‑related activity”). Later Schedule entries add named cyber groups and joint ventures associated with DPRK state cyber operations (for example, Kimsuky, Lazarus Group, Andariel), and new items show the instrument’s use as an evolving tool to track a broad range of activities and networks connected to the DPRK.

Primary legal effect under this instrument is on the persons and entities named in Schedule 1. Section 3 expressly makes each person and entity in Schedule 1 a “designated person or entity” under paragraph 6(a) of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, and each person in Schedule 1 a “declared person” under paragraph 6(b) (s 3(1)-(2)). Those named individuals and corporate bodies are therefore formally brought within the Regulations’ sanctioning regime by this instrument.

Secondary effects extend to anyone who deals with, provides services to, or otherwise interacts with listed persons and entities. The instrument itself does not articulate the consequences of dealing with a listed person or entity; the nature of those consequences is set by the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 and related instruments. Nevertheless the Schedule is the central authoritative source for screening. As a matter of practical compliance, the instrument is material to banks, financial institutions, freight and shipping companies, lawyers, accountants, corporate compliance teams, insurers, auditors and other commercial counterparties who must determine whether proposed transactions involve names, aliases or corporate vehicles that appear in Schedule 1. Example entries link listed persons to third‑country addresses and to corporate roles (for example, item 11 Kil Jong Hun is “connected to” KOMID and identified as its representative in Namibia). Those links indicate that counterparties operating in Namibia, Russia, Vietnam, China, Egypt, Myanmar, Taiwan, Switzerland and other listed jurisdictions need to screen carefully.

Government agencies charged with enforcing Australian sanctions and export control regimes will also be affected operationally because the instrument provides the specific identifiers they use to determine the target of enforcement measures. The Schedule’s metadata , instrument of first designation, passport numbers, SWIFT codes and business registration numbers , is material to investigative work, asset tracing, and intergovernmental information sharing.

Individuals and entities with legitimate business relationships that rely on the same corporate or personal identifiers as a listed party may also be implicitly affected through increased compliance costs, false positives in screening systems, enhanced due diligence and possible disruption to banking, shipping and commercial arrangements. The instrument’s entries that show multiple aliases, alternate dates of birth, multiple passport numbers and multiple addresses increase the risk of matching errors in automated screening, which in turn affects third parties who must decide whether to proceed with transactions.

Finally, the instrument affects legal advisers, compliance officers and journalists who must rely on the Schedule to advise clients or report accurately. Those professionals will need to consider not only the listed names but also the continuation clauses in ss 5-8 that maintain the legal effect of certain entries across amendment instruments.

The instrument itself does not create stand‑alone criminal penalties or procedural rights; instead it functions as a listing instrument that operates by reference to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Section 3 places persons and entities into the category of “designated” and “declared” per paragraph 6 of those Regulations. Consequently the operative duties and rights that apply to these entries are those contained in the Regulations and any associated exemptions, authorisation or licensing mechanisms established by other Australian legislation or guidance. This instrument records who is captured; it does not describe how they are captured.

Two practical duties follow immediately for obligated third parties. First, parties subject to Australia’s sanctions compliance obligations must screen proposed and existing customers, suppliers, payment counterparts and counterparties against Schedule 1. The Schedule provides multiple identifiers for that purpose (names, alternative names, dates of birth, passport numbers, addresses, business registration and SWIFT codes). Second, organisations should treat the Schedule as definitive for the purpose of determining whether a person or entity has been listed under Australian autonomous DPRK sanctions, and they must monitor for amendments and continuation provisions which preserve listings despite changes to the Schedule’s structure (ss 5-8).

On the rights side, the instrument provides traceability to the “instrument of first designation” recorded in each Schedule item. Those traces enable a person or entity that believes it has been incorrectly listed to locate the originating amendment instrument and, as necessary, seek legal advice about avenues for administrative review, merits review or judicial review. The instrument itself does not create or describe the review mechanism; it merely supplies the metadata required to identify the listing’s provenance.

Other practical rights and duties flow from the Schedule’s data quality. For example, where a listed item includes passport numbers, expiry dates, and multiple alternative names (for example items 5 and 6 with Taiwanese passports; items 11 and 12 with KOMID passports), third parties have a duty to match on multiple data points to reduce false positives. That is a compliance duty in practice, inferred from the Schedule’s structure, not spelled out as a legal obligation in the instrument itself.

The continuation clauses in ss 5-8 impose an implicit duty on users of the list to be aware that designations declared prior to an amendment instrument’s commencement may nonetheless "continue to have effect". Organisations cannot assume that entries removed from a particular Part of Schedule 1 have ceased to be legally effective without checking the instrument’s transitional provisions and the Regulations.

This instrument does not set or describe penalties or enforcement procedures. It is a listing instrument; the text makes no express provision for criminal or civil penalties, nor does it prescribe administrative enforcement powers. Enforcement and penalty regimes are therefore matters that must be located in the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, in any primary legislation that establishes offences related to sanctions (not reproduced here), and in relevant enforcement agency guidance.

Despite that absence, the instrument contains identifiers which facilitate enforcement action by other bodies. The Schedule lists passport numbers, addresses, business registration numbers and SWIFT codes for banks and companies (for example, Cheil Credit Bank SWIFT KYCBKPPYXXX in Part 3). Those data points are the building blocks for asset tracing, transaction blocking, and information requests by competent authorities. The Schedule’s additional information fields frequently assert an entity’s function or a person’s role in an organisation connected to proliferation, shipping, finance, or cyber operations. That contextualisation provides enforcement agencies with pathways to investigate related financial flows, shipping movements and corporate relationships.

Sections 5 to 8 are enforcement‑relevant in the sense that they are saving/transitional provisions that preserve the legal effect of certain designations in the face of amendment. An enforcement agency cannot rely on a technical reordering of Schedule 1 under an amendment instrument as an indication that the legal force of a particular designation has lapsed if those continuation clauses apply.

For practitioners advising clients, the important inference is procedural: do not treat the Schedule as a list of advisory names alone. It is an instrumentally binding list that feeds into the wider regulatory enforcement landscape. Users must therefore consult the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 and relevant government enforcement guidance to identify the specific penalties and enforcement mechanisms that apply to dealings with a listed person or entity. Where enforcement action is contemplated, the Schedule’s metadata provides the evidentiary starting point to justify investigatory steps, asset restraint, or licence refusal.

The express statutory interaction in the instrument is with the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Section 3 expressly operates for the purposes of paragraph 6(a) and 6(b) of those Regulations, and s 4 states that Parts 3 and 4 of the instrument are made for the purposes of subregulation 9(3) of the Regulations. Those cross‑references make clear that the instrument is ancillary to the Regulations: it implements the Regulations’ listing mechanism by naming individuals and entities. Any legal effect , prohibitions on dealing, asset freezing, exemptions, licensing regimes, or procedural rights of review , derives from the Regulations and any other primary legislation cited or relied on by those Regulations.

Beyond the Regulations, the instrument will interact operationally with Australia’s financial regulation, export controls and criminal law frameworks even though those interactions are not specified in the text. For example the Schedule includes banks and financial institutions (Cheil Credit Bank, Hana Banking Corporation Limited, Songhwa Joint Bank), shipping and transport firms (Marine Transport Office, Sonbak Trading Corporation), and trading companies (Paeksol Trading Corporation, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Materials Company Limited). Where offences or regulatory prohibitions exist in the Regulations or in other Acts, those entities become touchpoints for cross‑regulatory enforcement: financial regulators, customs and border protection, and national security intelligence agencies will need to cross‑check the Schedule when enforcing money transfer rules, customs clearance, and export licensing.

The Schedule also interacts with private law obligations. The identification data supplied in Schedule 1 must be used by private sector compliance systems in sanctions screening. Contracts, supply chains and banking relationships that involve the listed names will raise contractual, fiduciary and AML/KYC issues. The instrument itself does not resolve questions of private remedies or contractual breach arising from dealing with a listed party; such disputes will engage general contract, tort and property law, with the Schedule providing evidence of a formal government listing.

Finally, the Schedule interacts with international instruments only insofar as the instrument records jurisdictions, passport numbers and cross‑border addresses. The instrument does not reference United Nations sanctions or foreign sanctions regimes, and it does not assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Practitioners should treat this instrument as part of Australia’s autonomous sanctions toolkit that will nevertheless overlap operationally with other jurisdictions’ lists when entities and persons operate in multiple jurisdictions.

The instrument itself documents a modest internal amendment history by referring to a number of amendment instruments and by recording for each Schedule entry the “Instrument of first designation” or the “Instrument of first declaration”. The parts dealing with continuation of effect (ss 5-8) are explicitly tied to named amendment instruments and years:

• s 5 preserves the effect of designations and declarations that existed immediately before the making of the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons,DPRK) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2020. The note under s 5(1) describes a repeal and reinsertion between Parts of Schedule 1 on commencement.
• s 6 preserves designations and declarations with reference to the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons,DPRK) Amendment (No. 3) Instrument 2022.
• s 7 preserves designations and declarations with reference to the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons,DPRK) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2023.
• s 8 preserves designations and declarations with reference to the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons,DPRK) Amendment (No. 3) Instrument 2023.

The Schedule’s per‑item “Instrument of first designation” entries provide additional amendment markers. For example, many items first appeared in the original 2012 List or in Amendment Lists 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2022, 2023 and 2025 as recorded against particular items. Representative examples:

• Kohas AG is recorded as first designated in the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities - DPRK) List 2012 (Part 3, item 2).
• Items such as O Kuk-ryol (item 3) first appear in an Amendment List 2013.
• A cluster of items connected to KOMID and Korea Ryunseng Trading Corporation appear with a 2015 or 2016 amendment provenance.
• Amendments in 2017 added numerous entities and persons associated with North Korea’s financial network and shipping operations.
• Later entries (2020, 2022, 2023, 2025) indicate continuing updates that add persons, banks, Russian companies, cyber groups and other entities.

The Schedule therefore functions as a running ledger of designations, and the instrument’s continuation clauses guard against unintended legal lapses during the mechanical process of moving, inserting or repealing entries across Parts of Schedule 1. The Schedule’s “instrument of first designation” metadata is critical for reconstructing the evolution of a particular listing and for locating the original amendment instrument that introduced an entry. The instrument does not, however, provide a consolidated chronology of every amendment action taken since 2012 beyond those explicit references and the first‑designation metadata.

For practitioners maintaining compliance, the practical lesson from the amendment history in this instrument is to track both (a) the current Schedule as contained in this instrument and (b) the amendment instruments it references. The continuation clauses mean that an item’s legal effect may survive structural changes to Schedule 1, and the per‑item metadata is the only internal pointer to the originating amendment instrument.

The instrument contains no references to any litigation, judicial review or tribunal decisions. It does not record challenges to listings, complaints, or any outcomes of legal proceedings. Where the Schedule records the "instrument of first designation" and the amendment instrument that introduced an item, those entries provide the documentary substrate that a person or entity might use to locate the decision‑making record for a listing; they do not, however, indicate whether the listing has been subject to administrative or judicial review.

Absent specific litigation references in the instrument, practitioners should assume that any legal challenges to listings , including administrative review, merits review or judicial review , will be conducted by reference to the substantive decision‑making powers in the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 and applicable Commonwealth judicial review procedures. The instrument’s continuation clauses (ss 5-8) make it particularly important for a person or entity contemplating a challenge to map the listing’s amendment history. If a listing has been preserved across amendment instruments under those clauses, the legal challenge may need to address both the original decision and subsequent amendment actions that preserved the listing’s effect.

Because the instrument does not include procedural detail about review mechanisms or rights to reasons, parties seeking to challenge a listing must identify the origin amendment instrument referenced in the Schedule, obtain the administrative record that accompanied that amendment decision, and then consider grounds for review under general administrative law. The Schedule’s metadata is useful procedural evidence in that discovery process, but the instrument itself provides no record of litigation outcomes or remedial orders.

1. The instrument is a list maker, not a statement of sanctions consequences. It designates and declares per the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (s 3), but it does not specify what legal consequences attach to a “designated” or “declared” classification. Users who read the Schedule and assume particular penalties or exemptions without consulting the Regulations risk error.

2. Continuation clauses may preserve listings even where items move between Parts or are subject to repeal. Sections 5-8 expressly preserve designations and declarations “as in force immediately before” the making of certain Amendment Instruments. Do not assume that a transferred or repealed Schedule item is de‑listed; check the continuation provisions and the originating amendment instrument.

3. Name variants, alternate dates of birth, and multiple passport numbers are common. Several items include multiple alternative names and multiple passport numbers or alternative dates of birth (for example items 5 and 6 with multiple passport numbers and alternative birth dates). Automated screening systems that match only on one field will generate false negatives and false positives. Use multi‑field matching (name, DOB, passport number, address) where possible.

4. Passport expiries and stale data are present. Many passport numbers include expiry dates or are noted as “expired” (for example KOMID representatives’ passports recorded as expired in 2017-2019). A passport that has expired does not negate the listing; it is an identifier only. Treat expiry data as an identifier that indicates the historical passport used for screening, not as a status flag.

5. Entities have multiple aliases and addresses across jurisdictions. Several corporate entries list alternative names and addresses in different countries (for example Global Interface Company Inc., Trans Merits Co Ltd, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Materials Company Limited). Matching must account for corporate name permutations and local transliterations.

6. Overlap between persons and entities. The Schedule often links people to entities directly in the “Additional information” field. That linkage means that a sanctions check against an entity name should also prompt checks against named individuals associated with that entity (for example, item 11 Kil Jong Hun is “connected to” KOMID). Conversely, a person who is listed may indicate a corporate relationship that triggers secondary risk.

7. Newer categories include cyber groups and collective aliases. Some 2025 entries list cyber groups and multiple aliases (for example Kimsuky, Lazarus Group, Andariel, and Chosun Expo). Those entries name collectives and multiple alternative names under a single item, which complicates matching and attribution.

8. The instrument contains cross‑references to other amendment instruments rather than a complete audit trail. The per‑item “instrument of first designation” field is a pointer but users will need to retrieve the named amendment instrument to see the decision context. Do not rely solely on the Schedule if you require the legal reasoning or the exact operative text of the amendment.

9. Location data can be vague or inconsistent. Some items list only country names or general addresses (for example “North Korea” or “Russia”), and others include full street addresses in third countries. The practical effect is that screening across global banking, shipping and customs databases will require locality‑sensitive matching logic.

10. The instrument does not contain a delisting or appeal mechanism. No procedure for seeking removal of a listing is articulated in this instrument. A person or entity seeking removal must locate the Regulations and amendatory instruments to determine any statutory review or appeal routes.

1. Treat this instrument as the authoritative Schedule for the DPRK autonomous sanctions list in Australia and incorporate it into sanctions screening systems immediately. Section 3 commits the Schedule items into the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 framework, so automated watchlists, client onboarding checks and transaction screening must be configured to match names, alternative names, passport numbers, addresses and other identifiers listed in Schedule 1.

2. Use multi‑factor matching. Because many entries include alternative names, multiple passport numbers, and varying dates of birth, compliance systems should match on multiple identifiers where available. For example match on combinations of full name plus passport number, or full name plus date of birth and address, rather than name alone.

3. Monitor continuation clauses and amendment instruments. Sections 5-8 preserve listings across specific amendment instruments. Compliance teams must monitor those amendment instruments and check whether the Schedule has been restructured in ways that are subject to continuation provisions. Maintain an audit trail that records which amendment instrument introduced each listing using the “instrument of first designation” metadata.

4. Screen related parties and corporate networks. The Schedule frequently links listed individuals to designated entities (for example KOMID, Marine Transport Office, Mansudae Overseas Projects). For transactions that touch an identified entity, screen officers and beneficial owners for links to listed persons and entities recorded in the Schedule.

5. Record and escalate hits for legal review. When a match is made, log the matching criteria, obtain the originating amendment instrument referenced in the Schedule and escalate promptly to legal counsel. Because this instrument does not specify the consequences of a match, legal counsel must consult the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 and any relevant enforcement guidance to decide whether to suspend dealings, apply for a licence, block funds, or take other action.

6. Maintain transaction and record retention. Keep contemporaneous records of screening results, the data used for matching (including passport numbers, aliases and addresses), and the outcome of the internal decision to proceed, refuse or seek a licence. Those records will be necessary to demonstrate compliance to enforcement bodies and to support any future legal challenge.

7. Adopt enhanced due diligence for third‑country connections. Many listed items have addresses or roles in third jurisdictions such as Russia, China, Vietnam, Egypt, Myanmar, Taiwan, Switzerland and Namibia. Enhanced due diligence should include source of funds checks, beneficial ownership verification, shipping audit trails and a review of correspondent banking relationships.

8. Update KYC and contractual clauses. KYC questionnaires and warranties in commercial contracts should be amended to require counterparties to declare they are not listed in Schedule 1 and to permit termination where undisclosed links to listed persons or entities are subsequently discovered. Include clauses requiring immediate notification if a counterparty becomes a listed person or entity.

9. Plan for false positives. Automated matching will generate false positives because of common names and transliteration differences. Establish an internal procedure for rapid verification using the Schedule’s passport numbers, DOB and address fields to confirm true matches and reduce unnecessary disruption.

10. Seek targeted legal advice. The instrument does not describe enforcement measures, penalties or review pathways. If an organisation faces a proposed transaction involving a listed person or entity, it should obtain legal advice on whether to seek an authorisation or licence under the Regulations, whether to suspend or terminate transactions, and the procedural steps required to challenge a listing. Use the “instrument of first designation” entry for each Schedule item to locate the original amendment instrument and any administrative record relevant to review.

By treating this instrument as the authoritative list of DPRK related designations and by using the Schedule’s granular identifiers, compliance teams, lawyers, accountants and investigators can translate the list into practical screening rules, escalation paths and forensic checks.