Auditor General Act 2006

The Act defines and relies on a set of core statutory concepts that determine who and what falls within the Auditor General’s remit, how audits are to be conducted and where statutory powers attach.

Accounts: defined broadly to include records of transactions in respect of moneys or other property expressed in monetary units, and books, documents, vouchers and related records from which such records are compiled (s 4(1)). This broad definition underpins the Auditor General’s access and copying powers (s 35(2)).

Audit: expressly includes examination, investigation, inspection and review (s 4(1)). The definition is capacious and aligns the statutory audit function with both financial and performance‑type scrutiny (see s 18(2) enumerating performance and compliance purposes).

Auditing and Assurance Standards: the Act mandates that audits are to be carried out having regard to the Auditing and Assurance Standards issued by the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (s 4(1); s 28(1)(a); s 41). This anchors audit technique and reporting to national standards.

Agency, accountable authority and subsidiary body: several terms are cross‑referenced to the Financial Management Act 2006 (s 4(2) and 4(3)). The Act’s reach into subsidiary bodies is framed by definitions of local subsidiary and foreign subsidiary (s 16(1)), with differential statutory mechanics for each (ss 16(2)-(6)).

Related entity: defined by the statutory trigger in s 17(1), being an entity that performs agency functions in partnership, instrumentally, or by trust; the Auditor General may audit those related entities to the extent they carry out agency functions (s 17(2)).

Authorised person and written authority: the Act allows the Auditor General to authorise persons to exercise powers under the information‑gathering division, and requires those authorised persons to carry written authority when entering premises (ss 33; 35(1), 35(6)). The Act provides specific procedural boundaries on entry and access.

Independence and discretion: the Act declares the Auditor General an independent officer of Parliament (s 7(1)) and gives “complete discretion” in the performance of functions, including the content and timing of audits and reports (s 7(5)-(6)). That independence is, however, coupled with requirements to have regard to parliamentary audit priorities (s 8) and to consult the Treasurer in limited circumstances (s 14(3)).

Confidentiality and admissibility: the Act imposes statutory confidentiality obligations on OAG staff and others involved in auditing (s 46), while separately providing that answers or documents produced under compulsion are not admissible in evidence against the person in other civil or criminal proceedings, with specified exceptions (s 36(3)). The Act also accommodates confidentiality directions under the Financial Management Act, subject to Ministerial advice (s 37).

Fees and arrangements: the Auditor General may determine fees for statutory audits (s 21) and may undertake audits or services by arrangement for external persons or bodies, with some limits on the use of the Act’s other powers in those arranged audits (s 22). Section 22(4) specifically excludes section 30(b) and Part 4 Division 2 in relation to audits under s 22, which limits the compulsion and legal opinion powers when audits are performed by arrangement.

Independent audit of the OAG: the Act creates a structural firewall by preventing the Auditor General from auditing the OAG and requiring the Governor to appoint a registered company auditor to audit the OAG (s 38(1)-(2); ss 39-42). That distinguishes internal OAG audit arrangements from the Auditor General’s external audit functions.

Appointment and tenure mechanics: Schedule 1 prescribes the appointment process, the requirement for consultation with parliamentary leaders and committees before appointment, a single 10‑year term with no reappointment (Sch 1 cl 1(4)-(5)), remuneration rules (cl 2), limits on other employment (cl 3), and removal/suspension mechanics which require addresses from both Houses of Parliament (cl 7).

These main concepts determine the legal reach of the Auditor General, the procedural tools for obtaining information and access, and the institutional arrangements for accountability and independence.

The Act assigns roles, duties and compliance obligations across a defined set of public and private actors. Below is a structured list of parties affected and the concrete obligations or rights the Act places on them, with section references.

The State and Parliament: the Auditor General is an independent officer of Parliament and reports to both Houses (s 7(1); s 24(1)). Parliament influences priorities through either House or designated committees, which the Auditor General must have regard to (s 8).

Auditor General and OAG staff: the Act establishes the office, prescribes appointment, term and conditions (s 6; Sch 1), gives the office broad audit powers (s 27) and information‑gathering powers (ss 33-35), imposes confidentiality obligations on OAG staff and associates (s 46), and protects them from civil claims for actions done under the Act, except where malicious and without reasonable cause (s 45).

Deputy Auditor General and Acting arrangements: the Deputy Auditor General is created and may act as Auditor General when required, with specified declaration and consultation requirements (s 10; Sch 1 cl 8-9). These arrangements affect internal succession and continuity.

Agencies and accountable authorities: agencies must have their accounts audited at least annually (s 14(1)), must provide financial statements, key performance indicators and related information for audit (s 15(1)), and are subject to examinations and investigations (s 18). Accountable authorities must notify the Auditor General if an agency performs functions through related entities (s 17(1)). Agencies with local subsidiaries must ensure those subsidiaries appoint the Auditor General as auditor where the subsidiary has power to appoint (s 16(2)).

Local subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries: local subsidiaries that appoint the Auditor General become subject to the Auditor General’s audit powers (s 16(3)-(5)). For foreign subsidiaries, where the subsidiary has the power to appoint an auditor, agencies must exercise control so the foreign subsidiary appoints a person nominated by the Auditor General, and that appointed auditor must report as requested (s 16(6)-(7)).

Related entities and private partners: where agencies perform functions in partnership, through another body, or by trust, the accountable authority must notify the Auditor General (s 17(1)), and the Auditor General may audit those entities to the extent they perform agency functions (s 17(2)). Private parties involved in such arrangements therefore face potential audit and reporting obligations.

Treasurer and Ministers: the Auditor General must consult the Treasurer before dispensing with audits (s 14(3)). The Auditor General must also provide opinions to Ministers and accountable authorities (s 15(5)). Ministers may advise the Auditor General for confidentiality purposes under s 37, which will prevent inclusion of certain material in a report to Parliament.

Grant recipients and persons receiving State funds: the Act permits the Auditor General to audit accounts of persons to whom the Government has granted or advanced money at the Treasurer’s request (s 19). Recipients of such funding should expect potential statutory audit scrutiny and associated record‑keeping obligations.

Committees of Parliament and Clerks: the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates and Financial Operations Committee have roles in setting audit priorities and in requesting audits (s 8, s 20). Reports of the Auditor General are transmitted to Clerks when Parliament is not sitting and are taken to have been laid before the House (s 24(4); s 26).

Independent auditor for the OAG: the Governor appoints an independent auditor (a registered company auditor) to audit the OAG; that auditor and employees of the independent auditor operate under the Act for OAG audits (s 38; s 41). The independent auditor is entitled to fees determined by the Treasurer (s 42).

Occupiers of premises and other persons with custody of records: persons with custody of accounts, documents and records are subject to directions to produce documents and to allow access; occupiers must provide reasonable facilities for authorised persons entering premises (s 34; s 35(4)-(5)). Failure to comply attracts fines (ss 34(4), 35(5)).

Persons who assist the Auditor General: people appointed to assist in a particular matter and authorised persons must preserve confidentiality as prescribed (s 46). They are also protected from civil liability for acts done under the Act, except where malicious and without reasonable cause (s 45).

In short, the Act affects core public finance actors (Treasurer, agencies, accountable authorities, parliament), statutory officeholders (Auditor General, Deputy, OAG staff), private and quasi‑public bodies that partner with or are subsidiary to agencies, recipients of government funding, and those who hold records or premises relevant to audits. The Act places on them obligations to maintain records, permit access, respond to directions within 14 days (s 34(4)), and, in some cases, to appoint or accept the Auditor General or a nominated auditor as statutory auditor (s 16).

This section summarises the principal statutory duties assigned by the Act, and the rights or protections the Act confers. Citations identify the specific provisions.

Duties and powers of the Auditor General

• Duty to audit the Public Ledger (s 12). This is an express statutory duty and forms part of the Auditor General’s annual audit responsibilities.
• Duty to audit the Annual Report on State Finances and provide an opinion (s 13). The Auditor General audits the Treasurer’s Annual Report on State Finances and the Government Financial Responsibility Act 2000 provisions apply (s 13(2)).
• Annual audit duty for agencies: the Auditor General must audit an agency’s accounts at least once per financial year (s 14(1)), subject to a limited dispensation power (s 14(2)-(4)) that requires consultation with the Treasurer and notification to parliamentary committees (s 14(3)-(4)). The dispensation cannot be exercised for three consecutive years (s 14(5)).
• Duty to audit agencies’ financial statements, key performance indicators and related information and to prepare and sign an opinion on those audits (s 15). The opinion must state whether financial statements are based on proper accounts and present fairly, whether controls are sufficiently adequate and whether key performance indicators are relevant and fairly represented (s 15(3)). The opinion is provided to the agency’s Minister and the accountable authority (s 15(5)).
• Examinations and investigations: the Auditor General may carry out targeted examinations or investigations into accounting and financial management systems, compliance with legislative provisions and policies, and efficiency or effectiveness of agencies and related entities (s 18).
• Power to carry out audits at the Treasurer’s or certain parliamentary committees’ request (ss 19-20).
• Power to determine whether to charge audit fees, and to set amounts and liable parties (s 21).
• Discretion and independence: the Auditor General is to act independently and has complete discretion in performance of functions subject to the Act; in particular the Auditor General is not subject to direction from anyone as to whether or not a particular audit is to be conducted, how it is to be conducted, whether a report is to be made or its content, or priority except that the Auditor General must have regard to audit priorities of Parliament (s 7(5)-(6); s 8).
• Delegation and appointment powers: the Auditor General may appoint persons to carry out all or part of an audit (s 29), delegate powers to OAG staff or appointed persons within specific limits (s 31), and may accept appointment under the Corporations Act for auditing local subsidiaries (s 16(4)).
• Right to obtain legal opinion from the State Solicitor on questions concerning the Auditor General’s functions or questions of law relating to an audit (s 30).

Duties and obligations of agencies, accountable authorities and other persons

• Agencies must provide the Auditor General with financial statements and related information under the Financial Management Act (s 15(1)).
• Agencies must notify the Auditor General where they perform functions through related entities (s 17(1)), giving the Auditor General the statutory option to audit those related entities to the extent they relate to agency functions (s 17(2)).
• Where an agency has a local subsidiary with power to appoint an auditor, the agency must exercise control to ensure the local subsidiary appoints the Auditor General as its auditor (s 16(2)). Where a foreign subsidiary has power to appoint an auditor, the agency must exercise control to ensure it appoints a person nominated by the Auditor General and that the appointed auditor provides requested reports (s 16(6)-(7)).
• Persons can be directed to provide information, to attend and give evidence, and to produce documents by written notice for the purpose of an audit (s 34(1)). Such directions may require verification, written answers or answers under oath or affirmation (s 34(2)-(3)). Failure to comply without reasonable excuse within 14 days is an offence (s 34(4)).
• Occupiers of premises must provide authorised persons with reasonable facilities for effective exercise of powers under s 35(5), subject to authorised persons producing written authority on request (s 35(6)).

Rights, immunities and protections

• Protection from liability for the Auditor General, persons acting on behalf of the Auditor General, and the independent auditor for acts or omissions done under or apparently under the Act, except where it is proved the act or omission was malicious and without reasonable and probable cause (s 45).
• Confidentiality obligations: OAG personnel and persons assisting in audits must preserve confidentiality of matters learned in the course of duties, subject to limited exceptions connected with administration, proceedings or specific parliamentary committees (s 46). Breach attracts specified fines (s 46(2), (4)).
• Evidence protection for persons compelled to provide information: a person is not excused on grounds that their response may incriminate them (s 36(1)); the compulsion overrides other secrecy duties under written law (s 36(2)); and answers or documents produced under compulsion are generally not admissible in evidence against that person in other civil or criminal proceedings except for proceedings under this Division or Chapter XX of The Criminal Code (s 36(3)). There is a further Evidence Act exception noted in the Act (s 36(4)).
• The Governor must appoint a registered company auditor to audit the OAG and that independent auditor is entitled to a fee determined by the Treasurer (ss 38, 42); the independent auditor must carry out OAG audits in accordance with Auditing and Assurance Standards (s 41).
• The Auditor General may charge fees for audits or services and determine the liable payer (s 21), and may enter into arrangements to carry out audits or provide services for payment (s 22). For audits carried out under arrangement, certain powers (section 30(b) and Part 4 Division 2) do not apply in relation to those audits, which alters the audit toolbox available to the Auditor General when acting commercially (s 22(4)).

Collectively, these duties and rights structure the audit regime, allocate cost responsibilities, create compulsion and access powers, fortify independence and provide confidentiality and liability protections for auditors and those assisting them.

The Act combines administrative, civil and penal levers to enforce compliance with its audit and information‑gathering regime. The statutory enforcement tools include fines for specific failures, protection against civil claims for auditors, procedural mechanisms tied to parliamentary accountability and specific evidentiary rules about compelled material.

Monetary penalties and specified offences

• Failure to comply with a written direction to provide information, attend and give evidence, or produce documents under s 34 within 14 days without reasonable excuse is an offence carrying a fine of $50 000 (s 34(4)). That is the Act’s primary pecuniary enforcement for non‑compliance with compulsion directions.
• Failure by an occupier to provide reasonable facilities to an authorised person seeking to exercise powers to enter and remain on premises under s 35(4)-(5) is an offence carrying a fine of $50 000 (s 35(5)). These fines are statutory maxima stated in the Act text.
• Confidentiality breaches: persons to whom the confidentiality obligations in s 46(2) apply must preserve confidentiality and must not communicate information except as permitted; breach of s 46(2) attracts a fine of $50 000. There is also a separate fine for improperly dealing with a summary of findings given under s 25 (s 46(4), penalty $50 000). The Act sets these fines rather than specifying imprisonment or other sanctions.
• The Act identifies criminal procedure exceptions when compelled evidence may be used in proceedings under the Division (s 36(3)) and under The Criminal Code Chapter XX (s 36(3)(d)).

Protections and limits on civil liability

• Section 45 protects the Auditor General, persons acting on behalf of or with the authority of the Auditor General, and the independent auditor from civil action or claims for damages for acts or omissions done under or apparently under the Act or for the purpose of giving effect to the Act, except where it is proved the thing was done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause (s 45(1)-(2)). That provision reduces the risk of successful civil claims against auditors acting in good faith in carrying out their statutory functions.

Evidence and admissibility rules

• Answers, explanations and documents produced under compulsion are, subject to listed exceptions, not admissible in evidence against the person in civil or criminal proceedings (s 36(3)). The Act preserves use of compelled material for prosecution under the Division or certain Criminal Code offences. There is also a specific reference allowing such compelled answers to be the subject of questions under the Evidence Act 1906 s 21 (s 36(4)), which indicates a limited mode of use in proceedings. These provisions influence how compelled disclosures can be used in downstream enforcement or litigation, reducing deterrence against cooperation by protecting compellability from being used in unrelated prosecutions.

Administrative enforcement and parliamentary accountability

• The Auditor General’s reports are the primary accountability mechanism to Parliament (s 24). The Act prescribes annual reporting on matters of significance arising from the performance of functions, including drawing attention to failures by accountable authorities, statements of major audit approach changes, and opinions about Ministers’ decisions not to provide information to Parliament (s 24(1)-(2)). The Auditor General may also prepare reports on examinations or investigations (s 25). Transmission to Clerks when Parliament is not sitting causes the material to be laid before each House (s 26). These channels are enforcement levers in the sense of public and parliamentary scrutiny rather than criminal sanction.
• The Joint Standing Committee on Audit is mandated, including having budgetary recommendation roles in relation to the OAG and being required to conduct statutory reviews of the operation of the Act every five years (ss 43-44; s 48). The Committee’s recommendations and reviews function as institutional oversight.

Search and entry powers

• The Auditor General may cause searches and extracts to be taken from things in the custody of the Treasurer or any agency office without paying any fee for doing so (s 35(3)). The Act provides for entry and presence at premises by the Auditor General or authorised persons at reasonable times for audit purposes, subject to production of written authority (s 35(4)-(6)). These operational powers facilitate enforcement of audit demands without separate warrant processes specified in the Act, though the Act does impose procedural checks (written authority requirement).

Limits on enforcement and procedural protections

• Where arrangements are made under s 22 for the Auditor General to provide audits or services by arrangement, some statutory powers are not available in relation to those audits; specifically, s 30(b) and Part 4 Division 2 do not apply to audits carried out under s 22 (s 22(4)). Part 4 Division 2 contains information‑gathering powers (ss 33-37). The exclusion limits the Auditor General’s ability to compel evidence or use State Solicitor opinion powers in the context of contracted commercial work.

Removal and suspension mechanics for the Auditor General

• The process for suspension or removal of the Auditor General is administrative and parliamentary: the Governor may remove or suspend on addresses from both Houses of Parliament (Sch 1 cl 7(1)). The Governor may also suspend the Auditor General pending the laying of a full statement of grounds and a parliamentary address (Sch 1 cl 7(3)-(5)). These provisions can be regarded as constraints on the officeholder’s security and a mechanism for parliamentary enforcement of standards of competence and conduct.

In summary, enforcement under the Act relies on a mix of criminal fines for specified failures, statutory immunity for auditors, admissibility limits on compelled evidence, operational powers for access and search, and parliamentary reporting and committee oversight. The Act’s enforcement approach is therefore a blend of coercive statutory powers targeted at compelled cooperation, protective immunities for auditors, and public accountability via Parliament.

The Act is heavily cross‑referenced to other written laws and is designed to operate alongside, and in some respects to override, competing duties under other statutes. The Act explicitly incorporates or interacts with the Financial Management Act 2006, the Government Financial Responsibility Act 2000, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Public Sector Management Act 1994 and other written laws. The following paragraphs outline the principal statutory cross‑links and operational interactions as set out in the Act text.

Financial Management Act 2006 and Financial Management architecture

• The Act uses terms defined in the Financial Management Act 2006 and states that those terms have the same meaning in this Act unless a contrary intention appears (s 4(2)). Accountable authority, agency and subsidiary body are taken from the Financial Management Act (s 4(3)). Audits of financial statements and key performance indicators are performed on material submitted under Financial Management Act s 63(1) (s 15(1)). The Act also refers to information that is the subject of a notice under Financial Management Act s 82(1) in relation to confidential information and the Minister’s power to advise non‑disclosure (s 37). These cross‑references make the Auditor General’s statutory audit functions complementary to the financial governance framework in the Financial Management Act.

Government Financial Responsibility Act 2000

• The Auditor General is to audit the Annual Report on State Finances submitted under the Government Financial Responsibility Act 2000 s 14B(1), and that Act’s s 14B(2) applies to the audit (s 13). This interaction means the Auditor General’s audit provides assurance over the State’s consolidated financial reporting as required by that separate statute.

Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth)

• The Act incorporates the Corporations Act in two ways. First, it uses the Corporations Act definition for “company” when defining foreign and local subsidiaries (s 16(1)); second, for local subsidiaries, the Auditor General may accept appointment under the Corporations Act as the auditor of a local subsidiary (s 16(4)). For foreign subsidiaries, the Act contemplates nomination rights for the Auditor General where the foreign subsidiary has power to appoint an auditor (s 16(6)-(7)). The Corporations Act therefore operates alongside the Auditor General Act for corporate entities related to agencies, and auditors appointed under either legal regime may be the same person where accepted by the Auditor General.

Public Sector Management Act 1994

• The Act explicitly states that the office of Auditor General is not an office in the Public Service and that several provisions of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 do not apply to the Auditor General (s 9(1)-(2)). Parts 3, 5 and 6 of the Public Sector Management Act apply to and in relation to the Auditor General only to the extent provided in s 4(6) of that Act (s 9(3)). The 2010 amendment (Public Sector Reform Act 2010 s 72) amended s 9; the compilation table notes that change (see compilation table). This interaction separates the Auditor General institutionally from the Public Service employment framework, while retaining limited applicability of Public Sector Management Act provisions as provided.

Other written laws and overriding of secrecy duties

• The Act provides that the Auditor General’s functions include functions given under other written laws, and that the Act extends to audits the Auditor General is authorised to carry out under other written laws (s 5). Critically, the Act also states that a person must give information or produce documents as required under s 34 despite any duty of secrecy or confidentiality under another written law, and that doing so does not make the person guilty of an offence under that other written law (s 36(2)). The Act therefore creates a statutory override of conflicting secrecy obligations, while simultaneously protecting the compelled person by limiting admissibility in other proceedings (s 36(3)).

Evidence law and admissibility

• The Act states in s 36(4) that despite inadmissibility protections, a person may in civil or criminal proceedings be asked about an answer under the Evidence Act 1906 s 21. The compilation table also records an uncommenced provision referencing the Evidence Act 2025 s 492(2) (uncommenced), indicating possible future interactions between evidence law reforms and the Auditor General Act; as those provisions are uncommenced they are not operative in the text provided.

Interaction with the Corporations Act for registered company auditors

• The Governor’s power to appoint an independent auditor of the OAG is limited to a person who is a registered company auditor under the Corporations Act (s 38(2)). The independent auditor must carry out the OAG audit in accordance with Auditing and Assurance Standards (s 41) and provide opinions in the same form the Auditor General provides for other agencies (s 40).

Regulatory instruments and delegated powers

• The Governor may make regulations prescribing matters required or permitted to be prescribed under the Act (s 47). The Act also allows the Auditor General to delegate powers to staff (s 31) and to seek State Solicitor opinions on questions of law (s 30). These delegation and regulatory mechanisms interact with the administrative law framework that governs delegated instruments and statutory delegations.

Parliamentary committees and legislative oversight

• The Act gives the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates and Financial Operations Committee roles in determining audit priorities and requesting audits (s 8; s 20). The Joint Standing Committee on Audit is established by the Houses of Parliament (s 43) and has mandated roles including budgetary recommendations and conducting periodic reviews of the Act (s 44; s 48). Those parliamentary mechanisms interact with the constitutional and standing orders framework for committee powers and advice.

Overall, the Auditor General Act is designed to operate within the State’s existing financial management and corporate regulation framework, relying on cross‑references to the Financial Management Act, Corporations Act, Government Financial Responsibility Act and the Public Sector Management Act while also asserting specific overrides where information‑gathering or confidentiality tensions arise (notably s 36).

The compilation table and the Act text itself document a limited amendment history and some uncommenced provisions. The Act as compiled includes the following recorded legislative events.

Original enactment and commencement

• Auditor General Act 2006, No. 75 of 2006, assented 21 December 2006, commenced 1 February 2007 (see s 2 and compilation table entry). The Act’s basic institutional architecture (appointment, functions, powers and reporting) dates from that enactment.

Subsequent amendment recorded in compilation table

• Public Sector Reform Act 2010, No. 39 of 2010 s 72, amending s 9 of the Auditor General Act: the compilation table records assent 1 October 2010 and commencement 1 December 2010 (see compilation table). The Act text as provided includes an editorial note indicating that section 9 was amended by No. 39 of 2010 s 72, and the current s 9 sets out the limited application of the Public Sector Management Act to the Auditor General (s 9(1)-(3)). The compilation table provides the enactment history but does not provide further explanation of the policy intent; the statutory text reflects the substantive outcome of that amendment, namely clarification of employment and administrative arrangements between the Auditor General and the public sector regime.

Uncommenced provisions recorded in the compilation table

• Auditor General Amendment Act 2022, No. 43 of 2022, s 3‑9: assented 29 November 2022; marked in the compilation table as “To be proclaimed” (see Uncommenced provisions table). The compilation table therefore records an amendment Act whose specified sections have not yet been proclaimed into operation as at the compilation date. The text provided does not include the content of those amendment provisions, only the compilation table note that they are uncommenced.
• Evidence Act 2025, No. 15 of 2025, s 492(2): assented 25 September 2025; marked “To be proclaimed”. The compilation table notes a cross‑reference to an Evidence Act provision that is uncommenced. The Act text itself contains a reference to the Evidence Act 1906 in s 36(4), but the compilation notes the later Evidence Act 2025 provision as uncommenced.

Schedule and transitional provisions

• Part 7 contains transitional and saving provisions (ss 49-50) that preserve incumbency and pre‑existing audit appointments made under the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985, with specific rules for the incumbent Auditor General and treating prior appointments as made under the new Act (ss 49-50). Those transitional rules were operative upon commencement.

What the compilation table does not show

• The compilation table lists only the specific Acts and sections recorded; it does not include any delegated instrument changes, internal administrative directions, or subsequent regulations made under s 47. Where an amendment Act has not been proclaimed, the compilation table flags that fact but does not display the content of the amendments.

Practical effect for compliance and transition

• The 2010 amendment is visible in the current s 9 language. The uncommenced amendments listed in the compilation table mean that practitioners must check proclamation status for any 2022 Auditor General Amendment Act provisions or for Evidence Act 2025 interactions before assuming those changes are in force. The Act therefore has an amendment history that is modest in the compilation shown, but with outstanding amendments not yet in operation as recorded in the uncommenced provisions table.

All references in this section are to the compilation table and the Act text provided.

The Act text, the compilation table and the materials supplied do not record any judicial decisions, appeals or other litigation history interpreting the Auditor General Act 2006. The compilation contains only legislative history details and uncommenced provisions. There are no cases, reported judgments or tribunal decisions cited in the Act text provided.

The statute, by its structure, creates multiple potential legal questions that could generate litigation or judicial review. The Act itself identifies certain areas where legal contestation is foreseeable, though the source does not supply case law. The following are concrete points of legal friction that the Act’s provisions render litigable, set out as potential dispute vectors grounded in the statutory text:

• Scope and limits of information powers: The Auditor General’s written directions to require information, attendance and documents under s 34, and the entitlement to enter premises under s 35, could give rise to disputes about the scope of “relevance” to an audit, the reasonableness of time and scope of directions, the sufficiency of written authority, and compliance with procedural fairness. Parties might seek judicial review of directions on jurisdictional or statutory construction grounds.
• Interaction with privilege and secrecy: Section 36 overrides duties of secrecy in other written laws and requires compulsion despite potential self‑incrimination claims; litigation could test the boundaries of legal professional privilege or the use and protection of withheld material, especially where the Act’s inadmissibility protections (s 36(3)) are relied upon or contested in concurrent proceedings. The Act explicitly asks the Joint Standing Committee on Audit to review adequacy of information‑gathering powers in relation to claims of legal professional privilege and Cabinet documents (s 48(2)(c)), suggesting the legislature anticipated contested issues in that area.
• Audits of related entities and subsidiaries: The duties imposed on agencies to ensure subsidiaries appoint the Auditor General as auditor (s 16(2)) or to ensure foreign subsidiaries appoint a person nominated by the Auditor General (s 16(6)) could be the subject of disputes in corporate or administrative law, especially where corporate governance or overseas law constraints limit the agency’s ability to secure such appointments. Litigation could address whether an agency discharged its duty to exercise control as required by s 16.
• Confidentiality and disclosure to Parliament: The Auditor General’s obligation to submit reports and the Minister’s power to advise non‑disclosure under s 37 (where the Minister decides it is not in the public interest to disclose information mentioned in s 37(1)) might produce disputes over what may be included in reports laid before Parliament, including potential contestation over Ministerial advice and the Auditor General’s compliance with statutory reporting duties (s 24).
• Removal and suspension mechanics: Schedule 1 cl 7 gives the Governor the power to remove or suspend the Auditor General on addresses from both Houses, and to suspend where satisfied of incapacity, incompetence, misconduct or insolvency. Challenges could arise over the exercise of those powers, the sufficiency of evidence, or procedural fairness in suspension or removal proceedings.

Because the source supplied does not list precedent, any practitioner confronting litigation risk must treat the above as statutory points that could be litigated and should check up‑to‑date judicial databases and legal practice resources for any cases that may have been decided after the compilation date. The Act’s text and s 48 signal potential future review or reform in areas likely to attract litigation, particularly legal professional privilege and Cabinet documents in the context of audit information‑gathering.

This section lists practical traps and less obvious statutory features that lawyers, accountants, compliance officers and senior managers should be aware of when dealing with the Auditor General’s powers and obligations under the Act. Each gotcha references the relevant statutory provision.

1. Discretion and parliamentary priorities: The Act gives the Auditor General “complete discretion” in performing functions and explicitly bars directions from others in relation to audit decisions, methods and report content (s 7(5)-(6)). At the same time, the Auditor General must have regard to audit priorities of Parliament as determined by either House or specified committees (s 8). The practical consequence is that audit choice and prioritisation are concentrated in the Auditor General, but there is a statutory obligation to consider parliamentary priorities; the interplay may create perceived or actual tension when Parliament’s priorities compete with the Auditor General’s internal assessment of risk or materiality.

2. Dispensation power limited but potent: The Auditor General may dispense with all or part of an agency’s audit for a financial year (s 14(2)), but must consult the Treasurer before doing so and notify two parliamentary committees if the power is exercised (s 14(3)-(4)). The power cannot be used for three consecutive financial years (s 14(5)). Agencies should not assume dispensations are indefinite; the procedural consultation plus the notification requirement create political and accountability checks that may constrain use of the power.

3. Subsidiary appointment obligations and overseas law friction: For local subsidiaries that have the power to appoint an auditor, the agency must ensure the subsidiary appoints the Auditor General (s 16(2)). For foreign subsidiaries the requirement is to ensure appointment of a person nominated by the Auditor General (s 16(6)). In practice, corporate governance constraints, foreign law or shareholder rights could limit an agency’s ability to force such appointments. Agencies should document how they “exercise control” to meet s 16 obligations, and be aware that the Act treats failure to do so as a statutory duty rather than simply an administrative preference.

4. Arranged audits do not carry full compulsion powers: The Act permits the Auditor General to carry out audits or services by arrangement and to charge fees (s 22). However, s 22(4) provides that section 30(b) and Part 4 Division 2 do not apply in relation to audits carried out under s 22. Part 4 Division 2 contains information‑gathering powers, including s 34 that compels information, attendance and production. Therefore, where the Auditor General carries out audits by arrangement (for example, commercial or fee‑for‑service work), the strong compulsion and legal opinion powers are not available for that work. Parties contracting with the OAG should understand that the legal toolkit differs for statutory audits versus arranged audits.

5. Written authority and on‑the‑spot proof: Authorised persons must carry written authority when entering premises; an authorised person cannot enter or remain on premises if they fail to produce the written authority when asked by the occupier (s 35(6)). Auditors and OAG staff must ensure that authorised persons have immediately producible written authority to avoid denial of access.

6. Tight timeframes to respond and civil penalties: Directions under s 34 must be complied with within 14 days or the recipient commits an offence (s 34(4)). Agencies and private persons should put procedures in place to identify and respond to s 34 notices promptly, including escalation to legal counsel where privilege or confidentiality is asserted, because the statutory protection of confidentiality is limited by the Act (s 36(2)-(3)).

7. Compulsion overrides other secrecy duties but limits admissibility: The Act requires production of information despite other secrecy duties (s 36(2)), and compelled material is generally not admissible in evidence against the person in other proceedings (s 36(3)). This dual effect means compelled answers can be required but have constrained downstream use; legal advisers must understand both the compulsion and the protective admissibility rules when counselling clients.

8. Confidentiality obligations with criminal penalties for breaches: Section 46 imposes confidentiality obligations on OAG staff, persons appointed to assist, the independent auditor, and the Auditor General. Breaches attract fines of $50 000 (s 46(2) and s 46(4)). Persons handling draft findings or summaries of findings must be careful about sharing or reproducing materials while preserving the statutory right to make submissions under s 25(2).

9. Auditor General cannot audit the OAG: Section 38(1) excludes the Auditor General from auditing the OAG; the Governor must appoint an independent auditor for the OAG (s 38(2)). The independent auditor must be a registered company auditor, must audit OAG accounts annually and prepare opinions under s 40. The institutional firewall means queries about OAG governance or internal control will be dealt with by a separate auditor, which affects internal review and accountability processes.

10. Removal and suspension mechanics are political and procedural: Removal requires addresses from both Houses and suspension may be effected by the Governor when satisfied of incapacity, incompetence, misconduct, contravention of employment limits, or insolvency (Sch 1 cl 7). The Governor may suspend pending parliamentary action, but detailed time limits and restoration mechanisms apply (Sch 1 cl 7(3)-(5)). Practitioners advising an Auditor General or Parliament should be mindful that the statutory process is both political and procedural, with specified timelines.

11. Fee determination and who pays: The Auditor General decides whether a fee is to be charged for an audit under Division 1 and determines who is liable to pay (s 21(1)). For audits by arrangement the Act also contemplates payment terms (s 22(3)). Entities subject to audits should not assume fees are chargeable only to third parties; the statutory discretion allows the Auditor General to allocate costs as deemed appropriate.

12. Ministerial advice can exclude material from reports to Parliament: Section 37 allows the Minister to advise the Auditor General that it would not be in the public interest for certain information to be disclosed, in which case the Auditor General must not include that information in a report to Parliament. That safety valve may affect transparency and the content of public reports, and creates a decision point where Ministerial advice and Auditor General judgment intersect.

Each of these gotchas flows directly from the statutory text and may have material administrative and legal consequences for agencies, boards, external advisers, and private partners engaged with government functions.

This section sets out practical, source‑grounded steps and procedures for different parties to comply with the Auditor General Act 2006. The guidance is procedural and statutory; it does not substitute for legal advice in specific circumstances. Citations to the Act are provided so recipients can verify the statutory basis of each compliance action.

For agencies and accountable authorities

1. Maintain comprehensive accounts and records: The Act defines accounts widely (s 4(1)), and the Auditor General is entitled to full and free access to all accounts, documents, systems and records the Auditor General considers relevant (s 35(2)). Agencies should ensure records are accurate, retained and searchable to allow timely production on request. Adopt a records map that links corporate systems to the statutory “accounts” definition.

2. Prepare financial statements and key performance indicators in compliance with the Financial Management Act and be ready for audit: The Auditor General audits statements submitted under Financial Management Act s 63(1) (s 15(1)). Ensure internal controls, governance documentation and KPI methodology are documented to meet s 15(3)(a)-(c) opinion testing.

3. If performing functions through related entities, notify the Auditor General in writing without delay: The accountable authority must notify the Auditor General where agency functions are performed in partnership, through another body, or by trust (s 17(1)). Make the notification early and document the scope of functions performed by the related entity.

4. For subsidiaries, ensure appointment of statutory auditors: If a local subsidiary has power to appoint an auditor, exercise control to ensure it appoints the Auditor General as auditor (s 16(2)). For foreign subsidiaries with appointment power, ensure the Auditor General’s nominated auditor is appointed and that requested reports are transmitted to the Auditor General (s 16(6)-(7)). Document the exercise of control and keep correspondence evidencing compliance.

5. Respond to s 34 directions promptly: A person must comply with directions under s 34 within 14 days or risk a $50 000 fine (s 34(4)). Establish an escalation and legal review process to respond within that timeframe. Where privilege or confidentiality is asserted, prepare a contemporaneous record of the assertion and any legal advice obtained; note that s 36 overrides secrecy duties but provides for evidentiary protection (s 36(2)-(3)).

6. Provide reasonable facilities for authorised persons who enter premises: Occupiers must provide reasonable facilities for authorised persons (s 35(5)); ensure front‑line staff understand how to verify written authority and facilitate access where lawful. Keep a register of authorised persons and written authorities.

7. Manage confidentiality and summary of findings procedures: If a summary of findings is provided under s 25(2), treat it as confidential and limit distribution consistent with s 46(4). Prepare submissions under s 25(2) within the 14‑day window the Auditor General specifies, and ensure internal legal counsel is involved where necessary.

For ministers and the Treasurer

1. Be prepared to respond to consultation requirements: The Auditor General must consult the Treasurer before dispensing with audits under s 14(3). The Treasurer should put in place a structured response process to such consultations.

2. Consider Ministerial advice on public interest non‑disclosure: If material arises that is the subject of a Financial Management Act notice (s 82(1)), the Minister may advise the Auditor General that disclosure is not in the public interest, which will exclude that material from Auditor General reports under s 37. Prepare clear records and reasons when exercising this discretion.

For recipients of Government grants and persons whose accounts may be audited at the Treasurer’s request

1. Expect potential audits and retain supporting documentation: Where the Treasurer requests an audit of a grant recipient’s accounts to verify purpose compliance, the Auditor General may audit such accounts (s 19). Grant recipients should keep clear project‑specific records, budgets and audit trails.

2. Treat directions for production as statutory compulsion: Respond within 14 days to compulsion notices and take legal advice promptly if a claim of privilege is to be asserted, remembering s 36(3) limits admissibility of compelled material.

For OAG and independent auditors

1. For the OAG itself, ensure processes for independent audit are in place: The Auditor General cannot audit the OAG (s 38(1)); the Governor must appoint a registered company auditor (s 38(2)). Ensure the OAG cooperates with the independent auditor, provides records and implements recommendations in line with s 40 and s 41.

2. Maintain strict confidentiality and document retention: OAG employees, persons appointed to assist and the independent auditor must preserve confidentiality of matters they learn during duties (s 46). Implement confidentiality training, strict access controls and documented handling procedures for summaries of findings and draft reports.

For private firms and third parties

1. If entering arrangements with the Auditor General under s 22, understand the limits of statutory compulsion and powers: Audits by arrangement do not carry Part 4 Division 2 powers (s 22(4)), so standard contractual terms should be carefully framed to cover access, document provision, fees and dispute resolution. Negotiate explicit consent and document retention terms in the arrangement.

2. Ensure authorised representatives have written authority: When an authorised person will attend premises, confirm they possess written authority signed by the Auditor General and that staff will ask to see it on request (s 35(6)).

Cross‑cutting compliance controls

1. Legal opinion and privilege management: Establish a protocol to seek timely legal advice when s 34 notices raise privilege or secrecy issues. Remember that the State Solicitor is obliged to provide written opinion when the Auditor General requests one (s 30), and the Act contemplates questions of law can be referred to the State Solicitor by the Auditor General.

2. Document the decision and control chain where subsidiary appointment obligations exist: Where agencies must “exercise control” to ensure auditor appointment in local and foreign subsidiaries (s 16), maintain board minutes, shareholder agreements or other corporate records demonstrating actions taken to meet the statutory obligation.

3. Embed audit responsiveness in governance processes: Board and audit committee charters should include roles for responding to Auditor General requests and for implementing recommendations from Auditor General reports. Because the Auditor General’s reports are laid before Parliament (s 24-26), processes should be in place to brief Ministers and accountable authorities promptly.

4. Keep regulatory watchers informed of uncommenced amendments: The compilation table records uncommenced amendments (Auditor General Amendment Act 2022 and Evidence Act 2025 provisions). Compliance teams should monitor proclamation status and update procedures when those amendments commence.

5. Train staff on confidentiality and penalties: Given the $50 000 fines for confidentiality breaches (s 46) and compulsion failures (s 34), ensure staff handling audits are trained on statutory obligations and the procedural requirements for making submissions under s 25(2).

Checklist for immediate action upon receipt of an Auditor General direction

• Record the date and identity of the authorised person and the content of the direction (s 34).
• Verify written authority on arrival (s 35(6)).
• Gather and preserve requested documents, and create an index of produced material (s 35(2)).
• If privilege or secrecy is asserted, escalate to legal counsel immediately and document the legal basis of any claim, while preparing to comply because s 36(2) overrides other secrecy duties.
• Ensure sworn or affirmed evidence arrangements are handled appropriately if required by the direction (s 34(2)-(3)).
• Ensure submissions in response to any summary of findings are prepared for delivery within the 14‑day window in s 25(2).

All statutory references in this compliance section correspond to the Act text provided. Practitioners should combine the statutory checklist above with firm‑level compliance procedures, internal audit readiness, and dedicated liaison points for the OAG to reduce risk and ensure timely, verifiable compliance.