The Act organises the Attorney-General’s role around a compact set of legal concepts: office-creation, principal functions, expansive functional power, specific litigation powers, reporting obligations, service mechanics, regulation-making, and a mandated review linked to a discrete policy reform package. The text is the authoritative source for each concept and the following unpacks them with section references.

Office and status (s 3-4)

• The Act creates the office (s 3(1)) and specifies how the office is identified among Ministers (s 3(2)). It also places the Attorney-General as the first law officer of the State (s 4). These are structural declarations that set legal and constitutional expectations about who carries responsibilities under this Act and other laws that refer to the Attorney-General.

Principal functions and residual power (s 5; s 6(1))

• The principal functions are threefold: chief legal representative, provider of legal advice to the State, and Ministerial responsibility to Parliament for administration of law and justice (s 5). The Attorney-General is given a residual power to do all things necessary or convenient for these functions (s 6(1)). That combination creates a broad remit while identifying core public-facing duties.

Express litigation, prosecutorial and public-interest powers (s 6(2); s 7)

• The Act explicitly authorises the Attorney-General to start and conduct litigation for the State, the Governor, Ministers, and persons suing or being sued on behalf of the State (s 6(2)). Section 7 lists further powers including presenting indictments, entering nolle prosequi, granting immunities (with a statutory limitation on future acts), making non-use promises about information, enforcing trusts, bringing public-rights proceedings, granting fiats to extend standing, constitutional challenges affecting the State interest, appearing to assist courts, advising on judicial appointments, commencing contempt proceedings in the public interest, and applying for judicial review. The Criminal Code is specifically referenced regarding presentation and entry of nolle prosequi where relevant (s 7(1)(a)(b) note).

Limits and clarifications (s 7(2)-(3))

• The Attorney-General may not direct or instruct the Director of Public Prosecutions to present an indictment or enter a nolle prosequi (s 7(2)). The Act also clarifies that the Attorney-General may not grant immunity for a future act or omission, and that listing a matter in s 7 does not by itself make it an administrative decision under an enactment solely because it appears in the list (s 7(3)).

Retention of common law and other statutory powers (s 8-9)

• The Attorney-General retains the common law, equitable and traditional functions and prerogatives (s 8). Additional statutory functions or powers granted under this or other Acts are preserved and do not limit other authorities under the Act (s 9).

Relator fiats and transparency (s 9A-10)

• The Act requires relator applications for fiats to be made in the manner prescribed by regulation (s 9A). If an application for a fiat to enforce public rights is refused, or not granted within 60 days, the Attorney-General must prepare and table a report in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days setting out the nature of the application, the alleged breach, and reasons for the refusal or failure (s 10).

Reporting on prosecution decisions (s 11)

• Where the Attorney-General starts a prosecution that later ends in acquittal, conviction (with appeal periods expired or appeal finally decided), or where the Attorney-General enters a nolle prosequi, the Attorney-General must prepare and table a report in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days explaining the circumstances and reasons for the decision (s 11). The definition of convicted includes acceptance of a plea or finding of guilt regardless of whether a conviction is recorded (s 11(3)).

Administrative mechanics: service, regulation, and review (s 12-14)

• Documents required to be served on the Attorney-General under other Acts may be given to the chief executive (s 12). The Governor in Council may make regulations under the Act (s 13). The Attorney-General must ensure a statutory review of the operation and effectiveness of a set of legislative amendments arising from the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce recommendations, to start as soon as practicable five years after commencement and to consider specified topics; the Attorney-General determines the terms of reference and must table the review report (s 14).

Together these concepts create an architecture where the Attorney-General has broad common law and statutory authority to act for the State in legal matters, explicit powers in prosecutorial and public-interest litigation domains, and specific transparency duties to Parliament for relator fiat outcomes and prosecution decisions. The Act also centralises some procedural discretion (for example in the terms of reference for the s 14 review and regulation-prescribed application methods under s 9A) while setting time frames for reporting (60 days for fiat decisions and three sitting days for tabling reports under ss 10-11).

The Act's provisions reach a range of public and private actors by assigning functions, limiting authority, and imposing reporting and procedural obligations. The principal groups affected, and the mechanisms that connect obligations to those groups, are:

• The Attorney-General and Ministers: The Act creates the office (s 3) and defines the Attorney-General’s principal functions (s 5). Ministers who are designated as Attorney-General or Minister for Justice and Attorney-General by the Governor assume the role (s 3(2)). A Minister automatically becomes Attorney-General if no designation is made (s 3(2) second limb). The Attorney-General’s role of being responsible to Parliament for law and justice administration (s 5(c)) imposes political and parliamentary accountability on whoever occupies the office.

• The State, Governor and other Ministers: The Attorney-General may start and conduct litigation for the State, the Governor and a Minister (s 6(2)). Those public entities are direct beneficiaries of the Attorney-General’s litigation power and are affected by decisions to commence, conduct or discontinue proceedings (s 6(2), s 7).

• Persons suing or being sued on behalf of the State: The Attorney-General may start and conduct litigation for a person suing or being sued on behalf of the State (s 6(2)). That creates a pathway for the State’s legal representation to engage in such matters.

• Relators and entities without standing: Section 7(1)(g) empowers the Attorney-General to grant fiats enabling entities that otherwise would not have standing to start or continue proceedings in the Attorney-General’s name, to enforce charitable and public trusts and to enforce and protect public rights. Section 9A requires the application for such a fiat to be made in the way prescribed by regulation. Those seeking relator fiats are affected by the procedure, the 60-day clock in s 10, and the reporting requirement if refused or not decided within 60 days (s 10).

• Persons subject to prosecution and to prosecutorial decisions: The Attorney-General may present indictments and enter nolle prosequi (s 7(1)(a)-(b)). Where the Attorney-General presents an indictment and the matter later ends (acquittal, conviction and appeal period expiry, final appeal decision, or other end), or where the Attorney-General enters a nolle prosequi, the Attorney-General must table a report explaining the circumstances and reasons within three sitting days (s 11). Defendants, victims, and wider public interests are affected by both the exercise of those powers and the transparency obligations that follow.

• The Director of Public Prosecutions: Section 7(2) states the Attorney-General may not direct or instruct the Director of Public Prosecutions to present an indictment or enter a nolle prosequi. This affects the institutional relationship by drawing a statutory boundary between the Attorney-General’s personal powers under s 7(1)(a)-(b) and any direction to the DPP.

• Courts and tribunals: The Attorney-General may appear before a court to help the court in appropriate cases (s 7(1)(i)), commence contempt proceedings in the public interest (s 7(1)(k)), and apply for judicial review to correct errors by courts and tribunals (s 7(1)(l)). Courts are therefore affected both as forums where the Attorney-General may appear and as institutions subject to review applications brought by the Attorney-General.

• Chief executive(s) of relevant departments: For service of documents that must be served on the Attorney-General under other Acts, the Act allows the document to be given to the chief executive (s 12). This affects administrative practice and who receives statutory notices.

• Parliament and its members: The Attorney-General must table reports under ss 10 and 11 within three sitting days in the Legislative Assembly. Parliament (and through it, Parliament’s scrutiny processes) is an intended recipient of that transparency mechanism.

• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and victims and perpetrators of sexual and domestic violence: These groups are singled out as subjects the s 14 review must consider when examining the effects of specific legislative amendments made in response to the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce (s 14(3)(b)-(d)). The review’s terms of reference are to be set by the Attorney-General (s 14(2)), and the Attorney-General must table the review report (s 14(4)).

• Administrative and regulatory actors: The Governor in Council has the power to make regulations under the Act (s 13), which affects how details such as the relator application method (s 9A) will be prescribed and operationalised.

Who pays and who decides

• The Act places decision-making authority with the Attorney-General for functions set out in ss 5-7 and for determining terms of reference and ensuring the s 14 review (s 14(2)). The Act does not prescribe the funding source for those activities; it delegates design and decision responsibilities to the Attorney-General and the Governor in Council for regulations (s 13). The reporting and review tasks create administrative costs for the Attorney-General’s office and likely for agencies that support it (for example, preparing tabling documents), although the Act does not specify appropriation or staffing arrangements.

Substitution and institutional effects

• The ability to grant fiats under s 7(1)(g) shifts standing in particular public-interest litigation matters from litigants to the Attorney-General’s enabling fiat, thereby changing who litigates in the Attorney-General’s name. The separate prohibition on directing the DPP (s 7(2)) preserves a formal separation between the Attorney-General’s powers under this Act and the DPP’s exercise of prosecutorial functions.

Overall, the Act affects the Attorney-General as decision-maker, public entities as potential parties to litigation, relator applicants and would-be litigants who lack standing, accused persons and victims through prosecutorial choices and reporting, the DPP through a statutory non-direction rule, courts through litigation and review powers, chief executives through service mechanics, and Parliament by receipt of reports.

This Act establishes specific duties the Attorney-General must perform, and it confers rights and powers on the Attorney-General. The statutory text provides clear functional duties, timeframes, and substantive rights; these are set out with section references and practical implications.

Principal duties (statutory obligations)

• Ministerial responsibility to Parliament: The Attorney-General has a duty to be the Minister responsible to the Parliament for the administration of law and justice in the State (s 5(c)). That creates an ongoing political and statutory duty to report to Parliament and to assist in legislative and administrative oversight.
• Reporting on relator fiat applications: If an application for a fiat to enforce or protect a public right is refused, or not granted within 60 days after application, the Attorney-General must prepare a report detailing the nature of the application, the alleged breach of public right, and the reasons for refusal or failure to grant the fiat, and table it in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days after the refusal or end of the 60-day period (s 10). This is a time-limited statutory duty with a specific content requirement.
• Reporting on prosecutorial decisions: Where the Attorney-General presents an indictment and the prosecution process ends in acquittal, conviction with appeal periods expired or appeal finally decided, or otherwise ends, or where the Attorney-General enters a nolle prosequi, the Attorney-General must prepare a report outlining the circumstances and reasons for the decision, and table it in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days after that event (s 11). The statute defines "convicted" broadly to include plea acceptance or findings of guilt whether or not a conviction is recorded (s 11(3)). The duty is triggered by particular prosecutorial events.

Statutory rights and powers (what the Attorney-General may do)

• Residual powers: The Attorney-General "has power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the Attorney-General’s functions" (s 6(1)). This is a broad functional empowerment that supports exercise of functions listed elsewhere.
• Litigation powers: The Attorney-General may start and conduct litigation for the State, the Governor, a Minister, and a person suing or being sued on behalf of the State (s 6(2)). This gives the office the right to initiate and conduct litigation on behalf of those actors.
• Prosecutorial and related powers: The Attorney-General may present an indictment and enter nolle prosequi (s 7(1)(a)-(b)). The Criminal Code is referenced where applicable. The Attorney-General may grant immunities from prosecution (s 7(1)(c)), but the Act expressly declares the Attorney-General may not grant immunity for a future act or omission (s 7(3)(a)).
• Non-use undertakings: The Attorney-General may undertake to a person not to use, or make derivative use of, information or a thing against the person in a proceeding, except concerning the falsity of evidence given by the person (s 7(1)(d)). This is a constrained non-use promise with a clear carve-out for false evidence.
• Public-interest litigation tools: The Attorney-General may enforce charitable and public trusts, bring proceedings to enforce and protect public rights, and grant fiats to enable entities without standing to start or continue proceedings in the Attorney-General’s name for those purposes (s 7(1)(e)-(g)).
• Constitutional and court assistance roles: The Attorney-General may challenge the constitutional validity of legislation affecting the State's public interest, appear before a court to assist the court in appropriate cases, advise the Executive Council on judicial appointments, commence contempt proceedings in the public interest, and apply for judicial review to correct errors by courts and tribunals (s 7(1)(h)-(l)).

Statutory limits and clarifications

• Non-direction to the DPP: Despite the Attorney-General’s power to present indictments and enter nolle prosequi, the Attorney-General may not direct or instruct the Director of Public Prosecutions to present an indictment or enter a nolle prosequi (s 7(2)). That is an express limitation on the exercise of influence over the DPP.
• Non-future immunity: The Attorney-General may not grant immunity for a future act or omission (s 7(3)(a)). That narrows the scope of immunity decisions to existing or past conduct.
• Not administrative decisions by virtue of listing: The Act declares that a decision or proposed decision to exercise a power for a matter listed in s 7 is not a decision of an administrative character under an enactment merely because the matter is listed (s 7(3)(b)). That affects procedural characterisation for administrative law purposes and may influence reviewability and statutory administrative processes.

Procedural duties related to method and transparency

• Relator application method: Applications for a fiat under s 7(1)(g) must be made in the way prescribed by regulation (s 9A). That imposes a procedural compliance duty on applicants.
• Service mechanics: Where another Act requires service on or giving to the Attorney-General, service may be satisfied by giving the document to the chief executive (s 12). This is a duty on other agencies and private parties to recognise service to the chief executive as effective.

Review obligation

• Review of Taskforce-driven amendments: The Attorney-General must ensure a review is carried out into the operation and effectiveness of a specific set of amendments made following the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce recommendations. The Attorney-General determines the terms of reference, the review must start as soon as practicable five years after commencement and consider outcomes and effects on victims, perpetrators and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and must be tabled once completed (s 14). This is a statutory duty to oversee and table a bounded public policy review.

Who bears responsibilities and rights

• The Act places decision rights primarily with the Attorney-General and procedural rights with relator applicants to apply under prescribed regulation. The reporting duties allocate a public accountability obligation to the Attorney-General to Parliament. The Attorney-General’s powers create rights to act in litigation and prosecutorial domains, while limited by non-direction to the DPP and the non-future immunity rule.

Practical implication

• Together these duties create compliance obligations for the Attorney-General’s office in record-keeping, reporting, and conducting reviews, and impose procedural obligations on relator applicants and on those who must serve documents on the Attorney-General under other Acts. The actial text sets clear triggers (60 days, three sitting days, five years) and defines content requirements for some of those reports (s 10; s 11; s 14).

The Act does not create criminal penalties or civil fines for non-compliance with most of its requirements; enforcement mechanisms are predominantly procedural, political and judicial. The statutory enforcement architecture is composed of the following elements set out in the text.

No expressed penal regime in this Act

• The Act does not prescribe penalties, fines or criminal offences for failure to perform the duties it imposes, such as the tabling obligations in ss 10 and 11 or the duty to ensure the s 14 review. There is no stated sanction in the Act for non-compliance with reporting or review tabling obligations.

Parliamentary accountability as enforcement mechanism

• The primary enforcement mode for reporting duties is political and parliamentary. The Attorney-General is required to table reports in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days under ss 10 and 11. Failure to table those reports as required would therefore engage parliamentary scrutiny, ministerial accountability and the political consequences associated with non-compliance. The Act makes Parliament the direct recipient of the mandated reports rather than establishing a statutory penalty for failure to comply.

Judicial enforcement and litigation powers

• The Act does not prevent judicial scrutiny of the Attorney-General’s exercise of powers where judicial processes exist, but it contains an express declaration that a decision or proposed decision to exercise a power listed in s 7 is not a decision of an administrative character under an enactment merely because it is listed (s 7(3)(b)). That textual provision may affect whether certain decisions are characterised as administrative decisions subject to specific administrative decision-making procedures or review mechanisms under other enactments. The Act itself, however, preserves the Attorney-General’s ability to apply for judicial review (s 7(1)(l)) to correct errors by courts and tribunals and to challenge the constitutional validity of legislation (s 7(1)(h)). Those are affirmative litigation powers rather than enforcement mechanisms for compliance with the Act.

Powers to commence contempt or prosecutorial proceedings

• The Attorney-General may start proceedings for contempt of court in the public interest (s 7(1)(k)). That is an enforcement power in relation to the courts and court orders, not an enforcement tool for the Act’s reporting obligations. The Attorney-General may also present indictments and enter nolle prosequi (s 7(1)(a)-(b)), and grant immunities (s 7(1)(c)); these are prosecutorial rights rather than statutory enforcement sanctions for non-compliance with the Act.

Administrative enforcement via regulations

• The Governor in Council may make regulations under the Act (s 13). Regulations can create procedural requirements, including the way relator applications must be made (s 9A). The Act does not state whether regulations may prescribe penalties for breaches of regulation; however any regulatory penalty would need authorisation consistent with the empowering provision in s 13 and applicable legislative drafting conventions.

Public transparency as a compliance incentive

• The statutory requirement to table reports within three sitting days is a transparency and accountability device. The reputational and parliamentary consequences of failing to comply can act as practical enforcement against non-performance of duties even though the Act contains no express criminal or civil penalties for breach.

Who enforces and who monitors

• Parliament is the primary monitor and forum of consequence for the statutory reporting obligations because it is the place where reports must be tabled. Judicial avenues may remain open for legal challenges that impinge on rights (for example, where the Attorney-General’s exercise of litigation or prosecutorial powers raises justiciable legal issues), but the Act narrows the administrative character of s 7 decisions for some purposes (s 7(3)(b)).

Summary of enforcement picture

• Enforcement is largely non-penal and operates through ministerial accountability, parliamentary scrutiny and the ordinary operation of the courts for justiciable matters. The Attorney-General’s own litigation powers include starting contempt and criminal proceedings, but the Act relies primarily on transparency (reporting) and public-political oversight to enforce compliance with its procedural obligations rather than statutory penalties.

The Act is both self-contained in its articulation of the Attorney-General’s role and constructed to operate alongside existing criminal, administrative and statutory frameworks. The text explicitly references and preserves interaction with common law, other Acts, and the Criminal Code, and proposes mechanisms for service, regulation and review that depend on external instruments.

Preservation of common law and other statutory powers (s 8-9)

• The Act preserves the Attorney-General’s common law, equity, traditional and usage-based functions, prerogatives and privileges (s 8). It also states that additional functions and powers conferred on the Attorney-General under this Act or another Act remain available and do not limit other functions or powers (s 9). The effect is that the Act sits alongside and does not displace other statutory or common law authorities held by the Attorney-General.

Criminal Code interaction (s 7(1)(a)(b) note)

• The Act’s specific powers to present an indictment and to enter nolle prosequi carry a note referencing the Criminal Code (s 7(1)(a)(b) note). That signals the procedural context in which those powers must operate and indicates that Criminal Code provisions will be relevant to the conduct of indictments and nolle prosequi proceedings.

Non-direction to the Director of Public Prosecutions (s 7(2))

• The Act expressly prevents the Attorney-General from directing or instructing the Director of Public Prosecutions to present an indictment or enter a nolle prosequi (s 7(2)). This creates a statutory relationship between the Attorney-General and the DPP governed by a non-direction principle for those prosecutorial acts. Interaction with other statutes that confer powers on the DPP will therefore be shaped by this constraint, preserving the DPP’s institutional independence in certain respects, while the Attorney-General retains personal powers to present indictments (s 7(1)(a)) and enter nolle prosequi (s 7(1)(b)).

Administrative law consequences (s 7(3)(b))

• The Act declares that a decision or proposed decision to exercise a power listed in s 7 is not, merely because it is listed, a decision of an administrative character under an enactment (s 7(3)(b)). This limits the automatic application of administrative decision frameworks, procedural statutes or statutory merit-review regimes that apply specifically to administrative decisions. Where other enactments define administrative decision-making and attach statutory rights or processes, the characterisation of Attorney-General decisions under this Act may affect reviewability and applicable procedural requirements.

Service provisions and other Acts (s 12)

• For documents required by other Acts to be served on or given to the Attorney-General, service can be effected by giving the document to the chief executive (s 12). That alters service practice for other statutory regimes by validating service on a departmental chief executive as service on the Attorney-General.

Regulation-making and delegated instruments (s 13; s 9A)

• The Governor in Council may make regulations under the Act (s 13). Section 9A requires relator applications for fiats to be made in the way prescribed under a regulation. That delegated instrument will therefore interact with procedural requirements in other statutes and with administrative practice. How broadly regulations are drafted will shape cross-Act interactions, for example by establishing standardised application forms or timeframes complementary to other regimes.

Interaction with the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce amendment package (s 14)

• Section 14 requires the Attorney-General to ensure a review into the operation and effectiveness of a set of named legislative amendments made in response to the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce (2021). The Acts and amendments listed in s 14(1)(a)-(e) will therefore be subject to a statutory review process whose terms of reference are to be determined by the Attorney-General (s 14(2)). The review must examine the outcomes and effects of those amendments on victims, perpetrators, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and whether the amendments operate as intended (s 14(3)). That makes the Attorney-General the coordinating statutory node for policy evaluation across several distinct legislative instruments.

Judicial review and constitutional challenges (s 7(1)(h),(l))

• The Attorney-General has an express power to challenge the constitutional validity of legislation that affects the public interest in the State (s 7(1)(h)) and to apply for judicial review to correct errors by courts and tribunals (s 7(1)(l)). Those powers interact with constitutional law and administrative law frameworks and can lead to litigation that impacts the interpretation and operation of other statutes.

Implications for other agencies and parties

• Agencies that must serve documents on the Attorney-General under other Acts will have a simplified route via the chief executive (s 12). Relator applicants must follow the method prescribed by regulation (s 9A), and the Attorney-General’s tabling duties (ss 10-11) create an inter-branch interaction where the executive must inform Parliament about certain prosecutorial and relator decisions. Regulation-making will likely shape procedural harmonisation with other Acts (s 13).

Summary

• The Act is drafted to preserve and operate alongside common law powers and other statutory provisions, to interact with the Criminal Code on prosecutions, to protect DPP independence on certain prosecutorial acts, to limit the automatic administrative character of some Attorney-General decisions, and to centralise responsibility for review of a complex package of Taskforce-derived amendments. The regulation power and the service provision (s 12) are the primary delegated-instrument touchpoints that will determine many practical cross-Act interactions.

The text includes internal amendment annotations that identify particular statutory changes and insertions. Those annotations are the only source-provided evidence of amendment history; the Act’s text confirms some amendments by date and session references. Extracting and sequencing those amendments as given in the source yields the following summary.

Noted amendments and insertions in the provided text

• s 5 amendment (2023 No. 23 s 28): The text includes an annotation "s 5 amd 2023 No. 23 s 28" adjacent to the principal functions provision. This indicates s 5 was amended by Act number 23 of 2023, section 28. The consolidated text lists the three principal functions in s 5: being the State’s chief legal representative; giving legal advice to the State; and being the Minister responsible to the Parliament for the administration of law and justice in the State (s 5).
• s 7 amendment (2023 No. 23 s 29): Section 7 carries the annotation "s 7 amd 2023 No. 23 s 29". The statutory list in s 7 includes explicit powers (present indictment; enter nolle prosequi; grant immunities; undertake non-use of information except for falsity; enforce trusts; bring public-rights proceedings; grant fiats; challenge constitutional validity; appear to assist courts; advise on judicial appointments; start contempt proceedings; apply for judicial review). The annotation shows s 7 was amended by Act number 23 of 2023, section 29.
• s 9A insertion (2002 No. 34 s 4): The presence of "s 9A ins 2002 No. 34 s 4" indicates that s 9A (Relator application) was inserted by Act 34 of 2002, section 4. The provision requires relator fiat applications be made in the way prescribed by regulation (s 9A).
• s 10 amendment (2023 No. 23 s 30): Section 10 shows "s 10 amd 2023 No. 23 s 30", indicating amendment by Act number 23 of 2023 section 30. Section 10 imposes the reporting duty where a relator fiat application is refused or not granted within 60 days.
• s 14 insertion (2024 No. 48 s 4): Section 14 carries the annotation "s 14 ins 2024 No. 48 s 4", indicating section 14 (Review of amendments made in response to recommendations of the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce) was inserted by Act number 48 of 2024, section 4.

Internal cross-references and consolidated text

• The Act’s body integrates those amendments in its consolidated language (for example s 5, s 7, s 10, s 9A and s 14 reflect the amended or inserted text). The annotations identify the instrument responsible for the change and the relevant section number of that instrument, but the full titles and operative dates of those amending Acts are not fully reproduced in the provided text except where s 14 lists specific enactments to be reviewed.

What the annotations do not provide

• The source text does not include commencement dates for the amendments beyond annotation identifiers; it does not include the full schedules or amending Act texts that explain the precise changes or transitional provisions beyond the consolidated wording. The Act’s preliminary clause (s 2) states the Act commences on a day fixed by proclamation, but the provided text does not specify when the amending Acts’ provisions took effect in practice.

Practical significance of recorded amendments

• The recorded amendments show legislative activity in 2002, 2023 and 2024 that affected the Attorney-General’s role. The 2002 insertion (s 9A) formalised the relator application method requirement by regulation. The 2023 amendments appear to clarify and re-state principal functions of the Attorney-General (s 5), expand and set limits on the Attorney-General’s litigation and prosecutorial powers (s 7), and add reporting obligations concerning relator fiats (s 10). The 2024 insertion (s 14) added a statutory review obligation connected to a package of reforms arising from the Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce.

Limitations on further amendment history

• The provided text does not list earlier amending Acts other than those annotated, nor does it provide a full legislative history or explanatory memoranda. For a comprehensive record of amendments and their precise operative dates, one must consult the official statute compilation or the Parliamentary Counsel’s consolidated Act with amendment notes; the annotations here give specific amendment identifiers that can be used to locate those instruments (for instance 2023 No. 23 s 28-30 and 2024 No. 48 s 4).

The Act text supplied contains no references to litigation history, reported decisions, or judicial interpretations of its provisions. The source does not name any cases, nor does it include citations to judicial authorities applying or construing the Act. Given that omission, the following points reflect only the content of the Act and its implications for potential litigation, without asserting any actual litigation record.

No cases or judicial decisions cited in the text

• The Act as provided contains no case law, judicial notes, or references to litigation outcomes under its provisions. It does not list decisions interpreting the non-direction rule, the scope of the Attorney-General’s power to present indictments, or the operation of relator fiats and the reporting obligations.

Potential loci for future litigation (based on statutory design)

• Characterisation of Attorney-General decisions: Section 7(3)(b) declares that a decision or proposed decision to exercise a power listed in s 7 is not, merely because it is listed, "a decision of an administrative character under an enactment". This statutory declaration may be a focal point for litigation concerning the reviewability of those decisions under administrative law regimes. Courts may be asked to determine whether a particular exercise of an Attorney-General power is amenable to judicial review despite the statutory statement.
• Non-direction to the DPP: Section 7(2) creates a potential locus for legal questions about the boundary between the Attorney-General’s personal prosecutorial powers and the DPP’s statutory functions. Litigation could arise where alleged interference or direction is asserted, or where the practical consequences of prosecutorial action implicate institutional relationships between the Attorney-General and the DPP.
• Relator fiats and standing: Section 7(1)(g) and s 9A, with s 10’s reporting obligation, could generate litigation about the content and sufficiency of a fiat, or procedural fairness in the handling of relator applications if the regulation-prescribed procedure is challenged. Litigation might also test the scope of the Attorney-General’s discretion in granting or refusing fiats.

Enforcement-related litigation

• Judicial review or constitutional challenges instituted by the Attorney-General under s 7(1)(h) and (l) may touch on other laws and could produce case law that incidentally construes the Attorney-General’s powers under this Act, but the source contains no record of such litigation.

Contempt and prosecutorial proceedings

• The Attorney-General may start contempt proceedings (s 7(1)(k)) and present indictments (s 7(1)(a)). Any case arising from such an exercise of power could result in judicial rulings relevant to the Act’s operation, but no such litigation is recorded in the source text.

Summary

• The provided text contains no litigation history. It does, however, create statutory constructs that are plausible candidates for future litigation (administrative character and reviewability of s 7 decisions, the non-direction boundary with the DPP, procedural challenges to relator application processes and fiat decisions, and the content or timeliness of constitutionally or publicly significant prosecutorial choices). Absent case citations in this source, no assertion about litigated outcomes can be made from the Act text itself.

Several structural and drafting features of the Act create practical pitfalls for practitioners, officials and applicants. The following are concrete points that flow directly from the text and that can create unintended operational consequences if not attended to.

1. Relator fiat procedure is regulation-dependent (s 9A)

• Section 9A requires that an application for the Attorney-General’s fiat under s 7(1)(g) "must be made to the Attorney-General in the way prescribed under a regulation". Until the relevant regulations are promulgated and known, relator applicants risk making applications that do not comply with the prescribed method. Practitioners should not assume an informal or letter-based application will suffice; compliance requires checking the current regulations under the Act.

2. The 60-day clock triggers mandatory parliamentary reporting (s 10)

• If a fiat application is refused, or if the fiat is not granted within 60 days after application, the Attorney-General must prepare and table a report in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days after refusal or the end of the 60 days (s 10). The "60 days" is a hard statutory trigger for reporting. Applicants should be aware that delay in processing by the Attorney-General’s office will create a statutory obligation to explain the delay publicly in Parliament, which may affect strategic decisions about publicising applications.

3. Tabling obligations are tied to "sitting days" (ss 10-11)

• The requirement to table reports within three sitting days under ss 10 and 11 ties timing to Parliament’s sitting schedule rather than calendar days. In practice, the distinction can extend the real-world time between an event and tabling if Parliament is not sitting; alternatively, if Parliament is in session, the statutory duty imposes a short reporting window that requires rapid document preparation. Administrative processes must be ready to meet the three sitting day requirement.

4. Non-direction to the DPP does not remove Attorney-General prosecutorial powers (s 7(1)(a)-(b), s 7(2))

• The Act allows the Attorney-General personally to present indictments and enter nolle prosequi (s 7(1)(a)-(b)) but prohibits directing the Director of Public Prosecutions to do so (s 7(2)). This duality can create confusion about who acts in practice. Practitioners should verify whether a prosecution action is being taken by the Attorney-General personally or by the DPP to understand procedural rights, disclosure obligations and appeal routes.

5. Immunity power cannot be granted for future acts (s 7(3)(a))

• The Attorney-General may grant immunities from prosecution (s 7(1)(c)) but the Act declares the Attorney-General may not grant immunity for a future act or omission (s 7(3)(a)). Parties seeking assurances about future conduct cannot obtain prospective immunity under this statutory power. Any negotiated immunity must therefore relate to existing or past conduct.

6. Non-use undertaking exceptions (s 7(1)(d))

• The Attorney-General may undertake not to use, or make derivative use of, information or a thing against a person in a proceeding, but that undertaking excludes use "in relation to the falsity of evidence given by the person in a proceeding" (s 7(1)(d)). A party seeking such an undertaking must understand this explicit limitation, which may limit the practical protection offered.

7. Statutory declaration about administrative character may affect reviewability (s 7(3)(b))

• The Act states that listing a matter in s 7 does not make it a decision of an administrative character merely because it is listed (s 7(3)(b)). That may complicate applications for judicial review or for procedural rights that attach to "administrative decisions" under other legislation. Practitioners should consider carefully whether a particular Attorney-General decision falls within administrative law frameworks despite the statutory declaration.

8. Service on the Attorney-General via chief executive (s 12)

• Section 12 allows service required under another Act to be effected by giving the document to the chief executive. Parties attempting to serve documents should verify which chief executive is appropriate for the relevant matter and ensure proof of service is robust. Misidentifying the appropriate departmental chief executive could lead to disputed service.

9. The Attorney-General’s review power terms of reference are internally determined (s 14(2))

• The Act requires a review of specific amendments to start as soon as practicable five years after commencement (s 14(3)(a)) and to consider listed topics (s 14(3)(b)-(d)). However, the Attorney-General "must determine the terms of reference of the review" (s 14(2)). This centralises agenda-setting with the Attorney-General, which can shape scope and methodology. Stakeholders expecting an externally designed or independently run review should note the statutory allocation of this design power.

10. No penalties for failure to table reports (ss 10-11)

• Although ss 10 and 11 create clear obligations to prepare and table reports, the Act includes no stated penalties for failure to comply. Enforcement therefore relies on parliamentary scrutiny and political mechanisms. Parties seeking remedies for non-compliance will need to consider parliamentary or constitutional avenues rather than statutory sanctions.

11. Timing ambiguity about commencement (s 2)

• The Act commences "on a day to be fixed by proclamation" (s 2). For provisions tied to commencement (for example, the s 14 five-year review start date), stakeholders must ascertain the proclamation date(s) to compute statutory timeframes accurately.

12. Overlapping functions with other statutes

• The Act preserves other statutory powers conferred on the Attorney-General (s 9). Practitioners should map overlapping provisions across other Acts to identify which power is exercised under which statutory head and what procedural rules apply.

Practitioners, applicants and officials should treat these points as concrete compliance risks that require confirmatory checks: identify the relevant regulation under s 9A, verify the Governor in Council regulation instrument, confirm departmental chief executive details for service, determine the proclamation commencement date, and ensure internal processes can meet three sitting day tabling obligations.

For officials, legal advisers, relator applicants, departments and practitioners engaging with matters under this Act, compliance requires attention to procedural detail, timeframes and the distinction between the Attorney-General’s personal powers and the DPP’s functions. The following is a practical, source-grounded checklist with steps and references.

1. Confirm the Attorney-General and commencement dates (s 2; s 3)

• Verify which Minister has been designated by the Governor as Attorney-General or Minister for Justice and Attorney-General (s 3(2)), or whether the default Minister is acting as Attorney-General. Confirm the Act’s proclamation commencement date (s 2) and any proclamation dates for amending Acts so statutory timeframes (for example the five-year review in s 14) can be accurately calculated.

2. Understand which powers are available and who exercises them (ss 5-7)

• Map the Attorney-General’s principal functions (s 5) and the broad "necessary or convenient" residual power (s 6(1)). Where litigation or prosecutorial action is contemplated, distinguish whether action will be taken by the Attorney-General personally under s 7(1)(a)-(b) or by the Director of Public Prosecutions, remembering the statutory prohibition on directing the DPP (s 7(2)). If advice or litigation is required, identify the relevant power and its statutory limits (for example, immunities may not be granted for future acts under s 7(3)(a)).

3. For relator fiat applicants: follow the regulation-prescribed method and expect a 60-day decision window (s 9A; s 10)

• Prepare and lodge any application for a fiat under s 7(1)(g) in the manner prescribed by regulation (s 9A). Before applying, obtain and follow the current regulations under the Act. Track the 60-day period from lodgement carefully; if the Attorney-General refuses the application or fails to grant a fiat within 60 days, Parliament will receive a detailed report within three sitting days (s 10). Applicants should assemble full material to reduce risk of delay and should consider whether public or parliamentary timing consequences are relevant to strategy.

4. For the Attorney-General’s office: prepare internal processes for timely tabling (ss 10-11)

• The Attorney-General must prepare and table reports in the Legislative Assembly within three sitting days after the event triggering the duty under ss 10 or 11. Establish internal workflows and templates to gather required content: factual description of the application or prosecution, the alleged breach of a public right (s 10(2)(a)(ii)), the circumstances and reasons for prosecution or nolle prosequi decisions (s 11(2)(a)), and legal rationale where appropriate. Ensure liaison with Parliamentary Services to effect timely tabling on sitting days.

5. For accused persons and defence counsel: monitor for Attorney-General involvement and tabling obligations (s 11)

• Where the Attorney-General presents an indictment or enters a nolle prosequi, clients should monitor the case for the tabling trigger in s 11. Defence counsel should note the reporting obligation and prepare for potential parliamentary scrutiny that may follow the tabling of the Attorney-General’s report.

6. For agencies required to serve documents on the Attorney-General: use the chief executive route (s 12)

• When another Act requires service on the Attorney-General, serve the document on the appropriate chief executive to effect valid service (s 12). Keep proof of service, and ensure the recipient is the correct chief executive responsible for that particular matter.

7. For those seeking immunities or non-use undertakings: account for statutory limitations (s 7(1)(c)-(d); s 7(3)(a))

• If seeking an immunity from prosecution, understand the statutory bar on immunising future acts or omissions (s 7(3)(a)). Where a non-use undertaking is sought, be clear that the undertaking excludes use in relation to falsity of evidence given by the person (s 7(1)(d)). Draft and negotiate any undertakings with those restrictions expressly reflected.

8. For stakeholders covered by the s 14 review: prepare submissions and evidence, and note the Attorney-General sets terms (s 14)

• The Attorney-General must determine the terms of reference for the s 14 review and ensure the review starts as soon as practicable five years after commencement (s 14(2)-(3)(a)). Interested parties (victims’ groups, legal services, Indigenous organisations, service providers) should monitor the proclamation and the timing for the five-year start, seek the terms of reference once published, and prepare evidence addressing the statutory review topics: outcomes of the amendments, effects on victims and perpetrators, effects on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and whether the amendments operate as intended (s 14(3)(b)-(d)). Be ready to provide empirical, qualitative and jurisdictional evidence tied to those specific questions.

9. Watch regulations and delegated instruments (s 13)

• The Governor in Council will make regulations under the Act (s 13). Practitioners must review those regulations for procedural requirements, definitions, and any operational detail that affects relator applications, forms of service, or other processes. Regulations may be the vehicle for procedural detail not specified in the Act.

10. For internal legal units advising the Attorney-General: document decision-making carefully given non-administrative character clause (s 7(3)(b))

• Although the Act declares s 7 decisions are not administrative merely because they are listed, decision-making should still be recorded with clear reasoning and retention of supporting materials. That will facilitate transparency and help respond to parliamentary tabling duties under ss 10-11, and to any legal challenge that questions the character or reasonableness of a decision.

11. For parliamentary staff and media: understand the three sitting day window

• Parliamentary staff should coordinate with the Attorney-General’s office to schedule and circulate tabling documents within the three sitting day requirement. Media teams and stakeholders should anticipate public disclosure of the ministerial reports when the statutory triggers are met.

12. For the Director of Public Prosecutions: maintain institutional boundaries

• The DPP should maintain prosecutorial independence in line with s 7(2). Internal memoranda and practice directions should make clear the distinctions between prosecutions initiated by the DPP and actions taken personally by the Attorney-General, and records should document any communications with the Attorney-General’s office consistent with that separation.

13. Keep records of commencement and amendment exercise

• Because several provisions and review timeframes are tied to commencement, maintain a log of proclamation dates for the Act and for relevant amendments (for example the 2023 and 2024 amendments indicated in the annotated text). This will ensure accurate computation of the five-year review start date (s 14(3)(a)) and enable timely compliance with reporting and review obligations.

Operational checklist for practitioners and clients

• Before applying for a fiat: confirm the current regulation method (s 9A), gather comprehensive evidence of the public right to be enforced, and consider timing implications (s 10).
• For prosecutions and indictments: check whether the file is an Attorney-General matter or a DPP matter (s 7(1)(a),(b); s 7(2)), and prepare for possible tabling of a report in Parliament if the prosecution ends (s 11).
• For document service: use the chief executive route and retain service proof (s 12).
• For submissions to the s 14 review: prepare evidence targeted to statutory review topics and monitor the terms of reference set by the Attorney-General (s 14(2)-(3)).

Following these steps will align practice with the Act’s statutory demands and reduce the risk of procedural missteps that could have parliamentary, reputational or legal consequences.